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Abstract 
This thesis examines the reasons, methods, and implications of the legal reforms in Turkey’s 
corporate governance framework. The mainstream model of corporate governance that is based 
on the shareholder primacy theory, which currently enjoys global hegemony, holds that the 
purpose of the company is to maximize shareholder wealth. Its critics argue that corporate 
governance should also pursue stakeholder interests, including societal interests. The thesis 
moves beyond these debates by analysing the recent reforms in Turkey, an emerging market, 
from a socio-legal perspective to determine whether Turkish corporate governance laws have 
conformed to the mainstream model. This research’s unique contribution to the body of 
knowledge lies in its inter-disciplinary and critical approach in its examination of Turkish 
corporate governance laws. 
 
The thesis begins by exploring the process by which the shareholder primacy theory gained 
prominence alongside the rise of neoliberal ideology. It illustrates how this theory has been 
disseminated outside the Anglo-American context through the promotion of ‘universal’ 
corporate governance standards. It finds that Turkey has conformed to the mainstream model 
as evidenced by the alignment of its corporate governance laws with the OECD Principles. 
Nevertheless, while Turkish companies are characterised by concentrated ownership with 
family owners in control, the mainstream model is derived from an Anglo-American system of 
wide share dispersal that reduces corporate governance to an agency problem of aligning the 
interests of managers and shareholders. In this context, the research employs a Marxist 
theoretical framework to uncover the reason for imposing an Anglo-American variant of 
corporate governance rules on Turkish companies. 
 
Turkey has justified the recent corporate governance reforms with the need to attract foreign 
investors and its aspiration of joining the EU. The new legislation focuses on the rights of 
minority shareholders in an attempt to curb the power of controlling owners in favour of outside 
shareholders. Across this backdrop, the thesis critically assesses the implications of these legal 
reforms. It examines the possibility of the ownership structure of listed companies transforming 
from concentrated to diffused ownership, which is more suitable for the functioning of the 
mainstream model. Furthermore, the thesis discusses the consequences of the change of control 
from family owners to dispersed shareholders, concluding that this will align the objectives of 
Turkish companies with the interests of global investors. 
 
Overall, this thesis reveals the broader context in which neoliberal mainstream corporate 
governance laws are constructed, disseminated, and operate in capitalism, so that their raison 
d’etre can be understood and challenged.  
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CHAPTER I – Introduction 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The company1 is the predominant form of business organisation in the global capitalist setting. 
Companies are the main aggregators of productive activity, consumption, economic growth, 
and development. Currently, society relies on companies for all its needs, such as employment, 
education, health, and communication; this has led to the ‘corporatisation of life’.2 Thus, 
modern companies have ‘acquired the capacity to influence the circumstances of the societies 
within which they operate’,3 which means that their activities have an impact on everyone and 
everything. In fact, this impact occurs regardless of the subject’s association with the company. 
Just as the shareholders, employees, creditors, suppliers, and customers are directly affected by 
the company, so are the environment and members of the public who are located where the 
company operations take place. Hence, the rules that determine how companies are managed, 
how their resources are allocated, and to what end those resources are allocated are of the utmost 
importance. These rules are the subject matter of corporate governance. 
 
The broad definition of corporate governance is that it is a set of rules, systems, or mechanisms 
‘by which companies are directed and controlled’.4 However, this is as far as the consensus for 
an applicable definition of corporate governance. The differences in definition are because 
corporate governance rules inform both the creation and the distribution of wealth in society, 
thereby ‘touching upon one of the most sensitive, controversial and therefore deeply 
fundamental issues at the core of public debate’.5 These debates are underpinned by the issue 
of whose interests the company should be managed for; phrased more generally, the debate is 
over the purpose of the company. Executives who are in charge of companies can take decisions 
that create long-term value for the company, stakeholders, and society, or they can focus on 
short-term share price gains to prioritise shareholder interests. However, these choices do not 
result from purely economic reasoning. Instead, as Ireland has argued, ‘these different outcomes 
have been determined as much as by political decisions and their impact on prevailing 
                                                     
1 Unless otherwise stated, the term ‘company’ will be used to refer to the ‘public joint-stock company’ 
and the term ‘corporation’ will be used interchangeably with ‘company’. 
2 G Baars and A Spicer (eds), The Corporation: A Critical, Multi-Disciplinary Handbook (Cambridge 
University Press 2017) 2. 
3 RAG Monks and N Minow, Corporate Governance (5th edn, John Wiley & Sons 2011) 117. 
4 The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Report of the Committee on the 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Gee 1992) para 2.5. [hereinafter The Cadbury Report]. 
5 J Dine and M Koutsias, The Nature of Corporate Governance: The Significance of National Cultural 
Identity (Edward Elgar 2013) 64. 
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institutional arrangements as they have by the economic logic of either capitalism or the 
market’.6 
 
Shareholder primacy theory7 is the mainstream view today and gained prominence in the 1970s 
with the ‘law and economics’ scholarship of the Chicago School of Economics (Chicago 
School). The law and economics approach entailed the application of the Chicago School’s free-
market economics to corporate governance laws8 and asserted shareholder primacy on the basis 
of economic efficiency justifications.9 The shareholder primacy norm is underpinned by the 
agency theory, which regards the managers of the company as the ‘agents’ of the shareholders.10 
The proponents of the agency theory perceive the company as ‘a set of contracts’.11 Hence, they 
argue that managers are contracted to act in the best interest of shareholders and that 
‘shareholders alone are the parties to whom corporate managers should be accountable’.12 Thus, 
the core issue of corporate governance becomes that of ‘motivating the agent to act in the 
principal’s interest rather than simply in the agent’s own interest’.13 Shareholder primacy theory 
is defended on the basis of the claim that pursuing shareholder interest is the most efficient way 
to allocate resources in free markets and will thus increase aggregate social wealth.14 In terms 
of this theory, shareholder interest is understood as the maximisation of shareholder wealth as 
measured through share price increases.15 Corporate governance mechanisms are thus used to 
‘provide constraints and incentives that reduce deviations from shareholder-value 
maximization’.16 In sum, shareholder primacy theory dictates that the only purpose of a 
                                                     
6 P Ireland, 'The Corporation and the New Aristocracy of Finance' in Robé, Jean-Philippe, Antoine Lyon-
Caen and Stéphane Vernac (eds), Multinationals and the Constitutionalization of the World-Power 
System (Routledge, 2016) 97. 
7 This thesis refers to the shareholder primacy theory as the mainstream corporate governance model; it 
has also been referred to with varying terms in literature such as the shareholder theory of corporate 
governance, shareholder primacy norm or the outsider system of corporate governance. These terms are 
used interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
8 LA Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth: How Putting Shareholders First Harms Investors, 
Corporations, and the Public (Berrett-Koehler 2012) 18-19. See RA Posner, 'The Economic Approach 
to Law' (1975) (53) Texas Law Review 757. 
9 L Talbot, Progressive Corporate Governance for the 21st Century (Routledge 2013) 117-118. 
10 MC Jensen and WH Meckling, 'Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure' (1976) 3(4) Journal of Financial Economics 305, 309. Also, see W Lazonick, 
'Innovative Enterprise and Shareholder Value' (2014) 8(1) Law & Financial Markets Review 52, 57. 
11 EF Fama, 'Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm' (1980) 88(2) Journal of Political Economy 
288, 289. 
12 H Hansmann and R Kraakman, 'The End of History for Corporate Law' (2001) 89(2) Georgetown Law 
J 439, 441. 
13 R Kraakman and others, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional 
Approach (OUP 2004) 21. 
14 FH Easterbrook and DR Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard University Press 
1991) 38; MC Jensen, 'Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function' 
(2002) 12(2) Business Ethics Quarterly 235, 239. 
15 LA Stout, 'The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy' (2013) 161(7) University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 2003, 2004. 
16 LA Bebchuk, 'The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power' (2005) 118(3) Harv Law Rev 833, 850. 
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company is to increase profits for the benefit of its shareholders17 and perceives corporate 
governance to be the means to ensure that providers of capital to companies maximise 
investment returns.18 
 
Stakeholder theory is an alternative to the shareholder primacy norm and advances a more 
inclusive approach to corporate governance. This theory requires management to consider the 
interests of all stakeholders including employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, the 
environment, and the public. These interests are considered in addition to those of shareholders. 
The proponents of the stakeholder theory have argued that ‘management should make decisions 
for the benefit of all stakeholders’.19 Freeman has defined stakeholders as ‘any group or 
individual who can affect, or is affected by, the achievement of a corporation’s purpose’.20 For 
Donaldson and Preston, ‘Stakeholders are identified by their interests in the corporation, 
whether the corporation has any corresponding functional interest in them’.21 However, there 
are different justifications for recognising stakeholder interests in corporate decision-making. 
Some scholars have argued that stakeholder interests should be considered by management as 
a means to maximise shareholder wealth.22 Some are of the view that only the interests of 
stakeholders who make ‘firm-specific’ contributions to the company should be protected.23 
Others have asserted that pursuing stakeholder interest should be an end in itself instead of a 
means to profit.24 This thesis agrees with the latter view, which has been summarised by 
Clarkson as follows: ‘The economic and social purpose of the corporation is to create and 
distribute increased wealth and value to all its primary stakeholder groups, without favoring one 
group at the expense of others.’25 
 
                                                     
17 M Friedman, 'The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits' The New York Times 
Magazine (13.09.1970) 
18 A Shleifer and RW Vishny, 'A Survey of Corporate Governance' (1997) 52(2) The Journal of Finance 
737, 737. 
19 RE Freeman and J McVea, 'A Stakeholder Approach to Strategic Management' in Michael A Hitt, 
Edward R Freeman and Jeffrey S Harrison (eds), The Blackwell Handbook of Strategic Management 
(Blackwell 2001) 197. 
20 RE Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (Pitman 1984) 53. 
21 Emphasis in the original text. T Donaldson and LE Preston, 'The Stakeholder Theory of the 
Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications' (1995) 20(1) The Academy of Management Review 
65, 67. 
22 This view is also known as the instrumentalist approach to stakeholding theory. See Thomas M Jones, 
'Instrumental Stakeholder Theory: A Synthesis of Ethics and Economics' (1995) 20(2) The Academy of 
Management Review 404, 421-423. 
23 MM Blair, 'Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century' 
in Thomas Clarke (ed), Theories of Corporate Governance: The Philosophical Foundations of Corporate 
Governance (Routledge 2004). 
24 Donaldson and Preston, 'The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation' (n 21) 67. Also referred to as the 
intrinsic value approach to stakeholding theory. 
25 MBE Clarkson, 'A Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating Corporate Social 
Performance' (1995) 20(1) The Academy of Management Review 92, 112. 
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Debates over the purpose of companies and their accompanying forms of governance models 
have been ongoing since the 1930s, which featured the famous debate between two prominent 
scholars, Berle and Dodd.26 There have been claims that the shareholder primacy theory of 
corporate governance has triumphed over alternative models due to its economic superiority, 
thereby resulting in an ‘end of history for corporate law’.27 However, this is hardly the case 
because diverse corporate governance regimes continue to exist today. In fact, the corporate 
governance rules based on the shareholder primacy theory are specific to the Anglo-American 
corporate system of widely dispersed share ownership and highly developed stock markets.28 
In this system, the only viable company objective is shareholder wealth maximisation, and 
corporate governance serves as a monitoring mechanism to ensure that the management pursues 
this purpose. Hence, shareholder primacy theory adopts a very narrow approach to corporate 
governance by limiting its focus to the relationship between the shareholders and managers. 
Moreover, this view disregards stakeholder interests in company decision-making by portraying 
these interests as being adequately protected by contracts with the company or relevant laws.29 
 
Corporate governance has many dimensions that are determined by ‘the interdependence 
between firms and their market, technical, cultural, social, political, and institutional 
environments’ and not solely by the agency relationship between the shareholders and 
managers.30 By confining corporate governance to a singular focus, shareholder primacy theory 
conveniently disregards other stakeholder interests in the company. The corporate system on 
which shareholder primacy theory is based is not a global norm because companies typically 
have concentrated ownership structures that usually feature family owners in control.31 
Nevertheless, the corporate governance regime of the Anglo-American corporate system has 
become the conventional view of corporate governance on a global scale. Hansmann and 
Kraakman have argued that this is ‘because important economic forces have made the virtues 
                                                     
26 The ‘Berle-Dodd debate’ is elaborated in detail under Chapter 3, see text to footnote 275. 
27 Hansmann and Kraakman, 'The End of History for Corporate Law’ (n 12). The scholars list the 
alternative corporate governance models as: The Manager-Oriented Model; The Labor-Oriented Model; 
The State-Oriented Model and Stakeholder Models. For the purposes of this research, albeit 
acknowledging the importance and the variants of other models, this thesis examines the stakeholder 
model as the alternative to shareholder theory. 
28 BG Pettet, JP Lowry and A Reisberg, Pettet's Company Law: Company and Capital Markets Law (3rd 
edn, Pearson 2009) 62. 
29 Easterbrook and Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (n 14) 14-15. This view is based 
on the contractual theory of the company; see RH Coase, 'The Nature of the Firm' (1937) 4(16) 
Economica, New Series 386; Jensen and Meckling, 'Theory of the Firm' (n 10); MC Jensen, 'Organization 
Theory and Methodology' (1983) 58(2) The Accounting Review 319; EF Fama and MC Jensen, 
'Separation of Ownership and Control' (1983) 26(2) J Law Econ 301; O Hart, Firms, Contracts, and 
Financial Structure (OUP 1995). 
30 G Jackson, 'Comparative Corporate Governance: Sociological Perspectives' in Gamble, Andrew, Gavin 
Kelly and John Parkinson (eds), The Political Economy of the Company (Hart 2000) 265. 
31 R La Porta, F Lopez-De-Silanes and A Shleifer, 'Corporate Ownership Around the World' (1999) 54(2) 
The Journal of Finance 471, 496. The concentrated ownership is also referred to as the ‘insider’ system. 
13 
 
of that model increasingly salient’.32 Yet, Stout has argued that ‘the increasing influence of 
shareholder value thinking in business law and practice has been accompanied by, if anything, 
a decline in American corporate and economic performance’.33 Thus, explanations for the 
hegemonic position of shareholder primacy theory must go beyond the economic justifications. 
Ireland has asserted that ‘the spread of the shareholder-oriented corporation is a triumph not for 
economic logic or efficiency but for the growing political power of the shareholder class’.34 
Indeed, to grasp how the shareholder primacy theory became the orthodoxy in corporate 
governance thinking, the interests that this model seeks to advance must first be explored. 
 
The dominance of the shareholder primacy theory can be explained by tracing the rise of 
neoliberal ideology in the context of advanced capitalist economies. Neoliberalism, as defined 
by Harvey, 
 
is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human 
well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and 
skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, 
free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional 
framework appropriate to such practices.35 
 
In the post-war era, large companies in the United States acquired thousands of dispersed 
shareholders which, as Berle and Means have demonstrated, led to the separation of ownership 
from control.36  Control thus passed from shareholders to managers. Managers, who were more 
powerful than dispersed shareholders, were perceived capable of considering societal interests 
throughout the ‘golden age of capitalism’ that lasted from the post-war era to the 1970s.37 These 
developments undermined the power of shareholders in the company; in turn, as Ireland has 
noted, ‘corporate governance was more “socialized” than before or since’.38 Nevertheless, 
events that unfolded after the 1960s have provided capitalists with the opportunity to reassert 
the free-market ideology of neoclassical economics. Some of these factors were the 
                                                     
32 Hansmann and Kraakman, 'The End of History for Corporate Law’ (n 12) 449. 
33 Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth (n 8) 105. 
34 P Ireland, 'Shareholder Primacy and the Distribution of Wealth' (2005) 68(1) The Modern Law Review 
49, 52-53. 
35 D Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (OUP 2005) 2. 
36 AA Berle and GC Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (first published 1932, 
Transaction Publishers 1991) 84. 
37 This period, also referred to as the managerial era in terms of corporate governance is discussed under 
Chapter 3.2. 
38 P Ireland, 'Efficiency or Power? The Rise of the Shareholder-oriented Joint Stock Corporation' (2018) 
25(1) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 291, 318. 
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deteriorating macroeconomic conditions and falling profitability rates,39 rise of institutional 
investors and creation of new types of financial institutions,40 weakening of union power,41 the 
demise of the international monetary system (the Bretton Woods),42 increasingly competitive 
markets due to globalisation and the creation of a ‘market for corporate control’ that subjected 
underperforming companies to takeovers.43 These developments have led to a ‘shift from 
postwar to neoliberal capitalism’44 and enabled shareholders to reclaim their power over 
company management. Furthermore, the ownership justifications of shareholders were replaced 
with the efficiency arguments of the shareholder primacy theory. As a result of these 
developments, company managers became subjective to the sole objective of maximising 
shareholder wealth by the 1980s.45 
 
In the decades that followed, the shareholder primacy theory of corporate governance was 
exported from the United States to the rest of the world as part of the neoliberal Washington 
Consensus agenda and its ‘primary institutions […] namely the international financial 
institutions (IFIs) such as the IMF and World Bank’.46 The central premise of the Washington 
Consensus was ‘that liberalized financial flows promote a more efficient allocation of capital 
by permitting capital to travel across national borders where it could be employed in the most 
productive manner’.47 To this end, the IMF and the WB have determined international standards 
in 12 policy areas; these standards are known the Reports on the Observance of Standards and 
Codes (ROSCs).48 The ROSCs are mainly used by the IFIs as benchmarks to assess debtor 
countries’ compliance levels with their loan ‘conditionalities’.49 Corporate governance is one 
                                                     
39 P Ireland, 'From Lonrho to BHS' (2018) 29(1) King's Law Journal 3, 19. 
40 Ireland, 'Efficiency or Power?' (n 38) 320. 
41 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (n 35) 23. 
42 W Streeck, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism (2nd edn, Verso 2017) 1. 
43 The term ‘market for corporate control’ was coined by Manne, who argued that underperforming 
managers would be replaced by the natural functioning of the markets; accordingly, ‘lower the stock 
price, relative to what it could be with more efficient management, the more attractive the take-over 
becomes to those who believe that they can manage the company more efficiently’ in HG Manne, 
'Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control' (1965) 73(2) Journal of Political Economy 110, 113. This 
theory formed the foundations of the idea that pursuing share price increase would equate to the most 
efficient way of operating the company. 
44 Streeck, The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism (n 42) 3. 
45 G Duménil and D Lévy, Capital Resurgent: Roots of the Neoliberal Revolution (Derek Jeffers tr, 
Harvard University Press 2004) 185. 
46 S Soederberg, 'The Emperor's New Suit: The New International Financial Architecture as a Reinvention 
of the Washington Consensus' (2001) 7(4) Global Governance 453, 460. 
47 Ibid 465. The Washington Consensus is further elaborated in Chapter 3, see text to footnote 434. 
48 IMF, 'Standards and Codes: The Role of the IMF' (Factsheet, March 2016) 
<www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/sc.pdf> accessed 16 August 2018. 
49 S Soederberg, The Politics of the New International Financial Architecture:  Reimposing Neoliberal 
Domination in the Global South (Zed Books 2004) 136-138.  
According to the IMF, ‘conditionality’ implies ‘the macroeconomic and structural policies—and the 
specific tools used to monitor progress toward the goals outlined by the country in cooperation with the 
IMF. Conditionality helps countries solve balance of payments problems without resorting to measures 
15 
 
of the 12 areas and is assessed on the basis of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD)’s50 Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD Principles).51 Thus, the 
OECD acts as the standard-setting body for the corporate governance module of the ROSCs, 
and the IFIs use the OECD Principles as a benchmark for evaluating countries’ corporate 
governance frameworks and practices.52 Aside from its standard-setting function in the area of 
corporate governance, the OECD also seeks to promote and disseminate its corporate 
governance principles internationally. It assists ‘member and non-member governments in their 
efforts to evaluate and improve the legal, institutional and regulatory framework for corporate 
governance in their countries’.53 Hence, the OECD has adopted ‘a two-track approach, 
involving the development of benchmark principles and the active promotion of their use’.54 
The OECD Principles have become ‘an international benchmark for policy makers, investors, 
corporations and other stakeholders worldwide’55 and have been referred to by over 60 countries 
during the construction of national corporate governance frameworks.56 
 
The OECD Principles contain neoliberal undertones that accommodate the shareholder primacy 
theory of corporate governance. For example the OECD Principles’ preamble uses terms such 
as ‘efficiency’ and ‘monitoring performance’, which bear resemblance to the concepts of the 
agency theory.57 The OECD Principles also refer to the contractual nature of the company; its 
first article describes the company as ‘private contractual relations’.58 In its foreword, the OECD 
                                                     
that are harmful to national or international prosperity. At the same time, the measures are meant to 
safeguard IMF resources by ensuring that the country’s balance of payments will be strong enough to 
permit it to repay the loan.’ in IMF, 'IMF Conditionality' (Factsheet, 06.03.2018) 
<https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/ Sheets/2016/08/02/21/28/IMF-Conditionality> accessed 1 
August 2018. 
50 The OECD was established in 1961 ‘to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and 
employment and a rising standard of living in Member countries, while maintaining financial stability, 
and thus to contribute to the development of the world economy’ in OECD, 'Convention on the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development' (1960) <http://www.oecd.org/general/> 
accessed 2 December 2018. It currently has 36 members and Turkey is one of the founding members. 
51 IMF, 'Standards and Codes: The Role of the IMF' (n 48) 2; OECD, 'Principles of Corporate Governance' 
(1999). The OECD published its corporate governance principles for the first time in 1999, which was 
revised in 2004 and finally in 2015 the G20/OECD jointly published the latest version 'G20/OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance' <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264236882-en> accessed 15 
November 2018. 
52 The WB, 'Brief: Corporate Governance' (24.02.2016) <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/ 
financialsector/brief/corporate-governance> accessed 10 October 2018; The WB, 'Reports on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes' <http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/rosc> accessed 19 
October 2018. 
53 OECD, 'OECD Principles of Corporate Governance' (1999) 9. 
54 G Kirkpatrick, 'Improving Corporate Governance Standards: The Work of the OECD and the 
Principles' (OECD 2004) <https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/33655111.pdf>. 
55 OECD, 'OECD Principles of Corporate Governance' (2004) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/oecd-
principles-corporate-governance-2004.htm> 3. 
56 OECD, 'G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance' (2015) 3. 
57 OECD, 'G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance' (2015) 9-10. 
58 Emphasis added. OECD, 'G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance' (2015) 13. 
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Principles’ objective is stated to be ‘to help policy makers evaluate and improve the legal, 
regulatory, and institutional framework for corporate governance, with a view to supporting 
economic efficiency, sustainable growth and financial stability’.59 Thus, the use of the term 
‘economic efficiency’ hints at the OECD Principles’ reliance on the neoliberal ‘law and 
economics’ scholarship. Although the OECD Principles have been revised in 2004 and 2015, 
as the OECD Secretary-General has acknowledged, the ‘Principles maintain many of the 
recommendations from earlier versions as continuing essential components of an effective 
corporate governance framework’.60 Indeed, the neoliberal foundations of the 1999 OECD 
Principles have remained intact in both revisions. 
 
The OECD’s corporate governance approach is problematic because stakeholders are omitted 
from the scope of good governance. Dignam and Galanis have noted that the shareholder-centric 
approach of the OECD Principles is evident through its ‘advocating for managerial 
accountability solely to shareholders’. 61 Second, the OECD disregards the most common 
ownership structure worldwide by basing its supposedly universal principles on the agency 
problem, which is mainly endemic to corporate systems with wide share dispersal. Due to the 
OECD’s emphasis on the effective monitoring of managers as the benchmark for good corporate 
governance, it appears that the OECD Principles advance a corporate governance model which 
is specific to the market-centric systems of the United States and the United Kingdom. Indeed, 
the agency problem between the shareholders and the managers is not a common issue for 
companies worldwide. The majority of countries around the world are characterised by 
concentrated ownership,62 which require a different set of corporate governance rules and 
mechanisms. However, the OECD has portrayed shareholder primacy and its underlying agency 
theory to be universal corporate governance standards because those theories allegedly produce 
the most desirable system for profitability and efficiency.63 This assumption has entrenched 
shareholder primacy theory as the mainstream model of corporate governance globally.64 
 
                                                     
59 Emphasis added. OECD, 'G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance' (2015) 3. 
60 Ibid. 
61 A Dignam and M Galanis, The Globalization of Corporate Governance (Routledge 2016) 141-142. 
62 La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer, 'Corporate Ownership Around the World’ (n 31) 496. 
63 S Soederberg, Corporate Power and Ownership in Contemporary Capitalism: The Politics of 
Resistance and Domination (Routledge 2010) 118. Also see TJJ Andre, 'Cultural Hegemony: The 
Exportation of Anglo-Saxon Corporate Governance Ideologies to Germany' 73(1998) Tul L Rev 69, 77. 
64 There are other international organisations that exercise rule-setting functions in the area of corporate 
governance; for example, the International Corporate Governance Network. On the other hand, the Bank 
for International Settlements has an active role in promoting the corporate governance standards of banks 
or the International Accounting Standards Board which develops international accountancy standards. 
However, the OECD Principles are taken as a general reference point here due to their relevance in the 
context of Turkish corporate governance reforms. 
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The OECD Principles have been particularly taken up by emerging market economies because 
of their dependence on foreign capital. This is due to the consensus that stock market 
development is an important aspect of economic growth.65 Neoliberal logic dictates that 
liberalised and free markets lead to mutual gain for all market participants because capital 
inflows help to supplement the lack of domestic resources in developing countries.66 On this 
point, the OECD Principles have asserted that countries that wish to attract ‘international flows 
of capital’ must ‘adhere to internationally accepted principles’.67 The OECD Principles have 
further highlighted that ‘corporate governance is one key element in […] enhancing investor 
confidence’.68 Ararat has noted that ‘in many developing economies with emerging markets, 
liberalisation efforts overlap with corporate governance reforms to attract international capital 
to domestic firms’.69 Although the OECD’s corporate governance standards are non-binding, 
failure to implement the OECD Principles in emerging markets would risk investment strikes 
(not investing) or capital flight  (investments flowing out of the country).70 This dependency 
has been aptly described by Arthur Levitt, the former US Securities and Exchange Commission 
Chairman: ‘If a country does not have a reputation for strong corporate governance practices, 
capital will flow elsewhere.’71 Thus, the OECD Principles have an implicitly coercive character 
when coupled with the IFIs’ ROSC assessments that ultimately determine a country’s access to 
financial assistance. Hence, the imposition of the OECD Principles is aimed at creating 
conditions that are suitable for the interests of foreign investors, who this thesis will broadly 
refer to as global investors.72 The main objective of this strategy is to instil shareholder wealth 
maximisation as the sole purpose of the company in emerging markets so that the interests of 
the global investors who invest in foreign stock markets can be protected and further advanced. 
 
                                                     
65 R Levine and S Zervos, 'Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth' (1998) 88(3) Am Econ Rev 
537, 537. 
66 Soederberg, 'The Emperor's New Suit' (n 46) 455. 
67 OECD, 'OECD Principles of Corporate Governance' (2004) 13. 
68 Ibid 11. 
69 M Ararat, '“Comply or Explain” Without Consequences: The Case of Turkey' in Christine Mallin (ed), 
Handbook on International Corporate Governance (2nd edn, Edward Elgar 2011) 355. 
70 S Gill, Power and Resistance in the New World Order (2nd edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2008) 111; S 
Soederberg, 'The Promotion of “Anglo-American” Corporate Governance in the South: Who benefits 
from the new international standard?' (2003) 24(1) Third World Quarterly 7, 13. 
71 Arthur Levitt (SEC Chairman), 'Remarks Before the Conference on the Rise and Effectiveness of New 
Corporate Governance Standards' (New York, 12.12.2000) 
<https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch449.htm>. 
72 The term ‘global investors’ or the ‘global investor class’ is used throughout this thesis to refer to the 
investors operating on an international scale, mainly from the advanced capitalist economies, and 
organized in the form of institutional investors around the common objective of maintaining shareholder 
wealth maximization in stock markets abroad. Similarly, Ireland refers to such rentier shareholders as 
‘new aristocracy of finance’ which he describes as: ‘Operating in liberalized global financial markets, 
increasingly transnationally integrated, with no loyalty to place or community’ in Ireland, 'The 
Corporation and the New Aristocracy of Finance' (n 6) 96. 
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To instil the shareholder wealth maximisation objective of corporate governance in emerging 
markets, the concentrated ownership structure found in these countries must be replaced with a 
corporate system of wide share dispersal and developed stock markets. This is because a liquid 
stock market is a prerequisite for the company share to maintain its mobile character and 
generate surplus without being stuck in the production process.73 Liquidity provides other 
advantages for global investors, such as cheap exit options and risk diversification.74 
Economists have defended liquid markets on the basis of efficiency, arguing that the ‘one best 
way’ of corporate governance ‘is a close look-alike of the American institutions’.75 However, 
these corporate governance rules prioritise foreign shareholder interests to enable investors 
from wealthy economies to penetrate emerging stock markets where they can generate higher 
returns than in developed markets. To this end, rules that constrain the power of controlling 
owners are implemented, and listed company boards are restructured to align the company 
purpose with shareholder interests. Additionally, as global investors capitalise on the volatilities 
of emerging markets, their gains occur to the detriment of these countries’ economies and other 
stakeholders. 
 
Within this backdrop, Turkey, an emerging market country, has recently implemented corporate 
governance reforms with the explicit policy objective to attract foreign investment to its stock 
market. This is because Turkey has been unable to garner enough capital from its domestic 
investor base and has been reliant on foreign capital for its stock market development. However, 
the concentrated and family controlled ownership structure of Turkish companies has been 
regarded an important deterrent for foreign investors. To provide assurance for the prospective 
investors, the new corporate governance laws strengthen minority shareholder rights and 
introduce further rules to curb the controlling owners’ influence in listed companies. However, 
the corporate governance model that Turkey has adopted does not address the particular issues 
of its companies or stock market. Turkey has introduced reforms that align its corporate 
governance laws with the market-based rules found in the Anglo-American corporate system. 
Therefore, grasping the motives behind these legal reforms requires understanding which 
parties benefit the most from Turkey’s new corporate governance framework. 
 
In sum, the shareholder primacy theory’s global hegemonic position demonstrates not so much 
its economic superiority, but the relative power of the capitalist class over the rest of the 
                                                     
73 This process is explained through Marx’s theory on the circulation of money capital, see Chapter 2.2.a.  
74 E Engelen, 'Corporate Governance, Property and Democracy: A Conceptual Critique of Shareholder 
Ideology' in Thomas Clarke (ed), Theories of Corporate Governance: The Philosophical Foundations of 
Corporate Governance (Routledge 2004) 306. 
75 Ibid 304. Also, see MC Jensen, 'Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences' (1988) 2(1) The Journal 
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company stakeholders and the society.76 The global investor class is the particular capitalist 
class that benefits from the mainstream corporate governance model. Through the allegedly 
universal corporate governance standards, the Anglo-American, market-based corporate 
governance regime has been disseminated to emerging markets regardless of the differences in 
national contexts. The mainstream model’s underlying theories and its proposed solutions to 
corporate governance problems do not address the particular issues of many emerging markets’ 
corporate structures. This necessitates a critical inquiry into the raison d’etre of the mainstream 
corporate governance model. 
 
2 Why Turkey’s Corporate Governance Laws Matter 
 
Turkey is currently the world’s 17th largest economy and has had an overall high growth rate 
since 2002.77 Yet, the WB reported that ‘Turkey’s capital markets remain thin compared to other 
countries at the same level of development’.78 As at the end of 2017, Turkey’s market 
capitalisation was 26.7% (% of GDP), whereas the average for upper middle-income countries 
is 67.2%.79 Domestically, Ararat, Suel and Yurtoglu express that ‘Turkey has a low savings rate 
and serious limitations on capital formation’.80 This feature of the Turkish economy has been 
pointed out by the IMF, which has indicated that ‘raising domestic savings [is a] critical 
component that will assure Turkey’s place as one of the world’s most promising emerging 
economies’.81 As a result, the Turkish economy has largely been reliant on foreign investment 
to finance the country’s development and its companies.  
 
Another underlying reason for the low level of market capitalisation has been attributed to the 
hesitation of Turkish companies to float their shares.82 The wide availability of credit to 
                                                     
76 I have used the terms the capitalist class or the capitalists and the labour in a broad sense, adopting a 
class-based generalisation from Marx, but with the distinction that the labour class is used here to refer 
to a broader group of interests including the various company stakeholders other than the shareholders. 
In doing so, I acknowledge that there are differences of interest within these broad categories, yet for the 
purposes of this research, I do not attempt to breakdown each of these differences as they do not change 
the nature of the arguments. 
77 The WB, 'National accounts data GDP - current US$' <https://data.worldbank.org/> accessed 25 
August 2018. Turkey experienced a severe financial crisis in 2000-2001, but since then its GDP has 
steadily inclined, save for the year following the global financial crisis of 2008. 
78 The WB, 'Turkey’s Transitions: Integration, Inclusion, Institutions (Vol. 2): Main report' (2014) 22. 
79 The WB classifies Turkey in the Upper Middle-Income countries group. See the WB, 'Market 
capitalization of listed domestic companies (% of GDP)' <https://data.worldbank.org/> accessed 26 
August 2018.  
80 M Ararat, E Suel and BB Yurtoglu, 'Sustainable Investment in Turkey: The Case in Context – An 
Update' (March 2014) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2447937> 14. 
81 IMF, 'IMF Survey: Turkey: Increasing Saving to Reduce Vulnerabilities' (2013) 
<https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/socar122013a> accessed 2 August 2018. 
82 Ararat, Suel and Yurtoglu, 'Sustainable Investment in Turkey' (n 80) 13. 
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businesses, either through government connections or the company’s affiliate banks, has led to 
a dependence on bank financing as the main source of capital for Turkish companies, which has 
deterred them from resorting to stock market.83 Despite Turkey’s financial liberalisation efforts 
from the 1980s onwards to create a market-based system, the Turkish business setting remains 
bank-based.84 These factors are coupled with the economic and political instability that has been 
prevalent in the country throughout the last decade; hence investments in relatively risky 
financial instruments such as company stocks remained limited. In turn, the main cause of 
macroeconomic stability has been linked to Turkey’s high level of dependence on external 
financing.85 Although there are various impediments to the development of Turkey’s stock 
market, this thesis focuses on the ownership and control structure of its listed companies, which 
has been identified as an important element deterring investors from entering the Turkish stock 
market.86 
 
Turkish companies are characterised by highly concentrated ownership.87 In these companies, 
family ownership and control throughout the financial and industrial company groups is the 
norm.88 In fact, according to Turkish Family Businesses Association (TAIDER), 95% of all 
companies in Turkey are family-owned.89 Yüksel notes that ‘controlling shareholders often play 
a leading role in the management and strategic direction of company groups, many of which 
include companies that are listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange’.90 Large companies in Turkey 
are often set up as holding companies as a result of the founding families’ close ties with the 
state and are thereby able to operate across various industries. Yamak and Ertuna explain that 
the ‘state has provided incentives and supported the development of these family business 
groups by easing their access to finance through equity participations and credits from state 
banks, supplying low cost inputs, and protecting them from foreign competition’.91 Therefore, 
                                                     
83 S Yamak and B Ertuna, A Primer on Corporate Governance: Turkey (Business Experts Press 2017)11. 
84 Yamak and Ertuna, A Primer on Corporate Governance (n 83) 31. 
85 Ibid 19. 
86 M Ugur and M Ararat, 'Turkey, Corporate Governance at the Crossroads' (2006) 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2093453> 17. 
87 Yamak and Ertuna, A Primer on Corporate Governance (n 83) 69.  
88 OECD, OECD Corporate Governance Factbook 2017 (2017) 14. La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and 
Shleifer make a distinction between ‘widely-held’ companies, and companies with ‘ultimate owners’. 
They classify five types of ultimate owners in which ‘the family’ is one of them. Accordingly; ‘a 
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Around the World’ (n 31) 476. 
89 TAIDER, 'İş’te Aile Sayı: 2' (2017) <https://taider.org.tr/images/belgeler/iste_aile_2_sayisi.pdf> 
accessed 6 June 2018. 
90 C Yüksel, 'Recent Developments of Corporate Governance in the Global Economy and the New 
Turkish Commercial Draft Law Reforms' (2008) 3(2) Journal of International Commercial Law and 
Technology 101, 103. Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) has been restructured in 2012 and renamed as the 
Borsa Istanbul (BIST). 
91 Yamak and Ertuna, A Primer on Corporate Governance (n 83) 72. 
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it is vital for private enterprises to maintain close ties with the government in order to maintain 
their advantageous position.92 This situation has also led to the owner families being involved 
in the management of their companies even once the company goes public so that they can 
continue to handle the company’s relations with the state.93 As a result, the majority of the listed 
companies in Turkey are still controlled by their founding family-owners. A recent study found 
that ‘13 holding companies and their eight affiliated banks account for an estimated 40% of the 
market capitalization of Borsa Istanbul (BIST). 11 of these 13 holding companies are controlled 
by 11 leading families’.94 It can further be observed that the owner-families maintain control 
either through holding large blocks of shares or through cross-ownership within their group 
companies.  
 
With this type of company ownership and control structure, it has been argued that the 
controlling shareholders have the ability and incentives to expropriate from minority 
shareholders, that is, to use company resources for their own benefit at the expense of minority 
shareholders.95 In turn, the risk of expropriation by the controlling shareholding results in ‘sub-
optimal levels of investment’ by outside investors.96 The situation is exacerbated by the 
presence of ‘pyramidal groups and cross-holdings’,97 such as in the case of group companies, 
which creates opaqueness in the management structure and thereby incurs additional monitoring 
costs for outside investors.98 Moreover, there is a lack of a disclosure tradition in Turkish 
companies, as the market forces promoting transparency are weak.99 Due to the presence of the 
controlling owners, takeover risks are low and it is not possible to acquire a company without 
their consent; nor does the market have a disciplining function for managers who 
underperform.100 These features make investment in Turkish companies unattractive for the 
outside investor since minority shareholders have little power in the presence of the controlling 
owners in this corporate setting. 
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In order to increase the foreign investor base in Turkey’s stock market, the government initiated 
legal reforms in various areas, including corporate governance, starting in mid-2000s.101 In fact, 
the Turkish legal framework in general has undergone an overhaul throughout the last decade 
due to Turkish government’s eagerness to align national laws with the EU acquis en route to 
EU membership.102  Hence, the main motivators behind Turkey’s new corporate governance 
laws have been the prospect of joining the EU and attracting foreign investors by basing its 
corporate governance rules on the OECD Principles.103 These influences have been openly 
admitted by both the legislator and the regulator.104 It should be noted that Turkey is part of the 
continental legal system; therefore, legal rules are codified in the form of legislation. The 
primary legislation dealing with corporate governance is the new Turkish Commercial Code 
(TCC), which came into effect in July 2012. Moreover, a new Capital Markets Law (CML) was 
promulgated on December 2012. The reform process has been accompanied by various Capital 
Markets Board (CMB) regulations, which introduced detailed rules on corporate governance 
for listed companies, as well as the CMB’s Principles of Corporate Governance (CMB 
Principles), first published in 2003 and which took their final form in 2014. The CMB Principles 
initially had a soft-law nature that was later augmented by the comply-or-explain approach. Yet, 
as Ararat notes, this approach was ineffective and that companies were reluctant to implement 
the CMB Principles, particularly the rules concerning minority shareholders.105 On the other 
hand, the new legislation on corporate governance and the latest revisions of the CMB 
Principles introduced a hard-law approach to regulating corporate governance for the first time, 
thereby making compliance with various corporate governance principles mandatory for certain 
listed companies. 
 
Indeed, the new legislation introduced many novelties, especially in terms of strengthening the 
position of minority shareholders, who were granted with added rights and protections against 
the controlling owners. It established rules for facilitating the participation of outside 
shareholders in company decision-making through means such as electronic general assembly 
meetings and online voting, detailed rules regarding the protection of the shareholders of group 
companies, mandatory minimum independent board membership, and increased disclosure 
requirements. Thus, the new corporate governance laws are mostly aligned with the OECD 
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Principles, which will be demonstrated in detail under Chapter 6. These rules, however, have 
been incorporated into Turkish laws without regard for the particular characteristics of Turkey’s 
business environment, traditions, and ownership and control structure. As discussed earlier, the 
mainstream corporate governance model, which is underpinned by shareholder primacy theory, 
is peculiar to a corporate system with diffused ownership and developed stock markets thus this 
creates an obvious contrast with Turkey’s circumstances. On this point, scholars have observed 
that ‘the OECD benchmark was adopted in Turkey in spite of the lack of supporting regulatory 
institutions and institutional structure’.106 With this backdrop, the case of Turkey’s recent 
corporate governance law reforms requires critical inquiry in order to understand the insistence 
on incorporating the mainstream model into national law. 
 
The answer to the above contradiction can be found by exploring Turkey’s history with the IFIs. 
Turkey has taken on an economic liberalisation policy with neoliberal reforms since the 
beginning of the 1980s. The financial liberalisation policies adopted by emerging markets 
during the 1980s and 1990s have indeed played a prominent role in attracting foreign capital, 
particularly in the form of portfolio investments.107 Foreign portfolio investments have been 
hailed by economists as ‘as an unambiguous benefit’ to these countries.108 In this regard, Turkey 
was also applauded for showing significant economic progress in terms of completing its 
integration into the global financial system.109 Yet, financial liberalisation policies also brought 
economic volatility and vulnerability as Turkey became dependent on foreign capital. As a 
result of this dependency, Turkey experienced recurrent ‘boom-and-bust cycles’ signifying 
consecutive expansions and contractions in the Turkish economy.110 The recurring solution was 
to obtain IMF credit, which came with the requirement of implementing the IMF’s stabilisation 
programmes. These programmes had the principal goals of reducing inflation, as well as 
implementing extensive privatisation schemes, laws facilitating foreign investment, a reduction 
in labour costs, and decreases in social security spending.111 Soederberg argues that the 
imposition of neoliberal ideology in emerging markets has occurred through this IMF 
conditionality, which ‘describes conditions in the form of policy implementations that debtor 
countries must undertake if they are to receive IMF financing’.112 Hence, in order to continue 
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receiving financial assistance, Turkish policy-making autonomy was restricted to the 
implementation of the terms imposed by the IMF. 
 
The IMF stabilisation programmes did manage to lower inflation by 1999, yet, shortly after, in 
2000 and then again 2001, Turkey experienced two severe financial crises.113 At the time, 
commentators asserted that ‘the blame for the crisis lies in the failure of Turkey to adapt to 
globalization and seek benefits from it’.114 Yet, Cizre and Yeldan argue that the actual cause of 
the crises was exposure to ‘speculative short-term capital (hot money) attacks which increased 
instability and precipitated a series of financial crises’.115 Indeed, such speculative capital in the 
form of portfolio investments has two negative impacts on emerging markets: first, it constrains 
the autonomy of national policy-making and, second, it increases their economic 
vulnerabilities.116 It restricts policy-making as emerging markets have to adjust their economic, 
monetary, and social policies in order to secure investor confidence. On the second point, their 
economies become vulnerable because of the risk of withdrawal, since portfolio investment is 
associated with the highest degree of risk of exit.117 Indeed, Turkey experienced a considerable 
amount of foreign capital outflow from portfolio investments during its 2000–1 financial crises, 
which further damaged the economy.118 The government had to spend $47.2 billion to bail out 
failing financial institutions.119 This point illustrates how policy-making has been shaped by the 
demands of investors. As a result, Turkey’s foreign debt peaked following the crises and the 
country was ‘effectively pushed into debt peonage’.120 Scholars note that the ‘way in which the 
Turkish government has embraced policies benefiting international capital, as well as the role 
played by IMF, appears instructive’.121 The consequence of these developments has been that, 
in the aftermath of the crises, the balance of power has shifted largely in favour of capital in 
Turkey.122 In fact, one of the conditions of the IMF loan obtained following the crises was that 
Turkey needed to introduce ‘good governance’ practices in its private sector.123 Here, bearing 
in mind the relationship between the ROSCs and the OECD Principles briefly discussed earlier, 
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it can be assumed that the OECD standards are referenced as good governance practices. In 
sum, Turkey’s legal reforms in the area of corporate governance, which were initiated shortly 
after the 2000–1 crises,124 appear to be mandated by IFIs and the interests they serve, which 
explains the adoption of the Anglo-American derived mainstream model in Turkish laws. 
 
Thus, it appears that Turkey’s new corporate governance laws will have implications on listed 
companies beyond increasing the number of their foreign shareholders. The adoption of the 
mainstream corporate governance model requires a business environment that can 
accommodate the proper functioning of its rules, one with transparent, liquid stock markets and 
widely held companies run by professional managers according to shareholder interests. Yet, 
due to the presence of controlling owners and the corollary opaque governance practices, a 
system of concentrated ownership does not allow outsiders to interfere in or monitor company’s 
management. In this context, outside investors do not have the ability to influence how their 
money will be spent or for what purpose; in other words, they cannot ensure that the company 
management will pursue the objective of shareholder wealth maximisation. Thus, in order to 
attract investors, Turkey initiated legal reforms that advance minority shareholder rights over 
and above those of the domestic controlling owners. These developments are likely to affect the 
dominant ownership structure of the Turkish stock market and hint at a possible transformation 
from concentrated to diffused ownership structure. In turn, such transformation would be 
followed by the controlling owners giving away their control in lieu of professional 
management and boards with independent directors, who will bound by market discipline to 
pursue shareholder interests. 
 
Overall, the socio-legal analysis of Turkey’s recent corporate governance law reforms provides 
an opportunity to grasp who benefits the most from the ‘universal’ corporate governance rules 
promoted by the OECD and the IFIs. This inquiry also demonstrates how the Anglo-American 
derived standards are imposed on the rest of the emerging markets to assert shareholder primacy 
as the sole purpose of companies worldwide. On a broader perspective, the analyses of the 
reasons and the ways by which Turkey has incorporated the mainstream model into its national 
corporate governance laws illustrate the role of law in advancing capitalist interests. 
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of Turkish Banks' (2009) 45(6) Emerging Markets Finance & Trade 20, 20. 
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3 The Aim and the Research Question 
 
The aim of this research is to determine the reasons, methods, and implications of the recent 
reforms of Turkish corporate governance laws. The thesis attempts to achieve this objective by 
examining a number of sub-questions.  
 
The first question involves exploring the process by which the Anglo-American variant of 
corporate governance that is based on shareholder primacy theory became mainstream 
internationally. This inquiry is especially significant because the system of wide share dispersal 
on which the model is based is the exception rather than the norm around the world.125 The 
corporate governance rules based on shareholder primacy have been promoted by international 
organisations as universal values which all countries must abide by as an indispensable part of 
economic growth, even if those countries have different corporate systems. The reason why a 
particular corporate governance model has been portrayed as an international standard must be 
sought within the underlying capitalist relations of production. I use a Marxist theoretical 
framework to illustrate the class interests the mainstream corporate governance model strives 
to advance. 
 
The second sub-question examines whether Turkey has conformed to the mainstream model 
through its corporate governance law reforms and examines the methods it has used in doing 
so. Here, I analyse the corporate governance rules found in the new Turkish Commercial Code 
(TCC), the new Capital Market Law (CML), and the recent Capital Markets Board (CMB)’s 
regulations. Using the OECD Principles as the benchmark for the mainstream model, I assess 
the extent to which Turkish policymakers have been instructed by the demands of the IFIs and 
the OECD in constructing Turkey’s corporate governance framework. 
 
The third subsidiary question analyses the effects of Turkey’s corporate governance laws on the 
ownership structure of listed companies. I look into the possibility of transformation to a system 
of wide share dispersal due to the new legal rules, since this system is more conducive to the 
functioning of the mainstream model and to the interests of the global investors. In line with the 
dissipation of ownership, I discuss the consequences of the transfer of control from family 
owners to dispersed shareholders in the context of Turkish listed companies and evaluate the 
case for company stakeholders and society at large. 
 
                                                     
125 La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer, 'Corporate Ownership Around the World’ (n 31). 
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4 Methodology: A Socio-legal Approach to Corporate Governance 
 
The corporate governance phenomenon contains elements from various disciplines such as law, 
economics, management, sociology, psychology, and political science. This brings both 
advantages and challenges to conducting a legal study on any topic related to corporate 
governance. The challenge is that although a traditional doctrinal study would lead to a 
systematic analysis of the sources of law and allow a certain degree of interpretation, it would 
not be able to provide the complete picture of corporate governance. On the other hand, 
corporate governance has the advantage of being a fruitful area of research since there is a great 
deal of interaction between the disciplines, which offers multiple insights.  
 
When determining the most appropriate methodology for the inquiry at hand, the theoretical 
perspective is a key factor because it is ‘inextricably inter-linked’ to the methodology of 
choice.126 Accordingly, the thesis rejects the narrow definition of corporate governance as 
derived from the agency theory, which reduces it to the singular issue of aligning the interests 
of shareholders and managers in public companies. Corporate governance concerns more than 
the agency relationship; it ‘takes account of a wider range of relations and institutional 
arrangements that shape who controls corporations, what interests corporations serve, and how 
risks and rewards are allocated among stakeholders’.127  
 
This thesis advances the wider definition of the stakeholder theory and perceives corporate 
governance to be ‘the political economic, cultural, social and legal mechanism which govern 
the activities of corporations’.128 Indeed, the research question of this thesis cannot be answered 
by relying on traditional doctrinal methodology alone. The doctrinal or black-letter approach 
relies on the analytical tools of the legal discipline; it employs interpretive methods to study 
various legal sources to carry out a formal and descriptive analysis as well as normative 
evaluations of legal rules and principles.129 By not engaging with other fields of study, doctrinal 
methodology perceives law to be a self-sufficient discipline that ‘sees no use for social scientific 
insights or methods of analysis’.130 Such a methodology is not suitable for addressing the myriad 
aspects of my research question. 
                                                     
126 R Banakar and M Travers (eds), Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart 2005) 19. 
127 Jackson, 'Comparative Corporate Governance: Sociological Perspectives' (n 30) 267. 
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Instead, an inter-disciplinary approach is more suited to the inquiry at hand.131 Within the 
various inter-disciplinary research areas, the socio-legal approach best suits the aim of 
uncovering the raison d’etre of the recent reforms in Turkish corporate governance laws. Socio-
legal methodology broadly refers to the study of law as a social phenomenon,132 whereas others 
use the methodology to ‘refer to the study of the law and legal institutions from the perspectives 
of the social sciences (viz all the social sciences - not only sociology)’.133  
 
Overall, the socio-legal approach views the relationship of law to a social situation to which the 
law applies to be necessary for understanding of that situation.134 Hence, the socio-legal 
methodology is able ‘to highlight the issues that neither law nor sociology alone can study and 
grasp adequately’.135 In this thesis, the use of the word ‘socio’ is adopted in a broad sense to 
mean ‘an interface with a context within which law exists, be that a sociological, historical, 
economic, geographical or other context’.136 The use of the sociology discipline in socio-legal 
methodology brings the ability to look ‘beyond what is given and immediate to what is latent 
and inchoate’.137 In sum, socio-legal methodology enables insights from social disciplines other 
than law, thereby allowing critical analysis of the supposedly neutral character of the 
international standards of corporate governance. 
 
Understanding the objectives of the mainstream corporate governance model and how it became 
international orthodoxy requires further critical scrutiny. To that end, I have employed the 
critical legal studies (CLS) approach138 in addition to the socio-legal methodology, although 
                                                     
131 An inter-disciplinary research is described by Banakar and Travers as ‘an ambition to understand and 
integrate aspects of two or several disciplinary perspectives into one single approach […] in an attempt 
to transcend some of the theoretical and methodological limitations of the disciplines in question and 
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Paddy Ireland and Ian Grigg-Spall (eds), The Critical Lawyers' Handbook (Pluto Press 1992). 
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they have overlapping aims in that they both attempt to transcend the boundaries of traditional 
doctrinal research. In fact, Schiff has expressed that socio-legal methodology ‘must always 
remain in critical perspective’.139 The CLS approach is primarily concerned with the critique of 
liberal legal scholarship and expresses ‘a deep dissatisfaction with the dominant “black-letter” 
approach of the traditional legal education with its emphasis on the exposition of legal rules 
abstracted from their social, political and economic context’.140 Accordingly, legal liberalism 
implies, 
 
(a) the separation of law from other varieties of social control, (b) the existence of law 
in the form of rules which both define the proper sphere of their own application and 
(c) which are presented as the objective and legitimate normative mechanism whilst 
other normative types are partial or subjective, and (d) yield determinant and 
predictable results in their application in the juridical process.141  
 
Thus, law is treated as ‘a discrete and distinct object’ which has an autonomous existence.142 
Apart from this common ground, there is significant diversity of theoretical positions amongst 
CLS scholars.143 In this research, I use a Marxist theoretical framework, which has been one of 
the key traditions that have informed the CLS debates.144 
 
A Marxist critique holds that ‘the central question concerning the role of law in a class society 
is its apparent autonomy and neutrality’.145 On this point, Pashukanis has argued that all law 
was bourgeois law by the virtue of its form serving capitalist interests and should hence be 
discarded146 while other critical Marxists have considered the possibility of socialising the 
law.147 I agree with the latter camp, which finds expression in Fine and Picciotto’s remarks: 
‘The point is not merely to denounce the legal form but to fight for the best possible form and 
                                                     
The CLS movement has its origins in the United States with the proceedings of the conference held at 
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140 Paddy Ireland and Ian Grigg-Spall (eds), The Critical Lawyers' Handbook (Pluto Press 1992) ix. 
141 A Hunt, 'The Theory of Critical Legal Studies' (1986) 6(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1, 4. 
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content of law’.148 As Hunt has noted, a Marxist theory of law is ‘directed at converting the 
conventional wisdom of liberal legalism’.149 Thus, the Marxist critique employed in this 
research does not suggest the abolition of law; instead it attempts to ‘expose the real social 
antagonisms concealed beneath their apparently smooth surfaces’.150 To that end, Marxist 
theory on the capitalist relations of production are essential for grasping how the capitalist class 
was able to dominate the labour class (or more generally, the rest of the society). In turn, this 
dominance has enabled the capitalists to create legal rules and mechanisms such as the public 
company share to facilitate capital accumulation while portraying these legal rules as common 
sense.151 The mainstream corporate governance laws constitute such an example; their form and 
content are informed by the global capitalists and their collective interests.  
 
I employ a Marxist theoretical framework in this research because it is the most suited to explain 
the power relations underlying the current capitalist system and to illustrate how the laws work 
for the benefit of the dominant class in society. Moreover, the use of Marxist insights on the 
power disparity between the capitalist and the labour classes provides an understanding of how 
the shareholder primacy theory of corporate governance succeeded other forms of corporate 
governance and became the mainstream model. Therefore, I use a Marxist CLS approach to 
illustrate how capitalists promote corporate governance laws to emerging markets like Turkey 
to advance the interests of the global investor class, disregarding the rest of the stakeholders 
and society. 
 
I also make use of the black-letter methodology in Chapters 4 and 5 to explain and interpret the 
sources of corporate governance law in Turkey. Chapter 4 deals with the corporate governance 
provisions found under the capital markets legislation, and Chapter 5 examines the articles in 
the Turkish Commercial Code relating to corporate governance. In these two chapters, I discuss 
the legal provisions in detail. However, I also include the historical process by which the 
reforms took place, which means that Chapters 4 and 5 also include elements of socio-legal 
research. Alongside the primary laws, I utilise the Genel Gerekçe (General Justification) of 
these primary legal sources. Genel Gerekçe is an official text published by the legislators along 
with the legislation and includes the detailed reasoning behind the enactment of particular laws 
and its individual articles. I also use legal scholars’ views, especially those of Turkish law 
scholar Ünal Tekinalp because he is the head of the commission in charge of drafting the new 
commercial code. Finally, I examine the parliamentary discussions from the Turkish Grand 
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National Assembly (TBMM) regarding the passing of the related laws because commentaries 
from both the government and the opposition parties provide useful insights on the viewpoints 
of domestic actors. I also use the data from Turkey’s stock exchange, the Borsa Istanbul (BIST), 
to determine the level of stock market development over the years and the changes in the number 
of foreign shareholders in Turkish listed companies.152 I exclude the corporate governance of 
banks from the scope of the research because the rules pertaining to financial institutions’ 
governance require separate analyses and distinct research methodologies. 
 
5 Contribution to Research 
 
The methodology of choice, namely the socio-legal approach, is the main contributor to the 
novelty of this research. In light of the current state of the literature, this thesis aims to 
distinguish itself by employing a critical Marxist analysis to the interpretation of Turkey’s 
adoption of the Anglo-American legal rules on corporate governance. To my knowledge, as of 
the time of writing, no work on Turkey’s corporate governance issues has been produced from 
a socio-legal perspective or used critical legal theory. Therefore, this research will be the first 
of its kind. 
 
In Turkey, corporate governance has not been prevalent in law studies or legal academia until 
recently. Pulaşlı was the first legal scholar in Turkey to publish an academic book specifically 
on corporate governance in 2003,153 and even to this date, there are a limited number of books 
focusing on corporate governance laws.154 In his book, Pulaşlı has admitted that although 
international scholarship is advanced on the topic of corporate governance, Turkish scholars 
have been late to catch up to this growing field of law.155 Following the reform process of the 
new TCC, interest from legal academia has increased because the new law contained the first 
mention of the term ‘corporate governance’ in a piece of primary legislation in Turkey. There 
is a significant amount of literature concerning the drafting process of the new commercial code, 
which includes discussions on corporate governance law in Turkey but excludes theoretical 
discussions.156 In general, legal scholarship in Turkey tends to rely solely on black-letter 
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methodology or comparative studies because Turkish law education follows a conservative 
legal formalism and does not introduce law students to other disciplines or research 
methodologies.157  
 
On the other hand, there is relatively more literature on Turkish corporate governance from 
scholars from backgrounds other than law. Many scholars have researched and written 
extensively on corporate governance, especially from an economics or business studies 
perspective. These scholars have mostly used empirical research methods to explain the 
relationship between corporate governance and issues such as board size and company 
performance in the context of Turkey.158 However, while informative in terms of shedding light 
on the current state of corporate governance in Turkey, these studies have not critically engaged 
with the corporate governance orthodoxy and instead accepted it as given. The aforementioned 
studies have used a technical and narrow perception of corporate governance and have not 
extended their analysis beyond this understanding. In contrast, as elaborated in this thesis’ 
methodology, a socio-legal approach explores the interaction of corporate governance laws with 
various disciplines and adopts a critical stance that extends beyond readily accepted perceptions. 
Research on corporate governance laws from this vantage point has evidently been missing in 
the literature. With this thesis, I aim to fill an important gap in the legal studies of corporate 
governance, encourage more research that takes an inter-disciplinary approach to Turkish law, 
and garner further interest in critical legal studies internationally. 
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6 Structure of the Thesis 
 
In Chapter 1, I initiated the discussion by laying out the importance of the general subject. I 
briefly touched upon the ongoing debates on corporate governance and provided different 
perspectives. I presented the case for why research on Turkey’s corporate governance laws has 
merit. I also highlighted how this thesis can be distinguished from previous research in the field. 
After stating the aims of the research, I formulated the research question. Finally, I expressed 
why the inquiry at hand presents a unique contribution to the existing body of knowledge, 
drawing particularly on the methodology of choice. 
 
Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework which forms the foundation of the analyses 
presented throughout this thesis. The chapter begins with Marx’s base and superstructure 
metaphor for locating law within the capitalist system. It expands on the central elements of the 
Marxist critique of capitalism, such as the use and the exchange values of a commodity that 
elucidate how money commodifies social relations of production. It discusses Marx’s theory on 
the ‘circuit of capital’, which explains money’s transformation into capital and how profit is 
accumulated by the capitalist in turn. The chapter then elaborates on the roles of the joint-stock 
company and the company share in capitalism, which both commodify social relations and 
sustain the liquid and mobile character of money in the circulation of money capital. Next, I 
discuss the capitalistic character of law and demonstrate how the law works to conceal 
underlying struggles and power relations by using supposedly neutral legal structures such as 
the property right. I then elaborate that the mainstream corporate governance laws are also 
capitalistic in that they strive to advance the interests of the capitalist class. More specifically, 
these rules aim to provide global investors with control of company management, so they can 
appropriate the revenues for themselves. In sum, the use of the Marxist lens exposes how 
capitalism is sustained globally by law, more specifically corporate governance laws. This 
analysis also illustrates how capitalism serves the dominant class interests, which represents the 
global investor class in the context of the inquiry at hand. 
 
Chapter 3 presents an historic account of the shareholder primacy theory to illustrate the process 
by which it has been able to supersede other views and become the mainstream model in 
corporate governance. I discuss the shareholder primacy theory’s emergence in the context of 
United States’ era of managerial corporate governance, which is roughly defined as the period 
from the end of Great Depression until the late 1970s. The chapter continues by tracing the 
period marked by the rise of neoliberal ideology and the corresponding law and economics 
scholarship. I discuss the theoretical underpinnings of the shareholder primacy theory by 
examining the legal justifications put forth by its proponents. Through this analysis, I make the 
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point that both the form and substance of the mainstream corporate governance model is derived 
from an Anglo-American variant with dispersed ownership structure and highly liquid markets. 
Next, I explore the process by which the mainstream corporate governance model was exported 
to emerging market countries and promoted as universal standards by international 
organizations. This section draws on the role of the IFIs and their ROSCs, which rely on the 
OECD Principles as the benchmark for corporate governance. Finally, the chapter presents an 
alternative; the stakeholder theory of corporate governance. I highlight the various perspectives 
within this scholarship to underline the significance of the different approach to promoting 
stakeholder interests in company management. Overall, the chapter serves two interconnected 
purposes. First, this chapter attempts to explain how the shareholder primacy theory became the 
mainstream model of corporate governance by laying out the historical process by which capital 
gained power over labour and the rest of the stakeholders in a company. The chapter also 
exposes the motivation behind the process of exporting the OECD Principles to emerging 
markets, which in turn allows an understanding of the causes of Turkey’s adoption of the 
mainstream model into its corporate governance laws. 
 
Chapter 4 examines the first pillar of the Turkish corporate governance framework to explain 
the methods by which the mainstream model has been integrated into Turkish laws. The chapter 
provides a detailed analysis of the corporate governance reforms brought with the new CML, 
as well as the regulations of the CMB. The chapter begins with a narrative of the development 
of the capital markets in Turkey to provide the necessary background to the reform process of 
the corporate governance of listed companies. Next, I provide a black-letter analysis of the 
specific provisions of corporate governance envisaged in the new CML, the CMB’s 
communiques on corporate governance, and the CMB’s Corporate Governance Principles 
(CMB Principles). In particular, I highlight the CMB’s move from the comply-or-explain 
approach adopted in its earlier corporate governance principles to a hard law approach. Finally, 
the chapter reviews the substance of the CMB Principles under the following four sub-sections: 
Shareholders, Public Disclosure and Transparency, Stakeholders, and Board of Directors. 
 
Chapter 5 explores the new TCC and its corporate governance reforms, which constitutes the 
second pillar of the Turkish corporate governance framework. This chapter is a continuation of 
the previous chapter’s black-letter analysis of the laws and illustrates the methods of how the 
mainstream model of corporate governance has been incorporated into Turkish laws. The 
subject of the inquiry is the new TCC, which stipulates general rules on company law. Hence, 
its corporate governance provisions are applicable to not just joint-stock companies, but also all 
capital companies. The chapter starts with a background to the drafting process of the new 
commercial code and pinpoints the reasons and influences behind the new legislation. I then 
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provide a brief account of relations between Turkey and the European Union to demonstrate the 
influence of Turkey’s membership aspirations in the development of the new code. Next, the 
chapter explains in detail the articles pertaining to corporate governance and focuses on the new 
shareholder rights such as the principle of equal treatment as well as on the provisions on 
minority shareholders. The chapter concludes by discussing the extent and applicability of the 
rights provided to stakeholders in the new TCC. This chapter and the preceding chapter attempt 
to illustrate the particular provisions and methods by which Turkey has adopted the mainstream 
corporate governance model through its new legal framework for corporate governance. 
 
Chapter 6 constitutes the critical assessment portion of this thesis and attempts to determine 
whether Turkey has conformed to the mainstream model in its new corporate governance 
framework as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. I utilise the OECD Principles and the related 
OECD report on Turkey, which provides recommendations for the Turkish policy makers to 
fully conform with the OECD Principles.159  Next, I analyse the CMB’s shift from the comply-
or-explain approach to mandatory corporate governance principles. In the last part of the 
chapter, I discuss the implications of the new Turkish corporate governance laws on two levels: 
on the ownership structure of listed companies and for the stakeholder as well as society at 
large. I determine whether there have been more foreign investors in the Turkish stock market 
since the new corporate governance laws have been enacted. In line with the findings on whether 
there have been more investor, I engage the law and finance theory by analysing the possible 
implications of the new laws on the concentrated and family-owned structure of Turkish 
companies. This analysis assesses the likelihood of a transformation from that structure to a 
wide share dispersal system. I elaborate on the subsequent changes of the control of listed 
companies passing from family owners to independent boards and professional management as 
dictated by the demands of dispersed shareholders. I also discuss the likely consequences of this 
change for the stakeholders and society in general.  
 
Finally, in Chapter 7, I restate my overarching research question, followed by a summary of the 
main findings and analyses presented throughout this thesis. I conclude by briefly illustrating 
how I have achieved the aims laid out at the beginning of the research. I mention the areas left 
outside the scope of this thesis’, which present opportunities for further research. I also provide 
two broad topics that could be examined in the future that would continue the discussions and 
findings of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER II – The Theoretical Framework 
 
1 Introduction 
 
This chapter lays out the theoretical framework used to understand and analyse the capitalist 
system in which laws such as corporate governance laws work to advance the interests of a 
particular capitalist class, namely global investors. This thesis employs the Marxist theory of 
law and certain themes from the Marxist theory on the capitalist mode of production. The 
chapter starts with Marx’s base and superstructure metaphor to provide a general theory of law. 
Accordingly, the theory dictates that one must inquire into the economic base of the society to 
make sense of the legal structure, or the superstructure, which is built upon the material base. 
This material base refers to the social relations of production. The chapter continues with 
outlining the main elements of Marx’s theory on relations of production, drawing on the 
distinction between use and exchange values of a commodity, which explain how money 
commodifies social relations of production and the surplus creation. From here, I locate the role 
of the joint-stock company within the capitalist mode of production discuss that role from the 
viewpoints of contemporary theorists. I also point out how the company share also commodifies 
the relations of production within the company, thus conceals the underlying power relations.  
 
I expand on the importance of company share in capitalism by using Marx’s ‘circuit of capital’ 
formulation to elaborate how money turns into capital in the production process to generate 
profit. I build on this theory to indicate that a liquid stock market with wide share dispersal is a 
prerequisite for the capitalists to extract surplus with the company share. It is therefore 
unsurprising that the shareholder primacy theory of corporate governance that is derived from 
an Anglo-American market system has become the mainstream model globally. The 
mainstream corporate governance rules not only strive for liquid markets to continue the circuit 
of capital, but also work to protect the interests of the capitalists by ensuring that the profits 
accrue to the capitalist shareholders alone. On this point, the use of Marxist theory reveals that 
the profit accrues to the shareholders as ‘the appropriation of other people’s surplus labour’160 
and results in the externalisation of costs onto other stakeholders, environment, and society at 
large. 
 
Indeed, the surplus generated from company operations accrues to the shareholders as a result 
of the exploitation of labour, which has been legitimised through particular capitalist legal 
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forms. This is explained through law’s capitalist or bourgeoise character, which always seeks 
to reinforce and advance dominant class interests. Since neither Marx nor Engels have 
formulated a systematic theory of law,161 I refer to the ideas of various Marxist scholars to define 
the relationship between law and class interests. These discussions provide further insights on 
the role of law in the capitalist mode of production, thus allowing the analysis of corporate 
governance laws from a Marxist lens. Finally, the chapter discusses how various legal constructs 
such as the property right or corporate governance laws commodify social relations of 
production thus conceal the power disparities underlying these forms. This analysis in turn 
explains why the shareholder primacy theory’s lynchpin is the contractual model of the 
company, which is further elaborated under Chapter 3. All in all, the chapter presents a 
framework that attempts to surpass the conventional wisdom of the liberal legal orthodoxy by 
providing a Marxist perspective in which the logic of the capitalist system can be understood. 
 
2 Law and its Economic Base 
 
Marx’s starting point for a theory of law is his abstraction of the base and the superstructure 
metaphor:  
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into […] relations of 
production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of 
production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic 
structure of the society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political 
superstructure […]162  
In this description, law constitutes a part of the superstructure, which is founded upon an 
economic and material base. Marx adds that any changes in the economic foundation will 
eventually ‘transform’ the superstructure.163 Thus, to understand Marx’s legal superstructure 
phenomenon, we must examine the economic base, the relations of production, and the 
corresponding class relations which determine the mode of production in a society. 
 
According to Marx, the prevalent mode of production is determined by examining the 
possession of the means of production.164 In the industrial capitalist system, there are two main 
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social classes: capitalists (bourgeoise), who are in a dominant position because they have access 
to the means of production such as land, factories, and raw materials; and labourers 
(proletarians), ‘the class of modern wage-labourers who, having no means of production of their 
own, are reduced to selling their labour power in order to live’.165 In this mode of production, 
profit is of utmost importance. In fact, ‘It is the rate of profit that is the driving force in capitalist 
production, and nothing is produced save what can be produced at a profit.’166 The capitalists 
employ the labourers to produce a commodity that would have an ‘exchange-value’ in the 
market ‘greater in value than the sum of the values of the commodities used to produce it, 
namely the means of production and labour-power’167 which results in profit, or ‘surplus 
value’.168 It must be highlighted that Marx’s starting point in his critique of the capitalist system 
is his analysis of commodities.169 He has made a distinction between the use-value and the 
exchange-value of a commodity. The use-value refers to the usefulness of a commodity which 
satisfies human-needs,170 whereas the exchange-value of a commodity is a quantitative value 
determined independently of its use-value.171 The exchange-value is constituted of the product 
of labour, which is determined by ‘the labour time socially necessary for its production’.172 He 
has added that for a commodity to be of any exchange-value, it must be useful to others by 
being exchanged in the market.173  
 
In the market exchange, the value of commodities is expressed by a ‘universal-value’, which is 
money.174 Yet, according to Marx, money ‘fetishizes’ the social relations of production.175 In 
other words, ‘the money form – which conceals the social character of private labour and the 
social relations between the individual workers, by making those relations appear as relations 
between material objects’.176 As Marx has elaborated, ‘Profit thus appears […] as simply the 
appropriation of other people’s surplus labour, arising from the transformation of means of 
production into capital; i.e. their estrangement vis-à-vis the actual producer’.177 Under 
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capitalism, the social relations of production are commodified through the use of money, which 
works to hide the fact that the surplus-value created at the end of the production accrues to the 
capitalist because the labour is paid less than the value it produces. 
 
In sum, Marx perceives the production process to be the exploitation of labour, which means 
that surplus labour produced by the worker accrues as profit to the owner of the means of 
production because of the owner’s dominant position in society. The organisation of production 
within the joint-stock company can be analysed in the same light. According to Marx, the 
formation of joint-stock companies merely represented the expansion in the scale of production 
of businesses which would be impossible for individual capitalists.178 Talbot has drawn on a 
Marxist perspective to assert that the company is a way of organising social relations of 
production where labour produces products and value as well as where investors (and the credit 
system) invest their money into production.179 She has concluded that the ‘company is a legal 
vehicle for the extraction of the surplus value which labour creates and therefore the company 
is no different from any other legal vehicle under which capitalist production is organised’.180 
In a similar vein, Ireland has defined the incorporated companies to be the ‘dominant legal 
organisational form of capital’ which is a major site for ‘relations of domination and 
subordination in society.’181 
 
Just like in industrial capitalism and by the same capitalistic logic, shareholders of the company 
can claim entitlement to revenues because the employees are not remunerated according to the 
actual value they create, but rather receive the lowest the employer can pay. Thus, Talbot asserts 
that ‘capital’s ability to make this claim is therefore not an attribute of capital per se but as a 
result of the power disparity between capital and labour’.182 According to Marx, this is merely 
‘the misrepresentation and the objectification of the relations of production’.183 The dominant 
position of the capitalist over labour is moreover facilitated by laws, which will be discussed in 
the final part of the chapter. To conclude in agreement with Talbot’s assertion, the shift to 
investor capitalism did not change the fundamental nature of capitalism.184 The investors’ or 
shareholders’ claim to profit arises because of the money they invested in the company and not 
because of their labour. For Marx, transition to investor capitalism is ‘a mere point of transition 
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to a new form of [capitalist] production’.185 The company form and its share merely function to 
commodify the social relations of production within the company by concealing the power 
struggles between the capitalist and labour.186 
 
 The Link Between the Company Share and the Circuit of Capital 
 
According to Marx, ‘The driving motive and determining purpose of capitalist production is 
[…] the greatest possible production of surplus value, hence the greatest possible exploitation 
of labour-power by the capitalist.’187 To expand on the capitalists’ motive of the ‘greatest 
possible production of surplus value’, Marx’s theory on the ‘the circulation of capital’ must be 
grasped. In the capitalist mode of production, money goes into circulation to create surplus 
value. As previously mentioned, capitalists invest in the production process with the expectation 
of profit by producing a commodity that would be sold at the market exchange for a monetary 
value greater than the total production costs. Until that product is sold at a profit, however, the 
money that the capitalist has invested is stuck in the production process.188 At this point, money, 
which is inherently mobile and liquid, becomes capital, thus interrupting the circulation.189 The 
capitalist must wait to reap the benefits of their investment, and it is only when the product is 
sold that the capital turns into its liquid and mobile money-form again. Marx explains this circuit 
of capital as follows: 
Money is advanced as capital, first transformed into the elements of production, then 
transformed from these into the commodity product, and this commodity product then 
again converted into money. […] the result being money which can be used by anyone 
for anything.190 
Moreover, once the capital is a part of production, there is the risk that the surplus value may 
not be realized if the product is not sold at a profit or at all. Yet, money has to enter the 
production process to gain ‘the ability to function as capital’ since capital ‘produces profit, i.e. 
it enables the capitalist to extract and appropriate for himself a certain quantity of unpaid labour, 
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surplus product and surplus-value’.191 Considering the arduous and lengthy process that money 
must undergo en route to profit, the capitalists have sought ways to generate surplus while 
keeping their investment as liquid as possible.192 
The laws which have facilitated the transformation of the company share as a form of ‘money 
capital’ are prominent examples of the methods used by capitalists. Indeed, the fundamental 
function of the company share lies not in its contribution to the production process but rather in 
its ability to allow capital to retain its mobility and liquidity by generating surplus for the 
investor. Talbot has argued that laws such as the legislation that strengthened the rights of 
investors or that allowed the creation of a market in shares played a crucial role in facilitating 
investors’ capitalism.193 Indeed, it was through law that the company share was able to acquire 
the ‘money capital’ function as a result of the capitalists’ aspiration to expand their opportunities 
for wealth creation.194 As Baars has pointed out, the emergence of the joint-stock company with 
its particular characteristics such as the freely transferable company share ‘were each developed 
as a result of specific historical circumstances and in order to facilitate the advent of bourgeois 
capitalism’.195 The historical account of how the company share was reconceptualised in 
English law has been further illustrated by Ireland’s Marxist demonstration of how law 
redefined the company share from an equitable interest in the assets of the company to an 
autonomous form of property.196 This transformation was accompanied by the establishment of 
a developed market, which gave the company share its mobile and liquid character. Through 
these legal and economic developments, the company share has become a form of ‘fictitious 
capital’197 or money capital; ‘a commodity in itself which commands a price’.198 In sum, the 
company share now carries a value that is independent from the production process because the 
law enabled capitalists to ‘reduce the length of the circulation process to a minimum’.199 
Along with the changes in the legal nature of the company share, its value was also disconnected 
from the tangible assets of the company and instead became tied to ‘the market’s assessment of 
the revenue they were likely to generate in the future’.200 In line with the commodification of 
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the company share, the connection between the share price and the actual production process 
was severed.201 This has led to the emergence of rentier investors who provide no contribution 
other than their capital but expect to obtain the revenues from production.202 Marx has 
commented on the rentier investor class as follows: 
In joint-stock companies, the [entrepreneur] function is separated from capital 
ownership, so labour is also completely separated from ownership of means of 
production and of surplus labour. This result of capitalist production is its highest 
development, is a necessary point of transition towards the transformation of capital 
back into property of producers […].203 
Thus, the rentier investor’s lack of any entrepreneurial function did not change the fact that the 
surplus value accrued to the capitalist, ‘though no longer the private property of individual 
producers, but rather as their property as associated producers, as directly social property’.204 
To summarise, legal developments have facilitated the commodification of the company share 
to allow capitalists without entrepreneurial functions to nevertheless appropriate profit from 
production. 
The company share has been referred to as fictitious capital by Marx because the share 
circulated as money capital in the stock exchange.205 He explains this transformation as follows: 
‘On the basis of capitalist production, money […] can be transformed into capital, and through 
this transformation it is turned from a given, fixed-value into a self-valorising value capable of 
increasing itself.’206 Thus, in the stock exchange, company share ‘exists in a state which it can 
perform monetary functions’.207 For Marx, as opposed to commerce capital used in production, 
this ‘interest-bearing capital’ is the most ‘fetishized form’ of capital because it refers to money 
that produces more money.208 Likewise, the company share performs the function of interest-
bearing capital regarding shareholders’ entitlement to company profits: 
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[…] dividends they draw include both interest and profit of enterprise […] this total 
profit is still drawn only in the form of interest, i.e. as a mere reward for capital 
ownership, which is now completely separated from its function in the actual 
production process.209 
 
Thus, the dividends that accrue to the shareholder are the result of the investors’ money creating 
profit by itself without engaging in production. As Marx has explained, ‘it now appears 
conversely as if interest is the specific fruit of capital, the original thing, while profit, now 
transformed into the form of profit of enterprise, appears as a mere accessory and trimming 
added in the reproduction process’.210 Therefore, he has added, the circulation of capital is 
‘abbreviated’ with this form of capital.211 He defines this development as ‘the hoarder’s most 
fervent wish realized’.212 The interest-bearing capital function of the company share is further 
sustained by capitalist legal structures that seek to legitimise and conceal the underlying 
relations between capital and labour, which can be explained by law’s inherently capitalistic 
character. 
 
 Capitalistic Character of Law and the Mainstream Corporate 
Governance Laws 
 
In line with the above explanations regarding Marx’s theory on the relations of production 
which form the economic foundation on which the law is built, it follows that a Marxist 
approach to law is concerned with the role of law in the reproduction of the relations of 
production in a capitalist society. 
 
Since this thesis attempts to demonstrate the role of corporate governance laws in advancing 
the interests of the global investor class within the broader context of capitalism, the role of law 
as an instrument to serve dominant class interests must be further explored. However, apart 
from the base and superstructure metaphor213 and analyses of specific legislation of his time,214 
Marx has not formulated a systematic theory of law.215 Instead, scholars from the Marxist 
tradition have extracted ideas from his writings to determine the purpose of law within capitalist 
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societies.216 According to Hunt, a Marxist approach to law questions the role of law ‘in the 
reproduction of the structural inequalities which characterize capitalist societies’.217 For Hunt, 
‘the content and procedures of law manifest, directly or indirectly, the interests of the dominant 
class(es)’.218 In a similar vein, Collins has asserted that law ensures ‘the preservation of a 
particular mode of production and its corresponding class structure, thereby placing nearly all 
the available wealth and power in the hands of a fraction of the population’.219 The commonality 
in these Marxist perceptions to law is that both scholars form the link between law and class 
interests. This theme is apparent in the Manifesto of the Communist Party by Marx and Engels, 
where they state that the law is ‘but the will of your class made into a law for all, a will whose 
essential character and direction are determined by the economical conditions of existence of 
your class’.220 Engels has also acknowledged that ‘The working man knows too well, has 
learned from too oft-repeated experience, that the law is a rod which the bourgeois has prepared 
for him.’221 It follows that a Marxist approach to law accepts that the dominant class employs 
law as ‘a coercive instrument to foster its own interests’.222 
 
Indeed, in capitalism, the surplus value from production is appropriated by the capitalist due to 
their exploitation of labour, which has been legitimised by particular capitalist legal forms. An 
example of this are the laws that establish and protect a regime of property ownership.223 The 
property right is derived from the liberal legal doctrine, which asserts that property ownership 
is a neutral concept.224 In capitalism, the property owner is regarded as the person who possesses 
a commodity and can in turn exchange that property in the market through contractual relations 
between equal juridical subjects.225 Thus, capitalism portrays every individual in the society as 
equal, having free will, and the ability to freely enter into contracts.226 
 
According to Gill, at the start of modern capitalism in England, legal reforms were introduced 
to facilitate the law of contracts to benefit the propertied class of the society. As a result, the 
contractual relationship between the owners of the means of production and the worker is 
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perceived to be on equal footing because both parties have ‘formal equality before law’.227 Thus, 
Gill has rightly pointed out that ‘this legal form underpins the commodification of labour and 
of things’.228 Indeed, in the case of employment contracts, law works to conceal an underlying 
power disparity through a seemingly fair exchange between the employer and the worker. 
However, the capitalist owner of the means of production gains authority over the worker as a 
result of this contract.229 Even though it seems as if the worker entered the contract of their own 
free will, the contract codifies an inherently unequal relationship. 
 
The capitalistic nature of law is also evident from the mainstream corporate governance model 
that enjoys hegemony today. The corporate governance laws that are based on shareholder 
primacy theory hold that the sole objective of the company is to maximise shareholder wealth 
and that this is a natural consequence of share ownership. However, the right to property 
ownership is not a neutral legal form; instead, it reflects the dominant position of the capitalist 
class in society and works to the benefit of that class alone. As Engelen has asserted, ‘specific 
legal rights always reflect historical societal constellations and the class relations and ownership 
structures of which they consist’.230 This will become more apparent in Chapter 3’s examination 
of the managerial era in the post-war period in the United States, where labour had a stronger 
position vis-à-vis the capitalists. Thus, the laws at the time encouraged company management 
to run companies in line with broader interests than those of shareholders.231 
 
On the other hand, mainstream corporate governance rules commodify the relations between 
shareholders, labour, and the rest of the stakeholders. Shareholders accumulate the profit that 
accrue from company operations (i.e., the production process), where the surplus essentially 
arises as a result of the exploitation of stakeholders. This has been possible due to the power 
gap between the shareholders and the other stakeholders in the capitalist system. Yet, it should 
be noted that this in no way suggests that the interests of labour and other stakeholders are 
homogeneous in a company. They may have varying objectives and interests; however, their 
commonality lies in their position in relation to the shareholders.232 Therefore, the analysis of 
the ways in which capitalists use laws to maintain their dominant position over labour has wider 
repercussions for all stakeholders. 
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Contract law commodifies the relations of production and conceals the relative power of the 
parties to the contract. This explains why the shareholder primacy theory of corporate 
governance laws rests on the contractual theory of the company and insists that a company is 
nothing but a set of contracts.233 Moreover, contract law’s nature also explains why the 
mainstream corporate governance model provides that only those stakeholder rights which are 
specified in their contracts with the company should be protected.234 This view is evident from 
the OECD Principles, which state that stakeholder rights that are established ‘through mutual 
agreements’ should be respected.235 This understanding, which is prevalent in mainstream 
corporate governance regulation, does not provide any guarantees for the protection of labour 
or other stakeholder rights, which are already protected through existing legislation. Thus, 
corporate governance laws that purport to protect stakeholder rights instead commodify the 
relation between shareholders and stakeholders. The exploitative character of capitalism 
remains unchanged; the mainstream corporate governance laws that advocate the purpose of the 
company to be increases in share price or dividends are a reflection of underpaid labour, unsafe 
work environments, environmental hazards, and all other costs that are borne by stakeholders. 
This has been explained by Marx to be the capitalists’ tendency ‘towards increasing the 
productivity of labour, in order to cheapen commodities, and by cheapening commodities, to 
cheapen the worker himself’.236 In sum, law’s seemingly technical corporate governance rules, 
such as the optimal size of boards or the necessity for certain committees within boards, mask 
the power struggle between the capitalist and the labour inherent in the company. These rules 
serve the sole purpose of ensuring that surplus value accrues to the capitalist. 
 
In search for greater surplus value, the capitalists have expanded their reach beyond their 
national markets by investing in cross-border company stocks. As Soederberg has explained, 
this is a result of the globalised mode of capital accumulation, ‘whereby money dominates over 
productive capital [which] leads to the necessity of effectively expanding (as opposed to 
valorising) capital by continually increasing one’s exposure to risk, and thus higher returns’.237 
Hence, the developing world, particularly the emerging markets, provide ample opportunities 
for capital expansion due to their high expected growth rates and risks associated with their 
economic and political landscape. Neoliberal policies of market and capital liberalisation have 
been employed in emerging market economies by the IFIs that have asserted the importance of 
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free capital mobility for development.238 This expansion was accompanied by legal mechanisms 
to strengthen the position of mobile capital.  
 
To this end, international organisations representing the neoliberal discourse have disseminated 
a set of corporate governance rules to be adopted under the legal frameworks of emerging 
market countries.239 The adoption of these laws benefit the global investors by allowing them 
control over the distribution of company profits in the form of specific rights that take 
precedence over the rights of domestic controlling owners and stakeholders.240 Global investors 
can thus ensure that the surplus value created does not mainly flow to owner families, labour, 
or stakeholders. Moreover, the global investors are in a stronger position than the relatively 
immobile stakeholders due to the mobile character of their capital. Hence, they can exploit the 
opportunities in one market and change location once the economic conditions deteriorate, 
whereas the stakeholders do not have similar exit opportunities.241 These factors augment the 
already strong position of the global investor within the company. All in all, corporate 
governance laws help secure the prominent position of the global capitalist in the company 
through rules that allow control over how company profits are distributed, hence ensuring that 
the surplus value accrues to the capitalists alone. 
 
3 Conclusions 
 
A Marxist approach to law provides an understanding of how laws are shaped and whose 
interests they are designed to serve. This allows a critical analysis of the objectives of certain 
laws with extensive distributive consequences; including legislation on corporate governance. 
The Marxists argue that under capitalism, law serves the interests of the dominant class, which 
is the capitalist class due to their superior position from owning the means of production. There 
is no consensus amongst Marxists whether all law is capitalistic law or whether some form of 
law would be possible in the stage following the overthrow of capitalism.242 This argument is 
not relevant for the purposes of the research. The main Marxist assertion here is that, as Hunt 
has articulated, law is ‘an instrument through which the capitalist class imposes its will’.243 The 
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analyses of certain legal forms such as the property right or law of contracts illustrates this point 
because these constructs help commodify the relations of production by creating the image of 
fairness and equal bargaining between the capitalist and the worker. Thus, as Gill has noted, 
‘the most important relations within capitalist society are moulded into the form of contractual 
relations’.244 Through this commodification, the underlying struggles and the exploitation of 
labour associated with the capitalist mode of production are conveniently hidden. In sum, law 
assumes its capitalist character due to the material disparity between different social classes. 
This leads to the conclusion that shareholder-centric corporate governance became mainstream 
because of shareholders’ relative power over the rest of the stakeholders. 
 
Indeed, the mainstream corporate governance rules ensure that the primary objective of the 
company is to maximise shareholder wealth. This notion has been exported by the IFIs into the 
laws of emerging markets to enable global capitalists to expropriate the surplus value from these 
cross-border markets that offer higher returns, providing them with more opportunities for 
capital expansion. Through a Marxist lens, the surplus value accruing to shareholders is in fact 
unpaid labour time and constitutes the externalisation of any costs onto stakeholders due to 
capitalists’ desire to achieve the highest possible returns. As Marx has noted, ‘Expropriation is 
the starting-point of the capitalist mode of production, whose goal is to […] expropriate all 
individuals from the means of production.’245 To this end, if money is to retain its mobility, it 
must be released from the confines of the production process, which is ‘the basic curse of 
capitalism that commodities must go through the phase in which they contain – in as yet 
unrealized form – the surplus-value produced by the working class’.246 Thus, the transformation 
in the legal nature of the company share into ‘fictitious capital’247 has enabled capitalists to 
generate profit through stock markets without being involved in the lengthy production process. 
 
Marx’s theory on the circuit of capital thus explains the mainstream corporate governance 
model’s insistence for liquid stock markets. The shareholder primacy theory that underlies the 
mainstream model is derived from an Anglo-American market system where wide share 
dispersal is the norm and, which leads to highly liquid stock markets.248 A developed stock 
market is necessary for the capitalists to circumvent the production process. Thin stock markets 
are perceived as undesirable by the capitalists because they block the ‘circuit of capital’, causing 
capital to lose its mobile character. The mainstream corporate governance laws are portrayed as 
benefiting the economic development of the emerging market countries. Yet, instead, these laws 
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allow global investors to gain control over the governance of companies abroad and acquire 
decision-making power over how the revenues will be allocated amongst the various 
stakeholders. This implicit objective of the mainstream model is reflected in its preference for 
outside shareholders, which will be elaborated in the following chapters. This chapter concludes 
with the finding that the corporate governance laws that currently enjoy hegemony ensure 
capitalist interests are protected while using seemingly neutral rules to conceal the exploitative 
nature of company share ownership. Capitalists, by insisting on corporate governance rules that 
protect shareholder interests, are thus able to secure their position as the recipient of all surplus 
value accruing from company operations. Turkey, with its recent corporate governance reforms, 
is a case on point. The new legislation gives preference to shareholder interests, especially those 
of minority shareholders, to the detriment of other stakeholders and controlling shareholders. 
Examining this development from a Marxist lens elucidates whom these rules are designed to 
serve. 
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CHAPTER III – Development of the Mainstream Corporate 
Governance Model 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The shareholder primacy theory of corporate governance, referred to in this thesis as the 
mainstream corporate governance model, holds that the sole purpose of the company is to 
maximise shareholder wealth broadly through dividend distribution and share price 
appreciation. Various justifications have assisted this shareholder-centric model to dominate the 
current corporate governance agenda. In fact, as Stout has pointed out, shareholder primacy 
ideology has turned into ‘dogma: a belief system so widely accepted that most of those who 
embrace it cannot recall where they first learned of it or explain what evidence supports it over 
other theories’.249 This chapter explores how the shareholder primacy theory became 
‘conventional wisdom’250 to illuminate whose interests the mainstream model of corporate 
governance aims to serve. Thus, the goal of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive historical 
account of the current hegemony of the mainstream corporate governance model. The 
shareholder primacy theory advocates Hansmann and Kraakman have argued in their much-
deliberated article The End of history for Corporate Law that the mainstream corporate 
governance model’s ‘triumph’ over other governance models was due to its economic 
superiority.251 However, in this chapter I argue that the shareholder primacy theory became the 
orthodoxy in corporate governance because of the strengthened position of the capitalist class 
from the 1970s onwards. This position strengthened alongside the rise of neoliberal ideology, 
which has enabled the capitalists to influence policies and laws that advanced their own 
interests.252 
 
The first part of the chapter traces the evolution of the mainstream corporate governance model, 
starting with a narrative of how the purpose of the company has been perceived in legal thought 
since the 1930s in the context of the United States, where the phrase ‘corporate governance’ 
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first appeared.253 The chapter commences with the period when managerial corporate 
governance, also known as ‘the golden age of capitalism’254, reigned public companies. This 
period is roughly defined between the post-war era to late 1970s. During this time, the prevalent 
view amongst businesses, scholars, and society was that public companies ought to have a social 
purpose and that managers had fiduciary duties to not just shareholders but also the public.255 
This was reflected in Berle and Means’ seminal book The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property,256 which illustrated that ownership in large public companies in the United States has 
become so widely dispersed that their control has passed on to the managers, which establishes 
the ‘separation of ownership and control’ thesis.257 Berle and Means have argued that 
shareholders no longer had any interest in the running of these large companies since they held 
an insignificant portion of the overall shares.258 Hired managers came to be in charge of the 
largest corporations of the time, and therefore the corporate governance theory that dominated 
this period came to be known as managerial corporate governance. The result was that managers 
were seen as ‘capable of balancing the interests of all those involved from shareholders to 
consumers and employees’ and the companies were ‘conceived as public organisations’.259  
 
Therefore, Talbot notes that, in the managerial era the company ‘was viewed as a vehicle for 
social progress as well as dividend creation’.260 It is in this context that I present the Berle-Dodd 
legal debates of the 1930s over the issue of whose interests the company managers should 
pursue. Initially, ownership arguments were used to assert that shareholders were the owners of 
the company, and their interests should thus prevail. However, with the spread of large public 
companies with widely dispersed shareholders during this period, shareholders’ ownership 
claims subsided as they became passive rentier investors. The shareholder entitlement failed on 
the grounds of ownership defences and was resolved ‘by the subsequent emergence of an 
economics-derived neoliberal conceptualisation of the company in the “law and economics” 
tradition’.261 
 
The chapter continues by exploring the trajectory of events that have unfolded during the 
transition from the managerial era to neoliberalism to make sense of the arguments put forth by 
the proponents of the shareholder primacy theory. I discuss the demise of the managerial 
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corporate governance across the macroeconomic backdrop of the United States. As the 
Keynesian policies that marked the post-war era started to lose their validity, neoliberal 
economic and political policies started to take centre stage in the Anglo-American context. 
Margaret Thatcher became the Prime Minister in the United Kingdom in 1979 and Ronald 
Reagan was elected as the President in the United States in 1980. These two elections 
accompanied the gradual implementation of the neoliberal policies of free markets, 
privatisation, deregulation, disempowering of unions, and the roll-back of the welfare state. 
These policies were disseminated abroad, underpinned by the policy goals of the Washington 
Consensus agenda. In turn, as Ireland has noted, ‘concerted efforts have been made to 
universalize the shareholder-oriented, stock-market-market based forms of corporate 
governance found in the United Kingdom and the United States’.262 The neoliberal shareholder 
primacy model of corporate governance was primarily imposed on the emerging markets by 
IFIs in line with the interests of global investors. The OECD Principles have played a pivotal 
role in setting the supposed universal standards of good corporate governance in that process.263 
In this section, I elaborate on the essential components of the mainstream corporate governance 
model to identify its distinguishing characteristics. 
 
I also introduce the stakeholder theory, which is perceived to be an alternative to the mainstream 
model of corporate governance. The stakeholder theory’s supporters are of the view that 
managers should consider the interests of all the company constituents and recognise ‘the 
pluralistic nature of the corporation’.264 A broader definition explains stakeholder corporate 
governance as concerned with as ‘a wide range of groups with “stakes” in public companies - 
employees, customers, creditors, the community at large - should be recognised and, in some 
cases, represented in corporate legal and managerial structures’.265 Although this definition is 
the starting point of their arguments, stakeholder theorists differ in terms of their justifications 
for considering all stakeholder interests in company management. For instance, some have 
resorted to the efficiency justifications of the shareholder primacy theory to assert that a 
stakeholder approach is a more viable alternative.266 I elaborate on the possible implications of 
each of these perspectives. In summary, this chapter aims to clarify what the mainstream 
corporate governance model entails by delving into the historical process by which it became 
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orthodoxy and the interests it purports to serve. The chapter also provides the necessary context 
to analyse the reasons behind Turkey’s recent corporate governance reforms. 
2 Managerial Corporate Governance: The Golden Age of Capitalism 
 
The beginning of the 19th century experienced a rapid advancement of technology, which 
enabled entrepreneurs to take on projects that necessitated vast amounts of capital, know-how, 
and the professional management to handle these extensive undertakings. This was facilitated 
through the legal developments that allowed ‘fractionated ownership’ of businesses through 
public offerings which in turn ‘enabled the access to capital that funded modern industry’.267 
On the other hand, the management aspect of these large-scale projects had been handled by 
‘salaried managerial hierarchies who held no significant equity’.268 The drastic shift in business 
organisations captured the attention of two prominent American scholars: Adolf A. Berle and 
Gardiner C. Means. The authors put forth their landmark ‘separation of ownership from control’ 
thesis in their book The Modern Corporation and Private Property in 1932.269 Their research 
used empirical evidence from the large public companies in the United States to demonstrate 
that as these companies grew in size and their shareholdings became more dispersed, share 
ownership disconnected from control. This new organisation was a ‘quasi-public corporation: 
a corporation in which a large measure of separation of ownership and control has taken place 
through the multiplication of owners’.270 Shareholders were no longer interested in business 
affairs because their stakes were too insignificant in proportion to the total amount of shares. 
They had become ‘the passive beneficiaries’271 who owned shares, a form of ‘passive property 
[which] gives its possessor an interest in the enterprise but gives them practically no control 
over it and involve no responsibility’.272 In these companies, shareholders had ‘surrendered all 
disposition of it [profits] to those in control of the enterprise’.273 Berle and Means’ findings 
hinted the start of the managerial corporate governance era. 
 
Shortly before Berle and Means published their research, there had been an ongoing legal debate 
regarding ‘the interests corporations should properly serve with its correlative concerning the 
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duties of directors to various constituencies’.274 This famous debate was between the co-author 
of the Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle, and another American corporate law 
professor, Dodd, known as the so-called Berle-Dodd debate of the early 1930s. Concerned with 
the growing power of managers and the fear that they would divert company profits to 
themselves,275 Berle launched the debate with his article ‘Corporate Powers as Powers in 
Trust',276 arguing that ‘managerial powers are held in trust for stockholders as sole beneficiaries 
of corporate enterprise’.277 This position of Berle’s has made him renowned as ‘the grandfather 
of shareholder primacy’,278 although Ireland has pointed out that Berle had been supporting 
shareholder primacy due to ‘pragmatic reasons’ arising from his fear of managers abusing their 
discretionary power.279 Dodd responded with disagreement in his article 'For Whom Are 
Corporate Managers Trustees?':280 
 
He [Dodd, referring to himself] nevertheless believes that it is undesirable, even with 
the laudable purpose of giving stockholders much-needed protection against self-
seeking managers, to give increased emphasis at the present time to the view that 
business corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their stockholders. 
He believes that public opinion, which ultimately makes law, has made and is today 
making substantial strides in the direction of a view of the business corporation as an 
economic institution which has a social service as well as a profit-making function281 
 
Dodd had advanced his proposition by rejecting the notion that the public company is ‘a mere 
aggregate of stockholders’ and instead highlighted the traditional legal view that the 
‘corporation is a distinct legal entity’.282 In this view, the company is treated ‘as an institution 
directed by persons who are primarily fiduciaries for the institution rather than for its 
members’.283 Hence, the argument goes that the managers did not owe fiduciary duties to the 
shareholders alone. The debate continued with Berle’s article 'For Whom Corporate Managers 
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Are Trustees: A Note'.284 Berle was sceptical of Dodd’s stance of granting ‘uncontrolled power 
to corporate managers in the hope that they will produce that development’.285 He argued that 
‘unchecked by present legal balances, a social-economic absolutism of corporate 
administrators, even if benevolent, might be unsafe […] Meanwhile, as lawyers, we had best be 
protecting the interests we know […]’,286 referring to shareholder interests. However, Berle 
changed the initial position he took in the debate. Throughout the book Modern Corporation 
and Private Property, his position transformed ‘from a friend of shareholders to advocate of the 
corporation as an instrument for furthering national social welfare policy’.287 Scholars have 
attributed this change to the changing political trajectory in the United States at the time.288 The 
Berle-Dodd debate is significant in illustrating how the de facto separation of ownership from 
control and the increasing power of managers in large companies have shaped the legal 
scholarship on the purpose of the company and whom the managers owed fiduciary duties to. 
A few decades later, Berle came to accept that Dodd had won the debate. He admitted, ‘Events 
and the corporate world pragmatically settled the argument in favour of Professor Dodd.’289 
Indeed, the period between the 1930s and 1970s was marked by ‘managerialism’290 as the 
dominant corporate governance model, which has the underlying premise that the company’s 
purpose is to consider not only the shareholders’ interest but also the broader public’s interest.  
  
Another point to highlight is that the shift in business patterns had important consequences for 
share ownership and the associated property rights. In this regard, Berle and Means have drawn 
an analogy between the owners of the company in the past and the owners of the modern 
company. They have pointed out that the owners of previous business had two attributes: the 
first was providing capital and the second was managing the business. However, these two 
attributes were no longer combined in the same person in the modern company. Instead, the 
shareholder has ‘surrender[ed] control over his wealth’ to solely become the ‘provider of 
capital’.291 In light of these reduced attributes, Berle and Means have posed the question, ‘Must 
we not, therefore, recognize that we are no longer dealing with property in the old sense?’292 
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They have replied that ‘An answer to this question cannot be found in the law itself. It must be 
sought in the economic and social background of law.’293  
 
A similar change in share ownership occurred in the context of British businesses, which is 
illustrative of this ‘economic and social background of law’. Ireland has depicted this change in 
his account of the economic and legal transformation of the joint-stock company share in the 
United Kingdom.294 Accordingly, the transformation of the company share has been facilitated 
through the complete separation between shareholders and the company as well as the 
emergence of a developed share market.295 Ireland has explained that the first joint-stock 
companies found in England in the 16th century were more akin to partnerships; their shares 
were large in denomination, there were restrictions on their transfer, and there was an absence 
of a market for their trade.296 Thus, throughout the 17th to early 19th century, share ownership 
was regarded as having an ‘equitable interest in the assets of the company’,297 which in effect 
‘tied’ the members to the company. Thus, ‘complete separation’ could not be realised.298 This 
situation changed in the first half of the 19th century. The judiciary reconceptualised the legal 
nature of the joint stock company share from an equitable interest in the assets of the company 
whose value was derived from the company’s underlying assets to ‘an autonomous form of 
property, independent of the assets of the company’.299 Thus, Ireland has argued that the actual 
separation of incorporated companies from their members occurred once the legal and economic 
nature of the company share changed, not through the act of incorporation.300 
 
The complete separation of the company from its members not only further distanced the 
shareholders to the companies’ activities; ‘they were expelled from the sphere of production 
into the sphere of exchange where titles to revenues circulated’.301 The trajectory of these 
developments enabled the investor capitalist to generate greater surplus with minimal effort and 
risk. By contrast, the industrial capitalist who engaged in the production process had to 
undertake risks and contribute entrepreneurial activity into the business. On the other hand, as 
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Ireland has noted, ‘shareholders [have] gradually relinquished many of the rights and powers 
traditionally associated with ownership’.302 In a similar vein, Talbot has argued that this 
commodification of the company share has made shareholders more distant from the companies, 
undermining their entitlement claims.303 The weakening of the ownership status of the company 
shareholders later became problematic for the supporters of the shareholder primacy theory who 
tried to justify corporate governance rules protecting shareholder interests by claiming that 
shareholders’ interests should prevail because they own the companies.304 
 
Berle and Means have also observed the change in the nature of ownership status of 
shareholders in the United States. They have argued that ‘in earlier times the owner of property 
has been entitled to the full use or disposal of his property’305, but as shareholders became 
owners of passive property, their lack of entrepreneurial activity meant that their ‘real right of 
disposition’ over their property was only ‘over any returns which may be distributed to him, 
and over the proceeds of its sale’.306 Subsequently, shareholders becoming passive property 
owners had ramifications for shareholders’ entitlement claims, especially over the important 
issue of whose interests the company should be operated for.307 The authors have concluded as: 
 
On the one hand, the owners of passive property, by surrendering control and 
responsibility over the active property, have surrendered the right that the corporation 
should be operated in their sole interest, they have released the community from the 
obligation to protect them to the full extent implied in the doctrine of strict property 
rights. At the same time, the controlling groups, by means of the extension of corporate 
powers, have in their own interest broken the bars of tradition which require that the 
corporation be operated solely for the benefit of the owners of passive property.308 
 
Throughout Berle and Means’ analysis, they reject the application of strict property rights to 
the passive shareholder and opt for a ‘modification of the principle of private property’, which 
they regard as an essential consequence of shareholders giving up their control.309 This freed 
the managers from solely pursuing shareholder interests, and that ‘they have placed the 
community in a position to demand that modern corporation serve not alone the owners or the 
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control but all society’.310 The situation created the possibility that companies, or management 
more specifically, could in fact seek a social purpose. According to Talbot, the weakening of 
shareholders’ ownership rights has manifested ‘a potential for social change’ in the 
companies.311 For this change to materialise, Berle and Means have proposed that managers 
‘develop into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims by various groups in 
the community and assigning to each a portion of the income stream on the basis of public 
policy rather than private cupidity’.312 This idea of managers as ‘autonomous decisionmaking 
bodies’313 further resulted in the public company being perceived by scholars and the public as 
‘capable of balancing the interests of all those involved from shareholders to consumers and 
employees’.314 Stout has asserted that neither shareholder interests nor the idea of shareholder 
value was prioritised over the interests of stakeholders in the managerial corporate governance 
era.315 Moreover, Ireland has noted that by the 1950s, there was a widely held belief in the 
ability of managers to balance different interests using the discretion they had acquired in this 
period. 316 Indeed, the arguments put forth by Dodd in the early 1930s materialised in the 
decades that followed. Subsequently, he argued: 
 
Business - which is the economic organization of society - is private property only in a 
qualified sense, and society may properly demand that it be carried on in such a way as 
to safeguard the interests of those who deal with it either as employees or consumers 
even if the proprietary rights of its owners are thereby curtailed. […] legal tradition is 
rather in favor of treating it as an institution directed by persons who are primarily 
fiduciaries for the institution rather than for its members.317 
 
The separation of ownership from control and the subsequent changes in ownership rights were 
not the only reasons for the shift in perception of whom the managers owed fiduciary duties to. 
Ireland has pointed out that the period following the Second World War experienced the 
disempowerment of the capitalist class over labour, which was evident from decreasing income 
and wealth inequality levels.318 The post-war period was characterised by immense 
technological progress that led to increased profit, growth, and employment. This was 
supplemented by Keynesian policies ‘which made it possible for social struggles to obtain a 
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substantial increase in workers’ purchasing power, coupled with a system of social 
protection’.319 A class comprise between capital and labour was fully realised by the 1950s in 
the United States with the help of Keynesian policies that had the objective of ‘full employment, 
economic growth, and welfare of its citizens, and that state power should be freely deployed, 
alongside of, or if necessary, intervening in or even substituting for market processes to achieve 
these ends’.320 It was in this period that the power of finance started declining in relation to 
labour.321  
 
Dignam and Galanis have noted that the period between the post-war era to the late 1970s 
witnessed ‘an unprecedented period of economic growth and wealth creation often referred to 
as “the golden age of capitalism”’.322 These developments proved that ‘corporate governance 
could be non-shareholder oriented and corporations could operate in the interests of the 
community’.323 Nevertheless, this view was to be strongly rejected by the neoliberal proponents 
in the period starting from the mid-1970s. During this time, falling profits and economic 
problems created the opportunity for capitalists, particularly the financial property owners, to 
regain their power over workers.324 The next section discusses the shift from the managerial 
corporate governance era to a shareholder primacy dominated one, which was enabled by the 
change of power configurations in society facilitated by the rise of the neoliberal ideology. 
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3 The Mainstream Corporate Governance Model 
 
 Introduction: Shareholder Primacy on the Rise 
 
The years of social peace and economic stability sustained under the post-war class compromise 
started to break down throughout the Anglo-American economies from the late 1960s onwards. 
Subsequently, liberal thought re-emerged325 with its classical economic assumptions326 as an 
alternative to the Keynesian policies of the time.  In line with Talbot’s argument that the 
neoliberal corporate governance in hegemony today ‘reveals a political as much as an economic 
theory’,327 it is necessary to explore the premises of the neoliberal ideology to grasp how it 
became the ‘economic and political orthodoxy of the capitalist system’328 and how it has 
facilitated the rise of the shareholder primacy theory as the prevailing mode of corporate 
governance globally. 
 
At the core of neoliberal ideology lies the idea that social welfare can be most optimally 
achieved through freeing the markets and individuals from any state constraints.329 Harvey, 
however, has asserted that neoliberalism should be perceived ‘as a political project to re-
establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites’.330 
In the managerial era, the capitalists’ power has been restrained through the policies adopted by 
the welfare state and the managers of large companies who were inclined to consider a broader 
range of interests beyond those of shareholders whilst running the company. Moreover, the 
financial architecture established under the Bretton Woods system has kept the power of finance 
in check through fixed exchange rates and restrictions on international capital flows. 
Nevertheless, when economic conditions deteriorated in the advanced capitalist economies, the 
opportunity arose for the capitalist class to reassert their power over labour by promoting 
neoliberal policies. Indeed, as Harvey has noted, such policies could only become influential in 
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a particular set of circumstances. 331 These circumstances have materialised from the late 1970s 
onwards in the United States and the United Kingdom, both of which experienced economic 
turmoil mainly in the form of ‘stagflation’, which refers to an economy with high inflation, 
unemployment, and low growth.332 
 
According to Duménil and Lévy, the main reason why the advanced capitalist economies 
experienced economic crisis was the falling rates of profit.333 They have drawn from a Marxist 
analysis to argue that the low levels of profits decrease companies’ abilities to accumulate 
capital, thus causing slowdowns in production and increasing unemployment.334 The falling rate 
of profits can be attributed to several factors. The international financial order created by the 
Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944335 through the establishment of the IMF and the WB had 
constructed a regime of fixed currency exchange rates pegged to the US dollar. The dollar was 
then convertible to gold at a fixed rate. This system aimed to ‘shield countries from the 
destabilizing dynamics of international finance’.336 This regime also strictly controlled cross-
border capital movements, limiting any speculative activity and thus the financial gains of the 
capitalists. However, one pillar of this financial architecture was discarded in 1971 when 
President Nixon announced the end of the US dollar’s convertibility into gold,337 and the US 
transitioned to a floating exchange rate system.338  
 
The system of floating exchange rates was necessary for the successful implementation of 
neoliberal policies since it signified that the state had less authority over price determination 
and hence over the workings of the market. As a corollary, state regulation on capital 
movements became less effective, and financial deregulation took off in the Western 
economies, signalling the move away from Keynesianism towards a neoliberal free-market 
policy.339 The rate of profits continued declining after the drastic increase in oil prices due to 
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the Arab oil embargo against the US between 1973-1974.340 The increase in oil prices negatively 
affected US industry, resulting in rising prices, inflation, and stagnated growth. The low levels 
of profit meant that there were no investors willing to put their money in financing companies, 
which led to a bear stock market which entails continuously downward share prices and a 
generally negative outlook. In sum, the falling stock prices considerably led to doubts over the 
‘efficacy’ of managerial corporate governance and its ability to generate profit.341 
 
Another development in this period was the increasing power of institutional shareholders due 
to the spread of share ownership amongst the public through mutual funds, pension funds, and 
insurance companies. Accordingly, the ratio of institutional shareholdings in US public 
companies increased from 16% in 1965 to 47% in 1987.342 As share ownership passed from 
individuals to institutional investors, collective shareholders became much more influential in 
affecting company objectives. Also, because their shareholdings were large enough, they now 
had the power to sell their holdings if they believed the company was being poorly run, which 
would depress the share price.343 This paved the way for the active shareholder monitoring of 
corporate managers’ performance through ‘objective’ performance criteria that corresponded to 
share price.344 Moreover, the pay structures of top managers became tied to the share price 
through mechanisms such as stock options from the 1950s onwards; thus, ‘US corporate 
managers developed an ever-growing personal interest in boosting the market value of their 
companies’ stock.’345 
On the other hand, the agency theorists have argued that managers should not be left to their 
own discretion because ‘like all rational economic actors, [managers] have incentives to 
perform suboptimally when acting as agents’.346 On this point, Manne’s ‘market for corporate 
control’ thesis has argued that managers needed to be disciplined by market mechanisms so 
they would not diverge from pursuing shareholder interests.347 He has argued that there is ‘a 
high positive correlation between corporate managerial efficiency and the market price of shares 
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of that company’. Therefore, inefficient managers who fail to increase stock price would be 
replaced through the market mechanism.348 This theory formed the foundations of the idea that 
pursuing share price maximisation would be the most efficient way of operating a company. As 
Lazonick and O'Sullivan have noted, ‘the rate of return on corporate stock was their measure of 
superior performance, and the maximization of shareholder value became their [agency 
theorists’] creed’.349 It was in the context of a market for corporate control and hostile takeovers 
that company executives began to ‘push up the market value of the company’s stock’ at all 
costs.350 Cheffins has noted that by the 1980s, these developments had paved the way for ‘a 
shareholder oriented corporate governance infrastructure’.351 Subsequently, the perceptions of 
the purpose of the company started to shift; many started to believe that the company’s purpose 
was to maximise shareholder wealth and were aided by prominent scholars who spread the 
shareholder primacy agenda. Friedman, in his infamous newspaper article ‘The Social 
Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits’, went as far as stating that businessmen 
who consider social goals to be the responsibility of business were ‘unwitting puppets of the 
intellectual forces that have been undermining the basis of a free society’.352 
 
For Harvey, the purpose of the neoliberal project is to ‘disembed’ the capital from the 
constraints of the Keynesian policies of an interventionist state.353 As Cahill and Konings have 
argued, the supporters of neoliberal ideology ‘sought to cultivate the image of neoliberalism as 
concerned with the freeing of markets by limiting the state’.354 However, neoliberals believed 
that state intervention was still required to sustain the proper functioning of the market. As 
Friedman has acknowledged, ‘The existence of a free market does not of course eliminate the 
need for government.’355 On the political front, the election of Margaret Thatcher as the Prime 
Minister of the United Kingdom in 1979 and Ronald Reagan as the President of the United 
States in 1980 ignited the transition process to neoliberalism. The two leaders consolidated the 
neoliberal policies as the ‘new economic orthodoxy’ through methods such as dismantling 
union power and the welfare state, privatisations, and policies to tackle inflation regardless of 
their consequences.356 Both leaders insisted that the Keynesian policies were the root cause of 
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the problems faced in the previous decades.357 Thus, Hertz has asserted that the commonality 
of their policies has been ‘a rejection of all the pillars of the post-war Keynesian consensus’.358 
 
A part of this consensus has been the less shareholder-oriented understanding of corporate 
governance of the managerial era. Stout has argued that the perception of the company having 
a social purpose came under attack from the neoliberal Chicago School of free-market 
economics and ‘its intellectual cousin, the “law and economics” movement’.359 The law and 
economics movement promoted a shareholder-centric corporate governance model and 
legitimised it on ‘efficiency’ grounds so that investor interests and claims to profit could be 
reasserted as the main purpose of management over any other societal purposes. Neoliberalists 
discarded the concept of managerial corporate governance, replacing it with the assertion ‘that 
shareholder value corporations and open financial markets operate to maximise efficiency, 
wealth and welfare’. 360  This assertion seeks to legitimise the pursuit of shareholder wealth as 
a viable company objective. Thus the ‘Reaganite and Thatcherite revolutions’ led the way for 
shareholder value maximisation to be the ‘exclusive focus of corporations’.361 Harvey has added 
that ‘once “the English-speaking world” adopted the neoliberal shareholder primacy model of 
corporate governance, it was hard to gainsay its considerable relevance to how capitalism in 
general was working internationally’.362 In line with these developments, it became clear by the 
start of the 21st century that the shareholder primacy theory established itself as the mainstream 
model of corporate governance. 
 
 Legal Justifications for the Mainstream Corporate Governance Model 
 
Neoliberalism is an ideology of political and economic thought. However, as Ireland notes, its 
premises have ‘exerted enormous influence not only on policy making but on the trajectory of 
legal thought and scholarship’.363 This has been particularly the case in the field of corporate 
governance law. The ‘law and economics’ scholarship that emerged from the neoliberal 
Chicago chool of free-market economics in the 1970s established most of the arguments for a 
pro-shareholder model of corporate governance; these arguments consisted of contractual 
theorisations of the company, the agency model, and efficiency-based assumptions. In an effort 
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to promote shareholder interests and reassert the power of capital over labour in the company, 
these scholars have resorted to various justifications for shareholders’ entitlement to have the 
company run in their sole interests. In this section, I first discuss the ownership arguments of 
the shareholders. The ownership claims started losing their validity in practice by shareholders 
becoming passive investors and in law by the doctrine of separate personality. Hence, towards 
the end of the managerial era, the supporters of shareholder primacy theory relied on other 
justifications such as the efficiency claims of the law and economics scholarship to legitimise 
shareholder wealth maximisation as the proper purpose of the company. 
Regarding the ownership claims, Kraakman and others have defined one of the core features of 
the corporate form to be ‘investor ownership’.364 Friedman has also asserted that the ‘individuals 
own the corporation’.365 These claims are based on the ‘liberal legal doctrine, [whereby] stocks 
and shares are equivalent to ownership titles, which give the owner full and absolute disposition 
rights over the object of ownership’.366 The ownership claim has historical underpinnings in 
English law, which have been depicted by Ireland in his article ‘Defending the Rentier: 
Corporate Theory and the Reprivatisation of the Public Company’.367 In the early 19th century, 
when joint-stock companies were regarded by law to be similar to partnerships due to the close 
ties the shareholders had with the companies they invested in, shareholders were regarded ‘as 
the company’. Later, in the mid-19th century, the legal position of shareholders changed along 
with the establishment of large joint-stock companies with many investors, small 
denominations, and the establishment of a developed stock market. The share was legally 
redefined from an equitable interests in company assets to ‘an intangible form of property right 
in their own right’. The joint-stock company emerged as a separate entity capable of owning its 
own assets, leading to the doctrine of separate legal personality. By the end of this process, 
shareholders were perceived as ‘owners’ of the company instead of ‘being’ the company.368 
This resulted in what Ireland has described as the ‘ownership myth’, which is the perception 
that companies were the private property of its shareholders.369 
 
Indeed, this view is still relevant. For instance, UK company law stipulates that the directors’ 
duty is to promote the success of the company ‘for the benefit of its members as a whole’,370 
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which translates to the interest of the shareholders.371 The ownership claims are also reflected 
in the debates on corporate governance over the purpose of the company. Proponents of the 
ownership argument assert that ‘the company and its shares are private accumulations of capital, 
and any goal other than profit for shareholders is an infringement of private property’372, thereby 
justifying shareholder wealth maximisation. However, the shareholders being the owners of the 
company is a misleading and legally incorrect perception. Stout has asserted that from the 
perspective of American law, ‘shareholders are not the owners of the company’; instead, 
companies are separate legal entities that own themselves.373 The situation is similar in English 
law. The modern doctrine of separate corporate personality, which completely separates joint-
stock companies from their members,374 has been established. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that from a common law perspective, the incorporated joint-stock company has its own legal 
personality and cannot be owned by its shareholders. 
 
As previously discussed, in the managerial era, the shareholders’ claims to profit as the owners 
of the company were side-lined alongside the transformation of the shareholder’s ownership 
status from an entrepreneurial and active investor to a passive and rentier investor. On this point, 
Berle and Means have argued that because share ownership became passive and shareholders 
surrendered their control function, they could no longer claim the full extent of the rights 
provided under the ‘strict doctrine of property rights’.375 The waning ownership status of 
shareholders meant that the justifications for a corporate governance model that solely pursued 
shareholder interest became less valid. To reassert the shareholder entitlement to company 
profits, the law and economics scholarship defended shareholder primacy on the basis of 
economic efficiency, arguing that ‘advancing shareholder wealth trickles down and advances 
societal wealth’.376 This defence acclaims shareholder primacy as ‘a means to the end of 
maximising the general wealth’377 and is thus referred to as the ‘consequentialist justification’ 
of the shareholder primacy theory.378 Yet, as Ireland has argued: 
 
contractual theories of the corporation, with their emphasis on efficiency-based 
justifications, emerged as an attempt to defend and legitimate the rights and privileges 
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of rentier shareholders in face of the increasing difficulties involved in characterising 
corporations as private property and shareholders as corporate ‘owners’.379 
 
The contractual nature of the company has its foundations in the dichotomy of the origins of the 
company. The contractarians regard the company as ‘a single contracting party that coordinates 
the activities of suppliers of inputs and consumers of products and services’.380 In other words, 
the form of the company is defined as ‘associations formed by the agreement of the 
shareholders’.381 This view is in contrast with the state theory, which asserts that companies 
exist by an act of the state. In other words, ‘corporation’s legal power is derived from the 
state’.382 It follows from this view that since the company is created by the state, the state has 
the right to intervene in the running of the company. 383 The supporters of pure contract theory 
reject the state theory and argue for a non-interventionist approach to company law. Other 
supporters agree that the state has a role to play in the organisation of companies, but that role 
is limited to providing a standardised contract for reducing contracting costs and ensuring that 
the systems which allow a free market are in place.384 The contract theory of the company has 
practical uses for the law and economics approach because it provides the intellectual basis for 
the idea of the company as a profit-maximising vehicle and ‘entitlement to profit arises from 
the bargain made by shareholders’.385 
 
Jensen and Meckling have formulated the company as ‘one form of fiction which serves as a 
nexus for contracting relationships’ in their 1976 article Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.386 They have argued that defining the 
company as an aggregate of contracts ‘serve[d] to make it clear that the personalization of the 
firm implied by asking questions such as “what should be the objective function of the firm”, 
or “does the firm have a social responsibility” is seriously misleading.’387 Through this analysis, 
they were able to avoid the discussion of whether the company should have a social purpose 
because the company was not an individual; it was merely a legal fiction that was devoid of any 
motivations or intentions.388  
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In a similar way, Easterbrook and Fischel have emphasised the contractual nature of the 
corporation and concluded that this approach made redundant the debates over the purpose of 
the company or whether companies should have any social purpose. 389 Their reasoning is that 
since the company is a fiction, it is not capable of making moral choices. Also, the law and 
economics scholars have openly discarded the ownership arguments which became problematic 
for defending shareholder primacy since shareholders transformed into rentier investors. Fama 
has also argued that: ‘The firm is just the set of contracts covering the way inputs are joined to 
create outputs and the way receipts from outputs are shared among inputs. In this "nexus of 
contracts" perspective, ownership of the firm is an irrelevant concept.’390 Accordingly, the 
ownership of shareholders becomes a trivial concept; as the company is a set of contracts, it 
simply could not be owned. 
 
In addition to the contractual model of the company, Jensen and Meckling have also elaborated 
on the agency relationship found within the company. Accordingly, an agency relationship is 
defined ‘as a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person 
(the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision 
making authority to the agent’.391 They have added that ‘the relationship between the 
stockholders and manager of a corporation fits the definition of a pure agency relationship’.392 
They have also argued that if managers were to be given discretion over the allocation of 
company profits, they would use that discretion opportunistically for their own benefit.393 
Therefore, the shareholders need to limit these 
 
divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and 
by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant activities, of the agent. In 
addition, in some situations it will pay the agent to expend resources (bonding costs) to 
guarantee that he will not take certain actions which would harm the principal or to 
ensure that the principal will be compensated if he does take such actions.394 
All these create an ‘agency cost’ which is ‘the dollar equivalent of the reduction in welfare 
experienced by the principal due to this divergence’.395 Hence, the main preoccupation of 
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corporate governance becomes the alignment of the interests of company managers with those 
of shareholders to minimise the abovementioned agency costs. 
 
In sum, the contract theory of the company ‘sought to show that companies were associations 
formed by the agreement of the shareholders’.396 The understanding of the company as a bundle 
of contracts has been instrumental in furthering a shareholder-centric agenda in other ways as 
well. According to Easterbrook and Fischel, the constituencies of the company negotiate for or 
accept a set of terms under its contract with the company. Those terms are the extent of their 
rights and liabilities.397 The residual risk, however, ‘is borne by those who contract for the rights 
to net cash flows’398, where ‘those’ refers to the shareholder. In turn, the contracts of the 
managers stipulate that ‘in exchange for the specified payoff, the agent agrees that the resources 
he provides can be used to satisfy the interests of residual claimants’.399 Therefore, they 
conclude, the managers are bound by their contractual terms to pursue shareholder interest or 
be in breach. The idea of shareholders as risk bearers ‘derives from the fact that the 
remuneration of equity holders is not specified beforehand in the contract which binds them to 
the company, unlike the remunerations of wage earners and creditors.’400 Therefore, the 
argument goes, ‘they should take precedence in the distribution of power and profit.’401 
 
To summarise, the agency relationship between the shareholders and the managers and its 
accompanying contractual theory of the company constitute the building blocks of the 
shareholder primacy theory. The advocates of this theory perceive corporate governance to be 
merely ‘about what system of legal or other mechanisms exist to ensure that the interests of the 
managers of the company are aligned with those of the shareholders’.402 Hence, the law and 
economics scholarship has managed to reduce the complex set of issues surrounding corporate 
governance into a mere problem of conflict of interest between the shareholders and managers. 
In this regard, Talbot has argued that the contract theory of the company is actually ‘an attempt 
to morally neutralize its [company’s] activities’403 and that it is not a purely legal theory but ‘a 
highly ideological doctrine, encompassing and promoting neo-liberal values’.404 This is evident 
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both in the substance and form of the supposedly universal standards of corporate governance 
propagated by the IFIs to the rest of the world. 
 
 Dissemination of the Mainstream Corporate Governance Model 
 
Thus far, I have used a historical narrative to discuss how neoliberalism and the shareholder 
primacy theory of corporate governance with its various legal justifications managed to assert 
itself as the orthodoxy in corporate governance debates. It has not only succeeded over 
managerial corporate governance in Anglo-American countries; it has also been disseminated 
to the developing world in line with the neoliberal Washington Consensus agenda. These 
neoliberal policies which are based on the impetus of capital mobility and free markets have, as 
Dufour and Orhangazi have argued, facilitated ‘the creation of conditions that enable 
international capital to increase its wealth and power over developing economies’.405 Gill has 
noted that free capital mobility has given global investors from wealthy economies greater 
control over the profits of stock markets abroad and ensured more flexible labour markets ‘so 
that capital can better exploit labour.’406 
One of the most concerning aspects of the mainstream corporate governance model has been its 
legitimisation of the return of company profits to shareholders instead of reinvestment in 
production, research and development, improvement of working conditions, cleaner 
environment, or any other social purpose. Despite the claims that the mainstream corporate 
governance model facilitates stock market development and is therefore essential for country’s 
economic growth,407 this section argues that these rules instead seek to advance the interest of 
global investors. Drawing on this argument, I will analyse how particular corporate governance 
rules have been standardised and disseminated to the emerging markets under the auspices of 
the IFIs and the interrelated international organisations such as the OECD to secure the interests 
of foreign investors vis-à-vis other constituents of the company and the emerging markets’ 
societies. 
In identifying the mainstream corporate governance model, I utilise Talbot’s assertion that 
neoliberal objectives are served through the form and substance of corporate governance 
laws.408 Accordingly, she has argued that the substance of the shareholder primacy model of 
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corporate governance is derived from American scholarship and the model’s form is derived 
from the United Kingdom.409 Thus, the mainstream corporate governance model can be referred 
to as the ‘Anglo-American variant’ as per Soederberg’s terminology.410 It should be pointed out 
that this term does not imply that the two countries have identical corporate governance regimes. 
Nevertheless, both share common features such as well-developed stock markets, many 
companies listed on the exchange, and dispersed ownership amongst institutional and individual 
investors.411 As discussed earlier, the legal and theoretical foundations of the mainstream model 
originated in the United States alongside the neoliberal law and economics scholarship. Unlike 
the managerial era, when the separation of ownership from control was seen as an opportunity 
to pursue societal objectives, that separation came to be regarded as a corporate governance 
problem from the 1970s onwards.412 According to Fama, ‘the separation of ownership and 
control can be perceived as an efficient form of economic organisation, as long as one perceived 
the company as a “set of contracts”’.413 This contractual theory of the company and the agency 
relationship it accommodates helped to justify the shareholder primacy theory of corporate 
governance in the context of the Anglo-American corporate governance systems. 
In the United Kingdom, the issue of corporate governance came to the fore with the 
establishment of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance in 1991. 
This committee was established in reaction to the ‘concerns about the working of the corporate 
system [which] were heightened by some unexpected failures of major companies and by 
criticisms of the lack of effective board accountability for such matters as directors’ pay’.414 
The committee produced a report titled The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance in 
1992, which was also referred to as the Cadbury Report and was named after Sir Adrian 
Cadbury who chaired the committee. It included recommendations with the aim of increasing 
the corporate governance standards of UK-listed companies and ‘to contribute positively to the 
promotion of good corporate governance as a whole’.415  
 
The Cadbury Report contained a Code of Best Practice416 that covered issues such as non-
executive directors (NEDs), roles of shareholders in ensuring the application of corporate 
governance standards, and independent audits. Although the application of its provisions was 
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not mandatory, the London Stock Exchange required all UK-listed companies to state in their 
annual reports whether they had complied with the Code or the reasons for non-compliance.417 
Thereby, ‘the “comply or explain” approach was explicitly introduced by the committee 
[Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance]’418 into corporate governance 
regulation. According to the committee, ‘the approach based on compliance with a voluntary 
code coupled with disclosure will prove more effective than a statutory code’.419 However, its 
voluntary nature allowed a great deal of autonomy to companies in terms of implementation. 
Talbot has argued that this regulatory form has ‘enabled the dominant shareholder primacy 
values of neoliberal corporate governance to flourish.’420 
 
Aside from its form, the substance of the rules contained in the Cadbury Report also included 
the same theoretical underpinnings as the shareholder primacy theory. As Cheffins has noted, 
in the Cadbury Report and its consecutive revisions, ‘the single overriding objective shared by 
all listed companies was to preserve and enhance over time their shareholders’ investment’.421 
The corporate governance understanding of the report is explicitly founded upon the agency 
relationship between the shareholders and managers; the committee states that ‘The issue for 
corporate governance is how to strengthen the accountability of boards of directors to 
shareholders.’422 To further prevent the agency problem, the committee stresses the importance 
of separating the roles of the chief executive officer (CEO) and the chairman.423 This rule still 
persists to date in the UK Corporate Governance Code of 2018.424 Finally, the separation of 
executive and non-executive directors is stipulated in the Cadbury Report, whereby the NEDs 
are envisaged as monitors of the management and there is a minimum quantity of NEDs 
required for the sub-committees.425  
 
The importance of the NEDs is also clear in the subsequent revisions to the Cadbury Report. 
The insistence on NEDs is criticised by Talbot on the grounds that it creates a ‘dependency 
relationship’ for the executives who are being monitored by the non-executives who have much 
less information relating to company operations.426 Indeed, the mechanism of the Cadbury 
Report ensures that the NEDs monitor managers’ performance mainly on the basis of objective 
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share price criteria because they would not have the same level of knowledge of the intricacies 
of the business to evaluate their performance in greater depth. On the other hand, Ireland has 
argued that the NEDs have been pivotal in engraving the shareholder primacy norm at the board 
level in the United Kingdom since they ‘enforce the general priorities of financialization’.427  
 
Additionally, the voluntary form of the corporate governance regulations allow companies to 
sidestep any requirements relating to stakeholders since they are in charge of their own 
compliance under the comply-or-explain approach. Thus, executives are incentivised by the 
form of the regulation to prioritise shareholder interests. Indeed, directors do not owe any duties 
towards the stakeholders under corporate governance rules, unlike their contractual duties to 
shareholders that are emphasised under the agency model of the company. This voluntary and 
principle-based approach to corporate governance, which originated in the UK with the Cadbury 
Report, has thereafter influenced the corporate governance regulations globally.428 The Code of 
Best Practice approach and the corporate governance principles prescribed under the Cadbury 
Report have ‘struck a chord in many overseas countries; it has provided a yardstick against 
which standards of corporate governance in other markets are being measured’.429 
 
Due to increasing global competition in the 1990s, companies had to resort to capital markets 
for funding, which necessitated that they be ‘responsive to the concerns of shareholders’.430 
Alongside the companies looking for financing, investors who were no longer bound by national 
boundaries due to the liberalisation of markets turned their attention to stock markets abroad for 
more lucrative returns. By the mid-1990s, US institutional investors were already an active 
proponent of shareholder primacy and wanted to carry this approach to the companies in Europe 
and Japan that they were looking to invest in.431 Moreover, following the Asian financial crisis 
of 1997-98, the corporate governance failures resulting from the family-controlled structure of 
the companies in the region were criticised. This led the OECD to publish a report in 1998 that 
stressed the importance of good corporate governance to economic performance and noted that 
good corporate governance was the key to obtaining funds from the global capital markets.  The 
OECD report advanced the neoliberal ‘common sense’ assumption that companies with good 
corporate governance practices were more efficient because they reduced agency costs by 
providing mechanisms to ensure that managers pursued goals that maximised shareholder 
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wealth. In the decades that followed, shareholder primacy theory has been exported to the rest 
of the world as a universal corporate governance standard through the apparatus of the IFI such 
as the IMF and the WB. 
 
The IMF and the WB were established with the Bretton Woods agreement in 1944 ‘to avoid a 
repetition of the disastrous economic policies that had contributed to the Great Depression’.432 
Along with the United States government’s decision to abandon the convertibility of the dollar 
to gold and float the exchange rate, the monetary system created with Bretton Woods came to 
an end by the early 1970s. Subsequently, the roles assumed by the IFIs began to change in line 
with neoliberal policy objectives summarised under the ‘Washington Consensus’ agenda.433 
The term ‘Washington Consensus’ was coined in 1989 to describe a list of policy reforms agreed 
to in Washington for implementation in developing countries. At their core, these reforms had 
the objective of financial liberalisation, along with policies that involved removing any barriers 
to foreign trade and investments, curbing public expenditure, and privatisation, further 
emphasising ‘macroeconomic discipline, outward orientation, and the market economy’ as 
fundamental for economic growth.434 Cahill and Konings have argued that these policies had 
the sole objective of furthering the interests of ‘Northern capital’.435 
 
One of the ways by which the neoliberal policies have been imposed on the developing world 
has been through the use of ‘conditionality’ in return for the financial assistance provided by 
the IMF.436 The period between 1970-80s witnessed a series of recessions in most of the 
developing countries, which made them resort to IMF loans that were extended in exchange for 
liberalising their economies.437 By the 1980s, the IMF was imposing structural adjustment 
programs (SAPs) on the heavily indebted countries, which gave them access to funds for the 
repayment of their loans. In turn, however, they were required to undertake a ‘radical neoliberal 
restructuring that included the deregulation of finance and trade as well as the privatization of 
public assets.’438 The SAPs provided the template for what was referred to as the ‘conditionality’ 
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of the IMF loans.439 Put simply, the IMF conditionality referred to the set of policy 
recommendations in the form of SAPs which the debtor countries were required to undertake if 
they were to receive financing from the IMF. In effect, the SAPs applied immense pressure on 
these countries to create investment conditions that are ‘favourable to global capital’.440 
 
The conditions favourable for capital have been defined by the IMF and the WB under their 
mutually administered ROSCs. The ROSCs initiative was launched in 1999 for ‘promoting 
greater financial stability, both domestically and internationally, through the development, 
dissemination, adoption, and implementation of international standards and codes’.441 
Soederberg describes this post-Washington Consensus agenda as the new international financial 
architecture, which includes the G20 and the Financial Stability Forum (FSF).442 She argues 
that the new international financial architecture, similar to ‘its predecessor’443, ‘remains firmly 
rooted in the principle of global capital mobility found in the Washington Consensus’.444 
Following the East Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, the G7 leaders ‘acknowledged that the 
participation of major emerging market countries is needed on discussions on the international 
financial system.’445 Thus, the G20, founded in 1999, also included ‘strategically important’ 
emerging market countries.446 Within this system, the FSF was mandated ‘to coordinate the 
emerging international standards’.447 In 2009, the FSF was replaced by the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB), the primary objective of which is defined as promoting international financial 
stability through ‘coordinating national financial authorities and international standard-setting 
bodies as they work toward developing strong regulatory, supervisory and other financial sector 
policies’.448 In turn, the FSB ‘has also been assigned more effective mechanisms for 
encouraging compliance with international standards’.449 
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To this end, as previously mentioned, the IMF and the WB have determined ‘international 
standards’ in 12 policy areas that constitute the ROSCs.450 The ROSCs contain information on 
member countries’ levels of compliance with these defined standards in each of the policy areas, 
thereby forming a component of the FSB’s compliance mechanism to ensure that its objectives 
are met.451 The ROSCs are also employed by IFIs, in particular the IMF, as benchmark to assess 
debtor countries’ compliance levels with their loan conditionalities.452 Although the 
implementation of the ROSCs is entirely voluntary, refusing to abide by these standards would 
not only put further financing from the IMF at risk, but as Soederberg has noted, ‘refusal to 
submit to such practices will inevitably send negative signals to the international investment 
and financial communities’.453 Corporate governance has been established as one of these 12 
policy areas of the ROSCs. This has been a key step in facilitating the global dissemination of 
the standards envisaged under the mainstream corporate governance model. The IFIs measure 
national corporate governance frameworks, laws, and practices against the OECD Principles to 
determine whether they are being implemented at the country level.454 Thus, the OECD acts as 
the standard-setting body for the corporate governance module of the ROSCs.  
 
The background to the OECD’s rule-setting in the area of corporate governance follows the 
East Asian financial crisis, which highlighted the role of weak corporate governance practices 
in causing the crisis and the need to address these governance practices to ‘revive investor 
confidence’.455 In 1998, the OECD Advisory Group on Corporate Governance, with the 
mandate ‘to analyse international corporate governance issues and to suggest an agenda for 
further OECD initiatives’ published the report titled Corporate Governance: Improving 
Competitiveness and Access to Capital in Global Markets.456 The neoliberal undertone of the 
report can be identified through its references to efficiency, competitive labour markets, the 
private nature of the company, and its reliance on market-driven solutions for corporate 
governance, rather than regulation by the state.457 Moreover, the report places shareholder 
primacy at the core of corporate governance by defining ‘the mission of the corporation in the 
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modern economy’ as being one of creating long-term profit for the purpose of enhancing 
shareholder value.458  
 
Although the report acknowledges that companies should recognise wider societal interests, it 
adds that serving social purposes should ultimately benefit investors in the long run.459 
Furthermore, it adopts an instrumental approach towards stakeholders by asserting that social 
costs may be necessary to ensure that the company makes profit and that this would benefit the 
society in the long term.460 Finally, the report also identifies two types of agency costs which 
corporate governance needs to resolve to protect shareholder interests: limiting management 
discretion and ensuring that minority shareholders are protected.461 The OECD Principles, first 
published in 1999, draws on the findings of this report.462 They were revised in 2004 and again 
following the financial crisis of 2008, which was ‘to an important extent attributed to failures 
and weaknesses in corporate governance arrangements’,463 and took their current form with a 
revision in 2015.464 
 
As with the OECD Advisory Group’s report published a year earlier, the 1999 OECD Principles 
contain neoliberal undertones. For instance, their preamble notes that corporate governance is 
‘one key element in improving economic efficiency’.465 As pointed out by Dine and Koutsias, 
the use of ‘a key neoliberal axiom’ – efficiency ‘gives the message that markets should be 
“efficient” without properly defining efficiency’.466 Thus, in the context of corporate 
governance, efficiency is equated with increasing share prices and hence with maximising 
shareholder wealth. The preamble also indicates that ‘the Principles represent a common basis 
that OECD member countries consider essential for the development of good governance 
practice.’467 What is meant by good practice is elaborated as follows: ‘Good corporate 
governance should provide proper incentives for the board and management to pursue 
objectives that are in the interests of the company and shareholders and should facilitate 
effective monitoring, thereby encouraging firms to use resources more efficiently.’468 This 
broad statement reveals the OECD’s take on corporate governance, which appears to be based 
                                                     
458 Ibid 27. 
459 Ibid 67. 
460 Ibid. 
461 Ibid 40. 
462 Magdi and Chamlou, 'Corporate Governance: A Framework for Implementation' (n 455) 7. 
463 G Kirkpatrick, 'The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis' (OECD 11 February 
2009) <https://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-markets/42229620.pdf> 2. 
464 OECD, 'G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance' (2015). 
465 Emphasis added. OECD, 'OECD Principles of Corporate Governance' (1999) 9. 
466 Dine and Koutsias, The Nature of Corporate Governance (n 5) 12. 
467 Emphasis added. OECD, 'OECD Principles of Corporate Governance' (1999) 9. 
468 Ibid. 
78 
 
on the same theoretical underpinnings as shareholder primacy theory, as evidenced in its 
exclusive focus on the relationship between shareholders and managers. 
 
There have been minor changes to the OECD Principles of 1999 through its revisions in 2004 
and 2015. For instance, the 2004 revision added a new heading titled ‘Ensuring the Basis for an 
Effective Corporate Governance Framework’, in addition to the existing ‘The Rights of 
Shareholders’, ‘The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders, ‘The Role of Stakeholders in 
Corporate Governance’, ‘Disclosure and Transparency’, and finally ‘The Responsibilities of the 
Board’.469 Another novelty in the 2015 version was the introduction of a new set of corporate 
governance principles for ‘Institutional Investors, Stock Markets, and Other Intermediaries’ that 
‘addresses the need for sound economic incentives throughout the investment chain, with a 
particular focus on institutional investors acting in a fiduciary capacity.’470 The important points 
regarding the substance of the OECD Principles and any changes in the revisions will be briefly 
discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
The new set of principles added under the area of ‘Ensuring the Basis for an Effective Corporate 
Governance Framework’ along with the 2004 revisions includes the overarching principle that 
‘The corporate governance framework should promote transparent and efficient markets […]’ 
and stresses the importance of the rule of law and enforcement.471 The second set of OECD 
Principles deals with the ‘The Rights and Equitable Treatment of Shareholders and Key 
Ownership Functions’.472 These principles broadly state that the corporate governance 
frameworks should protect shareholder rights such as the transferability of their shares, the right 
to access relevant information on a timely and regular basis, participation and voting rights, 
electing the board members, and so forth. This heading also deals with the presumably universal 
corporate governance principle of fairness, which was initially designed as a separate heading 
under the 1999 and 2004 versions as ‘The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders’.473 The rules 
under this section require that the corporate governance frameworks should ensure that 
shareholders are subject to equitable treatment, particularly the minority and foreign 
shareholders, although what is implied by the principle of equitable treatment is not provided. 
The equitable treatment of shareholders is mentioned primarily in terms of facilitating their 
attendance to general shareholder meetings and voting.474 The principle of equitable treatment 
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is also referred to under the principles on disclosure and transparency, which require the 
‘simultaneous reporting of material or required information to all shareholders in order to ensure 
their equitable treatment’.475  
 
Finally, the principles envisaged under the ‘The Responsibilities of the Board’ assert that the 
board members have a duty of loyalty towards all shareholders and must ensure the equitable 
treatment of the minority shareholders and the shareholders of the dependent companies in the 
context of group companies.476 This provision was not included in the 1999 OECD Principles, 
but was later added in the 2004 revisions and maintained in the latest version. The rules 
concerning the principle of equitable treatment carry particular significance for concentrated 
ownership structures because the OECD Principles strive to protect the rights of minority 
shareholders in companies with controlling owners. The principles can thus be construed as 
primarily advancing the interests of outside shareholders, which, as Soederberg has argued, 
serves the interests of foreign capital.477 
 
Another area envisaged under the OECD Principles is ‘The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate 
Governance’. This heading states, ‘The corporate governance framework should recognise the 
rights of stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements’.478 The overarching 
principle of this heading echoes the neoliberal contractual nature of the company. In terms of 
the progression of the principle for stakeholders, the initial version of the OECD Principles 
solely recognised that the stakeholder rights that were established by law ought to be 
protected,479 while the 2004 revision added that their rights as established by mutual agreements 
also need to be recognised.480 Hence, Dine and Koutsias have noted that ‘stakeholders have a 
slightly enhanced status’ in the revised 2004 Principles.481 The final revision in 2015 maintained 
the earlier version’s position on the overarching principle for stakeholders. This principle 
essentially implies that the company should safeguard stakeholder interests insofar as it is 
required by law or by mutual bargaining only. The principle for stakeholders is therefore the 
clearest expression of the shareholder primacy theory because it allows and possibly 
incentivises the company managers to pursue objectives against the interests of the stakeholders 
as long as they are lawful.  
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It should also be noted that the 2015 revision moved away from its former position of 
recommending stakeholder participation in corporate governance as a ‘performance-enhancing’ 
tool482 and instead stated that ‘Mechanisms for employee participation should be permitted to 
develop.’483 This is in line with the ‘inclusive’ approach of the 2015 Principles, wherein the 
OECD acknowledges the interdependency between stakeholders and ‘corporate wealth 
creation’.484 Nevertheless, the OECD Principles are not binding and do not require corporate 
governance principles to be implemented in national contexts on a mandatory basis. Therefore, 
as Talbot has rightly noted, the OECD Principles not only allow but also further encourage 
companies ‘to fudge the issue of wider social concerns’.485 
 
The next area of the OECD Principles is on ‘Disclosure and Transparency’, which stresses the 
importance of ‘timely’ and ‘accurate’ disclosure of material information.486 The OECD has 
determined that material information is ‘information that a reasonable investor would consider 
important in making an investment or voting decision’.487 The rules under this heading are 
formulated in great detail and lay out extensive lists of points in relation to corporate matters 
which need to be disclosed for maintaining investor confidence. Moreover, the OECD has noted 
that having principles on disclosure and transparency ‘helps improve public understanding of 
the structure and activities of enterprises, corporate policies and performance with respect to 
environmental and ethical standards, and companies’ relationships with the communities in 
which they operate’.488 However, the Principles also note that the disclosure requirements 
should not ‘place unreasonable administrative cost or burdens on enterprises’ or ‘endanger their 
competitive position’.489 This provision effectively curtails the extent of disclosures on 
compliance with environmental or ethical standards that will be available to public because it 
allows companies to keep information if they consider its release to cost the company. 
 
Finally, the principles under the ‘Responsibilities of the Board’ include recommendations for 
‘the strategic guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of management by the board, 
and the board’s accountability to the company and the shareholders.’490 Thus, the accountability 
of the board is envisaged only in terms of shareholders, which mirrors the agency theory 
between managers and shareholders that underpins the OECD’s approach to corporate 
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governance. Indeed, the Principles state that ‘the board is chiefly responsible for monitoring 
managerial performance and achieving an adequate return for shareholders’,491 which is a clear 
expression of the shareholder primacy theory. Moreover, the annotations to the principle assert 
that the board has a duty to act in the best interest of the company and its shareholders whilst 
also mentioning that the board members ‘are expected to take due regard of, and deal fairly 
with, other stakeholder interests’.492 This position on boards’ responsibilities is maintained 
throughout the initial 1999 version of the principles to the 2015 version. 
 
Also, the OECD Principles stress the importance of NEDs, whose importance was initially 
highlighted in the Cadbury Report,493 by stating that ‘independent non-executive board 
members can provide additional assurance to market participants that their interests are 
safeguarded.’494 The provisions on independent directors or NEDs signify the need for a control 
mechanism to restrict the power of controlling shareholders in companies with concentrated 
ownership. As the OECD has acknowledged, such shareholders may have ‘considerable powers 
to appoint the board and the management’.495 Thus, the presence of NEDs ensures that minority 
shareholder interests are safeguarded by restricting the influence of controlling shareholders on 
company management. Similarly, the OECD Principles perceive the separation of the chairman 
and the chief executive officer to be good practice since it strengthens ‘the objectivity of the 
board and its independence from management’.496 This principle works to ensure that no 
executive has sufficient independent power to supersede shareholder power over management. 
In other words, this principle helps to align management interests with shareholder interests. 
The separation of the chairman and the CEO roles has been foreseen in the OECD Principles 
since the first 1999 version and has been maintained to date. 
 
In sum, both the substance and the form of the international corporate governance standards, 
which find expression in the OECD Principles as part of the IFIs’ ROSCs modules, are founded 
upon ‘the Anglo-American variant’.497 The non-binding character of the corporate governance 
principles draw mainly on the voluntary approach, which was introduced in the United 
Kingdom by the Cadbury Report under the comply-or-explain method for regulating corporate 
governance. This accords with the neoliberal laissez-faire economics that rely on deregulation 
as a main policy objective. The OECD Principles are legally non-binding, and the OECD 
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refrains from explicitly recommending that its corporate governance principles should be 
regulated on a mandatory basis in national contexts, thus allowing companies to self-regulate 
their actions. This approach to corporate governance, as Ireland has argued on point, will ‘serve 
to naturalize and depoliticize the corporate form as currently constituted and to entrench, as 
universal economic common-sense, a conception of the joint stock corporation as a “naturally” 
shareholder-oriented, private enterprise.’498  
 
Second, the content or substance of the OECD Principles are underpinned by American law and 
economics scholarship with its contractual theory of the company and the agency relationship 
between the shareholders and managers. The scholarship holds that latter is solely accountable 
to the former and thus, managers are responsible to pursue shareholder interests only. 
Furthermore, the frequent use of the term ‘economic efficiency’ in the definitions of the 
objective of corporate governance frameworks signals the neoliberal undertone of the OECD’s 
approach to corporate governance. Overall, it can be concluded that the OECD Principles have 
a ‘neo-liberal tenor’499 that is founded upon the primacy of the shareholder. 
 
A critical analysis of the OECD Principles yields the conclusion that the primary concerns of 
universalising standards for good corporate governance are to ensure that shareholder interests 
are prioritised in the company and controlling shareholders’ powers are restricted to further the 
interests of outside shareholders. As previously discussed, the process by which universal 
corporate governance standards were constructed came about as a policy response to the 
aftermath of the East Asian financial crisis. The concentrated ownership structure has been 
identified as a root cause of the crisis, which led to calls for corporate governance reforms that 
would protect minority shareholders.500 Thus, instead of abandoning the neoliberal policies 
which caused the crisis in the first place,501 the prescribed solution was the transformation of 
ownership and control patterns which involved ‘a shift away from state capitalism towards a 
free market system based on investor interests and the maximisation of shareholder value’.502 
For Soederberg, the East Asian crisis has created ‘an opportunity for more powerful states and 
capitals to take advantage of the weakened negotiating power of crisis-plagued governments 
and markets’.503 Indeed, following the crisis, the IFIs were able to leverage the situation to 
impose neoliberal policies in the form of corporate governance standards in return for financial 
assistance.  
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According to Gill, the policy measures which were led by the United States and the IMF ‘sought 
to […] liberalize domestic social and economic structures so that they are more amenable to 
penetration, ownership and exploitation by the United States and other foreign corporate 
interests.’504 Similarly, Soederberg has argued that the OECD Principles had two purposes. 
First, the dissemination of the OECD Principles ensures that developing countries abide by 
neoliberal policies, thereby stabilising the international financial system. Second, by promoting 
shareholder interest alone, the policies protect the interests of foreign capital.505 This is evident 
in the preamble to the initial OECD Principles, which highlights ‘the relation between corporate 
governance practices and the increasingly international character of investment’506 and points 
out the increasing need to respond to the demands of ‘institutional investors’ in defining 
corporate governance.507  
 
In terms of the raison d’etre for the OECD Principles and their dissemination, this thesis agrees 
with the arguments postulated by Gill and Soederberg. By blaming ‘crony capitalism’508 as the 
root cause for the East Asian crisis, the IFIs have made clear that the region needed 
 
restructuring along the lines of the American model of ‘capital-market’ based free 
enterprise where owners make all the key decisions, in contrast to the variants of East 
Asia model in which the interests of not only owners but also workers and the wider 
community are often taken into account in situations of crisis.509  
 
This restructuring is still ongoing: the OECD Principles are exported to emerging markets and 
the rest of the world, where its standards have been used as ‘the international reference point’ 
in over 60 countries worldwide.510 In sum, the primary aims sought by the IFIs and the OECD 
in line with the neoliberal agenda appears to be embedding the shareholder primacy norm in 
companies around the world, prioritising the interests of minority shareholders over those of 
controlling owners, and attempting to advance the rights of global investors in countries with 
concentrated ownership structure. 
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4 Stakeholder Theory of Corporate Governance 
 
The mainstream corporate governance model with its common-sense goal of shareholder wealth 
maximisation as the sole purpose of the company gave rise to concerns over its viability as a 
system due to a series of company scandals mainly in the United States from the late 1990s 
onwards.511 More recently, the global financial and economic crisis of 2008 has demonstrated 
that the mainstream corporate governance rules only brought short-termism. This led to 
detrimental outcomes for everyone, even for the shareholders because the shareholder primacy 
model of corporate governance, in fact, did not achieve efficiency.512 Proponents of shareholder 
primacy who claimed that the pursuit of efficiency would be for the benefit of all have been 
proven wrong; instead, as Ireland has noted, that pursuit contributed to greater levels of 
inequality, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom where the shareholder 
primacy model has been endorsed the most.513 
 
It is in this context that an alternative approach to the shareholder primacy theory has taken 
centre-stage in the debates on corporate governance, although that the idea was introduced much 
earlier.514 The stakeholder corporate governance model holds that company managers should 
make decisions that benefit not just the shareholders, but also the other stakeholders of the 
company. 515 In line with this perspective, the stakeholder theory perceives the public company 
in a broader sense; they view it ‘as public entities rather than just the private property of owners 
[which] have a variety of stakeholders, including insiders such as owners, managers, and 
employees, and outsiders such as lenders, suppliers, and customers.’516 In turn, the stakeholder 
theory rejects the assumption that corporate governance is a set of means to ensure that capital 
providers ensure returns on their investment.517 Instead, the stakeholder theory assumes that the 
company has the broader purpose of serving a variety of interests, including societal interests.  
 
However, there is a divergence of views between the proponents of stakeholder theory in terms 
of the justifications for recognising stakeholder interests. One camp paradoxically considers 
taking into account stakeholder interests as long as they lead to profit. They argue on the basis 
of economic performance, claiming that ‘adherence to stakeholder principles and practices 
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achieves conventional corporate performance objectives as well or better than rival 
approaches’.518 Thus, the supporters of this version of the stakeholder theory attempt to justify 
stakeholder claims on the basis of efficiency by measuring whether the inclusion of broader 
interests would have more efficient outcomes, translated vaguely to increased share price. 
However, this is the very justification that the neoliberal law and economics scholars use to 
legitimise the shareholder primacy model. According to Talbot, this approach essentially 
implies that ‘managers can best promote shareholders’ interest by ignoring them.’519 She argues 
that ‘The simple and logical truth is that managers cannot take better care of shareholders (and 
therefore also their own performance-related remuneration) by looking after stakeholders.’520 
Thus, recognising stakeholder interests only as an instrument to achieve shareholder wealth 
maximisation does not challenge the mainstream corporate governance model; if anything, it 
supports the shareholder primacy theory’s underlying assumptions. 
 
The second camp argues that certain stakeholders contribute to the overall success of the 
company. Therefore, management should take decisions considering the stakeholder interests 
that make a ‘firm-specific’ contribution to the company.521 Building on this approach, Blair and 
Stout have developed the ‘the team production theory’ of corporate governance.522 This theory 
also has its foundations in the law and economics approach of the company; the authors assert 
that their theory is ‘consistent with the “nexus of contracts” approach to understanding corporate 
law’.523 Accordingly, team members are stakeholders who make firm-specific investments, 
which are those investments that are committed to the company. Thus, ‘each party's specialized 
investment has little or no value outside the joint enterprise; neither can walk away from the 
venture and realize the value of the investment by selling it elsewhere’.524 In this context, the 
board becomes ‘a mediating hierarch-whose primary function is to exercise that control in a 
fashion that maximizes the joint welfare of the team as a whole’.525 This hierarchical model of 
the company allows wide discretion to directors to mediate different stakeholder interests when 
deciding the allocation of profits. Subsequently, as Blair and Stout have admitted, the weakness 
of this theory is that ‘any number of possible allocations among groups is possible.’526 Since the 
team production theory is not backed by laws that require directors to considers all stakeholders’ 
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interests, the authors have added that the interests that they will ultimately take into account 
will be decided by ‘political forces’.527 They conclude that currently, political power is in favour 
of the shareholder class, which allows them to capture greater gains from the mediating 
process.528 Considering the balance of power between the shareholders and the stakeholders has 
not shifted since the publishing of Blair and Stout’s article in 1999, it is unlikely that the team 
production theory of corporate governance will challenge the orthodoxy of the shareholder 
primacy theory. 
 
Finally, the third camp of stakeholder theory argues that stakeholder claims have an ‘intrinsic 
value’ of their own; in other words, ‘each group of stakeholders merits consideration for its own 
sake and not merely because of its ability to further the interests of some other group, such as 
the shareowners’.529 This view conceives pursuing stakeholder interest as a goal in itself and 
not as an instrument for furthering shareholder interests. To that end, Mitchell has argued from 
an American law perspective that the reason company directors prioritise shareholder interests 
above all others is ‘a natural consequence of the existing legal order’.530 Thus, there needs to be 
a legal recognition of stakeholders interests within the company structure.531 He has criticised 
the established common law principle that company directors owe fiduciary duties primarily to 
shareholders on the basis that ‘the fiduciary obligations […] are designed to deal with a variety 
of different types of conflict of interest’.532 Therefore, Mitchell has concluded as follows: 
 
The increasing recognition of the modern corporation's profound effect on the lives of 
a variety of groups not traditionally within the corporate law structure has the potential 
to lead corporate law into the next century in a manner more reflective of the role that 
this type of organization actually plays in our society.533 
 
This view is more in line with a ‘progressive’ model of corporate governance534 that can induce 
a change in the mainstream model for the benefit of the stakeholders and society at large. 
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Examination of the various perspectives on stakeholder theory indicates that their perceptions 
of the company and the responsibilities of managers generally contrast with the mainstream 
corporate governance model. It has been argued that ‘the enlightened shareholder value’ 
approach provided in the UK Companies Act 2006 may provide a middle way between the two 
opposing views.535 In 1998, the Company Law Review Steering Group (the Steering Group) 
appointed by the Labour government at the time initiated a revision of UK company law with 
the aim of creating ‘a modern company law for a competitive economy’.536 The Steering Group 
identified two approaches to corporate governance: ‘the enlightened shareholder value’ and ‘the 
pluralist’ approach. The enlightened shareholder value approach corresponded to the 
shareholder primacy model by recognising the ultimate objective of company to be ‘to generate 
maximum value for shareholders [which] is in principle the best means also of securing overall 
prosperity and welfare.’537 On the other hand, the pluralist approach rejected the idea that 
shareholder wealth maximisation will achieve overall prosperity and welfare, accordingly: 
 
company law should be modified to include other objectives so that a company is 
required to serve a wider range of interests, not subordinate to, or as a means of 
achieving, shareholder value (as envisaged in the enlightened shareholder value view), 
but as valid in their own right.538 
 
The term ‘pluralist’ signified that ‘the interests of a number of groups should be advanced 
without the interests of a single group (shareholders) being overriding’.539 As noted by Monks, 
these discussions effectively posed ‘the alternatives as between “shareholder” and 
“stakeholder”’ models of corporate governance’.540 
 
After a series of consultation papers, the review process led to the enactment of UK Companies 
Act 2006, which eventually adopted the enlightened shareholder value approach. A novel aspect 
of this legislation was that the common law fiduciary duties of the directors were codified in 
the new Companies Act, thereby clarifying the issue of whose interest the company would be 
managed for.541 Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 deals with the director’s ‘duty to 
promote the success of the company’. Accordingly, the directors are required to promote the 
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success of the company ‘for the benefit of its members as a whole’ whilst considering a set of 
other considerations such as the long-term consequences of their decisions and other 
stakeholder interests. As Tsagas has argued, under the enlightened shareholder value approach, 
‘stakeholders interests do not come second to shareholders interests, but rather constitute a 
means to an end of serving shareholder interests.’542 In effect, this informs directors that their 
duty to promote the success of their company for the benefit of its members generally means 
for the benefit of the shareholders.543 On this point, Talbot has noted that the decisions that are 
for the interests of stakeholders are most likely to be contrary to shareholder interests, such as 
wage rises.544 Therefore, although the enlightened shareholder value approach is portrayed as a 
compromise between the shareholder primacy and the stakeholder theories of corporate 
governance, the directors are effectively under a legal duty to make decisions that primarily 
serve shareholders’ interests.545 In this way, the Companies Act 2006’s formulation of directors’ 
duties and enlightened shareholder value approach reaffirm the premises of the mainstream 
corporate governance model. 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
The development and dissemination of the mainstream corporate governance model reveal the 
ways the capitalist class, in particular the global investor class, has managed to assert its power 
over labour and other constituents of the company. In the post-war period, when the Berle-Dodd 
debate took place over the proper purpose of the company, the prevailing view was that the 
company had a social duty to consider a variety of interests aside from shareholder interests. 
The company was perceived as capable of pursuing social goals through managers who used 
their discretion to balance different interest groups. Although the managerial corporate 
governance model resonates with the stakeholder theory, many proponents of the stakeholder 
model perceive stakeholders as a means to an end. This is still the case with the more recent 
corporate social responsibility initiatives of companies, which pursue socially responsible 
objectives as long as they contribute to profit. As Ireland has argued on point, this is a 
‘conservative’ notion as opposed to ‘the earlier idea of the “socially responsible corporation” 
with its transformative aspirations’.546 On the other hand, during the managerial era, there was 
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a social compact between capital and labour. Thus, the dominant thinking in business, academia, 
and the public was that managers ought to consider stakeholder interests as a worthy purpose 
by itself and not as a way of creating value for shareholders. 
 
The rise of neoliberal ideology from the 1980s onwards facilitated the acquisition of influence 
in corporate decision making by the shareholders. This was particularly as a result of the 
increased power of transnational capital relative to both governments and organised labour.547 
The law and economics scholarship and its neoliberal underpinnings provided the legal 
justifications for the shareholder wealth maximisation purpose of the company after the 1980s. 
Accordingly, managers were contractually bound to serve shareholder interests only. The 
company was conceptualised as a fiction that was incapable of having any moral values. 
However, I have demonstrated that the alleged ‘triumph’548 of the shareholder primacy theory 
‘rests less on its empirical accuracy, validity or intellectual merit and more on its consonance 
with certain powerful class interests’549, as asserted by Ireland. 
 
In terms of implementing the mainstream corporate governance model at the national level, 
policy making in the developing world has become tied to the interests of foreign capital due to 
the dependency created by the Washington Consensus agenda. This is particularly the case in 
emerging markets, where a deviation from neoliberal policies will be punished by investors in 
the form of investment strike or capital flight.550 This leaves countries with no option but to 
abide by the dictates of neoliberal policies. The OECD Principles constitute an integral part of 
this overall strategy ‘to make states operate under greater market discipline’, which gives the 
global investors free entry and exit options through promoting ‘an ideology of best practice’.551 
The OECD Principles draw on the shareholder primacy theory and are derived from the Anglo-
American model of corporate governance, which is evident in both the content and the form of 
these principles. A critical analysis of the OECD Principles exposes its underlying motive of 
restructuring national corporate governance regimes towards a single model of shareholder 
primacy where the interests of shareholders, particularly foreign shareholders, are prioritised 
over the controlling owners and other stakeholders. In turn, this provides global investors 
greater control over companies, resulting in the exploitation of other stakeholders, companies, 
and the countries in which they invest in to receive the highest possible returns. This finding 
thus provides the context to analyse the reasons for Turkey’s corporate governance reforms. 
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CHAPTER IV – Turkey’s Corporate Governance Framework Part – 
I: Capital Market Law and Capital Markets Board Regulations 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a black-letter account of the first pillar of the Turkish 
corporate governance framework to analyse the legal rules and regulations that accompany the 
recent reforms. Three main pieces of legislation constitute Turkey’s corporate governance 
framework: the Turkish Commercial Code (TCC), the Capital Market Law (CML), and the 
Capital Markets Board (CMB)’s secondary legislation in the form of communiques. The CMB 
Chairman has stated that corporate governance rules are ‘to be used primarily by listed 
companies as well as by joint stock companies in both the private and public sector’.552 Listed 
companies and the corporate governance rules applicable to them constitute the focus of this 
chapter because the research question of this thesis explores how these rules will impact the 
ownership structures of listed joint-stock companies in Turkey. 
 
The primary legal source for public companies in Turkey is the CML.553 The legislation has 
been revamped in its entirety; new capital markets legislation entered into force on 30 December 
2012 to replace the previous CML which has been in force since 1981.554 The new law, which 
is designed as a framework legislation with general outlines, sets out that the detailed issues 
relating to capital markets shall be regulated by the CMB’s secondary legislation.555 Following 
the CML’s enactment at the end of 2012, the CMB issued 67 communiques in a 1-year period 
to regulate the more detailed issues pertaining to public companies.556 In terms of corporate 
governance-related reforms, the most important novelty was a 2014 CMB regulation, the 
Communique on Corporate Governance. This communique made the implementation of some 
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corporate governance principles mandatory for listed companies in accordance with their 
systemic importance.557 It should be noted that the new rules of the CMB constitute a radical 
departure point from the previous state of law on corporate governance. Prior to the new capital 
markets legislation and the subsequent CMB communiques, corporate governance regulation in 
Turkey was in the form of comply-or-explain approach that was based on corporate governance 
principles with voluntary application.558 In the Communique on Corporate Governance, which 
includes the CMB’s Corporate Governance Principles (CMB Principles) as an annex, 24 
principles out of the total of 97 are binding. The rest of the principles are subject to comply-or-
explain approach, which imposes requirements on public companies to report their adherence 
to the CMB Principles in their annual activity reports.559 The specific principles which are 
binding for listed companies will be elaborated in detail under this chapter. 
 
The chapter begins with an historical account of the development of Turkish capital markets. I 
trace the developments back to the late Ottoman era, when the seeds of a Turkish capital market 
were first planted. I focus on the establishment of the joint-stock company, which had a separate 
legal personality from its members and whose shares could be traded in the secondary 
(unorganised) markets. This is followed by the history of the stock exchange. The first organised 
exchange was established in 1866, following the enactment of legislation with the aim to create 
investor confidence in the secondary markets. However, the exchange failed to become a 
success due to a fraudulent incident and was later shut down during the first World War. I then 
introduce the events that took place following the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey in 
1923 concerning the regulation of capital markets. Due to restrictive laws, foreign investors 
could not enter the Turkish stock markets for a long time. This was to change when the Turkey-
IMF lending relationship intensified, and the liberalisation process of the Turkish economy took 
off from the mid-1950s. 
 
In line with the liberal economic policies that were gradually included after the 1950s, the first 
CML was enacted in 1981. The Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) was also established in 1985. 
These developments were followed by lifting prohibitions on foreigners investing in Turkish 
stock markets, which occurred in 1989. The following years were marked by an influx of foreign 
investment into the ISE as well as an increase in Turkish company listings. Turkey experienced 
two severe financial crises in 2000 and 2001, resulting in capital flight. The crises also led the 
way for the victory of the AKP (Development and Justice Party) in the 2003 elections. The AKP 
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implemented more rigorous reforms in line with IMF programmes, one of which was to expand 
the role of the ISE in Turkey’s economic growth prospects. Thus, the next stage came in the 
development of the capital market legislation, resulting in the enactment of the new CML in 
2012. In this chapter, I include the parliamentary discussions of different political groups prior 
to passing the draft law to illustrate the criticisms of it. This section serves the purpose of 
providing the background information to why certain corporate governance reforms took place. 
The chapter is therefore a descriptive account of the capital markets law in Turkey that includes 
elements of socio-legal research: the legal developments are evaluated within the trajectory in 
which they take place. 
  
The second part of the chapter is concerned with the history of corporate governance in Turkey. 
Corporate governance gained prominence in Turkey in the aftermath of the 2000 and 2001 
crises, when banking law reform was enacted.560 These reforms in corporate governance came 
shortly after the OECD’s publication of its Corporate Governance Principles in 1999.561 
Thereafter, Turkish business circles began to indicate interest in the topic, publishing guidelines 
and forming associations to make discussions of the issue of corporate governance more 
widespread. Finally, in 2003, corporate governance regulation took off for non-financial 
companies in Turkey for the first time; the CMB published its Corporate Governance 
Principles562 in the form of voluntary soft-law rules. I will be further elaborating on these 
developments. This will be followed by a discussion of the corporate governance reforms of the 
new CML. Then, I discuss the CMB’s efforts to regulate corporate governance for public 
companies, starting from its usage of soft law principles in 2003 to its latest Communique on 
Corporate Governance in 2014, which uses a semi-hard law approach. Finally, I explain the 
CMB’s Corporate Governance Principles under the four categories as envisaged by the CMB: 
Principles on Shareholders, Principles on Disclosure and Transparency, Principles on Board of 
Directors, and finally Principles on Stakeholders. 
 
2 Development of Turkey’s Capital Market Legislation 
 
Capital market development took off in the late Ottoman Empire era, when the country resorted 
to foreign investment as a solution to its financial troubles in the first half of the 19th century. 
Starting from the 1840s, the government started issuing short-term bonds to French banks 
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through intermediaries known as ‘Galata Bankers’.563 In the following years, European 
investors started forming joint-stock companies in the Ottoman Empire by obtaining special 
concessions.564 Most joint-stock companies established in the Ottoman Empire at the time were 
owned by either foreigners or minorities. The government also wanted to incentivise the Turkish 
population to bring their capital together to establish companies. For this purpose, the Ottoman 
Empire enacted a Commerce Code for the first time in 1850 to provide the legal basis for the 
joint-stock company form. This code was a direct translation of the French commercial code.565 
Following the enactment of the Commerce Code, the first joint-stock company called the 
‘Sirket-i Hayriye’566 was established in 1851. The importance of the ‘Sirket-i Hayriye’ to the 
development of capital markets was that the company was regarded as a separate entity from its 
members, and its shares could be traded in the secondary markets. By the start of the 1900s, 
there were only 46 joint-stock companies, and 43 of them were owned by foreigners. The reason 
for the low number of companies is that Sultan’s approval was required for establishment and 
this approval was not granted often.567 Nonetheless, the enactment of the Commerce Code 
triggered an increase in the number of public joint-stock companies and share issuances, 
allowing these companies to access capital from the public.568  
 
During this period, trading of company stocks did not take place through a formal exchange; it 
was usually unregulated and over-the-counter. This led to a distrust in the market towards 
company shares.569 To remedy this situation, the Ottoman Empire enacted legislation setting up 
its first official exchange in 1866 called the Dersaadet Tahvilat Borsasi, which was located in 
Istanbul.570 As the use of telegraph became more common, stock trading spread to farther 
Turkish cities and European investors.571 However, in 1895, the reputation of the exchange was 
shattered when stock investors lost all their money in the ‘Sir Vincent incident’,572 leading to a 
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temporary closure of the exchange. To regain investor confidence in the capital markets and to 
regulate them more thoroughly, the Ottoman government issued a decree changing the name of 
the exchange to Esham ve Tahvilat Borsasi in 1906. With the new rules, the exchange officials 
were required to be civil servants, thereby increasing the role of the state in the oversight of the 
exchange.573 During World War I, the activities of the exchange were halted. The activities 
resumed after the end of the war but were thereafter dominated mainly by the foreigners in 
charge of the exchange.574  
 
Following Turkey’s independence war and the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, the 
government of the Republic of Turkey immediately enacted new stock exchange regulations to 
curb foreign influence over Turkish capital markets. The new legislation required the primary 
members of the exchange to be of Turkish citizenship and mandated all records to be kept in 
Turkish.575 Nevertheless, the first government of Turkey expressed that it was not against 
foreign investments. In the first Turkish Economic Congress which took place in Izmir in 1923, 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the first President of the Republic of Turkey, stated, ‘We are not 
opposed to foreign investment. Turkey would need substantial amount of investment and hard 
work to establish the newly found Republic and foreign investments are welcome as long as 
they are beneficial for our country’s interests.’576 This meant that the new Republic did not want 
to be indebted to foreigners and provide them with leverage over its policies the way Ottoman 
Empire did.577 In 1926, the parliament passed the Menkul Kiymetler ve Kambiyo Borsasi 
Kanunu (Securities and Foreign Exchange Law), placing the stock exchange under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Finance. According to this legislation, all company shares and 
bonds that were in circulation were required to be registered with the stock-exchange, thereby 
marking the first step towards transparency in Turkish capital markets.578  
 
The stock exchange failed to play an active role in the economy in the first years of the Republic 
of Turkey.579 Due to the Great Depression in the United States in 1929, which spread to other 
advanced capitalist economies, liberal economic policies were replaced with protectionist 
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measures, and investors started retracting their investments to their countries. In Turkey, in line 
with the state-controlled economic policy of the time, most foreign-owned companies were 
nationalised. In 1930, the government passed a law for the protection of the value of the Turkish 
currency,580 which enabled the Council of Ministers to restrict the sale and purchases of foreign 
exchange, shares, and bonds.581 Accordingly, the transactions of foreigners were largely 
restricted. These developments temporarily prevented the progress of Turkish capital markets. 
This situation lasted until the end of the Second World War, and even though Turkey did not 
partake in the war, its economy was still affected negatively. In its search for a new economic 
policy, Turkey sided with the United States, who came out of the war as an important global 
power. Turkey thus became a member to the United States-led IMF and World Bank in 1947.582 
Since it sided with the ‘capitalist camp’, Turkey started drafting legislation that would facilitate 
foreign investments.583 Furthermore, as Turkey switched to a multi-party political system in 
1946; the state control over the economy started to transform towards a liberal economic system 
with a focus on private enterprises.584  
 
At the start of the 1960s, the capital market was ‘reborn’ in Turkey, with the widespread use of 
savings and treasury bonds. The over-the-counter trading of these savings bonds led to the 
creation of informal secondary markets. 585 This period also witnessed the revival of the private 
sector and an increase in joint-stock companies. Some well-known families established 
companies in their own names and issued shares to the public, which led to an increase in stock 
investments in Turkey. 586 These factors created the need for a legal framework for an exchange 
that would allow the effective trading of these bonds and stocks. In 1962, works began on 
drafting a capital market law, and scholars and legislators organised seminars and meetings.587 
During these meetings, the prominent view was that the United States was to be taken as an 
example of regulating the capital markets.588 The CMB’s Ozcam has also noted that there were 
talks with the IMF in the 1960s regarding the regulation of the capital markets.589 
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The first draft capital markets code, Sermaye Piyasasinin Tanzimi ve Tesviki Hakkinda Kanun 
Tasarisi (Draft Law on the Establishment and the Promotion of Capital Markets), was presented 
to the parliament in 1964. It included provisions on encouraging companies to go public and 
issue shares.590 The draft was largely based on the Anglo-American legal system because joint-
stock company legislation based on continental European legal systems were too rigid and did 
not facilitate the development of capital markets, as the scholars who drafted the code have 
admitted.591 It should be noted that the TCC at the time,592 which contained provisions on the 
joint-stock company, was drafted by the German scholar Hirsch and was based on the 
continental European legal system.593 The committee drafting the capital market code seems to 
have had a preference for the Anglo-American legal system, despite the whole of Turkish 
legislation being based on the laws of civil law countries. This implies the influence of liberal 
economic policies at the time in Turkey. 
 
The draft code of 1964 failed to turn into legislation. Hence, a second draft code was prepared 
in 1970 that contained similar provisions to the old draft but increased incentives for companies 
going public, such as a reduction in corporate tax rates.594 The second draft also did not pass 
through parliament. One of the reasons for both draft codes being rejected was the influence of 
the domestic interest groups who were benefiting from the absence of a regulated market for 
the exchange of securities.595 However, their influence was overcome by external factors such 
as the IMF, which envisaged the establishment of a functioning capital market.596 As Onis and 
Bakir have analysed, ‘external anchors’ such as the IMF have had an important role in Turkey’s 
reform processes and have helped domestic policy-makers to overcome the resistance of the 
domestic groups.597 
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A brief note on the IMF and Turkey relations is necessary.598 Turkey joined the IMF in 1947599 
and received its first financial support in 1948.600 Since then, Turkey has been one of the 
countries most indebted to the IMF, which, as Yavuz has asserted, has created pressure and 
restrictions on the Turkish government’s policies.601 Even though the Turkish economy grew in 
the first few years after the switch to the multi-party system and the liberalisation policies, the 
uncontrolled increase in imports caused a balance of payments deficit and led to an economy 
dependent upon external financing.602 Evrensel has noted that by 1955, Turkey became the only 
country out of IMF members that exceeded its lending quota.603 Karagol has noted that the mid-
1950s were ‘the beginning of Turkey’s economic crisis and the need for external loans and 
eventually the IMF-imposed stabilization programs’.604 Thereafter, the impact of the IMF in 
influencing government policies, particularly in terms of capital market liberalisation, became 
more evident.  
 
In the second half of the 1970s, Turkish economy began to face severe distress and almost came 
to the point of shutdown due to a lack of liquidity, high inflation, and depleting foreign currency 
reserves. These economic troubles led the Turkish government to call upon the IMF again for 
assistance.605 The situation worsened with the global hikes in oil prices in 1973 and 1979, 
leading to stagnation in the Turkish economy.606 The IMF conditionality tied to its financial 
assistance meant that certain measures were taken, such as the devaluation of the currency, 
adding surcharges to public goods and services, and signing debt deferral protocols with the 
OECD member countries.607 These measures constituted the liberalisation process of the 
Turkish economy, which accelerated substantially in 1980 with a set of decisions named Istikrar 
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Programi (Stability Programme).608 These decisions brought structural changes to the Turkish 
economy and were instituted by the government of the time, which was headed by Prime 
Minister Suleyman Demirel.609 Arpac has argued that these neo-liberal reforms were carried out 
under the auspices of the IMF and the WB.610 The structural changes envisaged by the Stability 
Programme have been dubbed as the ‘breaking point’ that transformed the Turkish economy to 
a capitalist and liberal economic system.611 Indeed, the reforms envisaged under the Stability 
Programme were implemented, and the ‘program reached its initial targets very soon in terms 
of a lower inflation, a higher gross domestic product (GDP) growth, and a relatively liberalized 
external trade regime and financial system’.612 
 
As a part of the Stability Programme process, the government began working on establishing 
regulatory institutions that would limit the state’s involvement in the economy en route to 
economic liberalisation.613 In line with these efforts, the establishment of Turkey’s first 
regulatory authority, the CMB, was envisaged by CML No. 2499, which was enacted in 1981.614  
The relation between IMF conditionality and the passing of the capital market legislation has 
been covered in the media. As one of the most prominent newspapers in Turkey later 
commented, the passing of the CML has been instrumental in ensuring further financial 
assistance by the IMF.615 The economic liberal policies which gained momentum in Turkey at 
the beginning of the 1980s and the influence from IMF can thus be regarded as the reasons why 
the draft capital market code finally obtained parliament’s approval in 1981. 
 
The CML has been designed as a framework law with general provisions on the workings of 
the capital markets, leaving the regulation of more detailed issues to the CMB through 
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secondary legislation.616 The CML also included a provision establishing the CMB, which 
started its activities in 1982 and had ‘the status of a public legal entity with administrative and 
financial autonomy’.617 The objective of Turkey’s first CML was stated in its first article: 
 
The subject of this Law is to regulate and control the secure, transparent and stable 
functioning of the capital market and to protect the rights and benefits of investors with 
the purpose of ensuring an efficient and widespread participation by the public in the 
development of the economy through investing savings in the securities market.618 
 
Sezen has argued that the main objective of the first CML was to free companies from the 
restrictions imposed by the TCC and provide a legal framework that is more conducive to the 
development of capital markets.619 Indeed, prior to the enactment of the CML, joint-stock 
companies were subject to the commercial code’s lengthy and arduous procedures for capital 
increases, which hindered the financing of joint-stock companies. The CML, on the other hand, 
included provisions that were more conducive to raising capital.620 The CML also aimed to 
create investor confidence in Turkish capital markets and stipulated that any public offering in 
the primary markets was to be subjected to the approval of the CMB. According to Soydemir 
and Akyuz, the approval of the CMB was an implicit affirmation that the securities issued by 
that company were trustworthy and could be invested.621 
 
Following the promulgation of the first CML in 1981, the government enacted a decree in 1983 
regarding stock exchanges; Menkul Kiymetler Borsalari Hakkinda Kanun Hukmunde 
Kararname (Decree regarding Stock Exchanges).622 Following this legislation, the ISE was 
established and began its operations in 1985 in Istanbul. According to the CML, the CMB ‘is 
the competent authority for the monitoring and supervision of the exchanges, markets and other 
organized markets’;623 the ISE is therefore supervised by the CMB. In its first few years, the 
ISE remained under-developed and ‘was characterised by low liquidity, high volatility, high 
cost of capital (low firm valuation) and limited new capital formation’.624 To attract foreign 
investors to the ISE, in 1989 the government issued a decree known as Decision No. 32.625 This 
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decree created capital account liberalisation by lifting the restrictions on the purchase and sale 
of securities in the ISE by foreigners626 as well as allowed their earnings from the stock markets 
to be transferred outside of Turkey.627 After this decree’s enactment, there was an influx of 
foreign investors and increased demand for ISE-listed stocks, which provided liquidity to the 
markets and incentivised more companies to go public.628 While only 25 companies were listed 
between 1985-1989, this number increased to 252 between 1990-2000.629 It can be concluded 
that Decision No.32 was important for the development of capital markets in Turkey. 
 
Yet, despite the government’s attempts to create a legal framework conducive to attracting 
investments to the capital markets, the ISE remained under-capitalised in comparison to the 
stock exchanges abroad.630 Aytac has argued that this was due to the CML provisions being 
disadvantageous for public joint-stock companies; he has claimed that the obligations tied to 
issuing shares deterred many joint-stock companies from going public. 631 Indeed, there were 
only 76 listed companies in the ISE by the end of 1989.632  
 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the Turkish government initiated a project to revamp its capital 
market legislation in line with the global developments; thus, the Capital Markets 
Modernisation Project began.633 The government decided that Citibank634 would be in charge 
of the project, which produced its final report in July 1991. The findings of report included the 
need to take measures to increase the stock and bond issuances of companies, to create standards 
for public disclosure, and to transform the ISE into a joint-stock company independent from the 
public sector.635 The project led to the first amendment to the CML in 1992 and then the second 
in 1999. Both the amendments mainly pertained to issues of transparency and public disclosure. 
The most important novelty introduced by the amendments was the requirement for the public 
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companies to provide detailed, adequate, and timely information to the public to enable the 
investors to make informed decisions.636 This was a deviation from the former system, which 
involved the CMB hinting at the investment quality of the security by approving the security 
offerings after its investigation of the company documents and disclosures. After the 
amendments, however, the public became endowed with the duty to make its own informed 
decision on whether to invest.637 Moreover, the CMB became more independent from the 
state.638 The reforms of capital market legislation during this period help to explain the increase 
in company listings in the ISE between 1990-2000.639 
 
The amendments to the CML were important steps towards creating confidence in the stock 
market and were expected to lure in more investors. In fact, foreign investment in the form of 
portfolio investments reached an all-time high in 1993.640 However, due to the scepticism of 
investors in the aftermath of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, many foreign investors 
withdrew their money from stock markets abroad.641 Later in 2000 and 2001, Turkey 
experienced severe ‘twin crises’.642 Although there are differing views as to the causes,643 the 
crises ‘broke out in the midst of an IMF-directed adjustment program.’644 At the time, The 
Economist reported that just prior to the crisis in 2000, the ‘International Monetary Fund was 
showering praise on Turkey’s coalition government for successful implementation of the 
Fund’s ambitious economic stabilisation programme.’645 As per the IMF programme, the 
government had to take measures such as curtailing spending on social security services and 
freezing wages of public sector employees whilst also providing guarantees to investors for any 
losses incurred through bank deposits.646 Despite implementing the IMF’s advice, the investors 
were alarmed by the deteriorating economic conditions, causing a flight from the Turkish lira 
that led to a liquidity crisis, which sent interest rates up to 2,000% overnight in November 2000. 
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In February 2001, investors pulled out a further 5 billion US dollars in a single day, depleting 
the central bank’s reserves.647  
 
In the aftermath of the crises, the inflation rate, government debt, and interest rates were soaring, 
which were the opposite results of the primary objectives of the IMF stabilisation programme.648 
However, the only way out of the financial turmoil was for the government to substantially 
increase its borrowing, mostly from the IMF.649 In exchange for the debt burden, a number of 
structural changes were introduced that were in line with the Washington Consensus agenda, 
such as the ‘acceleration of the privatization process, an increased regressive taxation, Central 
Bank independence, a (virtually exclusive) focus on inflation, increasing flexibility in labour 
markets, and the liberalization of the agriculture sector’.650 The crises increased unemployment 
rates; in 2001, it rose to 10.6% and 11.3% in 2002.651 While the high levels of unemployment 
reduced the bargaining power of labour, the number of unionised workers also declined by the 
end of 2001, causing real wages to drop by around 19% in 2001.652 To sum up, following the 
crises in 2000 and 2001, the IMF gained the upper hand in domestic policymaking, while the 
power of government and labour weakened.  
 
It was in this context that the AKP won a ‘landslide victory’ in the 2002 Turkish parliamentary 
elections.653 Ozdemir has argued that the reason AKP won even though it had been founded 14 
months prior to the elections was because the Turkish people were fed up with the economic 
measures taken after the financial crises of 2000 and 2001 and hence wanted a change in 
politics.654 As commentators have pointed out, ‘with the election of the majority AKP 
government, a stronger political commitment to the IMF program emerged.’655 Indeed, using 
their broad public support, the AKP was able to introduce reforms in line with IMF programmes 
that the former governments had resisted.656 In this context, the need to revamp the capital 
market legislation emerged alongside the government’s objective to make Istanbul one of the 
top 10 financial centres of the world by 2023.657 In fact, enactment of the new law was given 
                                                     
647 Ibid 105. 
648 Ibid. 
649 Ibid 107. 
650 Dufour and Orhangazi, 'The 2000–2001 Financial Crisis in Turkey' (n 111) 102. 
651 'Derin krizin işsizlik acısı 2002’de çıktı (Deep crises hit unemployment in 2002)' Hürriyet 
(26.02.2003) <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/derin-krizin-issizlik-acisi-2002-de-cikti-130137> 
652 Dufour and Orhangazi, 'The 2000–2001 Financial Crisis in Turkey' (n 111) 105. 
653 ET Karagol, 'The Turkish Economy During the Justice and Development Party Decade' (2013) 15(4) 
Insight Turkey 115, 115. 
654 Y Özdemir, 'AKP’nin Neoliberalizmi (AKP's Neoliberalism)' Yenidüzen (11.07.2016) 
<http://www.yeniduzen.com/akpnin-neoliberalizmi-83516h.htm>. 
655 Arpac and Bird, 'Turkey and the IMF' (n 610) 147. 
656 Öniş and Bakır, 'Turkey's Political Economy in the Age of Financial Globalization' (n 597) 156. 
657 Karagol, 'The Turkish Economy During the Justice and Development Party Decade' (n 653) 127. 
103 
 
top priority because it was seen as essential towards achieving the Istanbul International Finance 
Centre project.658 Dufour and Orhangazi have argued that ‘the quick enactment of laws that 
considerably reduced the risk borne by international capital’ has been one illustration of the 
government’s lack of autonomy.659  
 
During the deliberations over the enactment of the new CML in parliament, a member of CHP 
(Republican People's Party), the main opposition party, criticised the AKP government for 
rushing the preparation of the law.660 Another opposition party member from the MHP 
(Nationalist Movement Party), also stated that AKP had been trying to pass the draft law from 
the parliament in a hurry, ‘as if trying to hide it from public opinion’.661 Another MHP 
parliamentarian commented that the Turkish stock market is already dominated by foreigners, 
which is detrimental to the national interests of the country, and questioned the motives for 
introducing provisions to lure further foreign investors. 662 These critiques of the AKP’s reform 
of capital markets legislation implies that there seems to be IMF influence on this area of 
government’s policy making. 
 
The official reasons for drafting new capital market legislation are listed under the Genel 
Gerekçe (General Justification).663 The justifications for the new law include the reforms 
undertaken in countries across the world following the 2008 crisis, the enactment of the new 
TCC and the need to create conformity between the two legislations, Turkey’s ongoing 
European Union accession process and the need to comply with EU’s acquis communautaire, 
the need to increase the competitiveness of the Turkish stock exchange in relation to its 
international counterparts, and the need to introduce corporate governance into capital market 
legislation to lure domestic and foreign investors to the stock market.664  
 
As discussed above, there have been dissenting views from opposition parliamentarians during 
the discussions over the passing of the new CML. A MHP representative argued that the real 
reasons behind the reforms in capital market legislation are to establish more market-based 
legislation and protect the investors first.665 The left-wing HDP (Peoples' Democratic Party) 
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representative commented that the new CML provisions have been drafted with the top 5% 
wealthy population in mind, not the general public of 74 million and that ‘it is designed to make 
the rich richer and poor poorer’.666 Another HDP representative argued that the objective of this 
law is to solely attract foreign investors because the Turkish public has ‘never walked past the 
stock-exchange in their lives, let alone buy stocks’. Hence, he concluded, the law will benefit 
the foreigners. 667 The CHP has also criticised the draft law for not being in in favour of the 
Turkish people.668  
 
Despite the criticisms, the AKP government did not approve any changes to the articles of the 
draft law. Since the AKP held a parliamentary majority, the draft CML passed through 
parliament on 6th December 2012. The Deputy Prime Minister at the time, the AKP’s Ali 
Babacan, exclaimed that ‘With this draft law, we expect increased interest to the Turkish stock 
market from all over the world, since we want ISE to be the stock exchange for the wider 
geography not just for Turkey.’669 This comment affirmed the comments from opposition party 
members that the draft CML provisions were intended to be beneficial for foreign investors 
instead of the Turkish people. Also, the draft law was prepared at a time when the power of 
labour was in continuous decline following the Turkish financial crisis. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the new CML, along with the secondary legislation to be issued by the CMB, 
was designed with the interests of foreign capital in mind. The novelties to corporate governance 
of the new CML will be discussed in detail below. 
 
3 History of Corporate Governance in Turkey 
 
Turkey’s acquaintance with the concept of corporate governance is fairly recent. Turkey has 
been a country ‘where corporate governance reforms are underpinned by the liberalization of 
markets’.670 Thus, according to Aysan, the late recognition of corporate governance has been 
attributed to ‘the delayed development of the competitive liberal economy, private initiative, 
private enterprise and managements.’671 Turkey has experienced heavy state involvement in its 
economic affairs and financial markets; Turkish laws have aimed to protect the value of the 
Turkish currency and a system of state- owned enterprises.672 Even though the situation started 
to change substantially in the 1980s when the Turkish economy embarked on a rigorous 
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liberalisation process, the state continued to be involved in many aspects of the economy. For 
instance, Ararat and Ugur, have commented that the under-development of corporate 
governance standards in Turkey was connected to the ‘heavy involvement of the Turkish state 
in the economy.’673 State involvement also resulted in family owned businesses becoming the 
dominant company structure in Turkey. During this period, businessmen used their connections 
to politicians to their advantage to create holding companies in various fields of activity; these 
companies later became ‘the typical big business unit’ in the Turkish company setting.674 
 
Indeed, it is still the case in Turkey that most companies ‘are characterized by concentrated 
ownership, in the form of family controlled and diversified business groups referred to as 
financial-industrial conglomerates’.675 In such companies, family shareholders have maintained 
control through maintaining large proportions of the holdings or by pyramidal ownership 
structures.676 This led to a situation where company management and day-to-day operations are 
conducted by family members. This type of business organisation has been reported to be 
reluctant to disclose their financials and be averse to any mergers and acquisitions.677 In such 
company settings, corporate governance practices were not on the agenda of Turkish businesses 
for many years until the financial crisis in 2000 and 2001. 
 
The debut of corporate governance phenomena in Turkey can be pinpointed to the aftermath of 
the 2000-2001 crisis, when the banking laws were reformed and the Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency was set up to regulate the banking practices more thoroughly.678 Although 
these regulations only covered banks, they also ignited further developments in corporate 
governance regulations for non-bank companies.679 The interest in corporate governance also 
arose because the OECD had published its first Principles of Corporate Governance in 1999, a 
year prior to the crisis in Turkey.680 As discussed earlier, the OECD Principles have influenced 
the policies of many developing countries, particularly in line with the financial assistance 
provided by the IFIs. The debtor countries implemented these rules as implicit pre-conditions 
for attracting foreign capital. A year after the publication of OECD Principles, the principles 
were translated into Turkish by an affluent non-governmental business organisation in Turkey 
named TUSIAD (Turkish Industry and Business Association).681 In the same year, TUSIAD 
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once again initiated the preparation of a codex of good practices in company management in a 
report called Corporate Governance Best Practices Codex: Structure and the Workings of the 
Board.682 This report specified rules on the formation of the board of directors and aimed to 
achieve institutionalisation in terms of business practices.683 The report’s preface stated that the 
Codex aims to provide the first step in the development of corporate governance in Turkey and 
encourage further regulatory steps that would enable Turkey to be in compliance with the 
OECD Principles.684 The report’s annex also contains a table of the provisions of the Codex that 
correspond to the OECD Principles; this table clearly indicates the close similarity between the 
two texts.685 
 
Aside from TUSIAD, the Corporate Governance Association of Turkey was established in 2003 
as ‘a non-profit organization aiming to develop and promote adherence to corporate governance 
standards and guidelines in Turkey.’686 It organises conferences, working groups, and 
networking events with companies and individuals to ‘share and exchange information, 
experience and knowledge about best practices in corporate governance’.687 Finally, there is the 
Corporate Governance Forum of Turkey (CGFT), also founded in 2003 under the joint initiative 
of TUSIAD and Sabanci University in Istanbul. The CGFT was founded to create awareness of 
corporate governance mainly through conducting scientific research.688 These efforts from the 
private sector helped to create awareness of corporate governance in Turkey.  
 
The efforts from TUSIAD also found regulatory support from the CMB in 2003. The CMB, in 
line with ‘the current practices worldwide’, published its corporate governance principles as 
guidance for public joint-stock companies.689 The CMB Principles consisted of four chapters: 
Shareholders, Transparency and Disclosure, Stakeholders, and Board of Directors. According 
to the CMB, these principles are based on the notions of equality, transparency, accountability, 
and responsibility which ‘appear to be main (sine qua non) concepts in all international 
corporate governance approaches that are widely accepted’.690 These principles are briefly 
elaborated by the CMB in the preface to its principles. Equality refers to ‘the equal treatment of 
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share and stakeholders by the management in all activities of the company’, transparency is 
understood as ‘to disclose company related financial and non-financial information to the public 
in a timely, accurate, complete, clear, construable manner and easy to reach at low cost, 
excluding the trade secrets and undisclosed information.’691 As the company is run by the board 
of directors, the accountability principle is viewed as the accountability of the board of directors. 
In this sense, accountability refers to ‘the obligation of the board of directors to account to the 
company as a corporate body and to the shareholders.’692 Responsibility is understood by the 
CMB as ‘the conformity of all operations carried out on behalf of the company with the 
legislation, articles of association and in-house regulations together with the audit thereof.’693 
These principles intended to achieve ‘sound corporate governance’ practices which meant 
 
improvement of a country’s image, prevention of outflow of domestic funds, increase 
in foreign capital investments, increase in the competitive power of the economy and 
capital markets, overcoming crises with less damage, more efficient allocation of 
resources attainment and maintenance of a higher level of prosperity.694 
 
Although the principles were primarily devised for listed joint-stock companies, the CMB 
acknowledged that the principles can be used by all joint-stock companies.695 The principles 
came out only a few years after the OECD Principles were first published in 1999. In fact, the 
CMB has openly acknowledged that the OECD Principles have been the departure point for 
preparing its own version of corporate governance guidelines. The introduction to the 2003 
CMB Principles stated that ‘primarily the “OECD Corporate Governance Principles” of 1999 
together with the particular conditions of our country have been taken into consideration during 
the preparation of these Principles.’696 The CMB’s 2003 Principles were only advisory in nature 
and had no legal basis. Therefore, they were not binding and their implementation by the listed 
companies was optional.697 The CMB Principles were essentially recommendations for good 
practice. However, the chairman of the CMB at the time stated that these practices would help 
attract foreign capital into Turkish companies: ‘the proper implementation of corporate 
governance Principles is essential for the restructuring process of the Turkish capital markets 
and for attracting capital inflow into Turkey.’698 
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Notwithstanding the importance placed on the application of the CMB Principles to attract 
foreign capital, the CMB did not issue binding corporate governance principles at the time, even 
though it had the authority to issue binding regulations through its by-laws and communiques.699 
The CMB Principles were not only non-binding; no explanation or justification was even 
required in the case of non-compliance. The reason the CMB may have refrained from making 
the application of these principles mandatory could be that there was no primary legislation that 
explicitly extended authority to the CMB to regulate the area of corporate governance. Since 
the CMB Principles did not have any legal basis or binding power in this period, even the listed 
companies had no corporate governance obligations to speak of. The CMB had only expressed 
its hope that some of these principles ‘may be subject to “comply or explain” approach in 
medium and long term.’700 Due to their voluntary nature, the CMB Principles of 2003 did not 
prove to be very effective and their implementation remained sparse.701 However, they were an 
important step in the development of corporate governance laws in Turkey because they 
constituted the first regulatory attempts in the field of corporate governance. 
 
In 2004, by the virtue of a CMB decision, public joint-stock companies with shares that were 
traded on an exchange were required to prepare Corporate Governance Compliance Reports to 
be published along with their annual reports, starting from 2005.702 These companies had to 
report which of the CMB Principles they complied with and provide declarations explaining the 
reasons for non-compliance, if any. This way, the comply-or-explain approach to corporate 
governance regulation was adopted in Turkey for the first time. In the year following the 
abovementioned CMB decision (2005), a total of 276 companies (86% of listed public joint-
stock companies) published their compliance reports, and 174 companies (63%) included 
detailed explanations.703 However, only 48 companies (54%) disclosed whether the minority 
shareholders were represented in the management of the company.704 Following the revisions 
of the OECD Principles in 2004, the CMB Principles were also been amended 2 years later in 
2005. The revised version integrated the 2004 CMB decision into its Corporate Governance 
Principles and added the following: 
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Unilateral declaration of the board of directors, which covers information about 
whether or not the Principles are being properly applied, if the Principles are not being 
applied, the reasons for such non-application and all possible conflicts of interest due 
to the improper adoption of the Principles, should be included in the annual report and 
disclosed to public, together with pertinent harmonization report, if any.705 
 
In line with this addition to the revised version, the advisory and the soft law nature of the CMB 
Principles have shifted to a comply-or-explain approach. 706 This situation was to change in 
2011 with a decree issued by the Council of Ministers.707 The decree gave the CMB authority 
to determine corporate governance principles to be applied by the listed public joint-stock 
companies, to create a categorisation system amongst these companies, to impose mandatory 
application of certain principles to companies that fall within certain categories, and finally to 
enforce application of such principles through filing lawsuits. With the wide range of authority 
conferred by the decree, the CMB published consecutive communiques from 2011 onwards and 
included the revised CMB Principles as an annex to these communiques. 
 
Another important development in terms of corporate governance came from the ISE’s708 
establishment of a Corporate Governance Index (CGI), which came into effect on August 
2007.709 Accordingly, the companies that scored high corporate governance ratings would be 
included in the CGI and enjoy benefits such as a substantial reduction in listing fees and the 
prestige of being included in the index.710 The CGI encourages companies to stay within the 
high corporate governance rating score range if they want to continue benefiting from the index. 
It also aims to incentivise other companies to improve their corporate governance standards to 
secure a good rating. The CGI initially included five companies, but includes 47 companies as 
of December 2018.711 The number of companies scoring high corporate governance ratings has 
increased almost tenfold since it was established in mid-2007. Inclusion in the CGI increases 
the reputation of the company and is a determining factor for prospective foreign investors.712 
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To score the corporate governance ratings of listed companies, the CMB issued a communique 
regarding the rating agencies in the capital markets. The communique stipulated that the 
corporate governance ratings are to be conducted by independent agencies in line with 
companies’ compliance with the CMB Principles.713 The companies are scored in line with their 
corporate governance practices under four headings, similar to the CMB Principles, albeit with 
different weights attributed to each category. Accordingly, corporate governance practices 
under the Shareholders category constitute 25% of the score, practices under the Public 
Disclosure and Transparency category constitute 35% of the score, practices under the 
Stakeholders category constitute 15% of the score, and practices under the Board of Directors 
category constitute 25% of the score.714 For a company to be included in the CGI, they must 
have an overall minimum score of 7 out of 10 and a minimum score of 6.5 for each category.715 
These ratings are an important determinant for investment decisions: ‘from a global investor’s 
perspective, CG ratings are seen as important proxies in assessing whether firms in emerging 
market countries follow corporate governance practices in line with international standards.’716 
 
As previously discussed, the CMB Principles closely resemble the OECD Principles. Hence, 
the level of compliance with the CMB Principles also means the same level of compliance with 
the international standards. A similar practice has been adopted in another emerging market 
economy. Brazil’s stock exchange has implemented special listing categories where companies 
are included in one of the four segments designated by the exchange based on the companies’ 
liquidity, transparency, and corporate governance practices.717 The most demanding segment is 
the Novo Mercado (New Market), where companies must meet requirements such as keeping a 
minimum free-float ratio of 25%, favour stock dispersion, offer more transparency, have a 
minimum number of independent directors, and issue only voting shares.718 The Brazilian stock 
exchange’s Nova Mercado initiative was established in 2000, which means that the practice 
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took off shortly after the OECD Principles were published.719 Leal has commented that in 
Brazil, ‘going public and listing in the traditional listing segment is a thing of the past, and 
probably unacceptable to most investors.’720 He has concluded that although the boards in Brazil 
are still largely dominated by controlling shareholders, ‘dispersion of capital is slowly 
increasing.’721 There are similarities between the Brazilian experience and Turkish companies. 
Both countries’ company structures are dominated by controlling shareholders, although Brazil 
is more advanced in terms of incentivising public companies to be listed in the higher corporate 
governance segment of its stock exchange. In contrast, listed companies in the Turkish stock 
exchange’s CGI constitute around 15% of all the companies whose shares are being traded in 
the BIST.722 It remains to be seen whether the listings under the CGI will increase in the future 
as more foreign investors dilute the stock market. Nevertheless, the creation of the CGI carries 
significance in terms of disseminating corporate governance practices in Turkey. 
 
In sum, the corporate governance phenomenon has had a brief history in Turkey that began with 
the introduction of corporate governance rules in the banking sector after the financial crisis of 
2000-2001.723 Afterwards, due to the efforts of non-governmental organisations in Turkey, 
corporate governance soon found its place on the agenda of the regulators. This was also 
because the OECD had published its first Principles of Corporate Governance in 1999. Taking 
the OECD’s text as inspiration, the CMB of Turkey published its own Corporate Governance 
Principles in 2003, which were non-binding guidelines for public joint-stock companies. The 
principles did not find much application in the family owned and controlled business 
organisations in Turkey. However, with the introduction of the Corporate Governance 
Compliance Reports’ mandatory reporting requirements from 2005, corporate governance 
issues started taking centre stage in the business world. 
 
On top of these developments, the ISE helped spread the principles via the establishment of a 
CGI and providing companies with incentives to score high corporate governance ratings. In 
fact, in terms of performance, it has been reported that between 2009 and 2017, the BIST 100 
Index increased by 387% and the CGI increased by 444%.724 This illustrates some link between 
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the application of the CMB Principles and increased share price for Turkish listed companies. 
On the other hand, despite having a ‘weak legal foundation’725 for its corporate governance 
principles, the CMB’s regulatory initiative can be considered a success. Since the launch of 
CMB Principles, foreign shareholders in ISE companies increased significantly, and some 
controlling shareholders sold their stakes in line with the rising demand for ISE listed stocks.726 
Nevertheless, the OECD’s report on Turkey’s corporate governance practices stated that there 
must be more improvements in the legal framework, especially for related party transactions, 
protection of minority shareholders, and board oversight of controlling shareholders.727 The 
following sections examine the developments on corporate governance legislation with the 
enactment of a new CML in 2012, which authorises the CMB to regulate corporate governance 
matters for public joint-stock companies, thereby providing the CMB Principles with its much-
needed legal basis. 
  
4 Corporate Governance in the new Turkish Capital Market Law 
 
It is important to clarify which forms of companies the provisions of the CML are applicable 
to. The provisions of the CML are applicable to the ‘publicly-held corporations’ which are, 
according to Article 3 of the CML, ‘A joint stock corporation, the shares of which are offered 
to public or are deemed to be offered to public.’728 The law further clarifies what constitutes 
deemed to be offered to public, in line with Article 16: ‘Corporations the shares of which are 
traded on exchange and the shares of joint stock corporations with a shareholder number 
exceeding five hundred shall be deemed to be publicly-held.’729 Therefore, the articles of the 
CML are applicable to all public joint-stock companies, regardless of whether they are listed or 
not.730 The CML provisions are specifically applicable to the public joint-stock companies, 
whereas the provisions found in the TCC are applicable to all companies. The TCC also includes 
provisions on corporate governance, but as will be discussed in the next chapter, these are more 
general rules, and the CML provisions take precedence in terms of application for public joint-
stock companies. Furthermore, the new TCC specifically confers upon the CMB the authority 
to regulate corporate governance-related issues. Article 1529 of the TCC states that the ‘Capital 
Markets Board is authorized to determine corporate governance principles, rules of explanations 
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of executive board related to corporate governance and rules and results of rating of companies 
in aspect of corporate governance, in open joint stock companies.’731 
 
This was not the case with the previous commercial code, which contained no references to the 
issue of corporate governance or the institution which would regulate it. With the new TCC and 
by the virtue of Article 1529, the CMB now has an explicit legal basis for being the sole 
authority regulating matters of corporate governance for public companies. On top of that, the 
new CML that entered into force shortly after the promulgation of the new TCC in 2012 further 
strengthened the ‘monopoly’732 of the CMB concerning its authority over corporate governance-
related issues. In this regard, Article 17/1 of the new CML stipulates that 
 
In publicly-held corporations, the procedures and the principles regarding corporate 
governance principles, the content and publication of corporate governance compliance 
reports, the rating of compliance of corporations with corporate governance principles 
and the independent memberships of board of directors shall be determined by the 
Board [CMB].733 
 
Along with this provision of the CML and the Article 1529 of the TCC, the CMB became the 
sole authority to determine corporate governance principles for public companies, avoiding any 
confusion. The reason for this is elaborated in the Genel Gerekçe (General Justification) of the 
TCC Article 1529; it is stated that the provision aims to ensure uniformity in corporate 
governance rules that would be applicable to public companies, thereby avoiding any confusion 
in practice regarding the applicability of these rules.734. The new TCC also allows for other 
public institutions to draft their own corporate governance rules concerning and limited to their 
own fields of activity. However, these regulations are also subject to the approval of the 
CMB.735 According to the wording of this provision, the corporate governance regulations of 
public institutions other than the CMB can only pertain to detailed matters. An example of this 
can be found in the Banking Law, where Article 22 highlights the complementary character of 
its corporate governance regulations and stipulates that the Banking Regulation and Supervision 
Agency has the authority to regulate matters on corporate governance in line with the opinion 
of the CMB.736 The purpose of this is to ensure that there is unity in the application of the 
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corporate governance principles throughout public joint-stock companies and to avoid 
confusion for both companies and investors. 
 
One of the most important reforms brought by the new CML are the mandatory corporate 
governance principles. Article 17/2 of the new CML gives the CMB authority to impose 
mandatory corporate governance principles for certain listed companies. Accordingly, the new 
CML explicitly allows the CMB to establish corporate governance principles; to provide 
categories for listed companies; and most importantly to decide which rules are to be mandatory 
for those categories as well as ensure compliance with these rules by various enforcement 
methods, including filing lawsuits.737 This was a turning point for Turkish corporate governance 
laws. With the power granted by this article, the CMB has published subsequent communiques 
that regulate the matter in detail. 
 
5 Capital Markets Board’s Corporate Governance Regulations After the 
New Capital Markets Law 
 
The CMB’s corporate governance regulations preceded the promulgation of the new TCC and 
the CML. The CMB’s 2003 Principles were not mandatory because they lacked any legal basis. 
Consequently, the CMB did not have any enforcement power to ensure the implementation of 
its principles. The only mandatory requirement from the 2005 revision was that the listed 
companies were required to publish their compliance with the CMB Principles in their annual 
reports. Other than this requirement, the CMB Principles remained a form of soft law. The soft 
law approach started to change towards the end of 2011 with the government Decree No. 654 
that amended an article in the old CML, providing the necessary legal basis to the CMB for 
regulating the issue of corporate governance.738 Shortly after the amendment came into effect, 
the CMB introduced the first shift from the comply-or-explain approach to the hard law 
approach. 
 
In 2011, the CMB Communique on the Determination and the Application of Corporate 
Governance Principles IV-54 stipulated that the listed joint-stock companies (excluding banks) 
whose shares are traded in the ISE and included in the ISE-30 Index739 were required to comply 
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with some of the corporate governance principles stated therein.740 Shortly after, the 
Communique on the Determination and the Application of Corporate Governance Principles 
IV-56 (Communique IV-56) followed, which replaced the previous one and provided that all 
listed companies under the ISE were within the scope of mandatory application, including the 
listed banks.741 It also specified that listed companies under the categorisation provided by the 
CMB were required to implement certain corporate governance principles according to the 
group they belonged in.742 Those listed companies were then obliged to update their articles of 
association and restructure their boards to ensure compliance with these new corporate 
governance obligations shortly after the publication of that communique.743  
 
With each subsequent communique, the CMB increased the scope of applicability of its 
mandatory provisions. Some of the CMB Principles that gained mandatory status by the end of 
2011 (with Communique IV-56) pertained to the convening of the general assembly;744 
transactions of controlling shareholders; board members; managers their families, and conflicts 
of interest;745 the requirement for a majority vote at the general assembly meeting for certain 
transactions;746 composition of the board of directors;747 and formation of committees within 
the board.748 The following section conducts a detailed analysis of the CMB Principles that have 
become mandatory and their significance to the research inquiry of this thesis.  
 
The most important novelty brought by CMB Communique IV-56 was the categorisation of 
listed companies according to their ‘systemic significance’, which is measured through their 
‘market capitalisation’ and ‘market value of shares in free circulation’, or the free-float.749 The 
communique established three categories that consider the above-mentioned features of public 
companies: 
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748 Ibid Principle 4.5.1. 
749 Ibid Article 2. 
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Category I Market cap > TRY 3,000,000,000 
Value of free-floating shares > TRY 750,000,000 
Category II Market cap > TRY 1,000,000,000 
Value of free-floating shares > TRY 250,000,000 
Category III All other listed companies that are outside the scope of categories I and II, 
and companies listed and trading at the Watch List and Emerging 
Companies Markets. 
Figure - 1 
 
According to the categorisation illustrated above, the listed public joint-stock companies that 
have a market capitalisation above 3,000 million Turkish Liras (TRY) and free-floating shares 
valued above TRY 750 million are required to comply with all of the mandatory provisions 
contained in the CMB Principles that were annexed to Communique IV-56. Companies in the 
second category, meaning their market capitalisation is above TRY 1,000 million and they have 
free-floating shares valued above TRY 250 million, will not have to comply with all the 
mandatory provisions. For example, it is stated in the communique that the second paragraph 
of Principle 4.3.9 will not be applicable to the listed companies in categories II and III.750 This 
principle stipulated that the board of directors must provide its list of independent board member 
candidates to the CMB, and that the CMB shall provide its dissenting opinion, if any, regarding 
the candidates on the list within 30 days to the company. In such cases, the candidate bearing 
the negative opinion shall not be elected as an independent director.751 Accordingly, the 
affirmative opinion of the CMB as to the independence of the directors is prioritised mainly for 
the Category I companies, which have the most systemic importance according to the CMB 
categorisation. Finally, Category III is for all other listed companies that are left outside the 
scope of categories I and II as well as companies listed and trading at the Watch List and 
Emerging Companies markets. These companies are considered to be less vital to the systemic 
functioning of the stock market and are therefore generally exempt from most of the mandatory 
provisions. 
 
                                                     
750 Ibid Article 5/4. 
751 Ibid. 
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In the event of non–compliance with the mandatory principles, the CMB has the authority to 
request injunction measures from the court to enforce compliance.752 The CMB can also apply 
to the court to request that the non-compliance to be determined and for the annulment of a 
transaction that conflicts with the CMB Principles. In its application before the court, the CMB 
is required to include its suggestions on how to achieve compliance with its principles. 
However, this suggestion must not be detrimental to the regular activities of the company and 
should not clash with its articles of association.753 This was a very bold step in the area of 
corporate governance because the independent institution of the CMB was granted enforcement 
powers in the form of court requests to annul company transactions to ensure compliance with 
corporate governance principles. 
 
The CMB Communique IV-56 has been amended several times following its publication, and 
with each consecutive amendment, the scope of the mandatory principles has been extended 
further.754 The CMB has advocated increasing the number of mandatory principles because it 
had observed that the companies that implemented the CMB Principles have had access to 
cheaper financing and therefore used their resources more efficiently.755 Also, during the 
parliamentary deliberations over passing the draft CML, the government stated that 2012 had 
been an important year for winning the confidence of international investors because of the 
enactment of the mandatory application of corporate governance principles. 756 The government 
spokesman also stated that the most important aim of these regulations has been to restore 
investor confidence in the capital markets.757 It can be observed that the CMB used its 
communiques to act ahead of the legislative body by laying down corporate governance 
regulations. As evidenced by the government’s statements, the CMB’s rule-making in the area 
of corporate governance has been welcomed by the government as an important step towards 
attracting foreign capital. This also indicates that the CMB is acting in line with the objectives 
of the legislator and there is no conflict between their policies. 
 
                                                     
752 Ibid Article 5/10. 
753 Ibid Temporary Article 2. 
754 The CMB issued 5 communiques regarding the determination and the application of corporate 
governance principles in a 3-year period following the Communique IV-56, until the Communique on 
Corporate Governance in 2014. 
755 CMB, 'Seri: IV No: 56 Sayılı Kurumsal Yönetim İlkelerinin Belirlenmesine ve Uygulanmasına İlişkin 
Tebliğ Hakkında Basın Duyurusu (Press Statement on the Communique Serial: IV No: 56 on the 
Determination and Application of Corporate Governance Principles)' (30.12.2011) 
<http://www.spk.gov.tr/Duyuru/Goster/20111230/0>. 
756 TBMM, 'Genel Kurul Tutanağı (Minutes of the General Meeting)' (12.12.2011). 
757 Ibid. 
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The latest CMB communique regarding corporate governance was published in 2014, titled 
Communique on Corporate Governance II-17.1 (Communique on Corporate Governance).758 
This new regulation repealed all the former CMB communiques relating to corporate 
governance. The CMB announced that the necessity for a new communique on corporate 
governance arose from the promulgation of the new CML and the TCC. The CMB’s 
communique revised its principles in line with the provisions of the two new legislation.759 For 
example, to be in conformity with the provisions of the new TCC, the Communique on 
Corporate Governance introduced a requirement for the establishment of an investor relations 
department because it was already stipulated under the TCC.760 In terms of the legal basis for 
the Communique on Corporate Governance, a provision was added to the communique to 
clarify that the CMB has the authority to regulate issues on corporate governance as per Article 
17 of the new CML.761 Overall, it can be concluded that the explicit reference to the 
communique’s legal basis was intended to bring more credibility to the rule-making and 
enforcement capabilities of the CMB, particularly in terms of Turkish companies’ perceptions 
of the application of the CMB Principles. 
 
6 The Capital Market Board’s Corporate Governance Principles 
  
The latest version of the CMB Principles is published as an annex to the Communique on 
Corporate Governance. The CMB Principles follow a similar outline to the initial version in 
that it consists of four sections; Shareholders, Public Disclosure and Transparency, 
Stakeholders, and Board of Directors. In total, there are 97 corporate governance principles, of 
which 24 are mandatory for certain listed companies as per their systemic categorisation. Article 
5 of the Communique on Corporate Governance lists the principles which the companies are 
liable to implement. These are all applicable for Group I category companies ‘whose average 
market value is above TRY 3 billion and average market value in actual circulation is above 
TRY 750 million.’762 The subsequent articles stipulate which mandatory principles will not be 
applicable for Group II and Group III companies. For example, Article 6 stipulates that ‘The 
criteria stated under the principle numbered (4.3.4.) regarding the number of independent board 
member shall not be applied for the third group corporations’.763 As discussed earlier, the 
                                                     
758 CMB, Communique on Corporate Governance II-17.1 (03.01.2014). 
759 CMB, 'Kurumsal Yönetim Tebliği II-17.1 Basın Duyurusu (Press Statement on the Communique II-
17.1 on Corporate Governance)' (03.01.2014) <http://www.spk.gov.tr/Duyuru/Goster/20140103/3>. 
760 Communique on Corporate Governance Article 11. 
761 Ibid Article 2. 
762 Communique on Corporate Governance Article 5/2. 
763 Ibid Article 6. 
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companies in Group III are considered to have the least systemic importance for their related 
sectors,764 which is why their corporate governance obligations are less rigid. 
 
The first section, Shareholders, contains four mandatory principles and 20 voluntary principles. 
In the Public Disclosure and Transparency section, there are six principles which are all 
voluntary. Under the Stakeholders section, there are 22 principles which are all voluntary. In 
the last section on the Board of Directors, there are 20 mandatory principles alongside 25 
voluntary principles. I examine these principles in more detail below, focusing on the mandatory 
principles and their significance. I also discuss the reasons why none of the principles listed 
under the Stakeholders section are binding and their possible implications in practice. 
 
 Principles for Shareholders 
 
The CMB Principles begin with rules concerning shareholders. These principles are categorised 
into the following sub-sections: Facilitating the exercise of shareholders rights, Shareholders’ 
right to information, Shareholders’ right to participate in the general assembly meetings, Voting 
rights, Minority rights, Dividend rights, and Transfer of shares. According to Article 5 of the 
Communique on Corporate Governance, listed companies are obliged to implement Principles 
1.3.1, 1.3.5, 1.3.6 and 1.3.9 under the Shareholders section.765 The Corporate Governance 
Communique also holds that listed companies ‘shall be divided into three groups in accordance 
with their systemic significance considering their market values and the market values of the 
shares in active circulation.’766 Group I companies are required to implement all mandatory 
principles listed in Article 5, which are the mandatory principles under the Shareholders section. 
Since there are no articles exempting the Group II and Group III companies, the mandatory 
principles concerning shareholder rights are applicable to all three categories of companies.767 
This signifies the importance attributed to these four mandatory principles because all the listed 
companies, even the ones in Group-III, are bound to implement these corporate governance 
principles. 
 
                                                     
764 Justification for CML Article 17 in TBMM, 'Draft Capital Markets Law and the Report' (n 101). 
765 Communique on Corporate Governance Article 5. 
766 Ibid Article 5/2. See Figure-1 for an illustration of the CMB’s categorisation system. 
767 Ibid: ‘First group: Corporations whose average market value is above TRY 3 billion and average 
market value in actual circulation is above TRY 750 million. Second group: Corporations among those 
excluded from the first group, the average market value of which is above TRY 1 billion and average 
market value in actual circulation is above TRY 250 million. Third group: Corporations among those 
excluded from the first and second groups, the shares of which are traded on National Market, Second 
National Market and Collective Products Market.’  
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To begin with, Corporate Governance Principle 1.3.1 articulates the type of information that 
needs to be announced to shareholders prior to the convening of the general assembly meeting. 
This includes information such as the ‘total number of shares and voting rights reflecting the 
current corporate structure’768, ‘changes in the management and activities of the corporation and 
subsidiaries thereof’,769 or changes to the company’s articles of association.770 The information 
listed above needs to be announced in the company website and in the Public Disclosure 
Platform (PDP).771 There is also a deadline for submitting the listed information online; 
accordingly, the announcement should be made at least 3 weeks prior to the general assembly 
meeting.772 This mandatory principle intends to provide investors with enough time to decide 
on the matters announced before the general assembly, thereby strengthening shareholders’ 
rights and incentivising prospective investors. 
 
The next mandatory principle concerns the facilitation of shareholder participation in the 
general assembly meetings. This principle requires that all shareholders be given equal 
opportunity to ask questions and express their opinions.773 This principle aims to achieve the 
equitable treatment of all shareholders. The mandatory principle in 1.3.6 pertains to the 
shareholders who hold the control function in the company and therefore carries significance in 
the context of Turkish family-controlled companies. This principles aims for the disclosure of 
situations where controlling shareholders enter into transactions with related persons or become 
unlimited shareholders in another company operating in the same line of activity, which may 
lead to a conflict of interest. The mandatory principle stipulates that such situations should be 
disclosed and discussed in the general assembly meeting as a separate agenda item.774 This 
principle seeks to prevent the expropriation of company assets by the majority shareholders who 
also hold control functions in the company. The last mandatory principle on shareholders 
stipulates that certain company transactions that constitute activity cessations or pertain to 
purchase or sale of assets or services whose value exceeds 10% of the total value of the assets 
require the approval of the majority of independent board members.775 The significance of this 
principle lies in that approval from the majority of the independent board members is required 
                                                     
768 CMB Principle 1.3.1 paragraph (a) 
769 CMB Principle 1.3.1 paragraph (b) 
770 CMB Principle 1.3.1 paragraph (d) 
771 ‘Public Disclosure Platform (PDP) is an electronic system through which electronically signed 
notifications required by the capital markets and Borsa Istanbul regulations are publicly disclosed’ in  
Public Disclosure Platform of Turkey, 'General Information' <https://www.kap.org.tr/en/menu-
content/About-PDP/General-Information> accessed 6 November 2017. 
772 CMB Principle 1.3.1 
773 CMB Principle 1.3.5 
774 CMB Principle 1.3.6 
775 CMB Principle 1.3.9 
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for the material value transaction to go through, which increases the power of the independent 
members in the company. 
 
In terms of minority shareholder rights, the non-binding Principle 1.5.1 states that ‘Maximum 
diligence shall be paid for the exercise of minority rights.’776 In terms of voting rights, the 
principles do not envisage a ‘one share one vote rule’ but rather advise that  
 
Privileges regarding voting rights should be avoided. In case there is a privilege in the 
voting right, the privileges in a feature to prevent the holders of publicly traded shares 
from being represented at the board of directors of the corporations shall in principle 
be revoked.777  
 
Moreover, there is a special provision regarding foreign investors; to induce all shareholders to 
exercise their voting rights, cross-border voting is encouraged.778 Another important point 
pertains to the transferability of the listed company shares; the principles explicitly state that 
‘Practices that would complicate the free transfer of the shares shall be avoided.’779 It can thus 
be asserted that the aim of this principle is to ensure the free transferability characteristic of the 
company stock so as to sustain liquid stock markets. 
 
In sum, the corporate governance areas that are considered important by the CMB are evident 
from its preference for mandatory principles. It is clear that shareholders’ access to information, 
particularly to timely information prior to the convening of the general assembly meetings, is 
considered a prominent issue. The matters that must be disclosed are also stipulated in great 
detail. Also, all shareholders’ rights to participate, ask questions, and have answers to their 
questions are safeguarded through a mandatory principle which all listed companies must to 
abide by. The aim of this provision is to prevent minority shareholders from being left out in 
general assembly meetings and provide them with the opportunity to be involved with company 
matters should they wish to do so. 
 
The CMB also took into consideration the specificities of the family-owned and controlled 
ownership structure of Turkish companies while regulating the mandatory principles. The CMB 
Principles require material transactions by the controlling shareholders to be disclosed and 
discussed before the general assembly as part of a separate agenda item. Material value 
                                                     
776 Ibid. Annex-1 Principle 1.5.1 
777 Ibid. Annex-1 Principle 1.4.2 
778 Ibid. Annex-1 Principle 1.4.1 
779 Ibid. Annex-1 Principle 1.7.1 
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transactions are also subjected to the approval of independent board members, increasing the 
power of independent members vis-à-vis the shareholders who hold control positions. In this 
way, the two mandatory principles provide safeguards for the minority shareholders against the 
controlling shareholders. The rest of the corporate governance principles under the Shareholders 
section are non-binding, although all listed companies are required to disclose their compliance 
with the rest of the principles in their Corporate Governance Compliance Reports.780 
 
 Principles on Public Disclosure and Transparency 
 
The earliest mandatory rule laid down by the CMB with regards to disclosure and transparency 
was its 2004 requirement for public joint-stock companies to publish a Corporate Governance 
Compliance Report. The initial corporate governance principles that were published by the 
CMB in 2003 also included a section on disclosure and transparency, which included provisions 
of a soft law nature. The 2014 revised CMB Principles still contain optional principles listed 
under the Public Disclosure and Transparency section. However, their application is 
recommended in accordance with the comply-or-explain method. Yet, Eminoğlu has asserted 
that one of the main reasons why corporate governance rules emerged in Turkey is because of 
the shareholders’ need for more transparency.781 
 
It is true that disclosure and transparency constitute the cornerstones of corporate governance. 
Thus, one could argue that they should have been regulated as mandatory principles. However, 
the CMB Principles under this section indicate that the provisions are covered by other binding 
legislation. For instance, the first principle under Public Disclosure and Transparency is the 
requirement for a corporate website;782 the initial version of the new TCC included an article 
that required all companies to create a website that was accessible by everyone.783 The article 
also listed detailed information that needed to be included in the company website. However, 
                                                     
780 According to Article 8/1 of the Communique on Corporate Governance: ‘Annual [company] reports 
shall include information as to whether principles of corporate governance set forth in the annex of this 
Communiqué are implemented, if not, it shall include a reasoned explanation with this regard and 
explanations as to whether the corporation has an amendment plan in the future within the framework of 
such principles in respect of the conflict of interest arising from the non-compliance to these principles 
and governance implementations of the corporation. In case there is a significant amendment within the 
term on these explanations, such amendments shall be included within the interim activity report.’ 
781 Eminoğlu, Corporate Governance in the Turkish Commercial Code (n 154) 43. 
782 CMB Principle 2.1 
783 Article 1524, Turkish Commercial Code No. 6102. It was provided that this Article would be effective 
as of July 1, 2013, giving companies time to comply with this obligation. 
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the article was later amended,784 and its scope was narrowed down to include only the 
companies which were subject to independent audits as per Article 397 of the TCC.785 
Accordingly, a Council of Ministers decision will determine which companies are subject to an 
independent audit. 786 In all the decisions of the Council of Ministers, listed companies have 
been classified as subject to independent audits and hence must have a company website. 
Therefore, the non-mandatory CMB principle regarding the company website merely provides 
recommendations as to the additional content of the website. Another novelty for Turkish 
corporate governance laws was the CMB principle that required companies to disclose their 
financial statements in English and Turkish through the PDP.787 Moreover, Principle 2.1.4 
stipulated that the information on the company website needs to be prepared in foreign 
languages, which is ‘in completely same content with the Turkish version’ to be used by foreign 
investors. 
 
To sum up, the difference between the CMB Principles and the TCC articles on public 
disclosure and transparency is that the latter is legally binding while the CMB Principles are 
not. It can be concluded that the CMB did not see the need to indicate the company website as 
a mandatory principle because it is already a requirement under the TCC. The CMB Principles 
instead set forth what is to be included in listed companies’ websites: 
Shareholding structure of the corporation, names, number and ratio of shares, and the 
privilege of the real person shareholders who own more than 5% shareholding cleared 
from indirect relations and cross ownership relations shall be disclosed by being 
updated at least in every 6 months.788 
The contents for listed companies’ websites are regulated with more detail because the company 
website serves the function of ensuring that the information reaches shareholders and investors 
who are physically distant from the company. In sum, the principles on Public Disclosure and 
Transparency may not be mandatory but due to the articles of the new TCC, they are in fact 
binding on listed companies. 
                                                     
784 Article 34, ‘Türk Ticaret Kanunu ile Türk Ticaret Kanununun Yürürlüğü Ve Uygulama Şekli 
Hakkinda Kanunda Değişiklik Yapilmasina Dair Kanun’ (Law Regarding the Changes to the Turkish 
Commercial Code) No. 6335, published in the Official Gazette numbered 28339 on June 30, 2012. 
785 The reason for this change was elaborated in the parliamentary discussions; a CHP parliamentarian 
expressed that the company website requirement was disadvantageous to small and medium sized 
companies, who mostly do not have the capacity to create a website both financially and technically. 
TBMM Proceedings of June 26, 2012. 847 
786 Article 397 of the Turkish Commercial Code No. 6102 
787 Principle 2.1.3 
788 Principle 2.1.2 
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 Principles for Stakeholders 
 
In In the revised CMB Principles annexed to the Corporate Governance Communique, the 
stakeholders are defined as: ‘persons, institutions or interest groups that are related with the 
achievement of goals or activities of the corporation such as employees, creditors, clients, 
suppliers, syndicates, several non-profit organisations.’789 The first principle on stakeholders 
states that the company must protect the rights of the stakeholders that are guaranteed by the 
relevant laws and those rights provided by the contracts between the stakeholder and the 
company.790 The provision’s reference to ‘relevant laws’ means the specific laws that protect 
the rights of certain stakeholders such as consumers or employees.791 The next principle is about 
the stakeholders whose rights are not protected by any relevant laws or when there is no contract 
between that stakeholder and the company: 
In case the rights of the stakeholders are not protected by the relevant legislation and 
reciprocal contracts, the rights of the stakeholders shall be protected within the 
framework of bona fides principles and within the capabilities of the corporation.792 
 
In other words, stakeholder protection is left to the goodwill of the company when the 
stakeholder has not entered into a contractual relationship with the company and is outside the 
scope of any special legislation. In practice, companies usually use general language in their 
Corporate Governance Compliance Reports to the effect that they are taking all measures to 
ensure that their stakeholders are protected.793 
 
Another important principle for stakeholders pertains to the participation of stakeholders in 
company management. The relevant principle starts by stating that models that support 
stakeholder participation in management, particularly employee participation, ‘shall be 
developed in a manner not to hinder the activities of the corporation’.794 Hence, before the 
                                                     
789 Principle 3.1.1. 
790 Ibid 
791 ‘Tüketicinin Korunması Hakkında Kanun’ (Consumer Protection Law) No. 6502, published in the 
Official Gazette numbered 28835 on November 28, 2013; ‘İş Kanunu’ (Labour Law) No. 4857, published 
in the Official Gazette numbered 25134 on June 10, 2003 
792 Principle 3.1.1. 
793 For instance, Arcelik A.S., a company listed in the Corporate Governance Index and is in Group-I in 
line with CMB’s Communique on Corporate Governance, in its 2017 Corporate Governance Compliance 
Report states that its management regularly organizes Retailer Meetings to listen to their problems, as 
well as creating a supplier web portal in which they can communicate their concerns to the management. 
However, there is no mention under this principle’s explanation of the stakeholders who do not contract 
with the company such as the society or the environment. The widely-held perception is that those 
stakeholders are considered under social responsibility projects. 
<http://www.arcelikas.com/sayfa/641/Kurumsal_Yonetim_Ilkeleri_Uyum_Raporu> 
794 CMB Principle 3.2.1 
125 
 
principle even suggests that the stakeholders should take part in management decisions, it states 
that such engagement should not obstruct the company’s operations. If employees take part in 
management activities, this will mean spending time on management functions that are outside 
of their usual work scope. This can be interpreted as hindering company activities due to lost 
time regarding the employees’ normal shift hours. The company can therefore claim that any 
model with employee engagement in management would hamper its operations and create 
additional costs. This provides a convenient justification for the company to refrain from 
implementing this principle. 
 
In terms of other legislation, there is limited scope for employee participation in Turkey. The 
initial draft of the Turkish Labour Law contained provisions that enabled employee 
representation for information and consultation purposes. However, before the draft code was 
adopted, such provisions were removed from its text ‘because government representatives, trade 
unions and employer associations had jointly rejected the proposal in 2003’.795 The only 
remaining provision in the Labour Law is the article that allows the formation of Annual Leave 
Committees that include employee representatives.796 Another form of employee participation 
in management can be found in the Occupational Health and Safety Law, which envisages the 
establishment of an occupational health and safety committee that includes employee 
representatives.797 However, the scope of this committee’s activities are very limited. In 
practice, when the companies in the CGI are examined, the only instance of a company with 
some form of employee participation in management was Aselsan A.S.798 According to the 
Stakeholders section of Aselsan’s Corporate Governance Compliance Report, an employee 
representative shall attend the company’s BoD meetings at least once a year.799 However, it 
should be noted that Aselsan is in the defence industry, and 74% of its shares are owned by the 
Turkish military. Similar practices of employee engagement in boards are not found in other 
private listed companies in Turkey. 
                                                     
795 Ozcure G, Eryigit N and Demirkaya H, 'The influence of the European Union employee participation 
system and related acquis on companies operating in Turkey' (2009) 1 South-East Europe Review 95. 
101 
796 Article 60, Labour Law No. 4857, published in the Official Gazette numbered 25134 on June 10, 2003. 
Accordingly, the article authorizes the Ministry of Labor and Social Security to determine the rules on 
the establishment of the Annual Leave Committee with its regulations. The related regulation entitled 
‘Yillik Ücretli İzin Yönetmeliği’, Article 15 stipulates that in workplaces with over 100 employees, a 
committee composed of the employer or its representative and two employee representatives shall be 
established. Article 16 states that the Annual Leave Committee is responsible for discussing employees’ 
leave requests, preparing annual leave schedules, listening to employee comments and complaints 
regarding annual leave.  
797 Article 22, ‘Is Sagligi ve Guvenligi Kanunu’ (Occupational Health and Safety Law) No.6331, 
published in the Official Gazette numbered 28339 on June 30, 2012.  
798 A.S. refers to ‘Anonim Sirket’, which means Joint-stock Company. 
799 From company reports published in PDP (Public Disclosure Platform) in 
<https://www.kap.org.tr/tr/bist-sirketler> 
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On the other hand, another CMB Principle provides that ‘With respect to the significant 
decisions which affect stakeholders, opinions of the stakeholders shall be taken.’800 The 
principle does not provide any details or further guidance of how the opinion of the stakeholders 
should be taken or whether it encompasses stakeholders in a broader sense. The Corporate 
Governance Compliance Reports of the companies listed in the CGI indicate that most 
companies demonstrate their compliance with this principle with practices such as employee 
satisfaction surveys, suggestion surveys, or internet portals for leaving comments and 
feedback.801 Therefore, this principle is not implemented by companies in practice because there 
are no formal procedures for consulting stakeholders, and there is no evidence to indicate that 
these surveys and online comments from employees are considered in decision-making. 
 
Overall, the ambiguity of the principles under the Stakeholders section make them impractical 
and futile because it is not clear how these principles would be applied by the company. 
Furthermore, the company’s compliance would only be measured by the subjective criterion of 
what the company believes it does for the stakeholders. Also, none of the principles under the 
Stakeholders section are mandatory. These principles stand merely as good practices 
recommended to companies under the comply-or-explain approach. Most companies have 
reported high levels of compliance with the principles for stakeholders, albeit with very general 
and unsatisfactory explanations.802 
 
 Principles for the Board of Directors 
 
The board of directors is arguably the most important organ of the company for implementing 
corporate governance.803 It is for this reason that the principles regarding the board of directors 
constitute the most detailed section and contains the most mandatory rules.804 The most 
mandatory rules are contained under the sub-sections Structure of the Board and the Board 
Committees. According to the Communique on Corporate Governance, the companies 
categorised under Group I are required to implement all of these mandatory principles in full. 
                                                     
800 CMB Principle 3.2.2. 
801 'Kurumsal Yönetim İlkeleri Uyum Raporu (Corporate Governance Principles Compliance Report)' 
(Anadolu Grubu 2017); 'Kurumsal Yönetim İlkeleri Uyum Raporları (Corporate Governance Principles 
Compliance Reports)' (Arçelik AŞ 2017); 'Kurumsal Yönetişim İlkeleri Uyum Raporu (Corporate 
Governance Principles Compliance Report)' (Doğuş Otomotiv 2017) published in the Public Disclosure 
Platform of Turkey (PDP) website  <https://www.kap.org.tr/tr/bist-sirketler> accessed 9 August 2018. 
802 CMB and EBRD, 'Türkiye’deki Halka Açık Şirketlerin Kurumsal Yönetim Yapıları ve Uygulamaları 
Hakkında Araştırma Raporu (Report on the Corporate Governance Structures and Practices of Public 
Companies in Turkey)' (June 2018). 
803 Eminoğlu, Corporate Governance in the Turkish Commercial Code (n 154) 20. 
804 The mandatory principles under the Board of Directors section are: ‘(4.2.6.), (4.3.1.), (4.3.2.), (4.3.3.), 
(4.3.4.), (4.3.5.), (4.3.6.), (4.3.7.), (4.3.8.), (4.5.1.), (4.5.2.), (4.5.3.), (4.5.4.), (4.5.9.), (4.5.10.), (4.5.11.), 
(4.5.12.), (4.5.13.), (4.6.2.) and (4.6.3.)’, in Communique on Corporate Governance Article 5. 
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The principles under this section start by stating that the BoD ‘shall conduct its activities in a 
transparent, accountable, fair and responsible way’,805 which refers to the corporate governance 
principles of transparency, equality, accountability, and responsibility.806 
 
There is a non-binding principle which stipulates that the roles of the chairman of the BoD and 
the CEO or general manager shall be ‘explicitly’ separated: ‘No one in the corporation shall be 
delegated with limitless decision-making authority.’807 This principle serves ‘as a method of 
ensuring an appropriate balance of power, increasing accountability and increasing the capacity 
of the board for independent decision making.’808 An OECD Report has found that the chairman 
and the CEO roles are indeed separated in most listed companies in Turkey; however, the CEO 
position is commonly held by a member of the BoD.809 Although the principle for the separation 
of the chairman and the CEO roles is voluntary, there is a mandatory principle which requires 
that if the chairman and the CEO are the same person, this must be disclosed with justifications 
on the PDP. However, a study conducted in 2018 has reported that amongst all the listed 
companies where the chairman and the CEO roles were gathered in a single person, only 22% 
of the companies disclosed their justifications despite the mandatory principle.810 In an analysis 
of the boards of listed companies in Turkey, Yurtoglu has noted that most of the BoDs are 
dominated by the owner’s family members, and the boards ‘are in the first place an internal 
mechanism of control reinforcing the owners’ influence on the company.’811 Therefore, even 
though this principle is mandatory, that makes little difference because the independence of the 
chairman is ambiguous in Turkish companies. 
 
The sub-section on the Structure of the Board includes mostly binding principles (80%).812 The 
first mandatory principle requires that the listed companies shall have at least five board 
members.813 This principle aims to ensure that there are enough directors for the subsequent 
formation of board committees, which are also regulated as mandatory corporate governance 
principles. Also, the majority of the BoD must be composed of non-executive directors 
                                                     
805 CMB Principle 4.2.1. 
806 CMB, Corporate Governance Principles (2003) Preface. 
807 CMB Principle 4.2.5 
808 OECD, 'OECD Principles of Corporate Governance' (1999) 42. 
809 OECD Corporate Governance Factbook 2017 (n 88) 102. 
810 CMB and EBRD, 'Report on the Corporate Governance Structures and Practices of Public Companies 
in Turkey' (n 802) 24. 
811 BB Yurtoglu, 'Ownership, Control and Performance of Turkish Listed Firms' (2000) 27(2) Empirica 
193, 209. 
812 CMB and EBRD, 'Report on the Corporate Governance Structures and Practices of Public Companies 
in Turkey' (n 802) 22. 
813 CMB Principle 4.3.1. 
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(NEDs).814 Amongst those NEDs, there shall be independent directors who must constitute at 
least 1/3 of the BoD.815 This mandatory principle does not apply to listed companies belonging 
to Group III.816 
In terms of the independence criteria, CMB has established a strict set of rules in 10 mandatory 
paragraphs.817 These criteria include objective and subjective criteria such as the board members 
having adequate education, knowledge, and experience.818 The independent board member 
should also be able ‘to maintain his/her objectivity in conflicts of interests between the 
corporation and the shareholders, to have strong ethical standards, professional reputation and 
experience to freely take decisions by considering the rights of the stakeholders.’819 Although 
this is a mandatory principle that requires the independent members to be capable of considering 
stakeholders’ rights, it does not require directors to consider stakeholder interests per se. 
Another principle on this topic is the non-mandatory rule that requires the BoD to establish 
internal control systems ‘which may reduce to minimum the effects of the risks on stakeholders 
of the corporation, mainly on shareholders’.820 The wording of the principle indicates that 
shareholder interests are prioritised over other stakeholders’ interests in terms of risk 
management in the company. Therefore, although stakeholder interests are mentioned 
throughout the principles, they are effectively side-lined by other prevailing interests. 
The election of the independent members is also stipulated as a lengthy process. The nomination 
committee will evaluate the candidates’ independence as per the criteria set forth in the CMB 
Principles and submit its evaluation report to the BoD for approval.821 The candidate is also 
required to submit a written declaration of independence along with this report. The BoD is then 
required to prepare the list of independent candidates and forward it to the CMB for approval. 
If the CMB disapproves of a candidate, that candidate cannot be elected to the BoD. The CMB 
approval process is not applicable to listed companies under Groups II and III.822 If the director’s 
independence is revoked, they shall resign.823 Considering the number and detail of the 
                                                     
814 CMB Principle 4.3.2. The Principle clarifies the meaning of non-executive as: ‘the person who does 
not have any administrative duty other than being a board member or any executive unit subsidiaries to 
himself/herself and is not involved in the daily work routine or ordinary activities of the corporation.’ 
815 CMB Principle 4.3.3 and 4.3.4. 
816 Communique on Corporate Governance Article 6. 
817 CMB Principle 4.3.6 
818 CMB Principle 4.3.6/c 
819 CMB Principle 4.3.6/e 
820 Emphasis added. CMB Principle 4.2.3. 
821 CMB Principle 4.3.7 
822 Communique on Corporate Governance Article 5/5. 
823 CMB Principle 4.3.8 
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mandatory principles listed under this sub-section, the importance attributed to the 
independence of board members is clear. 
The CMB Principles require the establishment of an Audit Committee, an Early Detection of 
Risk Committee, a Corporate Governance Committee, a Nomination Committee, and a 
Compensation Committee.824 Each committee shall have at least two members and the majority 
must be non-executive directors. Also, the chairman of the committees must be an independent 
board member.825 Finally, as a mandatory principle, the CEO cannot be in any committee.826 
The Corporate Governance Committee shall be responsible for determining compliance with 
corporate governance principles and provide advice to the BoD on how to improve the 
implementation of principles.827 The Nomination Committee is endowed with the duty of 
selecting candidates for the board and for management.828 In line with the provisions of the 
TCC, the CMB Principles also require the listed companies to establish an Early Detection of 
Risk Committee, which will be responsible for detecting any risk early on ‘which poses a threat 
to the existence, development and continuation of the corporation.’829  
As for the issue of pay, although the BoD has the final say in the remuneration of the board 
members and executive managers, the Remuneration Committee provides its advice 
‘considering the long-term targets of the corporation.’830 It is mandatory for the remuneration 
principles to be in writing and be submitted for shareholder’s approval in the general assembly. 
The principles must also be disclosed on the company website.831 It is also a mandatory principle 
that when determining the remuneration of independent directors, ‘payment plans such as 
dividend, stock options or payment options based on the corporation’s performance shall not 
apply.’832 The principle adds that the pay level should be adequate to maintain the independence 
of the director. 
In terms of female representation on the BoD, the relevant CMB Principle states that the 
company 
                                                     
824 CMB Principle 4.5.1 
825 CMB Principle 4.5.3. The principle further dictates that in the case there are two members in the 
committee, both shall be non-executive members. 
826 CMB Principle 4.5.4 
827 CMB Principle 4.5.10 
828 CMB Principle 4.5.11 
829 CMB Principle 4.5.12 
830 CMB Principle 4.5.13/a 
831 CMB Principle 4.6.2 
832 CMB Principle 4.6.3 
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shall determine a target rate provided that it is not less than 25% and a target time for 
membership of women in the board of directors and form a policy for this target. The 
Board of directors shall annually evaluate the progress in respect to achieving this 
target.833  
However, this provision has not been regulated as a mandatory principle. A recent study has 
found that female representation on boards is still very low in Turkey: the ratio of women on 
boards in only 11%.834 There are initiatives from non-governmental organisations to increase 
female representation on boards. On March 2017, the CGFT launched the 30% Club initiative 
in Turkey.835 The Steering Committee Chair of the 30% Club Turkey, Melsa Ararat, stated the 
following: 
Despite encouraging regulations by the Capital Markets Board, this ratio [the ratio of 
women on boards and in executive management in public companies] is still quite low 
and progress is sluggish. […] The members of the 30% Club, who are the CEOs and 
presidents of the leading companies in Turkey, state that the presence of women in 
decision-making mechanisms is indispensable for prudent business management. Their 
attitude will compel others to recognize subconscious predispositions and question 
them, which will in turn send a positive message to international investors about BIST 
companies.836  
This statement illustrates that the incentives for increasing female representation on boards are 
once again aimed at attracting foreign investors to the Turkish stock market. 
 
The vast number of mandatory principles regarding the BoD imposes arduous compliance 
requirements on listed companies, especially for those that belong to Group I. These principles’ 
implementation are especially imperative because in the case of non-implementation, the CMB 
is now ‘authorized to take decisions providing fulfilment of the compliance liability and fulfil 
the relevant transactions ex officio’.837  Indeed, since the CMB’s Communique on Corporate 
                                                     
833 CMB Principle 4.3.9 
834 CMB and EBRD, 'Report on the Corporate Governance Structures and Practices of Public Companies 
in Turkey' (n 802) 22. 
835 ‘The 30% Club launched as a campaign in the UK in 2010 with a goal of achieving a minimum of 
30% women on FTSE-100 boards’ in '30% Club' <https://30percentclub.org/> accessed on Aug 1, 2018. 
 
836 'Sabancı University Corporate Governance Forum launches the Turkish program of the 30% Club' 
Gazete SU (March 2017) <https://gazetesu.sabanciuniv.edu/en/2017-03/sabanci-university-corporate-
governance-forum-launches-turkish-program-30-club>. 
837 Communique on Corporate Governance Article 7. It can be observed that the CMB recently imposed 
administrative fines to companies for breach of the Communique on Corporate Governance or the CMB 
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Governance was published in 2014, listed companies have created Board Committees and 
elected independent board members in line with the criteria in the CMB’s mandatory principles. 
A recent survey has indicated that 98% of the companies included in the study have 
implemented the mandatory principles on Board Committees, and 99% have implemented the 
principles on the structure of the board that stipulate requirements for independent members.838 
These developments signal an important step towards professional boards in listed companies 
in Turkey. 
 
7 Conclusions 
 
Turkish capital market legislation has come a long way since the first Commercial Code for the 
establishment of a joint-stock company was enacted in 1855 during the Ottoman era. These 
companies’ shares were first traded in the unorganised secondary markets, and government 
bonds were issued for European investors, which eventually led an organised exchange 
appearing by 1866. Because this exchange experienced turbulence and was dominated by the 
foreigners in the country, after the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey, the new parliament 
enacted laws to strengthen state control over the capital markets. Until the 1960s, Turkish 
capital markets did not play an active role in the economy because of the laws that restricted 
foreigners from trading in the Turkish stock exchange and imposed state controls on the 
movement of foreign exchange. This was to change along with the liberalisation process of the 
Turkish economy that started in the 1950s and gained full momentum in 1980s due to the 
government’s Stability Programme, which was designed in line with the IMF’s designated 
objectives for the economy. The first CML was enacted in 1981, followed by the establishment 
of the CMB. The CMB possessed the authority to issue detailed secondary legislation regarding 
the capital markets. In 1985, the ISE was established, although the number of its public offerings 
and market capitalisation remained at low levels in comparison with other exchanges globally. 
To increase the attractiveness of the Turkish stock market, a new CML was enacted in 2012. 
 
Along with the promulgation of the new CML, the CMB Principles, which had a soft law nature 
since 2003, have been imbued with binding power. The CMB has in turn provided that some of 
its principles would be mandatory for certain listed companies in accordance with their systemic 
importance. The categorisation by the CMB considers the market capitalisation and market 
                                                     
Principles, see CMB, 'İdari Para Cezaları (Administrative Fines)' 
<http://www.spk.gov.tr/SiteApps/IdariYaptirim/ IdariParaCezalari> accessed 6 August 2018. 
838 The survey included 70 listed companies that constitute 81% of the total market capitalisation of BIST 
by the end of 2015. See CMB and EBRD, 'Report on the Corporate Governance Structures and Practices 
of Public Companies in Turkey' (n 802) 23. 
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value of shares in free circulation. Hence, the listed companies under Group I are considered to 
have the most systemic importance for the functioning of the markets and therefore are required 
to implement all of the mandatory corporate governance principles. The Group II and III 
companies are exempt from some of the mandatory principles. The most mandatory rules in the 
CMB Principles are in the Board of Directors section. During the parliamentary proceedings, 
however, the provisions of the new CML were criticised by opposition party members for giving 
too much power and discretion to the CMB.839 This is particularly the case regarding the 
independent board members; the CMB can appoint an independent board member to the 
company if the company fails to comply with the mandatory principles.840 Hence, the CMB can 
have a direct say in the election of the board members of the listed companies. It can be 
concluded that the regulator wanted to make sure its mandatory corporate governance principles 
were complied with, even if that means stepping into the affairs of private businesses. 
 
There are also mandatory principles listed under the Shareholders section of the CMB 
Principles. These principles are related to the convening of the general assembly meetings. A 
recent study has found that Turkish listed companies have demonstrated a high level of 
compliance with the mandatory shareholder principles.841 In the same way, although the 
principles under the Public Disclosure and Transparency section are non-binding, most of the 
companies were in compliance.842 Under the Stakeholders section, which also contains non-
binding principles, the highest level of compliance was observed with the Ethical Rules and 
Social Responsibility principle and the Human Resources Policy principle.843 However, the 
explanations under the compliance reports’ Stakeholder section were not detailed and often 
repetitive.844 Also, even the companies listed in the CGI (that score a high corporate governance 
rating) had Corporate Governance Compliance Reports that were filled with generic 
                                                     
839 TBMM, Sermaye Piyasası Kanunu Tasarısı ile Plan ve Bütçe Komisyonu Raporu (Draft Capital 
Markets Law and the Report of the Planning and Budget Commission)' (18.06.2012) 47. 
840 Communique on Corporate Governance Article 7/3. Indeed, the CMB has done this in the past and 
appointed new BoD members to the telecom company Turkcell as the current members failed to comply 
with the corporate governance principles. Capital Markets Board of Turkey. 'Turkcell İletişim Hizmetleri 
A.Ş.'ye ilişkin duyuru' (2013) <http://www.spk.gov.tr/Duyuru/Goster/20130815/2> accessed on Aug 6, 
2018. 
841 CMB and EBRD, 'Report on the Corporate Governance Structures and Practices of Public Companies 
in Turkey' (n 802) 15. The study found that all Group-I companies have implemented the mandatory 
principles under the Shareholders section of the CMB Principles. 
842 Ibid 19; CMB Principle 2.2. 
843 Ibid 21; (CMB Principle 3.5 Ethical Rules and Social Responsibility principle compliance level 99%, 
and Principle 3.3 Human Resources Policy of the Corporation, compliance level 92%) 
844 Ibid 20. 
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explanations and stakeholder interests were only mentioned in the context of social 
responsibility projects.845 
 
The CMB has drafted the principles on Stakeholders so that they imply that only the rights 
provided by other laws or by reciprocal contracts with the company should be protected. This 
view resonates with the mainstream corporate governance model, which views the company as 
a nexus of contracts.846 From the nexus of contracts perspective, the company is ‘a set of 
contracts among factors of production, with each factor motivated by its self-interest.’847 This 
argument implies that each constituent has freely contracted with the company, and the resulting 
arrangements are an outcome of that bargaining. Thus, stakeholder rights are considered to be 
adequately protected through their contracts with the company. Otherwise, as per the laissez-
faire economics’ freedom of contract principle, self-motivated individuals would not contract 
with the company in the first place.848 This viewpoint, however, neglects reality by assuming 
that every stakeholder has equal bargaining power. The CMB Principles have also neglected 
this reality. Hence, aside from the basic legal rights provided by special laws and corresponding 
contracts, the CMB Principles on stakeholders do not substantially protect stakeholder interests. 
 
In sum, the enactment of the recent CML and the subsequent communiques issued by the CMB 
have resulted in a partial departure from the soft law regulation of corporate governance in 
Turkish law. Some of the principles, mostly regarding the BoD, have been made mandatory for 
listed companies. For the rest of the principles, the comply-or-explain approach remains, where 
listed companies must report their compliance levels under their Corporate Governance 
Compliance Reports. Overall, the CMB Principles appear to be designed to facilitate a change 
in the structure of listed company boards in Turkey, which are currently dominated by 
controlling families. The objective is a transformation towards professional boards that consist 
of non-executive and independent board members having authority over important board 
decisions. The overall policy behind these corporate governance regulations seems to be the 
curbing of the power of controlling shareholders over minority shareholders, thereby providing 
the necessary safeguards for current and prospective foreign investors in the Turkish stock 
market. 
                                                     
845 For example, in Pegasus Hava Taşimaciliği Anonim Şirketi Kurumsal Yönetim İlkelerine Uyum 
Raporu <http://www.pegasusyatirimciiliskileri.com/tr/kurumsal-yonetim/kurumsal-yonetim-ilkelerine-
uyum-raporu> accessed on 24 July 2018.  
846 See AA Alchian and H Demsetz, 'Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization' (1972) 
62(5) Am Econ Rev 777, 778; Fama, 'Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm' (n 11) 290; Jensen 
and Meckling, 'Theory of the Firm' (n 10) 306. 
847 Fama, 'Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm' (n 11) 289. 
848 Easterbrook and Fischel, 'The Corporate Contract' (n 234) 1418. 
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CHAPTER V – Turkey’s Corporate Governance Framework Part - II: 
Turkish Commercial Code 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The corporate governance provisions found in the new TCC constitute the second pillar of 
Turkey’s corporate governance framework. This chapter’s discussions complement the 
previous chapter, where corporate governance rules for public joint-stock companies found in 
capital market legislation were explored in depth. The articles of the TCC are designed as 
general rules applicable to all companies, not just public joint-stock companies.849 In fact, the 
TCC states that its general provisions shall apply to joint-stock companies that are subject to 
special legislation on matters that are not regulated in these special laws.850 Thus, the corporate 
governance rules stipulated under the TCC are lex generalis, unlike the articles of the CML and 
the subsequent CMB communiques. Nevertheless, the new TCC, which came into effect on July 
2012, also brings important changes to corporate governance of the public joint-stock 
companies. In exploring these changes, the chapter includes both the backdrop to the reform 
process which led to the overhaul of Turkish company law and a black-letter account of the new 
code’s provisions on corporate governance. In doing so, the chapter aims to provide the 
complete picture of the methods used in the development of Turkey’s current corporate 
governance framework. 
 
The first part of the chapter contextualises the reform process that led to the enactment of the 
new TCC. Most of the changes occurred in the part of the commercial code that deals with 
commercial companies.851 The changes introduced new legal structures into Turkish company 
law such as the single member company,852 online general assembly and board meetings,853 and 
the first use of the term ‘corporate governance’.854 Before examining these innovations, the 
                                                     
849 For the different types of companies allowed under Turkish company law see page 145. 
850 TCC Article 303. This Article refers to joint-stock companies regulated with special laws such as 
public joint-stock companies, which are subject to Capital Markets Law, or the banks which are subject 
to Banking Law. 
851 Book 2 of the TCC is on commercial companies. TCC Articles 329 -563 regulate matters on joint-
stock company  
852 TCC Article 338 allows the formation of single member limited company or single member joint-
stock company, whereas in the old commercial code the formation of a joint-stock company required at 
least five members. (Old TCC Article 277) 
853 TCC Article 1527. According to Article 1527/5, online general assembly meetings are mandatory for 
listed joint-stock companies.  
854 TCC Article 1529 is entitled Corporate Governance Principles (the Turkish term used for corporate 
governance in the TCC is ‘kurumsal yonetim’). Although in literature different terms such as ‘kurumsal 
yonetisim’, ‘yonetisim’ or ‘iyi yonetisim’ are sometimes used; in S Gönen and E Yürekli, '6102 Sayılı 
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chapter starts with a brief introduction to the Turkish legal system. Then, it examines the reasons 
behind the annulment of the previous commercial code, herein referred to as the ‘old TCC’, 
which was in force since 1957.855 The chapter examines the legislators’ justifications for 
revising the commercial code, which are laid out in detail in the new TCC’s Genel Gerekçe 
(General Justification). The review of the Genel Gerekçe will be supplemented by legal 
scholars’ views, particularly those of Ünal Tekinalp, who headed the law committee that was 
responsible for drafting the new commercial code.  
 
Within this context, I also briefly explore the issue of Turkey and the EU relations, since the 
legislators have acknowledged EU membership as a main driving force behind the TCC 
reforms.856 I examine the discussions on corporate governance at the EU level. I analyse the 
‘EU Approach to Corporate Governance’857 to determine the theoretical underpinnings of the 
EU perspective on corporate governance. I also point out the areas where the new TCC has 
followed EU precedence in terms of corporate governance. After exploring the EU’s impact on 
the new legislation, I then analyse the articles of the new TCC on corporate governance in detail 
from a black-letter perspective. 858 The focus of the analyses is on the improved shareholder 
rights, with particular stress on how some of these new provisions purport to strengthen the 
position of the minority shareholders or outside shareholders vis-à-vis the controlling owners. 
Finally, I examine the new TCC’s articles on company stakeholders.   
 
2 The Backdrop of the New Turkish Commercial Code 
 
The Turkish legal system is part of the continental European system, where laws are codified 
in the form of legislation, which constitute the most important source of law.859 As the 
legislators are regarded as the sole law-making authority, case law is not considered to be a 
source of Turkish law, and even though the judges may resort to judicial precedents, these are 
                                                     
Türk Ticaret Kanunu Açısından Kurumsal Yönetim İlkelerinin 
Değerlendirilmesi (Evaluation of the Corporate Governance Principles as per the Turkish Commercial 
Code No.6102)' (2016) 2(4) Journal of Accounting, Finance and Auditing Studies 129, 131. 
855 Turkish Commercial Code No. 6762 published in the Official Gazette numbered 9353 and dated July 
9, 1956. 
856 TCC with Justifications (n 104) 64. 
857 This term is originally used in Global Corporate Governance Forum and International Finance 
Corporation, 'The EU Approach to Corporate Governance: Essentials and Recent Developments' 
(February 2008). 
858 Due to the extent of the reforms introduced by the new TCC, it has not been possible to discuss every 
corporate governance related article under this chapter. The focus will be on the provisions concerning 
minority shareholders. 
859 In the Anglo-American common law system uncodified laws prevail and the sources of law are mainly 
derived from ‘customary principles and judicial precedents’, in A Guriz, 'Sources of Turkish Law' in 
Tugrul Ansay and Don Jr Wallace (eds), Introduction to Turkish Law (6th edn, Wolters Kluwer 2011) 1. 
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not binding in any way.860 Prior to the Republic of Turkey, the Ottoman Empire’s laws were 
mainly derived from Islamic law and customs. However, along with the Tanzimat Edict of 
reforms that took place from 1839 onwards,861 secular laws in the area of civil law were 
introduced by the Sultan. These secular laws were mainly inspired by the French legal system.862 
For instance, in 1850, the ‘Kanunname-i Ticaret’ (Commercial Code) was adopted by the 
Ottoman Empire, which was a direct translation of the French Commercial Code of 1807.863  
 
After the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, Islamic laws were abandoned because 
secularism had been defined as one of the key pillars of the new republic.864 Radical legal 
reforms that were based on several European countries’ laws were introduced; for example, the 
Turkish Civil Code that was enacted in 1926 was based on the Swiss civil code, the Turkish 
Penal Code of 1926 was based on the Italian criminal code, and most legislation on 
administrative law was influenced by French public law.865 The adoption of Europe-based 
legislation into Turkish laws led to ‘a profound change in the social life of Turkey’ and indicated 
the ambitions of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, to Europeanise the 
country. 866 To that end, Ataturk introduced further radical reforms such as abolishing state 
religion, adopting the European (Gregorian) calendar and the Latin alphabet, setting the official 
holiday to Sunday (instead of the Islamic holiday Friday), and giving women the right to vote 
and be elected in 1934.867 Overall, Turkish policy has long been inclined towards 
Westernisation, which has been realised through the adoption of European laws.  
 
In terms of law-making, the Turkish parliament, which is called the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly (TBMM), has the sole authority to enact laws in Turkey.868 The President of the 
                                                     
860 Ibid 14. 
861 The edict of ‘Tanzimat’ (1839) and the later edict of ‘Islahat’ (1856) are ‘usually considered the 
beginnings of the constitutionalist movement in the Empire. Legally, these documents were no more than 
a unilateral declaration and recognition by the Sultan of certain basic human rights for his subjects, 
including security of life, honour, property, abolition of tax farming (iltizam), fair and public trial of 
persons accused of crimes and the equality of all Ottoman subjects irrespective of religion’ in E Ozbudun, 
'Constitutional Law' in Tugrul Ansay and Don Jr Wallace (eds), Introduction to Turkish Law (6th edn, 
Wolters Kluwer 2011) 19-20. 
862 F İpekel Kayali and MR Korkusuz (eds), Turkish Private Law (Seçkin 2018) 37. 
863 Özbirecikli M, 'Türkiye’de Ticaret Kanunlarında Denetim Anlayışı Üzerine Bir İnceleme (An 
Investigation on Audit Concept in the Commercial Codes in Turkey)' (2013) (4) Accounting & Financial 
History Research Journal 152, 153. 
864 Ozbudun, 'Constitutional Law' (n 861) 33.  
865 Guriz, 'Sources of Turkish Law' (n 859) 9-10 
866 Ibid 9. 
867 SF Özkan, 'Turkish-EU Relations and the Prospects for Turkey's Accession' (2001) 13 LBJ Journal of 
Public Affairs 43, 44. 
868 Article 7 of the Turkish Constitution states: ‘Legislative power is vested in the Grand National 
Assembly of Turkey on behalf of Turkish Nation. This power shall not be delegated.’ For the official 
English translation see; <https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf>. 
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Republic must promulgate the draft laws adopted by the parliament.869 Following the 
promulgation, laws come into effect either on the specified date stipulated in the legislation, or 
usually on the day of publication in the Official Gazette.870 The first commercial code after the 
establishment of the Republic was enacted in 1926 and was based on the German commercial 
code.871 This legislation was later replaced with a new Commercial Code in 1957, which was 
prepared by the German legal scholar Ernst E. Hirsch and based on the Swiss private law.872 
The Commercial Code of 1957 governed all aspects of commercial life and company law in 
Turkey for over 50 years. However, its provisions have been criticised to be outdated and 
lagging behind international developments, thus hindering the inflow of foreign investment.873  
 
Preparatory works for drafting a new commercial code took off in December 1999, when the 
Ministry of Justice set up a commission (the Commission) composed of officials from the 
ministry, academicians, the Court of Cassation (the Turkish high court Yargitay) judges, and 
representatives from various organisations.874 The Commission was headed by legal scholar 
Tekinalp. After 5 years of discussions and preparations, the Commission changed 1,100 out of 
1,535 articles of the former commercial code.875 In November 2005, the draft TCC was sent to 
the parliament for review. As per procedure, it was first discussed in the TBMM’s sub-
commissions, then approved in 2007 to be sent to the TBMM General Assembly for enactment. 
However, due to the country-wide general elections that took place in 2007, the enactment of 
the draft TCC was postponed.876 Finally, the draft code was approved by the members of 
parliament in the General Assembly in 13 January 2011. After promulgation by the President 
of Turkey, the new TCC was published in the Official Gazette on 14 February 2011. The new 
                                                     
869 Article 89 of the Turkish Constitution. 
870 The Official Gazette in Turkish is called ‘Resmi Gazete’, it is published daily in Ankara, except for 
holidays, and contains announcements regarding laws, regulations, decrees and other official 
announcements. If there are no specific provisions in the laws regarding their effectual date, the laws will 
come into effect forty-five days after their publication in the Official Gazette, Guriz, 'Sources of Turkish 
Law' (n 859) 12-13. 
871 TBMM, Turkish Commercial Code No. 865 (29.05.1926) in Union of Turkish Bar Associations, Türk 
Ticaret Kanunu Tasarısı Toplantıları I-II-III (Meetings on Draft Turkish Commercial Code) (Türkiye 
Barolar Birliği Yayınları 2008) 4-5. 
872 TBMM, Turkish Commercial Code No. 6762 (09.07.1956); EE Hirsch, ' İsviçre Hukukunun Yeni 
Türk Ticaret Kanununa Tesiri (The Influence of Swiss Law on the New Turkish Commercial Code)' 
(Şevket Müftügil tr) (1956) 119(4) Zeitschrift für Handelsrecht 157. 
873 Can, 'Thoughts on the Draft Turkish Commercial Code' (n 593). 
874 These representatives were from Turkish Bar Association, Turkish Notary Association, Capital 
Markets Board of Turkey, Turkish Accounting Standards Board, Banking Regulation and Supervision 
Agency and Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey, in TCC with Justifications (n 
104) 86-87. 
875 G Aras (ed), Yeni Türk Ticaret Kanunu’nun Finans ve Muhasebe Uygulamalarına Etkisi (The Impacts 
of the New Turkish Commercial Code on Finance and Audit Procedures (İSMMMO 2011) 23. 
876 B Doğrusöz, O Onat and FT Toralp (eds), Gerekçe, Karşılaştırmalı Maddeler, Komisyon Raporları, 
Önergeler ve Karşılaştırmalı Tabloları ile Türk Ticaret Kanunu (Turkish Commercial Code with 
Justifications, Article Comparisons, Commission Reports, Proposals and Tables) (Türkiye Odalar ve 
Borsalar Birliği 2011) 2-3. 
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TCC stipulated that it would enter into force on the 1st of July 2012.877 However, once the new 
TCC was published in the Official Gazette, some of its provisions became subject to heavy 
criticism from the business world.878 Therefore, before the legislation came into effect in July 
2012, the parliament passed another law in June 2012 to amend certain articles of the initial 
draft code.879 
 
The reasons for drafting a new commercial code in Turkey have been elaborated in detail by 
legislators in the Genel Gerekçe. One of the main reasons was Turkey’s aspirations of becoming 
an EU member state.880 Aside from the influence of the EU, the Genel Gerekçe also notes that 
Turkey must be a part of the international markets and thus requires a commercial code that 
includes the structures, institutions, and rules of international markets.881 It adds that Turkish 
companies ‘have to be the competitive, active and dependable actors of these international 
markets.’882 Finally, technological developments, particularly the use of internet becoming 
common in every aspect of daily life, have been reiterated as necessitating inclusion in the new 
commercial code provisions.883 These general points are further elaborated; Genel Gerekçe 
begins by laying out the developments that rendered the old commercial code obsolete. These 
developments which ‘directly’884 affected the reform process are listed as follows: 
 
major events took place during the second half of the twentieth century, including the 
creation of the EEC/EU as well as regional unions such as the EEA and NAFTA, the 
creation by the latter of substantial rules and supranational legal regimes, the fact that, 
starting from mid-sixties the concepts of free market and competitive economy gained 
wide currency in all countries and that these concepts figure among the Copenhagen 
                                                     
877 However, the new TCC also stated that certain provisions would enter into force one year later in 1st 
of July 2013, so that companies would have time to prepare their structures to be in conformity with the 
new articles. For instance, this was the case for the new requirement imposed on capital companies to 
have a company website as per TCC Article 1524. 
878 Eminoğlu, Corporate Governance in the Turkish Commercial Code (n 154) 61; Gönen and Yürekli, ' 
Evaluation of the Corporate Governance Principles' (n 854) 130. 
879 TBMM, Law Amending the Turkish Commercial Code No. 6335 (30.06.2012).  
For instance, the article prohibiting shareholders becoming indebted to the company was present in the 
initial draft. In the context of Turkish business culture, most owners tend to think that the assets of the 
company are their own and usually resort to getting loans from their own company. The initial provision 
in the draft was intended to put a stop to this customary practice. But due to the pressure from the business 
lobbies, the aforementioned prohibition did not make it to the final version of the TCC. See TCC Article 
359. Another example to the amendments to the initial draft in line with the business pressures was 
regarding the mandatory website requirement for all capital companies as per Article 1524. With the later 
amendment, the scope of the article was narrowed down to cover only certain capital companies, which 
were subject to independent audit in line with TCC Article 397/4. 
880 TCC with Justifications (n 104) 64. 
881 Ibid 65. 
882 (Own translation) Ibid. 
883 Ibid. 
884 Exact phrase used in the Genel Gerekçe in TCC with Justifications (n 104) 63. 
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criteria, […] the fact that e-commerce fundamentally effected the commerce as well as 
the calling of, the participation and voting in BoDs and GMs […].885 
 
The Genel Gerekçe also states that these global developments have affected many countries’ 
legislation, especially the EU member states,886 but that the old TCC failed to keep up with its 
European counterparts.887 Thus, it asserts that the creation of a new commercial code is the only 
way to bridge this gap.888 The rest of the Genel Gerekçe text examines the developments in 
certain European countries’ commercial codes individually. There is specific reference to the 
Cadbury Report of the United Kingdom.889 Also, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States 
is indicated as a factor that influenced the drafting of the new TCC.890 Yet, the section that 
mentions US regulations is limited to one paragraph only, and most of the Genel Gerekçe deals 
with the specific EU regulations which the draft TCC provisions have been based upon. 
Therefore, the next section discusses the extent to which Turkey’s aspirations of becoming an 
EU member have affected the new TCC’s corporate governance reforms. 
 
3 The Influence of EU on the New Turkish Commercial Code 
 
 Introduction 
 
The harmonisation of Turkish laws with the EU’s ‘acquis communautaire’, otherwise known as 
the EU acquis,891 took off once Turkey was granted applicant status for EU membership at the 
Helsinki European Council Summit in 1999.892 Yet, as legislators have noted, it was only after 
2005 when the EU accession negotiations officially began that Turkey was placed under an 
                                                     
885 Genel Gerekçe para. B.I.2 translated in Kayali and Korkusuz (eds), Turkish Private Law (n 862) 237. 
886 In fact, it has been noted that the commercial laws of the EU Member States have changed on an 
average of 64 times in the last 50 years, in K Özkorkut (ed), Impacts of the Draft Turkish Commercial 
Code (DTCC) on Capital Markets from an EU Perspective International Conference (Banka ve Ticaret 
Hukuku Araştırma Enstitüsü 2010) 401. 
887 TCC with Justifications (n 104) 64. 
888 Ibid. 
889 Ibid 69. 
890 Ibid 70. In particular, certain objectives of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act have been referred to, such as; 
increasing the scope of the responsibility of company boards, increased transparency, strengthening the 
powers of public supervisory bodies and independent authorities, eliminating the conflict of interest 
between company management and auditors and improving auditing standards. 
891 The ‘acquis communautaire’ is ‘the body of common rights and obligations that is binding on all the 
EU member states. […] Candidate countries have to accept the acquis before they can join the EU and 
make EU law part of their own national legislation. Adoption and implementation of the acquis are the 
basis of the accession negotiations’ in European Commission, 'European Neighbourhood Policy And 
Enlargement Negotiations' <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary 
/terms/acquis_en> accessed 28 June 2017. 
892 ‘Briefing No 7: Turkey and Relations with the European Union’ (European Parliament, 10.02.2000) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/7a1_en.htm> accessed 19 September 2018. 
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obligation to implement the body of EU acquis.893 Nevertheless, the new TCC’s draft was 
already sent to the parliament for approval in 2005 and was prepared with the objective of full 
compliance with the EU regulations.894 The Turkish Bar Association has criticised this move as 
premature and asserted that EU law is still developing in areas of commerce. Thus, it was too 
early to revamp primary legislation such as the commercial code in its entirety before the EU 
laws on the relevant matters have gained permanence, or before Turkey’s EU membership is 
confirmed.895 Despite the criticisms, the new TCC provisions are largely based on the EU 
acquis, especially in terms of its regulation of company law. This can be explained by Turkey’s 
inclination towards Westernisation. Indeed, throughout the Genel Gerekçe, the legislators 
provide a lengthy list of the EU resources which have been utilised in the preparation of the 
new TCC’s articles on company law.896 
 
Membership in the EU has been desired both by Turkish politicians and the public due to the 
expected material benefits and also because ‘for large segments of Turkish society, EU 
membership was sought as the final confirmation of Turkey’s European credentials, a quest that 
dated (at least) to Ataturk and foundations of the Turkish Republic.’897 Indeed, even before the 
creation of the European Economic Community (EEC), Turkey ‘chose Western Europe as the 
model for its new secular structure’.898 To that end, Turkey has aspired to join the EU for over 
half a century; Turkey applied to join the EEC in 1959, which is 1 year after the establishment 
of the EEC.899 In 1964, an Association Agreement was signed,900 followed by the establishment 
of a customs union in 1995 between the EU and Turkey, which was viewed to be the final phase 
                                                     
893 TCC with Justifications (n 104) 64. 
894 Doğrusöz, Onat and Toralp (eds), Turkish Commercial Code with Justifications, Article Comparisons, 
Commission Reports, Proposals and Tables (n 876) 2-3. 
895 Türkiye Barolar Birliği (Turkish Bar Association), Türk Ticaret Kanunu Tasarısı Toplantılari I-II-
III (Türkiye Barolar Birliği Yayınları 2008). 20. Turkish Bar Association argues that instead, changes in 
certain provisions or secondary legislation could have been undertaken. 
896 TCC with Justifications (n 104) 113-114. Accordingly, on company law, the new TCC has utilised 
various EU directives, regulations, recommendations and reports, which are listed as the influences on 
the new commercial code. 
897 F Cengiz and L Hoffmann (eds), Turkey and the European Union: Facing New Challenges and 
Opportunities (Routledge 2014) 196. 
898 ‘History of Turkey- EU Relations’, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for 
EU Affairs <https://www.ab.gov.tr/111_en.html> accessed on 15 September 2018. 
899 ‘History of Turkey- EU Relations’, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate for 
EU Affairs <https://www.ab.gov.tr/111_en.html> accessed on 15 September 2018. Even though 
Turkey’s application to the EEC was denied, ‘the ensuing negotiations resulted in the signature of the 
Agreement Creating An Association Between The Republic of Turkey and the European Economic 
Community (the ‘Ankara Agreement’) on 12 September 1963. This agreement, which entered into force 
on 1 December 1964, aimed at securing Turkey's full membership in the EEC through the establishment 
in three phases of a customs union which would serve as an instrument to bring about integration between 
the EEC and Turkey.’ 
900 ‘Agreement creating an association between the European Economic Community and Turkey’ (OJ L 
217, 29.12.1964) and Additional Protocol (OJ L 293, 29.12.1972), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/association_agreement_1964_en.pdf 
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of the Association Agreement. Although Turkey had applied for EU membership in 1987, it 
was not until December 1999 before Turkey was granted candidate status at the Helsinki 
Summit of the European Council.901 Following this progress in Turkey and EU relations after 
several decades of passivity, Turkey prepared a pre-accession strategy and a National 
Programme that envisages an action plan for aligning Turkish legislation with the EU acquis.902 
 
Since the beginning of the 2000s, before the accession negotiations formally began, Turkey has 
been implementing numerous reforms in its economic, legal, political, and social landscape 
which were ‘spurred in large part by EU conditionality’.903 These reforms were undertaken in 
the form of ‘chapters’ drawn out by the European Commission (EC).904 There were also annual 
progress reports produced both by Turkey and the EC to monitor progress in terms of 
compliance with the Copenhagen criteria,905 which refers to the accession criteria for EU 
membership that are imposed on candidate countries. The 2011 Progress Report confirmed that 
Turkey has made considerable progress in the area of company law due to the promulgation of 
the new TCC in the same year. This development has been perceived by the EU as ‘a key 
element in accession negotiations in this chapter.’906 Furthermore, in the 2018 Progress Report, 
the EC concluded that ‘Turkey is well advanced in the area of company law’ and highlighted 
Turkey’s ‘ability to assume the obligations of membership’.907 Thus, overall, since the EU has 
recognised that Turkey has conformed with the EU acquis on company law, it can be concluded 
that the TCC’s corporate governance provisions are also in line with the EU’s approach on 
corporate governance. 
 
                                                     
901 ‘Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to 
the other candidate States. […] An accession partnership will be drawn up on the basis of previous 
European Council conclusions while containing priorities on which accession preparations must 
concentrate in the light of the political and economic criteria and the obligations of a Member State, 
combined with a national programme for the adoption of the acquis. Appropriate monitoring mechanisms 
will be established. With a view to intensifying the harmonisation of Turkey's legislation and practice 
with the acquis, the Commission is invited to prepare a process of analytical examination of the acquis.’ 
Helsinki European Council 10 And 11 December 1999 Presidency Conclusions. 12 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm> accessed on 17 April 2017 
902 National Programmes for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) <http://www.ab.gov.tr> accessed on 
10 April 2017 
903 Cengiz and Hoffmann, Turkey and the European Union (n 897) 195. 
904 There are 35 chapters categorised under the EU acquis, and in the case of Turkey, 15 chapters have 
been opened, one chapter provisionally closed, and 14 chapters blocked for political reasons. The 
Company Law Chapter contains provisions on corporate governance. 
905 ‘The accession criteria, or Copenhagen criteria (named after the European Council meeting in 
Copenhagen in 1993), are the essential conditions all candidate countries must satisfy to become a 
member state.’ See <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/accession-
criteria_en> accessed on 18 August 2017 
906 European Commission, 'Staff Working Paper: Turkey 2011 Progress Report SEC (2011) 1201 
final' (12.10.2011) 60. 
907 European Commission, 'Staff Working Paper: Turkey 2018 Report SWD (2018) 153 
final' (17.04.2018) 7. 
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 The EU’s Approach to Corporate Governance 
 
The efforts to regulate corporate governance at an EU level started in September 2001, when 
the EC appointed The High-Level Group of Company Law Experts (the Group)908 to provide 
recommendations regarding the modernisation of company law and corporate governance in the 
EU. In November 2002, the Group released its final report, titled A Modern Regulatory 
Framework for Company Law in Europe.909 The report section on ‘Corporate Governance – 
Shareholders’ indicates the Group’s perspective on the proper objective of corporate 
governance regulation: 
 
In a proper system of corporate governance, shareholders should have effective means 
to actively exercise influence over the company. […] shareholders are the residual 
claimholders (they only receive payment once all creditors have been satisfied) and 
they are entitled to reap the benefits if the company prospers and are the first to suffer 
if it does not. Shareholders need to be able to ensure that management pursues - and 
remains accountable to - their interests. Shareholders focus on wealth creation and are 
therefore, in the Group’s view, very suited to act as ‘watchdog’ not only on their own 
behalf, but also, in normal circumstances, on behalf of other stakeholders.910 
 
The use of residual claimant arguments for justifying shareholder entitlement to control over 
company management is similar to the justifications used by the proponents of the mainstream 
corporate governance model.911 While admitting that the shareholders only focus on wealth 
creation, the Group asserts that the managers are accountable to shareholders alone, and that 
they must pursue shareholder interests. This view chimes with the agency problem posed by the 
law and economics movement and hence the shareholder primacy theory of corporate 
governance. In sum, the expressions used in the Group report evidence their disposition towards 
the mainstream model of corporate governance. 
 
Following the Group’s report, the EC responded in May 2003 by publishing a communication 
titled Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European 
                                                     
908 The members of the Group are as follows: Chairman: Jaap Winter, José Maria Garrido Garcia, Klaus 
J. Hopt, Jonathan Rickford, Guido Rossi, Jan Schans Christensen and Joëlle Simon; in European 
Commission, 'Report of The High-Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory 
Framework for Company Law in Europe' (04.11.2002). 
909 Ibid. 
910 'Report of The High-Level Group of Company Law Experts ' (n 908) 47. 
911 See Chapter 3.3.b. 
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Union—A Plan to Move Forward.912 It stipulated the reasons why company laws and corporate 
governance in the EU must modernised; such as the need to make the most of the internal 
market, the integration of capital markets, the maximisation of the benefits of modern 
technologies, enlargement, and the need to address the challenges of the recent financial 
scandals.913 Regarding the last point, the EC referenced the corporate scandals of the United 
States and the subsequent Sarbanes-Oxley Act:  
 
Corporate governance is indeed an area where standards are increasingly being set at 
international level, as evidenced by the recent developments observed in the United 
States. […] In many areas, the EU shares the same broad objectives and principles of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.914  
 
Also, the communication highlighted the key policy objectives to be strengthening shareholder 
rights and protecting creditors, especially in the context of listed companies.915 The EC also laid 
out an EU Action Plan which used the Cadbury Report to define corporate governance as ‘the 
system by which companies are directed and controlled.’916 Instead of devising an European 
code of corporate governance, the EC noted that it took the OECD Principles as a reference 
point.917 However, it also noted that 
 
A self-regulatory market approach, based solely on non-binding recommendations, is 
clearly not always sufficient to guarantee the adoption of sound corporate governance 
practices. Only in the presence of a certain number of made-to-measure rules, markets 
are able to play their disciplining role in an efficient way.918 
 
After asserting that the voluntary corporate governance principles were inadequate for ensuring 
sound practices, the report highlighted the necessity of binding regulation for markets to work 
efficiently. This statement indicates that the EU’s approach to corporate governance is broadly 
based on the neoliberal law and economics scholarship that advances the shareholder primacy 
theory of corporate governance and insists on its efficiency. Indeed, even at the forefront, the 
                                                     
912 European Commission, 'Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the 
European Union - A Plan to Move Forward' COM (2003) 284 final (21.05.2003). 
913 Ibid 7. 
914 Ibid 5. 
915 Ibid 8. 
916 Ibid. 
917 Ibid 12. The Report states that ‘the Commission notes that corporate governance is now at the forefront 
of the activities of the OECD, which recently decided to revise its corporate governance principles of 
1999 with the aim of adopting a modernised version of these principles in 2004. The Commission is 
taking an active part in this exercise.’ 
918 Ibid. 
144 
 
EC’s choice of the Cadbury definition for corporate governance reflects the underlying agency 
theory and the Anglo-American roots of its approach. The issues of corporate governance have 
not only been of legal importance to the EU; they also carried political significance. As the EU 
Commissioner at the time Frits Bolkestein put it, ‘Company law and corporate governance are 
right at the heart of the political agenda, on both sides of the Atlantic. That’s because economies 
only work if companies are run efficiently and transparently.’919 This statement corresponds to 
the arguments of the shareholder primacy advocates, who claim that the other models of 
corporate governance will eventually ‘convergence toward a single, standard model’.920 The 
‘standard model’ refers to the mainstream model of corporate governance derived from the 
Anglo-American market-based system. Hansmann and Kraakman attribute this tendency to 
converge in Europe to the recent shift of power ‘away from workers and the state and, 
increasingly, away from dominant shareholders’ to the shareholder class.921 This point 
illustrates the impact of class relations and power struggles that underlie the EU’s corporate 
governance standards, which has been discussed in depth in Chapters 2 and 3. In sum, it can be 
concluded that the EU approach to corporate governance is based on the mainstream model. 
However, the EU recommends that these rules should also be binding in EU member states and 
candidate countries. Thus, the EU provides specific directions on corporate governance which 
the EU member states and particularly candidate countries such as Turkey should adopt as 
conditions of EU membership. 
 
Indeed, when Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU formally began in October 2005, 
Turkey was obliged to transpose the objectives envisaged by the Group’s report and the 
subsequent EC communication Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate 
Governance in the European Union—A Plan to Move Forward into its company law 
framework.922 To that end, Turkey drafted the new TCC provisions within the framework of 
EU company law. For instance, the new TCC introduced single-member limited liability and 
joint-stock companies as per the 12th Council Directive.923 In terms of corporate governance, 
the Genel Gerekçe admits that the main source of influence has been the Group’s report, 
especially regarding the mandatory website requirement, online meetings and voting, and the 
provisions on group companies.924 Hence, it can be asserted that the new TCC has adopted the 
EU approach to corporate governance for the purpose of securing EU membership. The EU’s 
                                                     
919 Frits Bolkestein has been the European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services between 1999 
– 2004, quoted in 'The EU Approach to Corporate Governance (n 857) 3. 
920 Hansmann and Kraakman (n 12) 439. 
921 Ibid 453. 
922 TCC with Justifications (n 104) 85. 
923 12th Council Company Law Directive 89/667/EEC (1989) OJ L 395, mentioned in TCC with 
Justifications (n 104) 91. 
924 TCC with Justifications (n 104) 85. 
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perception of corporate governance, as evidenced by its official texts, are largely based on the 
Anglo-American variant and the mainstream corporate governance model. Thus, this approach 
has been indirectly transposed into Turkish corporate governance laws by conforming with the 
EU acquis. To explore this issue in more detail, the particular corporate governance reforms 
introduced with the new TCC will be examined in the following section. 
   
4 Corporate Governance Reforms in the New Turkish Commercial Code 
 
In general, provisions relating to company law and corporate governance rules are regulated by 
the TCC.925 The rules that pertain to company law are governed by the second book of the TCC, 
namely Book Two: Commercial Companies. Sub-section four of this book covers the joint-
stock companies, which includes most of the provisions on corporate governance. As per 
Turkish company law, there are five types of commercial companies allowed under the TCC: 
the collective company, the commandite company,926 the limited liability company, the joint-
stock company, and the cooperative company.927 The collective and the commandite companies 
are referred to as partnerships, whereas the limited liability company and the joint-stock 
company are called capital companies.928 The most commonly used types of companies in 
Turkish business practice today are the limited liability company and the joint-stock company. 
As of July 2018, there were 775,390 limited liability companies and 125,975 joint-stock 
companies registered in Turkey.929  
 
The joint-stock companies are classified into two groups:  publicly held or public joint-stock 
companies and closely held or private joint-stock companies. Turkish law distinguishes between 
the public joint-stock company and the listed joint-stock company. Once a joint-stock 
company’s shares are admitted to trade on the exchange, the company becomes classified as a 
listed company. However, joint-stock companies with more than 500 shareholders but without 
shares traded on the exchange are also regarded as public joint-stock companies. This point has 
been criticised by the legislators during the drafting the new TCC, who stated that classifying 
the company as public should not depend on the number of shareholders but rather the company 
                                                     
925 There are special laws on certain types of companies; for example, banks are governed by the Banking 
Law No. 5411 (01.11.2005). 
926 The commandite company is regulated under TCC Article 304 and is also referred to as limited 
partnership. Accordingly, in the commandite company there are two types of partners; one with limited 
and one with unlimited liability who conduct a business under a commercial name. 
927 TCC Article 124. The cooperative company, although considered to be a commercial company, is not 
regulated under the commercial code but instead by the Turkish Cooperatives Law No. 1163. 
928 Ibid. 
929 Republic of Turkey Ministry of Trade, ‘Monthly Data Bulletin’ (July 2018)  <http://risk.gtb.gov.tr/ 
data/5a536e56ddee7d1fa8b6c100/A.pdf> accessed on 18 September 2018. 
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being listed on the exchange.930 Therefore, while the old TCC used the term ‘public joint-stock 
company’, the new TCC abandoned that definition and instead provided that a joint-stock 
company can either be closely held or listed.931 
 
It should be highlighted that the most important changes in the new TCC pertain to the joint-
stock company, particularly the listed joint-stock company.932 In fact, the legislators have 
pointed out that the reforms included in the TCC can be referred to as the ‘joint-stock company 
reforms’ due to extent of changes in that area.933 The legislators have further added that the 
entire section of the commercial code on joint-stock companies was almost re-drafted from 
scratch.934 Regarding this, the Genel Gerekçe has noted that the reason for such extensive 
reforms has been the increased importance of corporate governance for listed companies within 
the last two decades.935   
 
The Genel Gerekçe has elaborated that corporate governance is founded upon four principles: 
transparency, fairness, accountability, and responsibility.936 Accordingly, transparency means 
the public disclosure of information relating to the company. This principle is not limited to 
making information available to only shareholders; it also includes making such information 
available to ‘all actors of the capital markets’.937 Fairness corresponds to the equal treatment 
principle, which means the equal treatment of not only shareholders but also all stakeholders, 
including society, in the running of the company.938 The accountability principle refers to clarity 
in management decisions, the management being able to justify its decisions on valid grounds, 
and the professionalism of management. Responsibility is defined as company executives 
discharging their duties as stipulated by the laws and articles.939 
 
According to Tekinalp, the legal scholar who led the commission in charge of drafting the new 
TCC, these four principles constitute the ‘corporate governance philosophy’ of the new TCC.940 
He adds that the TCC has a ‘concretization’ purpose; in other words, the aim of making these 
corporate governance principles ‘a part of the theoretic and dogmatic system of Turkish 
                                                     
930 TCC with Justifications (n 104) 90. 
931 Ibid. Also see justifications for TCC Articles 329/1 and 338/1 where the term ‘listed joint-stock 
company’ is used instead of ‘public joint-stock company’. 
932 K Özkorkut (ed), Impacts of the Draft Turkish Commercial Code (DTCC) on Capital Markets from 
an EU Perspective International Conference (Banka ve Ticaret Hukuku Araştırma Enstitüsü 2010) 3. 
933 TCC with Justifications (n 104) 90. 
934 Ibid. 
935 Ibid 84. 
936 Ibid. 
937 Ibid. 
938 Ibid 
939 Ibid. 
940 Tekinalp, 'The Corporate Governance Approach of the Draft Turkish Commercial Code' (n 156) 635. 
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company law’.941 What this means is that the TCC neither includes a separate chapter on 
corporate governance nor introduces a codex of corporate governance principles. Instead, the 
lawmakers have chosen to incorporate its ‘corporate governance philosophy’ as founded on four 
pillars (transparency, fairness, accountability and responsibility) into various articles of the 
TCC.942 In other words, the lawmakers chose not to form a catalogue of corporate governance 
standards but instead ‘integrated the corporate governance philosophy homogenously into the 
foundations of the code and from thereon to reflect this basis in the code’s articles.’943  
 
For instance, the transparency principle is envisaged throughout the TCC articles on mandatory 
website requirements, electronic publishing of books and announcements, and online general 
assembly and board meetings. Fairness is reflected in articles that pertain to the restriction of 
privileged shares or that restrain shareholders from becoming indebted to the company. 
Accountability is regulated under the provisions for internal and external audits in line with 
international standards. Responsibility is regulated under the TCC through prohibitions on 
board members transacting with the company, competing with the company, or becoming 
indebted to the company.944 By referring to the concretisation of these corporate governance 
principles, Tekinalp meant that the new TCC has strengthened the applicability of these rules 
by providing them with a legal basis.945 Although most corporate governance rules under the 
TCC are regulated under the section on joint-stock companies, the legislators have encouraged 
their adoption by all company types as a form of best practice.946 
 
Tekinalp has noted that the starting point of corporate governance regulation can be attributed 
to the need to protect the investors and to elevate the position of shareholders within the 
company.947 He has added that shareholders constitute the most important element of the 
company; without them, neither the management nor the stakeholders can exist. Thus, he has 
explained that new TCC has adopted this shareholder centrality in its approach to corporate 
governance.948 According to him, although the new TCC accepts shareholders as its departure 
point, it does not view corporate governance solely as a mechanism to deal with the agency 
problem between shareholders and managers. Instead, the new commercial code goes beyond 
the ‘singularity of interests’ of shareholders and adopts a broad approach of considering 
                                                     
941 Ibid. 
942 Ibid. 
943 (Own translation) Eminoğlu, Corporate Governance in the Turkish Commercial Code (n 154) 61. 
944 Kayali and Korkusuz (eds), Turkish Private Law (n 862) 247. 
945 Tekinalp, 'The Corporate Governance Approach of the Draft Turkish Commercial Code' (n 156) 636. 
946 TCC with Justifications (n 104) 84. 
947 Tekinalp, 'The Corporate Governance Approach of the Draft Turkish Commercial Code' (n 156) 636. 
948 Ibid. 
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stakeholder interests in terms of transparency.949 Therefore, Tekinalp has claimed that the new 
TCC has a pluralist approach to corporate governance.950 However, the pluralist approach of 
the new TCC only seems to be applicable in terms of the transparency tenet of corporate 
governance because stakeholder interests are not considered in other corporate governance 
areas. The fact that the stakeholder interests are restricted to transparency is compatible with 
the new TCC’s overall corporate governance approach because, as Tekinalp has admitted, the 
draft code has placed ‘shareholder value’ at its core.951 
 
5 Shareholder Rights in the New Turkish Commercial Code 
 
 Introduction 
 
The rights that derive from share ownership endow investors with the power to extract returns 
from their investment and provide protection against self-interested managers, majority owners, 
or controlling owners.952 Some of these shareholder rights include the right to attend general 
assembly meetings, the right to vote, the right to dividends, the right to information, and so on. 
In Genel Gerekçe, the legislators have stated that the new commercial code has improved the 
rights of shareholders in line with the necessities of modern company law.953 They have added 
that these changes cannot be solely attributed to compliance with the EU acquis, but rather ‘the 
changing dynamics of the listed companies’.954 To that end, the new TCC has strengthened the 
position of the shareholders through various means, which are grouped under eight categories 
by the legislators:955 
 
1- The list of shareholder rights has been enhanced: the new TCC not only 
keeps all the rights provided to shareholders in relation to ownership, 
management, control, and audit in the old commercial code but also 
introduces new ones such as the right to request a special audit956 and the 
right to equal treatment.957 
2- New grounds have been provided for filing derivative lawsuits; for 
example, in the case of unlawful exercise of control by the parent 
                                                     
949 Emphasis added. Ibid. 
950 Ibid 637. 
951 Ibid 639. 
952 Yurtoglu, 'Ownership, Control and Performance of Turkish Listed Firms' (n 811) 198. 
953 TCC with Justifications (n 104) 93. 
954 (Own translation) TCC with Justifications (n 104) 90. 
955 Ibid 93. 
956 TCC Article 438. 
957 TCC Article 357. 
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company, the shareholders of the dependent company can file a lawsuit 
against the controlling company to claim compensation or the purchase 
of their shares.958 
3- The new TCC has facilitated the exercise of certain shareholder rights. 
For instance, it introduced the institutional proxy system to make it easier 
to vote.959  
4- The available tools for transparency have been increased; the mandatory 
company website960 is an example. 
5- Privileges in voting rights have been restricted.961 
6- The limitations on the transferability of registered shares have been freed 
from arbitrariness and ambiguity.962 
7- Obligations to notify the related authorities have been stipulated in cases 
such as when a shareholder reaches a certain percentage of 
shareholding.963 
8- Finally, the board of directors has been assigned the duty to make a 
statement or issue a report on certain issues; for instance, in group 
companies, the board of the dependent company is required to produce a 
report on inter-company relations964 or a corporate governance evaluation 
report.965 
 
The above categorisation was provided by the legislators in the Genel Gerekçe as a broad outline 
of how shareholder rights have been enhanced in the new TCC. Aside from this list, the 
legislators have also pointed out that the most important problem for the company general 
assemblies has been the ‘power gap’, which occurs when shareholders refrain from participating 
in general assembly meetings. The result of this power gap is that one group gains control of 
                                                     
958 TCC Article 202/2: ‘Shareholders who have cast negative votes against the GA resolution and had 
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the company.966 As a solution, the legislators have noted it is important to facilitate active 
shareholder participation in company management by increasing the impact of the shareholders’ 
vote, and the way to achieve this is through ensuring shareholder democracy.967 
 
Indeed, shareholder democracy has been assigned utmost importance in the new TCC’s 
regulation of shareholder rights. On this point, the Genel Gerekçe has noted that the reforms on 
joint-stock companies have been influenced mainly by the principle of shareholder 
democracy.968 Accordingly, shareholder democracy ‘aims to increase shareholder value and the 
effectiveness of shareholder vote, increase interest in general assemblies, and to overcome the 
“absence of power” which arises out of the unwillingness to participate.’969 The absence of 
power here refers to shareholder passivity, which is when the shareholders of widely held 
companies become uninterested in the decision-making process, and the control function is 
exercised either by managers or controlling shareholders. In the Turkish business setting, 
however, companies are predominantly controlled by owner families, which may lead to a 
conflict of interest between them and the outside shareholders. This conflict is considered to be 
a type of agency problem: the non-controlling shareholders are the principals, and the 
controlling owners are the agents. Thus, corporate governance rules in such settings try to 
ensure that the outsiders are not expropriated by the controlling shareholders.970 The provisions 
in the new TCC were drafted with this particular characteristic of Turkish companies in mind, 
which is evidenced by the extensive list of rights provided to minority shareholders and the 
curbing of majority shareholders’ power in other instances. Hence, while the Genel Gerekçe 
has provided that all shareholder rights are augmented and that the rules on ensuring shareholder 
democracy work to the benefit of all shareholders, the ultimate effect of the new TCC provisions 
on corporate governance is the strengthening of the role of minority shareholders vis-à-vis the 
controlling shareholders. 
 
 The Principle of Equal Treatment 
 
One of the important innovations in the new TCC for strengthening the rights of shareholder is 
the principle of equal treatment.971 This principle was already established within Turkish legal 
doctrine and by the High Court;972 however, these are not primary sources of law in the Turkish 
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legal system. With the new TCC, the equal treatment principle has been provided with a legal 
basis within primary legislation. According to the TCC, the principle of equal treatment means 
that all shareholders under equal terms shall be treated equally.973 The legislators clarify that 
the principle of equal treatment is only provided for shareholders.974 
 
The legislators have noted that this provision reflects the principle prescribed in Article 42 of 
the European Council Directive 77/91/EEC,975 which states that, ‘For the purposes of the 
implementation of this Directive, the laws of the Member States shall ensure equal treatment to 
all shareholders who are in the same position.’ 976 In fact, the wording of the TCC article is very 
similar to that of the EC’s. The same principle is stipulated by the OECD Principles under the 
title The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders, where it is advised that ‘The corporate 
governance framework should ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders, including 
minority and foreign shareholders.’977 The OECD provision specifically mentions the need to 
ensure the equitable treatment of minority shareholders and foreign shareholders. The provision 
further states, ‘Minority shareholders should be protected from abusive actions by, or in the 
interest of, controlling shareholders acting either directly or indirectly’978, which refers to the 
companies with controlling shareholders. Although the principle of equal treatment is regarded 
as a right for all shareholders, in practice, it is particularly beneficial for the minority 
shareholders. The legislators have reiterated this by asserting that the aim of this provision is to 
provide a legal barrier to arbitrary decisions by the company organs against the minority 
shareholders.979 In a similar manner, Eminoğlu has noted ‘that this principle will serve the 
prevention of abuse of majority power and the strengthening of shareholder democracy in joint-
stock companies.’980 Guney has also asserted that this principle is an important tool to protect 
the minority shareholders against the majority shareholders or against the board, which is 
controlled by the majority.981 This principle has been endowed with so much importance that a 
further article of the TCC has provided that any decision of the board that is contrary to this 
principle shall be deemed be void.982  
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The principle of equal treatment is regarded as an important tenet of corporate governance 
regulation. As Eminoğlu has noted, the equal treatment principle is a reflection of the corporate 
governance principle of fairness.983 However, it should be stressed that the principle does not 
mean absolute equality; it refers to proportional equality.984 Thus, for instance, the principle of 
equal treatment can be constrained in the case of preferential shares where a privilege regarding 
dividends, liquidation, pre-emptive rights, or voting is granted to a certain share through the 
company’s articles of association.985 In legal doctrine, it is accepted that granting of share 
privileges does not infringe on the principle of equal treatment.986 The principle merely places 
a restriction on the company board’s decision-making in terms of considering all shareholders 
under the same terms equally.987 Therefore, it provides safeguards against the board decisions 
that favour the majority or the controlling shareholder. This way, as Karasu has argued, the 
principle also attempts to give confidence to the prospective investors.988 In sum, this provision 
mainly strengthens the position of minority shareholder against the controlling shareholders. 
 
 Representation of Shareholders in the General Assembly 
 
Shareholders in a company mainly exercise their powers through voting in the general 
assembly. Eminoğlu has noted that it is in the general assembly meetings ‘where the shareholder 
democracy materialises.’989 Indeed, the TCC has stipulated that shareholders use their rights 
regarding company affairs by participating in the general assembly meetings.990 The new TCC 
has introduced several provisions to ensure that all shareholders attend the general assembly 
meetings and effectively use their right to vote so that they can impact the company’s decision-
making process. These provisions aim to prevent shareholder passivity and encourage 
shareholders to become involved in the company decision-making process to fill the power gap 
in Turkish listed companies.991 
 
According to the legislators, shareholder representation is the first problem that stands in the 
way of achieving shareholder democracy.992 The old TCC did not contain any provisions on the 
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terms of representation of shareholders in the general assembly; the issue had been addressed 
through the provisions found in the Turkish Law of Obligations. These provisions led to 
confusion in practice regarding the proxy’s mandate. As per the old TCC, shareholders had to 
show up in person or send an authorized representative; they could not attend or cast votes at 
the general assembly through electronic means.993 Thus, during the regime of the old TCC, the 
exercise of shareholders’ right to attend the general assembly meetings has mostly been 
ineffective in listed companies. On that point, the legislators have observed that ‘the extent of 
the power gap is proportionate to the number of shares issued to the public.’994 In other words, 
the more widely held a company, the greater the risk of shareholders not using their rights 
effectively. The legislators have noted that this constitutes an important risk for public 
companies in Turkey.995 Thus, the new TCC envisaged new systems of representation to 
facilitate shareholder democracy and to allow shareholders to use their rights to participate in 
the decision-making more effectively and collectively to form opposition to the majority 
shareholders. 
 
As per the new TCC, shareholders do not need to attend the general assembly in person. They 
can use a proxy to represent them at the general assembly meetings.996 Moreover, this 
representative does not need to own shares in the company. In fact, the new TCC holds that any 
provision in the company’s articles of association that require the proxy to be a shareholder 
shall be deemed invalid.997 The new TCC provides two main types of representation for 
shareholders. The first is individual proxy and is regulated by the provisions of representation 
contained in the Turkish Law of Obligations.998 The second one is collective proxy and has three 
sub-categories: institutional proxy, board proxy, and independent proxy. Individual 
representation has been augmented in the new TCC and now includes a new mechanism called 
consignee proxy.999 This new article allows the person who has deposited the share physically 
or legally to represent the shareholder in the general assembly. For the representation to occur, 
the consignee must take instructions from the shareholder prior to each general assembly 
meeting.1000 
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The key difference between the new TCC and the old TCC regarding the shareholder 
representation in general assembly lies in the introduction of institutional proxy, which is a type 
of collective proxy and is a system unique to Turkey.1001 Accordingly, the institutional 
representative would issue a declaration announcing the direction they would take in the general 
assembly meeting, provide suggestions for issues concerning shareholders, and subsequently 
ask for representation rights from shareholders in line with their statement.1002 Shareholders 
who are of the same opinion can thus organise under the roof of the same representative and 
have their voices heard in a collective manner. According to the legislators, this provision 
intends to fill the ‘power gap’ in the general assembly meetings that arises from a lack of 
shareholder participation.1003 The institutional proxy is designed to act independently from the 
company management.1004 The shareholders are not able to give ad hoc instructions to the 
institutional proxy but rather will be deemed to have accepted the proxy’s stance as per their 
declaration at the beginning. In the words of the legislators, this innovation will serve to 
‘establish shareholder democracy and thereby encourage the formation of a management 
opposition hence form the basis for good governance on one hand, and on the other hand, it will 
help institutionalize the proxy system.’1005 The end goal, as the legislators have added, is to 
create a legal system whereby shareholders can make informed decisions and use their rights 
effectively.1006  
 
As a general rule, the representative does not need to own shares in the company, and the same 
principle applies to the institutional proxy. However, the institutional proxy is not allowed to 
ask for compensation in exchange for representing the shareholders.1007 According to the 
legislators, this article merely devises a mechanism to encourage those who are willing to 
organise other shareholders with the same view on company management under one effective 
voice.1008 In sum, the institutional proxy system allows for the otherwise ineffective minority 
shareholders to form opposition against the majority or the controlling owners. 
 
Alongside the institutional proxy, the TCC provides two other types of representation: the board 
proxy and independent proxy. The board proxy refers to a person related to the company and 
proposed by the company management. This person gathers all the shareholders who wish to 
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vote in line with the recommendations and propositions of the management.1009 If the company 
proposes such a proxy, it is also required by law to propose an independent person to act as a 
proxy alongside the board proxy.1010 The difference between the two types of representation is 
that, as their name suggests, a board proxy will be a person who has a relation with the company, 
whereas an independent proxy will have no connection or contractual relationship with the 
company.1011 The company shall announce the names of these two different types of 
representatives according to the companies’ articles of association and shall publish those 
names on the company website.1012 These representatives will issue a declaration stating the 
direction they will take on management issues and how they will vote. For both types of proxies, 
the shareholders are not able to give instructions to their representatives because once the 
shareholder has chosen a particular proxy, it will mean that they have accepted the stance 
provided in their declaration by default.1013 The difference between these two types of proxies 
and the institutional proxy is important. The board proxy and the independent proxy have to be 
proposed by the company, whereas the institutional proxy can exist without any interference 
from the company. Hence, the institutional proxy is a shareholder initiative.1014 The institutional 
proxy is intended as a safeguard option that ensures that shareholders have a collective 
representation opportunity in case the company does not propose a board proxy. 
 
In sum, the new TCC provisions introduce three types of collective representation mechanisms 
which will increase the power of minority shareholders in general assembly meetings, who 
would otherwise be deemed ineffective. The TCC’s system of representation illustrates the 
importance the legislators have accorded to the engagement in the company decision-making 
process by shareholders who are not part of the majority or controlling group. The legislators 
have argued that these new mechanisms will help rectify the supposed free-rider problem in 
Turkish listed companies and thereby enhance shareholder democracy further.1015 That said, it 
can be observed that the legislators intend to use the TCC’s new provisions on shareholder 
representation to empower minority shareholders in the general assembly meetings vis-à-vis the 
controlling owners.  
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 Electronic General Assembly and Online Voting 
 
The legislators have indicated on numerous occasions that the biggest problem for listed joint-
stock companies is the ‘power gap’ due to the minority shareholders being usually unable to 
attend the general assembly meetings.1016 The new TCC introduces the important corporate 
governance reforms of electronic general assembly meetings and online voting mechanisms to 
facilitate the active participation of outside shareholders in the company’s decision-making 
process. Eminoğlu has asserted that regulating these mechanisms has been a necessary outcome 
of the globalisation phenomenon, which involves investors commonly investing in companies 
outside their national stock markets but are unable to participate in their decision-making 
process.1017 He has added that the advancement of technology has made it no longer necessary 
for the shareholders to be physically present to convene a general assembly meeting.1018 
 
According to the new TCC, general assembly meetings can be conducted electronically, as long 
as this is provided for in the company’s articles of association.1019 The relevant article also states 
that the details and implementation of the online general assembly shall be regulated through a 
communique which shall be issued by the Ministry of Customs and Trade.1020 Accordingly, 
once the aforementioned communique enters into force, it will be mandatory for listed joint-
stock companies to include electronic voting and online general assembly in their articles of 
association.1021 Thus, in line with this new provision, listed companies are no longer able to 
only convene physical general assembly meetings. This requirement is an important step 
towards attracting minority investors, particularly foreign investors who reside in a foreign 
country because they would otherwise be unable to participate in company decision-making. In 
sum, although this provision is regulated as a general shareholder right, it will most likely 
benefit foreign shareholders. 
 
 Limitations on Privileged Shares 
 
Privileged shares are thought to distort shareholder democracy, thus, ‘limiting the issuance of 
privileged shares is a necessary component of the corporate governance approach’.1022 The new 
TCC allows the issuance of privileged shares but introduces a limitation that each share can 
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only be granted a maximum of 15 votes.1023 This limitation can be revoked only in two instances 
and with a court ruling.1024 The first instance is where the company provides ‘an 
institutionalization project’ to the court, and the second is where there is valid ground to ask the 
court for such an exemption.1025 
 
This provision is very interesting because the lawmakers make reference to the family owned 
or controlled structure of Turkish companies when justifying the article. Accordingly, ‘the draft 
[code] has employed, as a legal policy, to ensure that the structures and the working order of 
Turkish joint-stock companies are removed from the family company model, and that they 
become institutionalized.’1026 The legislators have also stated that institutionalisation requires 
professional management, and the privileged shares can play an important part in realising this 
goal. In fact, according to the legislators, the only reason why privileged shares are still allowed 
in the new TCC is because they facilitate institutionalisation.1027 It has been argued that the 
legislators have used these articles to try to ‘enforce’ institutionalisation and professionalism 
on Turkish companies.1028 
 
 Principle of Mandatory Provisions  
 
The new TCC has introduced a radical provision to Turkish company law by stipulating that a 
company’s articles of association can only diverge from the articles provided in the TCC on 
joint stock companies if explicitly provided for.1029 Tekinalp has stated that the objective of ‘the 
mandatory provisions rule’ is the protection of shareholders.1030 This article indicates that 
companies are no longer able to resort to the principle of freedom of contract to draft articles of 
association that suit their interests while completely disregarding the rights of others. The 
legislators thus express their explicit preference for one principle over the other; the principle 
of freedom of contract is restricted to protect the interests of minority shareholders. The 
justification for this article states: ‘In joint-stock company law today, individual shareholding 
rights as well the minority shareholder rights are undoubtedly limiting the scope of the principle 
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of freedom of contract, which has been losing ground recently.’1031 In line with this provision, 
the joint-stock company’s articles of association must abide by the mandatory provisions 
stipulated in the TCC, and it is only possible to depart from these rules when explicitly allowed 
for. In particular, the mandatory provisions principle provides protection for the minority 
shareholders, who have been regarded as the weak party regarding the company’s articles of 
association.1032 The legislators have also noted that this provision may face criticism that it 
leaves little room for the will of the shareholders to construct their business rules or lead to ‘one 
size fits all approach’. However, the explanation also states that this principle will prove to be 
useful considering the particular circumstances of Turkish company practice and will serve to 
strengthen the rule of law.1033  
 
Hence, the TCC ‘standardises’ the joint-stock company’s articles of association in Turkish 
company law.1034 This standardisation attempts to eliminate prospective investors’ fears that the 
majority may impose provisions in the company’s articles that are contrary to the minority’s 
interests. This not only aims to protect the minority shareholders, but also frees the prospective 
investor from the burden and costs of having to inquire after the articles of association of each 
company they are looking to invest in. Thus, the mandatory provisions principle effectively 
reflects the legislators’ objective of incentivising outsiders to invest in Turkish listed companies. 
However, the freedom of contract is restricted to prevent the mere possibility of majority 
shareholders acting to circumvent minority interests through company articles. This in turn 
restricts the company’s flexibility in its operations. The balance of competing interests 
contained in the mandatory provisions rule of the new TCC indicates that the legislators have 
preferred to strengthen the minority shareholder’s interest over any other business concern or 
the power of the majority shareholders. Tekinalp has affirmed this stance by arguing that the 
minority shareholders are powerless against majority power, which distorts the fairness 
principle of corporate governance.1035 Thus, to benefit the outsider shareholders and prospective 
investors, the new TCC has restrained one of the most important powers of the majority 
shareholders: the ability to alter the articles of association. 
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6 Provisions for Group Companies 
 
The new TCC not only provides extended rights for the minority shareholders against the 
majority, but also aims to protect outside shareholders from the minority shareholders who hold 
control in group companies, which commonly is a feature in the Turkish corporate sector.1036 
The new TCC introduced detailed rules on ‘group companies’1037 into Turkish company law for 
the first time to adjust the legal rules to the realities of Turkey’s business life.1038 In this scenario, 
shareholders may retain the control of the affiliate companies through certain structures which 
allow them ‘to exercise a degree of control over the corporation disproportionate to the 
shareholders’ equity ownership in the company.’1039 Indeed, shareholders can reduce their 
cashflow rights below their control rights and still hold on to control through structures such as 
shares with superior voting rights, pyramidal structures, or cross-shareholdings.1040 In Turkey, 
most companies have cross-ownerships, pyramidal structures, and privileged shares.1041 Thus, 
by regulating the joint-stock companies in line with the reality of group companies, the new 
TCC attempts to provide further rights to non-controlling shareholders against the shareholders 
who ultimately hold control. 
 
In accordance with the TCC, a group company refers to structures where there are at least two 
companies, and each company is legally independent but is dependent on the parent company 
either financially or in terms of decision-making.1042 Thus, in group companies, there is a 
dominant parent company and affiliate companies that are dependent on the parent company 
(known as the dependant).1043 The new TCC provides three ways in which the direct or indirect 
control of the parent company can be established: holding a majority of the voting rights, articles 
of association that permit the selection of board members to form a decision quorum, or a 
contract that provides the majority of the voting rights in another company.1044 However, these 
are not numerus clausus because the article accepts the presence of control in other ways, to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis.1045 Finally, the article includes a legal presumption which 
states that in the case of a company owning the majority of the shares in another company or 
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enough shares to take corporate decisions, then that company is presumed to be the controlling 
company.1046 
 
Prior to the new TCC, companies in a group structure were treated as completely separate 
entities, leading to problems in terms of the rights of shareholders of the affiliate company. The 
old commercial code’s approach of treating the affiliate company as a separate and independent 
entity from the parent company has been criticised because it conflicts with the corporate 
governance principles of fairness and accountability.1047 On this point, the legislators have noted 
that  
 
the assumption that a joint-stock company is independent despite belonging to a group 
company is becoming more obsolete day by day. [...] To turn a blind eye to this reality 
means being unfair to the management, minority and small shareholders.1048  
 
Thus, the new TCC contains extensive provisions regulating group companies and their 
disclosure requirements. These provisions have the explicit objective of protecting shareholders 
of the dependent company from the actions of the dominant company and the controlling 
shareholders. For Eminoğlu, the group company provisions of the new TCC constitute ‘the most 
significant and material reflection of corporate governance approach in the commercial 
code’.1049 
 
Accordingly, the main principle in the regulation of group companies is that the controlling 
company shall not use its dominant position to inflict loss on the dependent company.1050 In 
determining the liability of the controlling company, there must be a loss incurred on the 
dependent company and a causal link with that loss and the act of the controlling company.1051 
Here, the determination of loss is interpreted broadly.1052 For instance, it has been argued that 
‘there could be loss even in the absence of monetary damage, in the event a dependent company 
is instructed to provide collateral to secure an affiliate’s debt, causing it to have reduced credit 
capacity for its own expansion needs.’1053 If an act of the dominant company results in such a 
loss, it must offset the loss. If it fails to do so, any shareholder of the dependent company has 
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the right to file a lawsuit requesting the loss to be compensated to the company.1054 Under certain 
conditions, the minority shareholders of the dependent company can submit requests to the court 
that their shares be sold to the parent company, so they cease to become shareholders.1055 
Alternatively, they can request compensation if they have voted against a general assembly 
decision that inflicted a loss on the dependent company.1056 This provision, according to 
Eminoğlu, reflects the shareholder democracy principle in practice: the shareholders have been 
given a considerable power to directly and indirectly affect the management of the group 
company.1057 
 
The new TCC also requires the dependent company’s board to produce an annual affiliate 
company report. This report must disclose group relations, including but not limited to 
transactions entered into with the group companies.1058 Moreover, this report must disclose the 
losses caused by the parent company and clarify whether the losses have been compensated.1059 
Cankorel has stated that minority shareholders can use this report as a basis for filing a 
lawsuit.1060 Moreover, rights provided to the shareholders of group companies are not limited 
to this report. For instance, shareholders of the parent company can request information from 
the general assembly regarding the affiliate company’s financial position, assets, shareholders, 
managers and related persons, and so on.1061 Additionally, the TCC also provides the 
shareholders of the dependent company with the right to request a special auditor.1062 Overall, 
these provisions impose further disclosure requirements on group companies to strengthen the 
transparency of Turkish group companies, thus mainly protecting outside shareholders. 
 
7 Provisions for the Board of Directors 
 
In Turkish company law, the board of directors (the BoD or the board) is the representation and 
the management body of the company.1063 The legislators have noted that the TCC’s provisions 
on BoD have been affected the most by the corporate governance reforms.1064 For example, the 
new TCC states that the joint-stock companies must have a BoD consisting of at least one person 
who is determined by the company’s articles of association or appointed by the general 
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assembly.1065 The single-member board is an innovation of the new code; the old commercial 
code required at least three directors to constitute the board.1066 The new code also introduces 
voluntary insurance for companies to cover the losses incurred by the members of the board in 
fulfilling their duties.1067 According to the legislators, although this is a discretionary 
mechanism, it is an important step towards bringing the Turkish companies’ boards in line with 
the professional boards of the West.1068 Aside from these specific changes, Tekinalp has also 
highlighted the TCC’s reforms to the BoDs in the following areas: first, the new TCC regulates 
the board with consideration of group companies;1069 second, it adopts the professional board 
approach; third, it establishes the separation of duties between the shareholders and the board; 
and fourth, it perceives the board to be the agent of all stakeholders and not only of the 
shareholders.1070 Finally, the new TCC makes a distinction between the BoD members who 
have executive or management functions and those who have non-executive powers.1071 
According to Tekinalp, this distinction is reflected mainly in the provisions for the liability of 
the directors.1072 
 
One of the most significant reforms to the BoD brought by the new TCC has been the 
acknowledgement of the separation between the duties of the board and the shareholders.1073 
According to previous established practice in Turkish companies, the general assembly usually 
took on duties of the board by using the company’s articles of association to assign itself some 
of the board’s powers.1074 Because of this blur, the old commercial code required the board 
members to also be shareholders; if someone was elected to the board, they could not start duties 
until they owned shares in the company.1075 The new TCC has abolished this requirement and 
has explicitly stated the list of exclusive and non-assignable duties as well as the responsibilities 
of the BoD in an attempt to separate the powers of the two company organs.1076 Some of these 
non-assignable duties are the management of the company, determining the company’s 
                                                     
1065 TCC Article 359/1. 
1066 Old TCC Article 312. 
1067 TCC Article 361: ‘If the damage incurred by the company through the fault of board members while 
performing their duties is insured at a price exceeding 25 percent of the company capital and the company 
is secured, in the case of public companies this matter shall be announced in the bulletin of the CMB and 
if the shares are listed on a stock exchange this shall also be announced in the stock exchange bulletin, 
and such matter shall be taken into account in the assessment of compliance with the principles of 
corporate governance.’ Translated in PwC, 'New Turkish Commercial Code: A Blueprint for the Future' 
(n 958) 98-99. 
1068 Justification for TCC Article 361. 
1069 These provisions are previously discussed under Chaper 5.6. 
1070 Tekinalp, 'The Corporate Governance Approach of the Draft Turkish Commercial Code' (n 156). 639. 
1071 Ibid 639. 
1072 Ibid 640. 
1073 TCC Articles 374 and 375. 
1074 Justification for TCC Article 374. 
1075 Old TCC Article 312. 
1076 Justification for TCC Article 375. 
163 
 
management organisation, appointment and dismissal of managers, supervising the managers, 
and preparing the annual activity report and corporate governance statement and presenting 
them to the general assembly.1077 As Eminoğlu has asserted, clarification of these exclusive 
rights and duties reflects ‘the law maker’s intention to move away from the understanding which 
perceived the board as the representative of majority shareholders.’1078 Indeed, as Ararat notes, 
in Turkish companies, the members of the BoD are ‘unilaterally nominated and elected by 
controlling shareholders and the boards are frequently dominated by members of the controlling 
family who occupy the board seats’.1079 Thus, the established belief is that the controlling 
owners should be given more priority in management.1080 In most Turkish holding companies, 
for instance, there is an informal structure called the ‘executive committee’ that is composed of 
the directors and members of the controlling shareholders. This committee makes the decisions 
for all affiliate companies.  
 
In a similar manner, even if there is a CEO who is separate from the board chairman, there is 
the perception of a hierarchy of these two posts. The board chairman is perceived to be the 
representative of the dominant shareholder.1081 In this context, dominant shareholders perceive 
the professionalism of the board to indicate a loss of their authority in the company.1082 Thus, 
the new TCC aims to redress this issue. The articles of the new TCC on BoDs are in line with 
the legislators’ overall objective to institutionalise the company and transform the BoD into a 
purely professional organ, instead of being composed of controlling owners. However, some 
articles regarding professional boards that were found in the initial draft of the new TCC have 
been revoked following pressure from business circles and the realisation of the impracticality 
of certain measures for Turkish companies.1083 An example of this is the draft code’s 
requirement that at least one-fourth of the board members must have received higher 
education.1084 This requirement was taken out from the final version of the TCC prior to entering 
into force.1085 Also, the independence requirement for board members is not regulated in the 
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new TCC. However, listed companies are subject to the CMB’s mandatory corporate 
governance principle on having a minimum number of independent board members.1086 
 
One important corporate governance reform of the new TCC is that it allows different 
shareholder groups and minority shareholders to be represented in the BoD.1087 This provision 
did not exist in the old commercial code. Previously, although not stipulated by law, the Turkish 
High Court Yargitay, had allowed shareholder groups to be represented in the board under the 
term ‘group privileges’, but this privilege was not extended to minorities.1088 Thus, the new 
TCC provision constitutes an important reform for minority shareholders’ representation in the 
BoD. The related articles read as follows: 
 
Provided that it is stated in the articles of association, certain share groups, shareholders 
consisting of a certain group in terms of their qualities and nature, and minorities can 
be granted the right to be represented on the BoD. […] It is mandatory that the candidate 
nominated by the GA as a board member or who is a member of the group and the 
minority to whom the right to nominate is granted shall be elected absent fair cause to 
oppose that candidate.1089 
 
According to the justification of the article, the privileged shares, for instance, can constitute a 
group to be represented at the board.1090 The article also stipulates that the minority shareholders 
can be considered a group and thus be represented at the board.1091 Once a candidate is put forth 
by a shareholder group or the minority shareholders, the general assembly is under the 
obligation to elect that nominee as a board member unless there are valid grounds for rejection 
of the candidate. The TCC article does not expand on what it means by ‘valid ground’; however, 
the justification for the article states that this provision should be interpreted as being decided 
on a case-by-case basis and should be developed by the courts and jurisprudence.1092 The article 
further indicates that the shares that are given representation rights in the board shall be regarded 
as privileged shares.1093 
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Another of the TCC’s reforms pertain to board members becoming indebted to the company. In 
the old commercial code, the board members and their relatives were prohibited from taking 
loans from the company. This was still the case in the first draft of the new TCC. However, by 
the final version, only the board members who do not own shares in the company were 
prohibited from becoming indebted to the company. In other words, board members who are 
also shareholders are allowed to take loans from the company. The purpose of this provision in 
its original form was to protect the minority shareholders against the controlling shareholders 
appropriating company funds for their personal use. This was due to the established perception 
in Turkish companies that company funds were equal to the funds of the controlling owner.1094 
Thus, the article in the initial draft of the TCC was aimed to eradicate this perception and bring 
Turkish boards one step closer to professional boards.1095 Nevertheless, the initial draft was 
amended prior to the code entering into force due to pressure from business groups, which 
indicates that owner shareholders have significant influence over the legislators. Nevertheless, 
it can be argued that the legislators intended to use this provision to provide further rights to 
minority shareholders that strengthened their position in relation to the controlling shareholders. 
 
The new TCC also makes a distinction between the executive and non-executive roles of the 
BoD. It does so by allowing the management function of the board to be delegated to a group 
or a member of the board, provided that this delegation is stipulated for in the company’s articles 
of association.1096 This affects the liability of the board members. According to the new TCC, 
if the board delegates the management function, the board members will not be held liable for 
the manager’s actions insofar as they have acted diligently in the selection of the delegated 
management.1097 This is a result of the new code’s modification of directors’ duties. The new 
TCC introduces the principles of duty of care and the duty of loyalty.1098 The article reads, 
‘Board members and third parties delegated with management owes a duty of care of a diligent 
manager in discharging their duties, and a duty of loyalty in pursuing company interests.’1099 In 
the old commercial code, board members’ liability was subject to an objective standard of care 
of a ‘prudent person’. However, because this provision was interpreted narrowly by the courts, 
the new law abandoned the prudent person standard.1100 Instead, the new TCC used an objective 
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criteria of a ‘diligent manager’, which the legislators have interpreted as follows: ‘the board 
members shall make decisions in line with the business judgement rule, taking into account 
corporate governance principles’.1101 The new TCC regulated the duty of loyalty for the first 
time. According to the above-stated article, the directors or third parties who have management 
functions owe a duty of loyalty to the company. The article’s justification states that this duty 
requires the managers to put the company interests before any other personal interests, 
controlling shareholder interests, or any interests of third parties or relatives.1102 The legislators 
have added that this provision intends to ensure the managers do not run the company in a 
manner that prefers the dominant shareholders’ interests.1103 
 
Determining the extent of the board members’ liability is a vital aspect of corporate governance 
because it brings predictability and accountability for both the directors and the shareholders.1104 
The new TCC replaces the liability system of the old commercial code, which held the directors 
jointly and severally liable, and each director was individually held responsible for the entire 
loss.1105 According to Tekinalp, the old provision went too far to protect the creditors.1106 The 
new TCC introduces the differentiated liability system, which determines each director’s 
liability separately.1107 Accordingly, the directors and managers will be liable if they fail to 
discharge their duties as stipulated under the articles of associaton or in the law.1108 The article 
clarifies that if the management function is delegated, the board will be released from 
liability.1109 Thus, the new TCC adopts a ‘no management function, no liability’ approach.1110 
Tekinalp has stressed that the TCC’s liability provisions acknowledge the separation between 
executive and non-executive directors.1111 TCC’s Genel Gerekçe has further noted that this 
separation brings Turkish companies’ boards in line with the American board system.1112 In 
terms of corporate governance reforms, this provision is also an attempt to shift away from 
owner-dominated boards towards professional boards. 
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Finally, the BoD has been given the exclusive and non-assignable duty to prepare the company’s 
corporate governance statement as per the new TCC.1113 Accordingly, the board is required to 
prepare and present the company’s corporate governance statement to shareholders in the 
general assembly meeting. For Tekinalp, this provision enables the board to self-assess.1114 
Aside from this general provision that is applicable to all companies, the TCC also has a more 
specific provision that is applicable only to the public joint-stock companies. The provision 
provides that all matters relating to the corporate governance statements of these companies 
shall be determined by the CMB.1115 Prior to the new TCC, the corporate governance 
compliance reports of companies prepared in line with the CMB regulations were ineffective; 
they only consisted of a few pages and were similar each year because they lacked any legal 
basis.1116 The TCC provisions for the corporate governance statement attempt to tackle this 
issue. The legislators also granted sole authority to the CMB to determine the contents of such 
statements to ensure uniformity amongst the corporate governance statements of public 
companies.1117 This provision ensures that the corporate governance reporting of public 
companies can be comparable with each other.1118 However, a recent study examined the 
corporate governance statements of the 70 listed companies which constitute 81% of the market 
capitalisation of BIST in 2015 and found that the explanations in the statements were mostly 
vague and not open to any objective comparisons.1119 Thus, despite the legislators’ efforts to 
facilitate standardised corporate governance statements, the business practice remains far from 
that goal. 
 
8 Minority Shareholder Rights 
 
Majority rule prevails in the decision-making process of joint-stock companies.1120 Unless a 
greater quorum is specified in the company’s articles of association, Turkish company law 
provides that the general assembly meeting convenes with the presence of shareholders or their 
representatives who hold at least one-fourth of the company’s capital.1121 Subsequently, the 
TCC article states that the decision quorum is the majority of the votes of the shareholders who 
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are present at the meeting.1122 There are, however, instances when unanimity is required for 
decisions at the general assembly,1123 or where the votes of the shareholders that represent at 
least 75% of the company’s capital are required.1124 In terms of listed companies, the TCC has 
a provision that requires that shareholders constituting at least one-fourth of the company’s 
capital to be present at the meeting to take certain decisions, saving where a higher quorum is 
provided for in the company’s articles of association.1125 These decisions are as follows: ‘a) 
Decisions on the amendments to the articles of association regarding the increase of the 
company capital or ceiling of the authorized capital; b) Decisions on mergers, divisions and 
type changes.’1126 The decisions made by the votes of the majority of the shareholders in the 
general assembly will be binding not only for those who voted in favour, but also for the 
shareholders who voted against those decisions and even for the shareholders who did not attend 
the general assembly meeting.1127 Hence, whoever holds the most number of votes to form a 
majority may decide on important company matters, such as approving the annual reports, 
distributing of dividends, and electing or removing the board members. 
 
Majority rule in company decision-making has led to the owners who hold the majority of 
voting rights also becoming the controlling shareholders. It has long been argued that since 
shareholdings are widely dispersed among the public in large companies, control resides in the 
managers.1128 In such large companies, the main corporate governance issue is about resolving 
the agency problem between self-interested managers and dispersed and small shareholders 
who do not possess enough shares to have any control function in the company.1129 The 
corporate governance mechanisms to tackle this type of agency problem are usually found 
within the context of efficient markets.1130 However, there is evidence that this type of company 
structure, which is mainly found in the American system, is the exception, and that most 
companies around the world typically have controlling shareholders.1131 A controlling 
shareholder system leads to a range of agency problems that are different from the agency 
problems experienced in companies with dispersed shareholdings.1132 In companies with 
controlling shareholders, agency issues arise due to the possible conflict of interest between the 
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majority shareholders in control and the minority shareholders due to the minority’s ‘rational 
expectation that this divergence of interest distorts corporate decisions to benefit controlling 
shareholders.’1133 
 
It is argued that in the above setting, ‘there is potential for abuse, for example in situations 
where controlling shareholders impose commercial conditions that go against the interests of 
the company as a whole and minority shareholders’.1134 In terms of protecting minority 
shareholders’ rights, market forces in Turkey are unable to discipline the controlling 
shareholders, which was previously coupled with the old commercial code’s provision of weak 
legal rights to the minority in terms of sell-off and filing lawsuits.1135 Thus, to remedy the agency 
problem associated with Turkey’s company ownership structure, the new TCC introduced new 
minority rights and extended existing rights. For instance, in the case of group companies, to 
remedy the risks of abuse of the minority associated with cross-ownerships and pyramidal 
structures, the new TCC requires the affiliate company board to produce an annual report that 
discloses group relations to increase transparency in inter-group relations. Also, in terms of 
privileged shares, the new TCC limits each share to 15 votes,1136 whereas the old commercial 
code did not impose any limit on the number of votes. Aside from these examples, it can be 
observed that, overall, the new TCC has given prominence to the protection of the minority 
shareholders. Eminoğlu has argued that one of the main goals of the TCC has not been to 
strengthen the rights of all shareholders; instead, it aimed to strengthen the rights of small 
shareholders.1137 The rights of the minority shareholders under the new TCC indeed reveal the 
legislators’ preference for protecting minority shareholder rights. 
 
Minority rights are separate from individual shareholder rights because the former are granted 
to shareholders who represent a certain defined portion of the company capital.1138 The 
provisions of the new TCC define minority shareholders as those shareholders who own at least 
10% of the capital in closely held joint-stock companies and 5% of the capital in public joint-
stock companies. There is, however, an exception to this rule. The shareholders whose shares’ 
total nominal value exceeds 1 million Turkish Lira can also be granted the minority right to 
request special audits from a court.1139 This exception is only limited to requesting special audits 
and does not apply to other kinds of minority rights under the new TCC. On the other hand, 
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there is a provision that allows the 10% and 5% requirements to be reduced via the company’s 
articles of association in the case of the minority shareholder’s right to request a general 
assembly to convene or to add an item to the agenda of the general assembly meeting.1140 These 
are, however, the only instances when the TCC allows the minority percentage to be altered via 
the company’s articles of association. This is because the new TCC clearly states that a 
company’s articles of association can only deviate from the rules contained in the TCC if it is 
explicitly allowed, such as for the principle of mandatory provisions.  
 
According to the Genel Gerekçe, the new TCC improves minority shareholder rights in three 
main ways as follows: 1141 
 
1- New exceptions have been introduced to the principle of abiding by the 
general assembly agenda.1142 
2- The right to request special audits has been granted to the minority 
shareholders.1143  
3- The introduction of a new set of minority rights such as the right to request 
the dissolution of the company1144 or to file a lawsuit against the auditor 
examining the financial reports on the grounds of fair cause or breach of 
impartiality.1145 
 
One important right granted to the minority shareholders is the right to request to convene the 
general assembly and add an item to the agenda. Accordingly,  
 
the shareholders comprising at least 5 percent of the share capital in public joint stock 
companies, along with their justifications and the requested agenda items in writing, 
can request from the board of directors to convene a general assembly meeting, 
otherwise if the general assembly meeting is already scheduled to add their requested 
items to the meeting agenda.1146  
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As explained above, this article is the only instance where the 5% ratio can be decreased through 
the company’s articles of association. The article further states that the board shall convene the 
general assembly meeting 45 days from the date of the request at the latest. If the board fails to 
do so, the requesting shareholders will have the right to convene the meeting.1147 The 
justification for this article mentions that the 45-day limitation ensures that the board does not 
delay the convening of the general assembly meeting and thereby render it ineffective in 
practice.1148 This limitation is an important reform that was not available to minority 
shareholders in the previous commercial code. If the board rejects the minority shareholders’ 
requests or does not give an affirmative answer within 7 days, the minority shareholders can 
apply to court to decide on the matter.1149 In sum, with this provision, the new TCC facilitated 
the effective use of minority shareholder rights to convene the general assembly meetings and 
add items to the meeting agenda. 
 
Another minority shareholder right provided by the new TCC is the right to request a special 
auditor.1150 A special audit can be initiated by the request of the minority shareholders to clarify 
certain issues deemed necessary for the shareholder to exercise their shareholding rights. It is, 
however, necessary for that shareholder to have exercised their rights to information or 
examination prior to requesting a special auditor. The shareholders can use this right even if it 
is not included in the general assembly meeting agenda. Once the minority shareholders have 
requested a special auditor, it is up to the general assembly to decide on the request. If the 
general assembly accepts the request, then the company or any shareholder may ask the court 
to appoint a special auditor.1151 If the general assembly rejects that request, then the TCC only 
allows the minority shareholders to apply to court to appoint a special auditor.1152 This provision 
is the only instance of the law having added an extra provision regarding what constitutes a 
minority shareholder.  
 
In addition to the general rule on determining the minority percentages, shareholders of public 
joint-stock companies whose shares have a total nominal value that exceeds 1 million Turkish 
Lira are also considered to be minority shareholders for the purposes of this article. The 
legislators have noted the inherent difficulty of large companies reaching such percentages and 
hence introduced the 1 million Turkish Lira rule so they can benefit from the rights provided to 
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minority shareholders.1153 Also, Eminoglu has argued that small shareholders can add up their 
shares’ nominal values to reach the 1 million Turkish Lira requirement and use this right 
collectively.1154 This is a major advantage afforded to minority shareholders by the new TCC 
because in the old commercial code, the special auditor was chosen by the decision of the 
general assembly.1155 Thus, although such a minority right existed before, it was rendered 
ineffective in practice because the majority or controlling shareholders elected the auditor, who 
would conduct their duty in line with the majority shareholders’ interests.1156 Moreover, the 
minority shareholder had to fulfil onerous requirements to apply to court such as entrust the 
shares they held with a bank until the court had decided on the matter.1157 This deterred most of 
the minority shareholders from challenging the decisions of the controlling shareholders in 
court, which made the old commercial code’s provision for the appointment of a special auditor 
practically ineffective. Thus, the new TCC provision on this matter is expected to bring 
confidence to both existing minority shareholders and to prospective investors.1158  
 
A related minority shareholder right is the right to request the dismissal of a current auditor and 
to appoint a new one.1159 As a general rule, the general assembly appoints the auditor. In the 
case of group companies, the parent company’s general assembly will appoint the auditor for 
the whole group of companies. However, in instances where the independence of the appointed 
auditor becomes questionable, and the minority shareholders have reasons to believe that the 
auditor is not acting objectively and can establish those reasons, the court will appoint a new 
auditor.1160 Thus, the minority shareholders have been granted a very important right against 
the controlling or majority shareholders because they will be able to employ court challenges 
against the impartiality and fairness of the auditor appointed by the majority. Ultimately, the 
minority shareholders have been given the opportunity to remove an auditor and to replace it 
with an auditor deemed appropriate by the court.1161 
 
                                                     
1153 Justification for TCC Article 438. 
1154 Eminoğlu, Corporate Governance in the Turkish Commercial Code (n 154) 105. 
1155 Old TCC Article 348. 
1156 S Güven, '6102 Sayili Türk Ticaret Kanunu Çerçevesinde Anonim Sirketler Hukukunda Özel 
Denetim (Special Audit in Corporation Law, in accordance with Turkish Commercial Code No. 6102)' 
(2011) 7(2) Çankaya University Journal of Law 133, 134. 
1157 Old TCC Article 348. 
1158 Eminoğlu, Corporate Governance in the Turkish Commercial Code (n 154) 105. 
1159 TCC Article 399/4/b. 
1160 TCC Article 399/4. 
1161 The article adds: ‘In order for minority shareholders to file this action, they must have voted against 
the election of the auditor at the GA, had their opposing votes recorded in the minutes and been a 
shareholder for at least three months prior to the date of the GA at which the election was made.’ TCC 
Article 399/5 translated in PricewaterhouseCoopers, 'New Turkish Commercial Code: A Blueprint for 
the Future' (2011). 
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Another minority shareholder right prescribed in the new TCC is the right to postpone the 
meetings on discussions of financial statements and related matters.1162 This provision serves to 
provide more time to the minority, particularly outside shareholders, to examine the financial 
statements in detail. If minority shareholders need to adjourn the general assembly meeting, 
approval of the general assembly is not required; the meeting will be adjourned for 1 month by 
default. Under the old commercial code, a similar right was also provided, but the minority 
percentage required for both public and closely held joint-stock companies was 10%.1163 The 
new TCC has differentiated the percentages for public companies and lowered the ratio to 5%, 
making it easier for small shareholders to exercise the right to postpone in public joint-stock 
companies. 
 
There is another article in the new TCC that requires that the removal and election of the 
members of the BoD must considered in relation to the annual meetings on financial 
statements.1164 The minority shareholders are thus granted a significant right that will allow 
them to adjourn the general assembly meetings where the future of the BoD is discussed. 
Making this power available to the minority shareholders will undeniably exert pressure on the 
rest of the shareholders and the board. The new TCC goes even further and adds that once the 
general assembly meeting on financial statements and related matters is adjourned, the minority 
shareholders can request a second adjournment.1165 Eminoğlu has stated that this provision 
demonstrates the importance accorded to minority shareholders in the corporate governance 
context.1166 Indeed, with the new provisions, the minority shareholders can apply greater 
scrutiny over crucial matters such as the removal and election of the board of directors, which 
strengthens their position vis-à-vis the controlling shareholders.  
 
The new TCC introduced the minority right to file a lawsuit for the dissolution of the company 
on valid grounds. This right was introduced to protect the minority shareholders from the actions 
of the majority.1167 This provision did not exist in the old commercial code. Moreover, the 
precedent of the Turkish high court Yargitay was that claiming valid grounds for the dissolution 
of the company could not be brought in court.1168 On the other hand, the new TCC provides that 
                                                     
1162 TCC Article 420. 
1163 Old TCC Article 377. 
1164 TCC Article 413.  
1165 TCC Article 420/2. According to the article, the member presiding the general assembly does not 
have the right to reject the request on this matter on the first time, however, in the second-time around, 
he/she has to decide whether there have been inadequate explanations on the minority shareholders’ 
reservations. 
1166 Eminoğlu, Corporate Governance in the Turkish Commercial Code (n 154) 107. 
1167 TCC Article 531. 
1168 H Çağlar and E Kaşak, 'Anonim Şirketin Haklı Sebeple Feshine İlişkin TTK M.531 Hükmünün 
Zaman Bakımından Uygulanması (Application in terms of date of Art. 531 Turkish Commercial Code 
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the minority shareholders can file a lawsuit requesting the dissolution of the company on valid 
grounds. What is considered a valid ground has not been prescribed by the TCC article. It is 
instead left to the discretion of the court and jurisprudence, according to the legislators.1169 The 
justification for the article gave some examples from the practice in Switzerland, which was 
one of the influences on the article. Some examples of valid grounds include 
 
convening the general assembly unlawfully on numerous occasions, continuous 
violation of minority and individual shareholder rights, especially the obstruction of the 
right to information and examination, the company regularly making a loss and the 
steady decrease in the amount of dividends distributed.1170  
 
To further dissect the wording of the justification, the minority shareholders have been 
effectively given the right to request dissolution of the company on the basis of most of the 
majority’s decisions. The court will have the ultimate discretion to decide what constitutes a 
valid ground for dissolution. However, if the court determines there is a valid ground for 
dissolution, dissolution of the company is not the only possible outcome.  
 
The legislators have expressed that even if the court decides that the minorities’ grounds for 
requesting dissolution are justified, ‘the survival of the company may sometimes make sense 
economically and rationally’.1171 Thus, the court can make an alternative ruling. The article 
states that where the court has established the presence of a valid ground for company’s 
dissolution, it may decide not to dissolve the company but instead make a ruling on the removal 
of the plaintiff shareholders from the company by paying them the real value of their shares, 
determined on the date of the ruling. This provision also allows the court to rule on any other 
remedy it deems appropriate to the case at hand.1172 The legislators have listed some examples, 
for instance, the court can rule on mandatory dividend distribution or decide on partial 
dissolution of the company. The Turkish high court has made a recent ruling that the sale of a 
portion of the immoveable assets allocated to the use of a company’s field of activity and the 
disagreement amongst members in a family company are valid grounds for the dissolution of a 
                                                     
Regarding Just Termination of Joint Stock Company)' (2016) 65(3) Ankara Üni Hukuk Fak Dergisi 659, 
661. 
1169 Justification for TCC Article 531. 
1170 (Own translation) Ibid. 
1171 Ibid. 
1172 Ibid. Eminoğlu elaborates on other possible court rulings as distribution of dividend from a portion 
of profit reserves in one go or in instalments, or representation of the minority shareholders in the board 
of directors in Eminoğlu, Corporate Governance in the Turkish Commercial Code (n 154) 115. 
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company.1173 More importantly, Turkish legal scholars are of the view that company resources 
being expropriated by the majority shareholders can be regarded as a valid ground.1174 
 
The new TCC also increases the opportunities for the minority shareholders to be represented 
in the BoD. The TCC introduced a new rule to Turkish company law by according the right to 
representation in the BoD to certain groups and minorities. 1175 The previous commercial code 
provided that only certain shares could be granted representation on the board as privileged 
shares.1176 With the new provision, ‘this right shall be granted to certain share groups, 
shareholders forming a certain group with their common characteristic and qualification and 
minority groups.’1177 Board members can be elected amongst certain shareholder groups or 
minorities if stipulated in the company’s articles of association.1178 These groups can be chosen 
as representatives and nominate candidates to the board. In both cases, the general assembly 
must elect the groups’ representative unless it can prove there is a just cause or a valid reason 
against the candidate. However, the article states that such representatives cannot constitute 
more than half of the board. The representatives chosen in this way, however, cannot fulfil their 
duties by taking instructions from the groups or minorities who have chosen them.1179 
Otherwise, they would be acting contrary to their duty of loyalty to the company.1180 
 
Overall, the new TCC provisions explored in this section provide far-reaching rights and 
protections to the minority shareholders with the objective of ensuring that the majority 
shareholders do not monopolise company decision-making. Eminoğlu has gone as far as to say 
that the provisions in the TCC ‘even reach the level of positive discrimination for the benefit of 
minority [shareholders] at times.’1181 Examples of these positive discrimination provisions 
include the right to request the convening of the general assembly or the right to add an item to 
meeting agenda, which provides a buffer against the abuse of the minority by the BoD and the 
                                                     
1173 Yargitay 11. HD 2.6.2014, E. 2014/3669 K. 2014/10238, in F Nomer Ertan, 'Anonim Ortaklığın Haklı 
Sebeple Feshi Davası - TTK m. 531 Üzerine Düşünceler (Rightful Termination of Joint-Stock Company 
– Thoughts on TCC Article 531)' (2015) 73(1) Journal of Istanbul University Law Faculty 421, 427. 
1174 T Ayoğlu, 'Anonim Ortaklıkların Haklı Nedenle Feshi (Dissolution of Joint-Stock Companies on 
Valid Grounds' (2015) (78) Galatasaray Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi 219, 228; Ü Tekinalp, 
Sermaye Ortaklıklarının Yeni Hukuku (The New Law of Corporations) (4th edn, Vedat 2013) 292. 
1175 TCC Article 360. 
1176 R Karasu 'Anonim Şirket Yönetim Kurulunda Belirli Gruplarin Temsil Edilme Hakki (Right to 
Representation of Certain Groups in the Board of Directors of Joint-Stock Companies)' (2016) (1) Ticaret 
ve Fikri Mülkiyet Hukuku Dergisi 31, 31. 
1177 Ibid. 
1178 However, since this will require a change in the company’s articles of association, such change needs 
to be approved by shareholders constituting at least 75% of the total capital of the company in the general 
assembly voting as per TCC Article 421/3. 
1179 Karasu, 'The Right to Representation of Certain Groups in the Board of Directors' (n 1176) 32. 
1180 Ibid 33. 
1181 Eminoğlu, Corporate Governance in the Turkish Commercial Code (n 154) 70. 
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majority shareholders. The new provisions not only protect the minority shareholders, but also 
convert them into an important factor in company management. All in all, the new TCC’s 
provisions on minority rights aim to shift the power balance in the company in favour of the 
non-controlling shareholders, which brings Turkish company structures more in line with the 
dispersed Anglo-American corporate system. 
 
9 Provisions for Stakeholders 
 
The new TCC places the shareholder at the centre of its corporate governance reforms. Yet, 
Tekinalp has noted that one of the main corporate governance reforms of the new TCC pertain 
to the stakeholders.1182 He has argued that the new TCC introduces the concept of the 
‘stakeholder’ into Turkish company law for the first time, which he admits ‘will bring a strategic 
depth to our legal system in terms of policy making and also pave the way for further sustainable 
reforms.’1183 For Tekinalp, while the new TCC acknowledges shareholders as its starting point, 
it does not perceive corporate governance to be merely as a solution to the agency problem 
caused by the conflict of interest between the shareholders and the managers. Instead of 
focusing on the singular interest of the shareholder, the code approaches corporate governance 
from a broader angle; from a stakeholder’s perspective.1184 He has listed ‘stakeholders’ to be 
the employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, and prospective investors.1185 More importantly, 
he has added that the TCC’s stakeholder perspective only relates to the transparency aspect of 
corporate governance.1186 This is also reiterated in the Genel Gerekçe of the TCC, which states 
that the transparency principle of corporate governance shall cover all stakeholders, not just the 
shareholders.1187 One of the ways in which transparency is envisaged in a manner that would 
benefit stakeholders is the mandatory company website requirement, which provides 
stakeholders with an ‘access right’.1188 The access right refers to the right to access information 
and documents relating to the company such as the financial statements, audit reports, general 
assembly resolutions, and so forth. This right is further augmented by a right of action that 
allows stakeholders to file a lawsuit against the company when their access right is breached.1189 
 
                                                     
1182 Tekinalp, 'The Corporate Governance Approach of the Draft Turkish Commercial Code' (n 156) 636. 
1183 (Own translation) Ü Tekinalp, 'Türk Ticaret Kanununun Kurumsal Yönetim İlkeleri Yaklaşımı: 
Somutlaştırma ve Hukukî Bir Kavram Durumuna Getirme (The Corporate Governance Approach of the 
Turkish Commercial Code: Reification and Legality)' (Conference Proceeding) (19.10.2006) 2. 
1184 Tekinalp, 'The Corporate Governance Approach of the Draft Turkish Commercial Code' (n 156) 636-
637. 
1185 Tekinalp, 'Reification and Legality' (1183) 2. 
1186 Tekinalp, 'The Corporate Governance Approach of the Draft Turkish Commercial Code' (n 156) 637. 
1187 TCC with Justifications (n 104) 84. 
1188 Tekinalp, 'Reification and Legality' (1183) 2. 
1189 Ibid. 
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In light of the above explanations, it should be noted that the new TCC does not directly address 
the issue of stakeholder rights in a specific provision. According to the Genel Gerekçe, 
stakeholders are indeed recognised in the new code, but their rights seem to be confined to the 
transparency principle, which is only one corporate governance principle out of the four 
embodied in the new TCC.1190 While Tekinalp has referred to the new TCC’s ‘pluralist 
approach’ in terms of transparency, Eminoglu has argued that a pluralist approach would mean 
the consideration and protection of all stakeholder interests alongside the shareholder interests 
in the decision-making process.1191 Here, the only stakeholder right that the new TCC recognises 
is the right to access information, which materialised in the form of a company website 
requirement1192 and ensuring stakeholders’ access to accurate information.1193 These are the 
extent of the general stakeholder rights created by the new TCC’s corporate governance 
reforms. The new code provides additional protections for a particular stakeholder, namely the 
creditors. For instance, in the case of group companies, the creditors have been given the right 
to file a lawsuit against the parent company regarding the compensation of the losses incurred 
by the dependant company.1194 This provision gives the creditors the right to sue the company 
while the company is still solvent. Second, creditors can file a lawsuit against the board 
members or auditors on the basis of a failure to fulfil the statutory duties in the TCC.1195 In the 
event of company mergers and divisions, the new code states that the impact of such mergers 
or divisions on the creditors and employees shall be elaborated in a report that is prepared by 
the management of the companies involved.1196 
 
Aside from a few provisions that grant new rights to creditors, the new TCC does not improve 
stakeholder rights per se. The legislators have asserted in the Genel Gerekçe that ‘shareholder 
rights and their efficacy regarding important and structural decision-making should be 
augmented’1197, but there is no corresponding statement for strengthening stakeholder rights. 
Yet, the legislators have noted the increasing global trend for stakeholders to be included in the 
scope of the equal treatment principle.1198 The legislators have added that ‘this social expansion 
is becoming more and more evident each day’.1199 Despite acknowledging the increasing 
                                                     
1190 Four pillars of the TCC’s corporate governance philosophy are: Transparency, fairness, 
accountability and responsivity, in TCC with Justifications (n 104) 84. 
1191 Eminoğlu, Corporate Governance in the Turkish Commercial Code (n 154) 267. 
1192 TCC Article 1524. 
1193 Tekinalp, 'The Corporate Governance Approach of the Draft Turkish Commercial Code' (n 156) 637. 
1194 TCC Article 202/1/c. 
1195 TCC Articles 553-554. Also, in PwC, 'New Turkish Commercial Code: A Blueprint for the Future' 
(n 958) 49. 
1196 TCC Articles 147/2/i-j and 169/2/g-h. 
1197 (Own translation) TCC with Justifications (n 104) 84. 
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1199 (Own translation) Ibid. 
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importance of stakeholders in corporate governance, the legislators have excluded this approach 
in Turkish company law. This has been reiterated by Tekinalp, who had stressed that the new 
TCC placed shareholder value at the core of its provisions.1200 Thus, the statements of the 
legislators and the provisions of the new code indicate that the TCC has indicated a clear 
preference for the shareholder primacy theory of corporate governance over a pluralist 
approach. 
 
The involvement of employees in management through participation in the company boards has 
been recognised in certain European jurisdictions, such as Germany’s co-determination 
system.1201 Moreover, in many European countries, the national corporate governance systems 
require inclusion of the employee voice in the company.1202 Indeed, employee representation is 
also envisaged in various EU regulations.1203 Nevertheless, employee participation in 
management has not been regulated in the TCC. Historically, employee participation was 
provided for in the Turkish Labour Law of 1936, which included provisions allowing employees 
to take part in management.1204 The Law on Trade Unions in 1963 replaced the provisions on 
employee participation in management with the institution of union representatives, thus 
limiting the scope of employee representation to those companies with unions.1205 After the 
economic liberalisation policies of the 1980s, employee representation was abolished in its 
entirety, and union representation was allowed in companies only under certain conditions. 
Under the current laws, the employees are granted the right to be informed in cases of collective 
redundancy, when the union representative may enter into discussions with employers over the 
measures to prevent the redundancy or its effects.1206 Other employee representation provisions 
are also found scattered amongst various Turkish labour law regulations.1207 Aside from these 
indirect representation rights, the TCC has been silent on the matter, and the new TCC did not 
include any reforms on employee representation in the company. On the other hand, the CMB 
Principles encourage companies to increase stakeholder involvement in management, 
particularly employee involvement. However, these are only applicable to listed companies and 
are not mandatory principles. 
                                                     
1200 Tekinalp, 'The Corporate Governance Approach of the Draft Turkish Commercial Code' (n 156) 639. 
1201 In the co-determination system, the BoD has a dual structure, where employee representatives are 
placed at the supervisory board along with the shareholder representatives elected by the general 
assembly. See Pendleton and Gospel, 'Corporate Governance and Labor' (n 516) 56-57. 
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1205 Ibid 62. 
1206 TBMM, Labour Law No. 4857 (10.06.2003) Article 29. 
1207 For examples in the Labour Law No. 4857 (10.06.2003); Occupational Health and Safety Law 
No.6331 (30.06.2012). 
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One of the new TCC’s reforms for employees is the article that provides them with the 
opportunity to become shareholders of the company via ‘conditional capital increase’.1208 This 
employee right did not exist in the old commercial code. Moreover, there is a limitation on the 
shareholder’s pre-emptive rights to purchase new shares in favour of the employees. 
Accordingly, one of the valid grounds for limiting the shareholder’s pre-emptive right is the 
employees’ right to join the company.1209 However, these articles cannot truly be considered to 
be stakeholder rights because they give employees the possibility to gain shareholder status, 
which transforms them from a mere stakeholder to an owner-employee. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that these reforms are not augmenting stakeholder rights per se. On the other hand, 
the new code includes protection measures for the employee in the case of company 
restructuring. For instance, the TCC requires that the legal and economic effects of company 
mergers and divisions on employees must be explained in a report that is prepared by the boards 
of the companies involved.1210 
 
In Turkish legal doctrine, the public has also been recognised as a stakeholder of the 
company.1211 Eminoglu has stated that this perception brings a social function to the 
responsibility pillar of the corporate governance philosophy of the new TCC.1212 Tekinalp has 
also acknowledged that ‘social responsibility’ constitutes one of the founding pillars of the new 
commercial code, not only for listed companies but for all Turkish companies.1213 Indeed, the 
articles of the new TCC that aim to protect the public interest indicate that the code has accepted 
the public as a company stakeholder. One example of this is the provision that gives the Ministry 
of Customs and Trade the right to file a lawsuit for the annulment of the company. The provision 
empowers the Ministry to inspect the activities of companies.1214 If the Ministry determines that 
a company is involved in an activity, transaction, or any preparation that is contrary to public 
order, it can file a lawsuit requesting the company’s annulment within a year.1215 For this 
provision to take effect, however, there must be a clear breach of public order.1216 For example, 
a company producing medicine that is detrimental to public health would be considered a breach 
                                                     
1208 TCC Article 467/1. Accordingly, the employees, as well the creditors, can acquire the nominal shares 
through capital increase and their right to do so cannot be obstructed via restricting these shares’ 
transferability. 
1209 TCC Article 591/2. 
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1214 TCC Article 210/1. 
1215 TCC Article 210/3. 
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of public order.1217 However, it has been argued that there is the risk that the Ministry is a 
political body and may act with political motivations when filing a company annulment 
lawsuit.1218 Overall, although this article protects the public interest regarding company 
operations, it allows companies to conduct activities that fall short of illegality. 
 
10 Conclusions 
 
The new TCC brought extensive changes to Turkish company law, mainly to joint-stock 
companies. Whereas the provisions of the CML and the subsequent CMB communiques 
constitute the specific legislation applicable solely to public joint-stock companies, the articles 
of the TCC contain general provisions that complement the rules on public companies. One of 
the most important reforms was the introduction of the term ‘corporate governance’ to Turkish 
company law for the first time, alongside various articles that contain corporate governance 
rules. Moreover, the new TCC explicitly authorises the CMB to establish mandatory corporate 
governance principles for public joint-stock companies. The main ramifications of these 
developments are as follows. First, the corporate governance phenomenon has been 
acknowledged in a primary piece of legislation, thereby ingraining it in the Turkish legal 
system. Second, the CMB’s corporate governance principles have been given a legal basis, thus 
strengthening the CMB’s enforcement capability.1219 Additionally, due to the under-
development of Turkish capital markets and the subsequent absence of effective market forces, 
it has been argued that such corporate governance rules had to be secured legally and not left to 
the initiative of companies.1220 
 
Indeed, the overhaul of the commercial code was a necessity. This was elaborated on by the 
legislators in detail in the Genel Gerekçe. Some of the factors that led to the new code are global 
developments such as market liberalisation, increased competitiveness, globalisation, and 
technological advancements.1221 However, the main driving force behind the legal reforms, 
especially in company law, was Turkey becoming a candidate for EU membership.1222 Turkish 
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scholars have acknowledged that the EU accession process has been one of the most influential 
factors shaping the new TCC.1223 For instance, Ararat and Ugur have stated that adjustments to 
commercial law had ‘the explicit objective of aligning it with the European directives on 
company and capital market laws’.1224 Indeed, the Genel Gerekçe in combination with Turkey-
EU relations and the timing of the legal reforms indicate that the main objective of the new TCC 
has been the alignment of Turkish company laws with the EU acquis. Certain EU-level reports 
have been identified as references for the new TCC.1225 These reports indicate the shareholder-
centric undertone of the EU approach to corporate governance through their use of residual 
claimant justifications for pursuing shareholder value and their reliance on the agency theory. 
These arguments resonate with the Anglo-American variant of corporate governance instead of 
the continental European approach to corporate governance which contains a ‘logic of 
intermediation’ between various stakeholders.1226 Instead, the EU documents suggest 
conformity to the mainstream model of corporate governance; in fact, they make explicit 
reference to the OECD Principles.1227 Although Tekinalp has denied that the new TCC’s 
corporate governance reforms are based on any specific codex such as the OECD’s,1228 by 
adopting the EU’s perspective on the issue, shareholder interests inevitably become prioritised 
over other stakeholder interests. This brings Turkey’s corporate governance laws closer to the 
mainstream model rather than creating a unique corporate governance system as was intended. 
 
The corporate governance reforms of the new TCC have found domestic backing because the 
business community, trade unions, and most political parties backed all efforts towards EU 
membership. These bodies hoped that membership would bring EU financial aid, increased 
foreign investment, and overall economic growth to Turkey.1229 Thus, most of the new company 
law provisions were able to pass through parliament and subsequently come into effect even 
though they were controversial regarding current business practices and the ownership structure 
of Turkish companies.1230 Scholars even praised the new TCC for adopting an ‘innovative and 
reformist approach, departing from conventional approaches and historical legacies that have 
been in force for more than 50 years’.1231 Some of the profound changes which the new TCC 
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Corporate Governance in the Turkish Commercial Code (n 154) 59. 
1224 Ararat and Ugur, 'The Turkish National System of Corporate Governance' (n 624) 263. 
1225 TCC with Justifications (n 104) 85; European Commission, 'Report of The High-Level Group of 
Company Law Experts' (n 908); European Commission, ‘A Plan to Move Forward' (n 912). 
1226 Aglietta and Rebérioux, Corporate Governance Adrift (n 400) 56. 
1227 European Commission, ‘A Plan to Move Forward' (n 912) 12. 
1228 Tekinalp, 'The Corporate Governance Approach of the Draft Turkish Commercial Code' (n 156) 638. 
1229 Özkan, 'Turkish-EU Relations' (n 867) 49. 
1230 Some of the articles of the draft TCC were amended prior to entering into force with the Law 
Amending the Turkish Commercial Code No. 6335 (30.06.2012). 
1231 Ararat, Suel and Yurtoglu, 'Sustainable Investment in Turkey' (n 80) 15. 
182 
 
brought include introducing the equal treatment principle, abolishing the requirement for board 
members to own shares in the company, allowing the general assembly to be held electronically, 
enabling online voting, facilitating the use of shareholder participation rights through new forms 
of representation, and allowing minority shareholders to be represented at the BoD.  
 
While preserving shareholder primacy as the starting point of Turkey’s corporate governance 
regulation, the particular TCC provisions indicates that the new code seeks to protect the rights 
of minority shareholders specifically. Rules such as the equal treatment principle aim to 
empower outside shareholders in Turkish family-owner dominated companies despite being 
presented as a general shareholder right. Similarly, the extensive provisions on group companies 
purport to strengthen the position of the minority shareholders of the affiliate company against 
the controlling majority. These articles share the same objective with the OECD Principles, 
which particularly seek to strengthen the rights of the ‘minority and foreign shareholders’.1232 
The result is that the new TCC curtails the existing power and influence of the family owners 
who control Turkish listed companies in favour of the outside shareholders.  
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Chapter VI – Assessment of Turkey’s Corporate Governance 
Framework 
1 Introduction 
 
This chapter incorporates the previous theoretical and black-letter research into a set of critical 
analyses. The first aim of this chapter is to determine whether the new Turkish corporate 
governance framework has conformed to the mainstream model of corporate governance. 
Second, it analyses the reasons and implications for adopting a hard law approach to the 
regulation of corporate governance in Turkey. Subsequently, the chapter discusses the possible 
implications of Turkey’s adoption of mainstream corporate governance laws, particularly for 
the ownership structure of its listed companies. The chapter concludes with the consequences 
of a transformation in the ownership structure of listed companies for stakeholders and society 
at large. 
 
The OECD has published a report entitled Corporate Governance in Turkey: A Pilot Study (the 
Pilot Study) in 2006.1233 This report ‘assesses on an OECD Principle-by-Principle basis the 
extent to which the OECD Principles have been implemented in Turkey’.1234 The Pilot Study is 
an accurate indicator of the reasons that led to certain reforms in corporate governance laws. 
Moreover, the study carries significance in terms of being the ‘first of its kind for a member 
country’1235 in which the OECD has evaluated the compliance level of a country’s corporate 
governance framework with its principles.1236 Using the Pilot Study as a reference, I examine 
Turkey’s new corporate governance framework to determine the degree to which it has adopted 
the OECD recommendations on corporate governance. The timing of the Pilot Study allows for 
such analysis because it was published in 2006, which is when the groundwork was laid for the 
new legislation that constitutes Turkey’s new corporate governance framework. Moreover, the 
Pilot Study demonstrates the importance the OECD accords to ensuring that Turkey adapts to 
the mainstream corporate governance model. In fact, Turkey’s corporate governance reforms 
have been given so much emphasis that the most recent version of the OECD Principles have 
                                                     
1233 OECD, 'A Pilot Study' (n 159). 
1234 Ibid 7. 
1235 Angel Gurría (OECD Secretary-General), 'Corporate Governance in Turkey' (Istanbul, 17.10.2006) 
<http://www.oecd.org/turkey/corporategovernanceinturkey.htm>. 
1236 It should be highlighted that the OECD report ‘A Pilot Study’ was published in 2006, hence it based 
its evaluation of Turkey’s compliance with the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2004. The 
OECD Principles have been revised since then, however, since the legal framework constituting Turkey’s 
corporate governance framework has been revamped prior to the publishing of OECD Principles of 2015, 
the chapter uses the OECD Principles of 2004 for reference. 
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been adopted at the 2015 G20 meeting in Turkey.1237 This move could be interpreted as a 
symbolic affirmation of Turkey’s alignment of its corporate governance laws with the OECD 
Principles. Therefore, the findings under this section illustrate the influence of the OECD in 
shaping national corporate governance frameworks in emerging markets. 
 
2 Compliance with the Mainstream Model? A Review of the Pilot Study 
 
 Introduction 
 
In Turkey, a corporate governance codex was drafted for the first time when the CMB published 
its Corporate Governance Principles in 2003. This initiative used the OECD Principles of 1999 
as reference.1238 In 2004, the OECD reviewed its principles; the CMB then revised its principles 
and published an amended version of the CMB Principles in 2005.1239 Thus, the OECD 
Principles constitute the ‘cornerstone’ of corporate governance standards in Turkey.1240 
Nevertheless, because the CMB Principles were soft law and not backed by any legal sanction 
other than the comply-or explain obligations imposed on listed companies, prior to the 
enactment of the new TCC and the CML it was observed that companies were not ‘eager or 
conscious about the implementation of these principles’.1241  
 
During the period between the CMB publishing its soft law principles and whilst the 
preparations for drafting the new TCC and CML were ongoing, the OECD published the Pilot 
Study in 2006. The principal aim of the Pilot Study was to investigate the implementation levels 
of the OECD Principles in Turkey. The report examined the totality of the ‘corporate 
governance framework’, which includes ‘legislation, regulations, rules, standards, codes, 
principles, business practices and systems, such as the judicial system’.1242 Thus, the purpose of 
this section is not to merely compare the OECD Principles with the CMB Principles; it seeks to 
consider the overall corporate governance framework in Turkey to grasp the extent to which 
Turkey has conformed to the mainstream model as depicted by the OECD. 
 
                                                     
1237 OECD, --'G20 Leaders endorse G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance' (16.11.2015) 
<https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/g20-leaders-endorse-g20-oecd-principles-of-corporate-governance.htm> 
accessed 15 October 2018. 
1238 CMB, Corporate Governance Principles (2003) 7. 
1239 CMB, Corporate Governance Principles (2003, amended 2005). 
1240 Akdoğan and MA Boyacıoğlu, 'Corporate Governance In Turkey: An Overview' (n 1036) 12. 
1241 Ibid. 
1242 OECD, 'A Pilot Study' (n 159) 7. Since this research analyses the Turkish corporate governance laws, 
other areas assessed in the Pilot Study such as the judicial system is not examined under this section. 
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It should be noted that the 2006 Pilot Study is based on the OECD Principles of 2004.1243 The 
Pilot Study notes that in assessing implementation levels with the OECD Principles, the draft 
Methodology For Assessing The Implementation of the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance (the Methodology) 1244 was used as guidance. Accordingly, the Methodology is  
 
intended to underpin an assessment of the implementation of the Principles in a 
jurisdiction and to provide a framework for policy discussions. The ultimate purpose of 
an assessment is to identify the nature and extent of specific strengths and weaknesses 
in corporate governance, and thereby underpin policy dialogue that will identify reform 
priorities leading to the improvement of corporate governance and economic 
performance.1245  
 
It is further noted that ‘the Methodology like the Principles treats countries consistently, despite 
their widely different institutional structures and traditions’.1246 The stated objective of the 
Methodology and its treatment of various’ countries’ corporate governance frameworks reveals 
the underlying raison d’etre of the OECD Principles to be the conversion of all national systems 
to a standard model with a sole focus on economic performance. Indeed, the Methodology has 
admitted this by hinting that ‘This feature is intended to facilitate a discussion about different 
remedies for similar problems and the transferability of experience between jurisdictions’.1247 
 
The Pilot Study employs a similar structure as the OECD Principles by assessing Turkey’s 
implementation levels under six broad headings. Each of these headings constitute an aspect or 
a general principle of corporate governance: Ensuring the Basis for an Equitable Corporate 
Governance Framework,1248 The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions, The 
Equitable Treatment of Shareholders, The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance, 
Disclosure and Transparency, and The Responsibilities of the Board. In the OECD Principles, 
each of these areas is regulated with a main principle, followed by ancillary sub-principles. The 
Pilot Study examines each of these principles and sub-principles to assess the degree to which 
they are implemented in Turkish practice, laws, regulations, and enforcement capabilities of the 
related authorities. It assigns an assessment to that corporate governance area as either Fully 
Implemented, Broadly Implemented, Partly Implemented, Not Implemented, or Not Applicable. 
                                                     
1243 OECD, 'OECD Principles of Corporate Governance' (2004). 
1244 OECD, 'Methodology For Assessing The Implementation of the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance' (2007). 
1245 Emphasis added. Ibid 8. 
1246 Ibid 9. 
1247 Emphasis added. Ibid 9. 
1248 In the OECD Principles of 2004, this first principle is titled ‘Ensuring the Basis for an Effective 
Corporate Governance Framework’. 
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According to the Methodology, ‘[t]he assessment would cover not just the assessed strengths 
and weaknesses of individual principles but also indicate how they serve to determine the 
operation and efficiency of the overall corporate governance system’.1249 In sum, the Pilot Study 
grades the Turkish corporate governance framework’s conformity with the OECD standards 
and recommends how to make changes to the framework for full compatibility with the OECD 
standards. 
 
The first corporate governance area analysed under the Pilot Study is Ensuring the Basis for an 
Equitable Corporate Governance Framework. Prior to its assessment of the specific OECD 
Principles’ implementation, the Pilot Study first notes that the ‘over-arching Principle’ in this 
first area is the promotion of transparent and efficient markets that are consistent with the rule 
of law.1250 It adds that, overall, the assessment practice involves ‘the corporate governance 
framework’s completeness, coherence and integrity, as well as a consideration of whether it 
promotes efficiency’.1251 The OECD bases its assessment on the neoliberal assumption of 
efficiency and takes a critical approach to the existing Turkish corporate governance 
framework, mainly due to its ownership structure and the resultant lack of disclosures to outside 
shareholders. At the same time, the Pilot Study applauds the CMB for adopting corporate 
governance practices similar to those advanced by the OECD Principles, regarding them as ‘an 
admirable effort to provide more detailed guidance to companies about how to improve their 
practices while raising the domestic and international communities’ expectations about 
corporate governance practices in Turkey’.1252 Although the findings of the study are merely 
suggestive, the legal reforms that have followed indicate that the Turkish policymakers have 
indeed taken up the recommendations of the OECD’s Pilot Study and rectified the legislation’s 
‘lacking’ areas in corporate governance. 
 
 Ensuring the Basis for an Equitable Corporate Governance Framework 
 
The Pilot Study starts with the first corporate governance principle, Ensuring the Basis for an 
Equitable Corporate Governance Framework.1253 The related OECD principle reads as follows: 
‘The corporate governance framework should promote transparent and efficient markets, be 
consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate the division of responsibilities among 
                                                     
1249 OECD, 'Methodology' (n 1244) 17. 
1250 OECD, 'A Pilot Study' (n 159) 8. 
1251 Ibid. 
1252 Ibid 16. 
1253 It should be noted that in the OECD’s 2004 Principles, this principle is entitled ‘Ensuring the Basis 
for an Effective Corporate Governance Framework’. In the Pilot Study, the title of this principle is slightly 
altered and instead of the word ‘effective’, ‘equitable’ is used. 
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different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities.’1254 The annotations to the OECD 
Principles elaborate that to ensure that an effective corporate governance framework is in place, 
‘it is necessary that an appropriate and effective legal, regulatory and institutional foundation is 
established upon which all market participants can rely in establishing their private contractual 
relations’.1255 This principle highlights the contractual nature of market relations and clearly 
indicates its theoretical underpinnings. 
 
The first ancillary principle listed under this heading pertains to the development of a corporate 
governance framework that impacts the ‘overall economic performance, market integrity and 
the incentives it creates for market participants and the promotion of transparent and efficient 
markets’.1256 The second principle states that ‘The legal and regulatory requirements that affect 
corporate governance practices in a jurisdiction should be consistent with the rule of law, 
transparent and enforceable’.1257 Under this principle, the OECD has noted that while corporate 
governance principles may be formulated in voluntary codes, ‘they might leave shareholders 
and other stakeholders with uncertainty concerning their status and implementation’.1258 With 
this statement, the OECD has suggested that there is a need to regulate corporate governance 
with legislation rather than soft law. The other ancillary principles listed herein are within the 
scope of responsibilities and enforcement capabilities of the related authorities in a 
jurisdiction.1259 The Pilot Study has assessed the Turkish corporate governance framework to 
have ‘Partly Implemented’ all the principles under this heading. The areas where Turkey fell 
short are focused around the CMB’s enforcement capability and the lack of disclosures, 
especially concerning the issues posed by the concentrated ownership of Turkish companies.  
 
The Pilot Study notes that while transparency is improving in Turkey in relation to ‘financial 
reporting’, ‘accessibility of company disclosures’, ‘basic information about share attributes and 
the largest direct shareholders’, ‘basic information about boards and senior management’, and 
‘stakeholder policies’, the corporate governance framework still has not fully conformed with 
the OECD standards.1260 One main reason for the assessed lack of implementation under this 
heading is the lack of information disclosed, particularly ‘relating to the sensitive topics of 
ownership and control, actual decision-making processes and structures, related party 
                                                     
1254 OECD, 'A Pilot Study' (n 159) 17. 
1255 Emphasis added. OECD, 'OECD Principles of Corporate Governance' (2004) 29. 
1256 Ibid Principle I-A. 
1257 Ibid Principle I-B. 
1258 Ibid 30. 
1259 Ibid Principles I-C and I-D. 
1260 OECD, 'A Pilot Study' (n 159) 10. 
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transactions, self-dealing and the effectiveness of internal controls’.1261 In terms of the 
disclosure of ‘sensitive topics’, the main concern seems to be the disclosure of related-party 
transactions.1262 According to the OECD; ‘Related parties can include entities that control or 
are under common control with the company, significant shareholders including members of 
their families and key management personnel.’1263 On this point, the study has warned that the 
‘variability in companies disclosure practices limits to some extent the effectiveness of some 
formal enforcement mechanisms and remedies and makes it more difficult for market forces to 
operate’.1264 More particularly, the Pilot Study has noted that following its survey of market 
participants, it found that there was ‘selective disclosure’; information was only disclosed 
between company groups and to controlling shareholders by the board members and 
executives.1265 The message is that minority shareholders were not given access to the same 
level of information as the controlling shareholders in Turkey. 
 
The new corporate governance legislation has attempted to significantly remedy this situation 
by bringing stringent rules to the approval and disclosure of related party transactions. The new 
CML has provided that the detailed rules on related party transactions are to be established by 
the CMB.1266 The CML also states that a majority of the independent board members’ approval 
is required for the implementation of the relevant board decision on related party 
transactions.1267 If the board does not grant approval for the related party transaction, a public 
disclosure of the matter and the approval of the general assembly is required to proceed with 
the transaction. When the general assembly is deciding on the related party transaction, the 
parties to the transaction and the persons related to them are prohibited from voting. 
Furthermore, the CML article has provided that any decision of the BoD or the general assembly 
that pertains to related party transactions that do not follow the procedures stipulated in the 
article shall be invalid.1268 Related party transactions are also regulated in detail under the 
CMB’s Communique on Corporate Governance. The CMB Principles stipulate that any related 
party transaction ‘shall be included in the agenda as a separate item for providing detailed 
information at the general assembly meeting on the matter and recorded in the minutes of the 
                                                     
1261 Emphasis added. Ibid 10. 
1262 Ibid 11-12. 
1263 OECD, 'OECD Principles of Corporate Governance' (2004) 52. What is considered a related-party 
transactions is generally decided on a case-by-case basis, however, some common forms are ‘transactions 
involving the sale or purchase of goods, property or assets, provision or receipt of services or leases, 
transfer of intangible items, provision, receipt or guarantee of financial services, assumption of financial 
or operating obligations, purchase of equity or debt or establishment of joint ventures’ in OECD, 'Guide 
on Related Party Transactions in the MENA Region' (2014) 7. 
1264 OECD, 'A Pilot Study' (n 159) 12. 
1265 Ibid. 
1266 CML Article 17/3 
1267 Ibid. 
1268 Ibid. 
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meeting’.1269 This principle constitutes a mandatory CMB Principle. The disclosure 
requirements on related party transactions thus have been aligned with the OECD’s 
expectations. 
 
The Pilot Study also mentioned Turkish companies’ lack of implementation of the CMB 
Principles. The OECD notes that  
 
some companies appear to have taken the position that, if a particular corporate 
governance practice is not compulsory, they are not obliged to disclose any information 
about why they have not implemented it, despite the existence of a ‘comply or explain’ 
requirement.1270 
 
Indeed, Turkey initially adopted a soft law approach with the CMB Principles of 2003. Later 
on, the principles required listed companies to disclose their level of compliance with the 
principles or reasons for non-compliance in their annual reports. The CMB conducted a survey 
in 2004 to assess the listed companies’ level of compliance with its principles.1271 The survey 
found that aside from the companies included in the ISE-30 Index, most of the listed companies’ 
annual reports provided sparse information regarding the implementation of corporate 
governance principles.1272 The Pilot Study has noted that the reason for this may be that ‘the 
penalties for non-compliance with the CMB Communiques are relatively low […] and, 
therefore, do not appear to have a sufficient deterrent effect’.1273 The OECD thus concludes that 
this can make it difficult for ‘interested persons’ such as prospective investors ‘to determine 
whether or not a particular company is meeting expectations’.1274 Subsequently in 2011, prior 
to the enactment of the new CML and TCC, the CMB acted in advance to publish a communique 
that made certain CMB Principles mandatory for the companies listed in the ISE-30 Index.  
 
In the following years, the CMB increased the scope of applicability of its mandatory principles 
with each consecutive communique it published. This was mainly because the two primary 
sources of Turkish law, the new CML and TCC, both explicitly granted exclusive authority to 
the CMB to set corporate governance standards and enforce compliance with its principles for 
listed companies. The new TCC also contained a provision enabling the CMB to set corporate 
                                                     
1269 CMB Principle 1.3.6. 
1270 OECD, 'A Pilot Study' (n 159) 16. 
1271 CMB, 'Kurumsal Yönetim Uygulama Anketi Sonuçları (Results of the Corporate Governance 
Implementation Survey)' (2004) <http://www.spk.gov.tr/Sayfa/Dosya/68> accessed 14 July 2018. 
1272 Ibid 24-25. 
1273 OECD, 'A Pilot Study' (n 159) 16. 
1274 Ibid 17. 
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governance principles for all public companies, determine the rules regarding the BoD’s 
disclosures on the matter, and distinguish the rules for rating companies’ corporate governance 
practices.1275 The related article states that the CMB has exclusive authority on this matter. 
Hence, when the other public entities are establishing corporate governance rules applicable to 
their specific line of activity, they must obtain approval from the CMB.1276 In sum, the CMB’s 
authority over corporate governance has been clearly defined and further augmented with the 
power to sanction the non-implementation of its corporate governance principles. On this point, 
the Pilot Study states, 
 
While the OECD Principles and draft Methodology do not specifically recommend that 
regulatory authorities possess particular enforcement powers, they do recommend that 
authorities have sufficient, effective enforcement powers to ensure that, in combination 
with other incentives for good governance and deterrents to misconduct, the outcomes 
advocated by the OECD Principles are achieved in the jurisdiction.1277 
 
The recent legal reforms on corporate governance have indeed strengthened the CMB’s rule-
making and enforcement powers. The result is that there is now a strict legal regime that imposes 
liabilities on listed companies to implement mandatory corporate governance principles. 
Indeed, following the changes in legislation, the CMB acquired the authority ‘to take sanctions 
that range from legal warnings to legal prosecution’.1278 In the case of non-compliance with the 
mandatory CMB Principles, the CMB is ‘empowered to determine the breach, ask courts for 
precautionary legal measures, and file a lawsuit for the execution of the related corporate 
governance principles’.1279 Following the enactment of the new laws, the CMB has indeed 
increasingly used its enforcement powers to ensure compliance with its corporate governance 
principles. In 2016, the CMB charged 16 listed companies with an administrative fine for non-
compliance with its Communique on Corporate Governance.1280 Far fewer companies were 
charged in previous years, which indicated a change in the CMB’s stance and determination to 
ensure the implementation of its mandatory principles. In sum, the new corporate governance 
framework addresses the issues raised by the OECD in terms of ensuring not only that Turkey’s 
corporate governance framework conforms to the standards drawn by the OECD, but also that 
they are also enforced by the related authorities. 
                                                     
1275 TCC Article 1529/1. 
1276 TCC Article 1529/2. 
1277 OECD, 'A Pilot Study' (n 159) 23. 
1278 OECD, 'Supervision and Enforcement in Corporate Governance' (2013) 77. 
1279 Ibid. 
1280 CMB, 'Annual Activity Report' (2016) <http://www.spk.gov.tr/Sayfa/Dosya/1271>. 
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 The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions 
 
The OECD Principles of 2004 include principles on shareholder rights under two headings: The 
Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions and The Equitable Treatment of 
Shareholders. The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions states its overarching 
principle as follows: ‘The corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the 
exercise of shareholders’ rights.’1281 According to the OECD, this principle ‘covers what are 
agreed to be fundamental shareholder rights to ensure the integrity and efficiency of equity 
markets’. 1282 To realise the objective of ensuring basic shareholder rights, the principles also 
include detailed ancillary principles listed under this heading, such as the shareholders’ ‘right 
to influence the corporation (voice), the right to information, the right to sell or transfer shares 
(exit) and the right to participate in the profits or earnings of the corporation (economic 
rights)’.1283 The Methodology further elaborates: ‘Shareholders rights to influence the 
corporation (voice) centre on certain fundamental issues such as the election of board members, 
or other means of influencing the composition of the board’.1284 Shareholder rights, particularly 
in terms of influencing the decision-making process, are an important component of the OECD 
Principles because the shareholders are accorded prominence amongst the other constituents of 
the company in the mainstream model. These shareholder rights are labelled as ‘agreed upon’ 
fundamental rights in the OECD document. Hence, these rights are accorded the status of 
universal values, which leaves no room to question their legitimacy. Moreover, the end goal of 
securing such shareholders rights appears to be achieving efficient markets, which once again 
indicates the neoliberal tendencies of the OECD Principles. 
  
The Pilot Study has noted that an assessment of Turkey’s implementation levels under The 
Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions also requires, inter alia, 
 
the extent and quality of disclosures about capital structures that enable some 
shareholders to exercise a degree of control disproportionate to their equity ownership 
interest; the efficiency and transparency of markets for corporate control; whether 
institutional investors acting in a fiduciary capacity are encouraged to make informed 
use of their shareholder rights and effectively exercise their ownership functions; and 
whether shareholders are able to consult each other on issues concerning their basic 
rights.1285 
                                                     
1281 OECD, 'OECD Principles of Corporate Governance' (2004) Principle II. 
1282 Emphasis added. OECD, 'Methodology' (n 1244) 35. 
1283 Ibid. 
1284 Ibid. 
1285 OECD, 'A Pilot Study' (n 159) 26. 
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In terms of compliance with the fundamental shareholder rights listed in the OECD Principles, 
the Pilot Study has found that Turkey has differing implementation levels for each of the 
subsidiary principles. For instance, ‘shareholder’s right to obtain relevant and material 
information on the corporation on a timely and regular basis’ is graded as Fully Implemented. 
However, the section has also noted that ‘the only matter considered under this OECD Principle 
is whether or not companies use internal or procedural mechanisms to impede shareholders or 
their representatives from obtaining relevant company information or documents without undue 
delay or cost’.1286 Thus, Turkey’s full compliance with this principle seems to be the result of 
the limited scope of assessment. Indeed, the other sections that examine this principle in detail 
have noted Turkey’s implementation level as Partly Implemented.1287 
 
Another sub-principle that was assessed as Fully Implemented was the ‘shareholders’ right to 
participate and vote in general shareholder meetings’.1288 Although Turkey’s corporate 
governance laws seem to be in compliance with OECD standards on this matter, the Pilot Study 
criticises a provision in the old commercial code which required the shareholders of bearer-
shares to block their shares at least 1 week before the convening of the general assembly 
meeting.1289 According to the OECD, ‘These requirements make it more costly for shareholders 
to exercise their rights, since they must give up their freedom to sell their shares in the week 
before the meeting if they wish to exercise their voting rights.’1290 The new TCC has removed 
this requirement and prohibited such share-blocking prior to the convening of the general 
assembly.1291 This development is evidence that the new legal reforms on corporate governance 
have closely followed the recommendations contained in the Pilot Study. This new legal 
provision further enhances shareholder rights and makes it easier for outside shareholders to 
attend general assembly meetings, thus increasing their impact on company governance. 
 
On the other hand, the Pilot Study has highlighted various areas under this general principle on 
shareholder rights to require further improvement. One such area pertains to the shareholders’ 
‘right to participate in, and be informed on, decisions concerning fundamental corporate 
changes, such as extraordinary transactions, including the transfer of all or substantially all the 
assets, that in effect result in the sale of the company’.1292 The Pilot Study has assessed this area 
                                                     
1286 Ibid 28-29. 
1287 Ibid 34-39. 
1288 Ibid 29. 
1289 Old TCC Article 360. 
1290 OECD, 'A Pilot Study' (n 159) 29. 
1291 TCC Article 415/4. 
1292 OECD, 'A Pilot Study' (n 159) 33. 
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to be Partly Implemented. The old commercial code, which was in force when the Pilot Study 
was published, required shareholder approval only in the case of company dissolution, and the 
CMB imposed detailed disclosure requirements for the mergers of public companies.1293 The 
corporate governance framework at the time did not impose an obligation to obtain shareholder 
approval for other types of extraordinary transactions. The CMB Principles, however, did 
recommend that public companies’ articles of association should provide that such significant 
transactions should be decided upon in general assembly meetings and that shareholders should 
be encouraged to participate in this decision-making process.1294 Since the CMB Principles of 
2005 were soft law, this provision did not impose any obligations on companies. Indeed, a 
survey conducted by the CMB found that less than 1% of the listed companies included in the 
survey implemented this recommendation.1295 The Pilot Study has also noted Turkish 
companies have a ‘prevalence of transactions involving the transfer of significant amounts of 
assets (or the transfer of most of the interests in significant amounts of assets, e.g. through 
leases) to related parties on terms that did not represent fair value’.1296 The Pilot Study noted 
the related party transactions undertaken by the controlling shareholders to be a primary 
concern, which highlights the complexity of such transactions and the difficulty of holding these 
persons to account.1297 Overall, the OECD assessed the shareholders’ right to participate in 
significant decisions to be Partly Implemented. 
 
The recent legal reforms have rectified the weak points of Turkey’s corporate governance 
framework in this area. The CMB has made the related principle mandatory; significant 
transactions such as the asset or service purchases or sales that exceed the threshold stipulated 
in the CMB Principles require a majority of the independent board members’ approval. If the 
board decision is not taken with unanimity, the matter must be publicly disclosed. If the majority 
of the independent board members did not grant approval, the transaction must be publicly 
disclosed and further subjected to shareholders’ approval at the general assembly meeting.1298 
Moreover, the new TCC introduced further disclosure requirements for intra-group 
transactions.1299 This development in Turkish laws was anticipated by the OECD, which has 
stated that ‘Proposed amendments to the TCC relating to company groups […] are expected to 
increase transparency regarding intra-group transactions and restrict opportunities for abuse of 
                                                     
1293 CMB, Communique on Mergers I-31 (14.07.2003, amended 19.12.2009). 
1294 CMB, Corporate Governance Principles (2003, amended 2005) 18. 
1295 OECD, 'A Pilot Study' (n 159) 33. 
1296 Ibid. 
1297 Ibid. 
1298 CMB Principle 1.3.9. is a mandatory principle. 
1299 TCC Articles 195-209. 
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controlled companies’ minority shareholders.’1300 Indeed, the main objective of the legislators 
in providing stringent rules for group companies was to protect the minority shareholders of 
group companies from the expropriation of the company assets through transactions of the 
owner or controlling shareholders of the parent company.1301 Overall, the changes in Turkey’s 
corporate governance framework on this matter have followed the OECD guidance and 
accordingly provided additional protection measures for the non-controlling shareholders. This 
is in line with the actual objective of the mainstream corporate governance model, which is to 
increase the powers of the non-controlling shareholders. 
 
Another partly implemented area concerning shareholder rights is the right to ‘be furnished with 
sufficient and timely information concerning the date, location and agenda of general meetings, 
as well as full and timely information regarding the issues to be decided at the meeting’.1302 The 
Pilot Study has noted that  
 
in light of the early deadlines for share blocking and delivery of proxies before 
meetings, a concern arises whether shareholders currently have sufficient time to 
evaluate the information provided about agenda items before making a decision about 
whether or not exercise their voting rights.1303  
 
Although the old commercial code provided a 2-week notice period for announcing the ordinary 
general meetings, the OECD has found that ‘a number of investors commented that companies 
do not consistently meet the compulsory two-week deadline for sending relevant materials to 
shareholders’.1304 The CMB Principles, on the other hand, provided for the longer deadline of a 
3-week period to inform the shareholders of listed companies.1305 However, the CMB Principles 
did not have binding power at the time. This point was rectified when the CMB adopted the 
hard law approach in making its certain corporate governance principles mandatory. 
Subsequently, such information must be announced on the company website and through the 
PDP at least 3 weeks prior to the meeting.1306 The importance of timely and advance disclosure 
of the general assembly meeting date and the agenda items are considered to be vital for the 
outside shareholders to attend the decision-making process and make informed decisions. With 
the new mandatory principle, the listed companies must abide by the minimum 3-week notice 
                                                     
1300 OECD, 'A Pilot Study' (n 159) 34. 
1301 Justification for TCC Articles 195-209. 
1302 OECD, 'A Pilot Study' (n 159) 34. 
1303 Ibid. 
1304 Ibid 35. 
1305 CMB, Corporate Governance Principles (2003, amended 2005) 14. 
1306 CMB Principle 1.3.1 is mandatory principle. 
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period and must announce the required information online, which is a crucial tool for facilitating 
foreign shareholder participation. Thus, it can be seen that this requirement is another example 
of how the new legal framework attempts to draw global investors into the Turkish stock 
markets by providing them further opportunities to be involved in companies’ decision-making. 
 
One of the ancillary principles under this heading concerns the controlling ownership structure 
of Turkish companies. The related OECD Principle reads, ‘Capital structures and arrangements 
that enable certain shareholders to obtain a degree of control disproportionate to their equity 
ownership should be disclosed.’1307 Such arrangements are listed as pyramid structures, cross-
shareholdings, or shares with different voting rights, which the OECD believes ‘can be used to 
diminish the capability of noncontrolling shareholders to influence corporate policy’.1308 
Pyramidal structures in family controlled companies and cross-ownerships between company 
groups are common features of the Turkish corporate sector.1309 Moreover, the use of privileged 
shares, which are those ‘shares in which superior rights compared to ordinary rights are vested’, 
is also widespread amongst Turkish companies.1310 Thus, there is the risk that these mechanisms 
‘create a potential for the expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling families’.1311 
The OECD does not recommend the prohibition of such arrangements altogether. However, it 
does require detailed disclosure of such instances to shareholders, ‘given the capacity of these 
mechanisms to redistribute the influence of shareholders on company policy’.1312 On this point, 
the Pilot Study has found that the existing corporate governance framework in Turkey did not 
have sufficient disclosure requirements: ‘Companies do not, however, have to disclose which 
shareholders hold either multiple voting shares or shares with nomination privileges, nor do 
they have to disclose their percentage ownership interest in such shares.’1313 For instance, the 
CMB Principles, which were voluntary at the time, required listed companies to publish in their 
annual reports an ‘ownership structure table showing the controlling shareholder(s), as released 
from any indirect and cross-ownership relations’.1314 Nonetheless, the Pilot Study has found that 
companies do not disclose this information consistently.1315 
 
Therefore, the OECD Principle requiring disclosure of ownership and control structures has 
been assessed as Partly Implemented. The Pilot Study has added that the proposed amendments 
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to the TCC will improve disclosures in this area, particularly the proposed provisions on group 
companies.1316 Moreover, the CMB has introduced an obligation for listed companies to prepare 
their annual reports in line with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), 
beginning from January 2005.1317 The OECD expects this development to improve disclosures 
to some extent in this area.1318 Indeed, the Methodology has also stated that the ‘disclosure of 
capital structures is so fundamental that the criterion does not foresee a voluntary disclosure 
requirement’.1319 To that end, the corporate governance reforms have made such disclosures 
compulsory to a significant extent. Nevertheless, the Pilot Study asserts the following:  
 
Even with these reforms, however, some gaps in disclosure practices are likely to 
remain and it could still remain difficult for interested persons to easily and quickly 
acquire an understanding of the structure of ownership and control of a company.1320 
 
This statement appears to be the OECD criticising the ownership structure of Turkish 
companies. With the proposed reforms, Turkish corporate governance laws become aligned 
with the OECD Principle on this area; yet, the Pilot Study demonstrates concern over the 
presence of such structures in Turkey. From a broader perspective, this hints at the OECD 
Principles’ preference for the dispersed ownership found in the Anglo-American corporate 
governance model over a corporate structure with majority or controlling shareholders. 
 
 The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
 
The next general principle concerning shareholder rights is The Equitable Treatment of 
Shareholders, which is the third chapter of the OECD Principles.1321 The overarching principle 
is as follows: ‘The corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable treatment of 
all shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should have the 
opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights.’1322 On this point, the Pilot 
Study has noted that the assessment of this principle involves determining, inter alia, whether 
the corporate governance framework effectively ‘deters the abuse of power by insiders’.1323 
While certain ancillary principles under this heading such as ‘within any series of a class, all 
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shares should carry the same rights’ are marked as Fully Implemented,1324 others, particularly 
in relation to the minority shareholders, have been assessed as Partly Implemented. In fact, the 
Pilot Study includes a section that is lengthier than usual that discusses how the Turkish 
corporate governance framework has not conformed with minority shareholder rights and 
protections. The Pilot Study notes that ‘a survey of Turkish companies found that that corporate 
governance principles aimed at protecting minority shareholders are the least widely 
implemented in Turkey’.1325 Thus, the Pilot Study has stated that market participants in Turkey 
have concerns regarding the existing corporate governance framework’s effectiveness in 
ensuring the equitable treatment of all shareholders.1326 
 
The OECD Principle states that ‘Minority shareholders should be protected from abusive 
actions by, or in the interest of, controlling shareholders acting directly or indirectly, and should 
have effective means of redress’.1327 The Pilot Study has found this principle to be Partly 
Implemented in Turkey. It has noted that the remedies available to minority shareholders when 
their rights have been violated are arduous and costly, which usually deters the shareholders 
from pursuing redress.1328 The old commercial code included several minority rights and 
protections, such as the right to request a special auditor.1329 However, using this right was 
subject to certain procedures. First, the general assembly had to approve the appointment of the 
special auditor before the minority shareholders or the company could apply to the court to have 
an auditor appointed. Furthermore, the minority shareholders who request the auditor must have 
had their shareholdings for at least 6 months prior to making such request at the general 
assembly meeting.1330 In case the general assembly did not approve the minority shareholders’ 
request, they could submit a direct request to the court to appoint a special auditor. However, 
they must deposit the fees for the appointment of the auditor with the court in advance.1331  
 
The minority shareholders were also provided with the rights to call the convening of the general 
assembly meeting or add an item to the meeting agenda under the old TCC.1332 The minority 
shareholders could apply to the court if their call to convene a general assembly meeting was 
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not undertaken by the board in a reasonable time, but they must deposit their shares within a 
bank in order to file that lawsuit.1333 Moreover, if the court dismisses the minority shareholders’ 
request and determines that they have acted in bad faith, they would be liable to pay all the fees 
and damages incurred by the company.1334 The Pilot Study has reviewed the existing legal 
framework and found that although there are certain minority rights in place, these ‘require 
shareholders to incur significant out-of-pocket costs or opportunity costs, relative to the value 
of their investment, in order to initiate an inquiry process’.1335 Thus, the Pilot Study has 
concluded that the laws under the old commercial code were ineffective because they deter 
minority shareholders from pursuing their rights and related remedies. 
 
The new TCC provisions have significantly remedied these concerns by according extensive 
rights and protections to minority shareholders in line with the OECD’s findings.1336 For 
instance, the right to appoint an independent auditor has been freed from any formalities; if the 
request of the minority shareholders is not approved by the general assembly, the minority 
shareholders can apply to court without having to deposit their shares or pay any sort of fees in 
advance. Also, the minority shareholders can request to convene the general assembly meeting 
or request to add an item to the meeting agenda, and if the board does not convene the general 
assembly within 45 days of the request, the minority shareholders can convene the meeting by 
themselves. 1337 Thus, unlike the old commercial code, the board has been provided with a pre-
determined time frame of 45 days to fulfil the request of the minority shareholders. The new 
commercial code also removed the need to resort to court if the meeting was not been convened. 
Each of these legal developments corresponds to the criticism put forward by the OECD in its 
Pilot Study, which indicate the likely influence the Pilot Study has had on the drafting of the 
new commercial code. 
 
Another sub-principle under this heading states that ‘Impediments to cross border voting should 
be eliminated.’1338 This principle has been assessed to be Broadly Implemented. The Pilot Study 
has indicated that while foreigners have the same voting rights as domestic shareholders, ‘some 
practical obstacles exist for foreign investors.’1339 Accordingly, ‘The principal problem they 
face relates to the amount of time available to review meeting documents, decide whether or 
not to exercise voting rights and make the necessary arrangements to do so.’1340 On a related 
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point, the Pilot Study has also criticised Turkey’s implementation level regarding the sub-
principle: ‘Processes and procedures for general shareholder meetings should allow for 
equitable treatment of all shareholders. Company procedures should not make it unduly difficult 
or expensive to cast votes.’1341 As per the existing legislation at the time, shareholders were 
required to have their shares blocked 1 week prior to the general assembly meeting. This 
necessitated the foreign investors traveling to Turkey in advance to make the necessary 
arrangements to attend in person or to assign a proxy.1342 The OECD has added that although 
the same challenges exist for domestic investors, ‘distance exacerbates the problem for foreign 
investors.’1343 The Pilot Study has recommended that the introduction of mandatory electronic 
voting procedures for listed companies would rectify the issue.1344 Subsequently, the new TCC 
has stipulated that companies can conduct general assembly meetings online and allowed for 
the possibility for electronic voting if it is provided in the articles of association.1345 The related 
CMB Principle states, ‘Any actions that may complicate the use of voting rights must be 
avoided. Each shareholder should be given the opportunity to exercise his/her voting right, 
including cross border voting, in the most appropriate and convenient manner.’1346 Although 
the aforementioned provisions do not impose a mandatory requirement on companies to conduct 
online meetings or allow electronic voting, the Ministry of Trade published a regulation in 2012 
which permits electronic voting and imposes the obligation on all listed companies to conduct 
their general assembly meetings online.1347 
 
Overall, the annotation to the OECD Principle has highlighted that ‘Management and 
controlling investors have at times sought to discourage non-controlling or foreign investors 
from trying to influence the direction of the company.’1348 Although the Pilot Study did not 
mention that controlling shareholders have engaged in such restrictive practices in Turkish 
companies, it has criticised the existing corporate governance framework:  
 
It can be somewhat difficult for shareholders to obtain access to relevant information 
about shareholder meetings in sufficient time to make an informed decision about 
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whether or not to attend the meeting and then complete the necessary formalities to 
participate in the meeting within the deadlines required or permitted by law.1349  
 
However, the recent legal reforms have significantly addressed the OECD’s concerns by 
introducing a compulsory online general assembly meeting and electronic voting. Indeed, the 
Pilot Study has anticipated this development and stated that once such legal changes are in 
effect, ‘a Fully Implemented assessment would likely be appropriate.’1350 This development 
illustrates how the new Turkish corporate governance regime has been shaped in accordance 
with the OECD Principles. Moreover, although online meetings and electronic voting would 
benefit both foreign and domestic shareholders, the Pilot Study has focused particularly on the 
benefits for foreign shareholders. In fact, the report has admitted that ‘to date, very few 
shareholders other than controlling shareholders or foreign institutional investors have 
demonstrated an interest in attending meetings.’1351 Since controlling shareholders are usually 
located where the meetings take place and are closely involved in the management of their 
companies,1352 the new provisions seem to be introduced solely to advance the interests of the 
foreign investors. 
 
 The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance 
 
The OECD Principle on stakeholders states the following: ‘The corporate governance 
framework should recognise the rights of stakeholders established by law or through mutual 
agreements and encourage active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in 
creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises.’1353  
 
The OECD only recognises that the rights of stakeholders that are guaranteed by laws or private 
contracting. This is clear evidence of the mainstream corporate governance model, which is 
based on the contractual model of the company. Since contracts with the stakeholders such as 
employees are regarded as ‘voluntary and unanimous agreement among affected parties’,1354 
the protection afforded to such stakeholders is limited by what is provided through that contract. 
In this approach, the underlying power disparity between the parties to the contract is masked 
by depicting the contract as mutually agreed upon between equal parties. Thus, corporate 
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governance mechanisms need only protect the rights of stakeholders insofar as stipulated in the 
relevant contracts and laws. 
 
Also relevant is the OECD Methodology’s definition of stakeholders as ‘resource providers to 
the corporation including employees, creditors and suppliers.’1355 Stakeholders such as the 
public or the environment are omitted from the scope of the definition because they have no 
contractual relationship with the company. The OECD has admitted this stance by expressing 
that ‘the principle recognises that the relationship [with stakeholders] is often contractual.’1356 
In the annotations to the OECD Principle of 2004, the OECD has asserted that corporate 
governance is about encouraging stakeholders in the company to ‘undertake economically 
optimal levels of investment in firm-specific human and physical capital.’1357 This statement 
has acknowledged that stakeholders’ investments are firm-specific and suggests that these 
should be ‘economically optimal’, which means efficient. This ties stakeholders to the company 
to which they have made firm-specific contributions, which further reduces their bargaining 
power.  
 
The Pilot Study has been the least critical in assessing Turkey’s corporate governance 
framework for stakeholders. Most aspects of this principle have been either rated as Fully 
Implemented or Broadly Implemented. This can be interpreted as the OECD’s unwillingness to 
recommend any improvements to the rights of stakeholders. At the forefront, the Pilot Study 
has noted that, ‘It has been a long-standing tradition for many Turkish companies and their 
controlling families to pursue philanthropic initiatives that benefit the communities in which 
the companies operate.’1358 In contrast with the OECD definition, the CMB Principle defined 
stakeholders as 
 
any person, entity or party, who have an interest in the operations and reaching the 
targets of the company. These parties may be persons/groups who have a binding 
contractual agreement with the company; or it may be persons/groups who have no 
binding contractual agreement with the company.1359  
 
It should, however, be highlighted that the CMB Principle quoted above was amended in 2005. 
The initial version stated that the company’s corporate governance system must protect the 
rights of stakeholders as established by law or other rights which have not been provided by 
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law. After the changes in 2005, the same principle read as follows: ‘The corporate governance 
framework should recognise the rights of stakeholders established by law or through any other 
mutual agreement.’1360 The CMB thus mimics the 2004 OECD Principle, which illustrates how 
Turkish corporate governance principles have come closer to the mainstream model.  
 
Also, according to the Pilot Study, the principle which states that ‘companies should foster 
wealth creating cooperation among stakeholders to enhance their companies’ competitiveness 
and profitability’ is a ‘novel concept’ for Turkish companies.1361 The wording of this statement 
suggests that the recognition of stakeholders is encouraged as far as it increases the company’s 
profitability. On this point, the OECD has regarded the CMB Principles as ‘a welcome first step 
that encourages companies to develop mechanisms that facilitate investment by stakeholders in 
firm-specific human capital.’1362 The approval of the CMB Principles by the OECD is an 
affirmation that the Turkish corporate governance framework has started to conform with the 
mainstream model. 
 
On the issue of stakeholder rights as established by law, the Pilot Study has asserted that ‘the 
OECD Principles do not focus on whether particular standards protecting the interests of 
stakeholder groups have been introduced.’1363 Instead, they focus on whether the stakeholder 
rights as provided by law are respected and enforced by the authorities, whether the mutual 
agreements are respected by the company and finally the availability of remedies to stakeholders 
when their legal rights are violated.1364 The Pilot Study has concluded that there are various 
Turkish laws that confer rights on different groups of stakeholders, and that: ‘In light of the 
limited available data and given the complexity of the issues involved, the [OECD] Secretariat 
concluded that it was inappropriate to express a view’ on the issues listed above.1365 Thus, this 
principle has been assessed as ‘Fully Implemented/Not Assessed’ by the Pilot Study. That the 
OECD perceives the protection of stakeholder rights to be a mere formality is evident from its 
admissions that it is not concerned with the introduction of standards for stakeholders and that 
it only assesses whether laws and private contracts have been respected in public companies 
and that they have been enforced by authorities.  
Another issue under the Stakeholders heading concerns the participation of stakeholders in 
company governance. The related OECD Principle stipulates that ‘Performance-enhancing 
                                                     
1360 Ibid 37. 
1361 OECD, 'A Pilot Study' (n 159) 63. 
1362 Ibid. 
1363 Ibid. 
1364 OECD, 'A Pilot Study' (n 159) 63. 
1365 Ibid. 
203 
 
mechanisms for employee participation should be permitted to develop.’1366 The wording of the 
principle denotes that the only employee participation mechanisms which should be developed 
are those that ‘enhance performance’, thus linking employee participation in governance to 
efficiency and profitability. The Methodology provides some examples of these performance-
enhancing corporate governance mechanisms, such as employee stock ownership plans or other 
‘profit-sharing mechanisms’.1367 These arrangements, however, serve to align the interests of 
employees with those of shareholders because employee interests become tied to the profit-
maximisation objective of the company. Thus, such mechanisms do not advance stakeholder 
rights per se. While the OECD has noted that arrangements such as stakeholder representation 
on boards are not mandatory, ‘there should be no legal barriers to their adoption if the principle 
is to be assessed as fully implemented.’1368 On this point, the Pilot Study has found that the 
‘corporate governance framework in Turkey does not appear to inhibit companies from 
developing, in consultation with employees, performance-enhancing mechanisms for employee 
participation.’1369 The Pilot Study contains a list of examples in Turkish practice such as 
companies developing human resources policies or fostering a collaborative work environment 
where regular meetings with employees are held and training is provided. Thus, the Pilot Study 
assesses Turkey to have fully implemented the absence of legal barriers to the adoption of 
performance-enhancing mechanisms.1370 In sum, this indicates that an assessment of full 
compliance can be easily obtained from the OECD by merely mentioning some soft practices 
that do not truly resemble employee participation. 
 
On a related note, the next ancillary principle states, ‘Where stakeholders participate in the 
corporate governance process, they should have access to relevant, sufficient and reliable 
information on a timely and regular basis.’1371 This principle pursues stakeholders rights only 
in relation to their right to information. The new TCC adopted a similar approach to the OECD. 
This approach only considers stakeholder rights in terms of the transparency pillar of corporate 
governance. The remaining principles of accountability, responsibility, and fairness, which the 
Turkish legislators have deemed to be the founding pillars of corporate governance, seem to 
have limited applicability, if any, to stakeholders.1372 Under the Turkish corporate governance 
framework, stakeholders do not need to be included in company governance. The only provision 
on this matter is the non-binding CMB Principle, which states that ‘The company should 
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establish mechanisms and models to encourage participation of the stakeholders in the 
management of the company while giving priority to employees and not hindering company 
operations.’1373  
 
Despite the similar wording in the CMB Principle and the related OECD Principle, the Pilot 
Study deems the principle to be Broadly Implemented in Turkey. The assessment fell short of 
full implementation due to criticism over the level of disclosure.1374 This illustrates how 
stakeholder rights are considered solely in terms of disclosure and how the OECD promotes 
mechanisms that grant stakeholders roles in governance only to the extent that they contribute 
to the company’s performance. These mechanisms are thus merely means to an end. Hence, 
companies are freed from any obligation to pursue stakeholder interests because these ancillary 
principles remain best practices in which ‘a clear distinction is drawn between ethical and 
societal concerns and commercial objectives of companies’1375 and where the best practice is 
conceived as tying the former to the latter. 
 
 Disclosure and Transparency 
 
The OECD Principle on disclosure and transparency reads as follows: ‘The corporate 
governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material 
matters regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, performance, ownership, 
and governance of the company.’1376 According to the principle’s annotations; ‘A strong 
disclosure regime that promotes real transparency is a pivotal feature of market-based 
monitoring of companies and is central to shareholders’ ability to exercise their ownership rights 
on an informed basis.’1377 It adds that transparency and disclosure allow shareholders to assess 
the ‘stewardship of management’.1378 Thus, this principle is central to the monitoring of 
managers by the shareholders, which is an agency issue present in systems of share dispersal 
but not in countries with concentrated ownership structures.  
 
The Methodology has explained that the intended outcome of this general principle is 
transparency, which is, inter alia, central to the ‘the accountability of the company to its 
shareholders.’1379 However, the company’s accountability to its stakeholders is omitted from 
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this statement. Indeed, it adds that ‘Experience in countries with large and active equity markets 
shows that disclosure can be a powerful tool for influencing the behaviour of companies and 
for protecting investor.’1380 Here, the OECD seems to hint that its ideal model is a system with 
developed capital markets and dispersed shareholdings because it advocates rules that function 
within that system. The OECD has further suggested that the underlying aim of this principle is 
achieving efficiency because ‘insufficient or unclear information may hamper the ability of the 
markets to function, increase the cost of capital and result in a poor allocation of resources.’1381 
To determine the type of information to be disclosed, the OECD has provided the ‘material 
information’ criterion: ‘information whose omission or misstatement could influence the 
economic decisions taken by users of information’.1382 The OECD has also added that the 
disclosure requirement should not place unreasonable administrative costs or burdens on the 
company. 
 
Company objectives are one of the types of material information that must be disclosed as per 
the OECD Principle:1383 ‘In addition to their commercial objectives, companies are encouraged 
to disclose policies relating to business ethics, the environment and other public policy 
commitments.’1384 The related CMB Principle has also recommended that ‘the company’s 
position with respect to the defined strategic objectives’ is disclosed in listed companies’ annual 
reports.1385 Although the Turkish framework on this principle is in conformity with the OECD 
Principle, the Pilot Study has criticised the practices of Turkish companies with regard to the 
disclosure of objectives. The OECD was not concerned with the companies’ level of disclosure; 
instead, they were keen to emphasise that the CMB Principles  
 
do not specifically encourage companies to describe their non-commercial objectives, 
disclose the proportion of their profits allocated to such activities where such amount 
might be considered relevant to investors or explain how decisions are made about 
which non-commercial objectives the company pursues.1386  
 
The reason why this was concerning is related to the Pilot Study’s finding that ‘large number 
of Turkish companies also appear to pursue some non-commercial objectives (principally 
philanthropic ones)’.1387 Hence, information about the resources allocated to such non-
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commercial activities is considered to be material and may affect investment decisions. 
Although the CMB Principles recommend that companies disclose their social responsibility 
and ethical policies, these recommendations are non-binding.1388 Therefore, the Pilot Study has 
refrained from declaring Turkey has fully conformed to this principle and instead assessed it as 
‘Broadly Implemented’. These explanations lead to the conclusion that the OECD is not 
interested in whether companies pursue any social or ethical objectives. It is more concerned 
with whether this ‘material information’ are disclosed so as to allow investors to make informed 
decisions. 
 
In the new corporate governance framework, the CMB Principles under the Public Disclosure 
and Transparency heading are non-binding principles. The regulator left these principles outside 
the scope of mandatory application. Also, under the Stakeholders heading, there is another non-
mandatory principle which states that ‘The operations of the corporation shall be carried out in 
accordance with the ethical rules disclosed to public via the corporate website’.1389 Although 
the CMB Principles do not require companies to disclose their non-commercial activities, the 
new CML obliges public company boards to prepare an annual report detailing company 
activities, decisions, and ‘their economic and social consequences’.1390 This CML provision 
thus conforms to the outcomes intended by the aforementioned OECD Principle. Accordingly, 
listed companies’ annual reports must now include information on their non-commercial 
activities and the economic and social impacts of those activities.  
 
From the OECD’s perspective, such non-commercial activities ‘may be important for 
investors’. 1391 Thus, for instance, if the company deems its social commitments to be ‘material 
information’ which can affect investment decisions, they must be disclosed. However, as Dine 
and Koutsias have argued, this kind of disclosure will only work if all investors are assumed to 
take an ethical approach.1392 For example, an activity that is environmentally unfriendly but is 
unlikely to deter prospective investors may be withheld because disclosure requirements under 
the OECD Principles are expected not to place ‘unreasonable burdens or costs’ on the 
company.1393 Hence, this ancillary principle on disclosure does not ‘improve public 
understanding of the structure and activities of enterprises, corporate policies and performance 
with respect to environmental and ethical standards, and companies’ relationships with the 
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communities in which they operate’ as stipulated by the OECD.1394 Instead, it can be argued 
that this principle intends to ensure that Turkish companies disclose their philanthropic 
activities in detail so that external investors can apply pressure regarding the costs of such 
activities. 
 
The OECD Principles also consider ‘major share ownership and voting rights’ to be material 
information that must be disclosed.1395 According to the OECD, ‘One of the basic rights of 
investors is to be informed about the ownership structure of the enterprise and their rights vis-
à-vis the rights of other owners.’1396 This becomes more crucial where companies are dominated 
by controlling shareholders ‘which may be individuals, family holdings, bloc alliances, or other 
corporations acting through a holding company or cross shareholdings [that] can significantly 
influence corporate behaviour.’1397 In these companies, ‘the primary governance issue is how 
outside shareholders can prevent the controlling shareholder from extracting excess benefits 
through self-dealing or disregard the economic rights of minority shareholders.’1398 Thus, the 
disclosure of such information works to the benefit of outside shareholders. This principle has 
been assessed by the OECD to be Partly Implemented. The Pilot Study has reported that the 
existing capital market legislation in Turkey requires the annual disclosure of ‘substantial’ share 
ownership in public companies but criticises that this is ‘well below’ the controlling ownership 
threshold.1399 It adds: ‘Although the CMB Principles encourage publicly held companies to 
provide information about company group structures and significant cross-shareholdings, very 
few companies provide detailed information.’ 1400  
 
Moreover, the Pilot Study has noted that the prevalence of group companies in Turkey makes 
it more difficult to understand ownership structure. The OECD has asserted that ‘group 
structures might be used to transfer resources to the detriment of minority shareholders’1401 and 
hence expects countries to provide improved disclosures on group companies. Turkey’s new 
corporate governance framework has significantly addressed these concerns. The CMB’s 
Communique on Material Events Disclosure requires listed company boards to disclose 
‘information, events and development which may affect the value or price of securities or the 
investment decisions of investors.’1402 Accordingly, changes in ownership or voting rights 
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which exceed the listed thresholds stated in the communique as well as the changes in 
management control must be disclosed to public.1403 On the other hand, the new TCC has 
introduced detailed disclosure provisions regarding group companies.1404 In sum, the new 
framework has followed the OECD guidance in introducing stringent disclosure requirements 
for the transparency of ownership structures of Turkish companies, which work in favour of the 
outside shareholders. 
 
 The Responsibilities of the Board 
 
The overarching OECD Principle regarding the BoDs states that ‘The corporate governance 
framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of 
management by the board, and the board’s accountability to the company and the 
shareholders.’1405 Its ancillary principles recommend, inter alia, that the corporate governance 
framework should ensure the boards ‘are accountable to the company and its shareholders’, 
‘treat all shareholders fairly’, and ‘are able to exercise objective, independent judgment on 
corporate affairs’.1406 
 
The annotations to the OECD Principle explain that ‘the board is chiefly responsible for 
monitoring managerial performance and achieving an adequate return for shareholders.’1407 
This statement reflects the agency theory and the primacy of shareholder interest, which form 
the basis of the mainstream model. Indeed, it is openly acknowledged in the Methodology that 
‘the board’s role is to contain the agency problem associated with professionally managed, 
public companies.’1408 Thus, this OECD Principle is based upon an Anglo-American corporate 
governance system that is characterised by professionally managed companies with dispersed 
outside shareholders. Under this system, the board has a vital role in corporate governance 
because they are directly elected by the shareholders to oversee the management of the 
company.1409 Subsequently, the OECD has placed significant importance on ensuring Turkey’s 
                                                     
1403 Ibid Article 12: ‘Changes in Capital Structure and Management Control’: ‘ If and when direct or 
indirect shares or voting rights of a natural person or legal entity or of other natural persons or legal 
entities acting together with that natural person or legal entity in the capital of a publicly traded issuer 
reach or fall below 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 33%, 50%, 67% or 95%, the disclosure obligation is 
performed by the said persons […] the disclosure obligation is performed by the said founder.’ 
1404 TCC Articles 195-209. For the provisions on group companies under the new TCC, see Chapter 5.6.  
1405 OECD, 'OECD Principles of Corporate Governance' (2004) Principle VI. 
1406 OECD, 'A Pilot Study' (n 159) 97. 
1407 OECD, 'OECD Principles of Corporate Governance' (2004) 58. 
1408 Emphasis added. OECD, 'Methodology' (n 1244) 105. 
1409 S Peck and W Ruigrok, 'Hiding Behind the Flag? Prospects for Change in German Corporate 
Governance' (2000) 18(4) European Management Journal 420, 424. 
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corporate governance framework conforms to the principles under this heading. This is 
evidenced by the detailed and lengthy assessment of this section under the Pilot Study. 
 
In particular, the report highlights various discrepancies and issues regarding the 
implementation of this principle. The report attributes these problems to Turkey’s controlling 
ownership structure. Almost all of the ancillary principles were marked as Partly Implemented, 
which indicates an overall lack of alignment of the Turkish corporate governance framework 
with the OECD Principle regarding the responsibilities of the board. That being said, the Pilot 
Study has found that ‘there was very little systematic data available analysing how the boards 
of Turkish, publicly held companies actually operate.’1410 Thus, the report has added that their 
assessment relied upon an examination of the relevant standards, publicly available company 
documents, and surveys conducted ‘through interviews with informed market participants, 
including company representatives and their advisers.’1411 
 
As per the Methodology, the most important sub-principle on the responsibilities of the board 
is that ‘Board members should act on a fully informed basis, in good faith, with due diligence 
and care and in the best interests of the company and its shareholders.’1412 This principle 
stipulates the fiduciary duties, namely the duty of care and the duty of loyalty of the directors. 
Accordingly, ‘The duty of care requires board members to act on a fully informed basis, in good 
faith, with due diligence and care.’1413 Regarding the duty of care, the Pilot Study notes that the 
existing corporate governance framework in Turkey is in good standing, which is expected to 
further improve with the new TCC provision that articulates the exclusive duties and 
responsibilities of the board.1414 The problematic area is the duty of loyalty, which unlike the 
duty of care was not prescribed in the old commercial code. The Pilot Study has found that in 
Turkey, 
 
many board members and managers perceive that their primary duty of loyalty is to the 
shareholder who appointed them and that, secondarily, they consider the interests of the 
corporate group as a whole as reflected in the controlling shareholders’ wishes. […] 
Likewise, they might not ask themselves whether or not the controlling shareholders’ 
instructions are consistent with the interests of the company or shareholders 
generally.1415 
                                                     
1410 OECD, 'A Pilot Study' (n 159) 97. 
1411 Ibid. 
1412 OECD, 'Methodology' (n 1244) 106. 
1413 OECD, 'OECD Principles of Corporate Governance' (2004) 59. 
1414 OECD, 'A Pilot Study' (n 159) 98. 
1415 Ibid. 
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Indeed, in Turkey, boards usually act as an ‘advisory board’ for the controlling shareholders, 
particularly for the owner families.1416 Accordingly, market participants have stressed that 
‘many board members perceive their primary duty of loyalty to the controlling shareholders 
who appointed them and generally do not take into account the minority shareholders’ 
reasonable interests.’1417 The legal framework at the time did not explicitly provide that the 
boards owed any duty of loyalty to all shareholders. However, for the OECD, the duty of loyalty 
is considered to be of ‘central importance’ to the principle of the equitable treatment of 
shareholders.1418 The problem is further exacerbated by the prevalence of group companies in 
the Turkish context. The Methodology has argued that ‘company groups often lead to some 
significant weakening of the duty of loyalty for board members to their specific company if 
they are also obliged to follow group strategies.’1419 It has further noted that the prevalence of 
controlling shareholders ‘further serves to confuse to whom the duty is due.’1420 
 
Nevertheless, the Pilot Study has highlighted the ongoing corporate governance reform 
initiatives as positive developments in this area; these initiatives have ‘started influencing the 
perceptions of some board members, executives and controlling shareholders. […] [and] have 
started deepening the understanding among some key decision makers in companies of what 
these duties mean in practice.’1421 Indeed, to address these concerns, the new TCC brought in 
extensive rules to ensure that the boards of group companies are not perceived independently. 
More particularly, the new TCC requires that the board of the controlling company compensates 
any losses incurred by the controlled company due to its actions. Hence, by placing a duty of 
loyalty on the boards of controlling companies, the new corporate governance framework 
attempts to protect the minority shareholders of the dependent company. The new TCC also 
explicitly stipulated the board’s duty of loyalty for the first time.1422 The new provision of the 
TCC holds that the board members’ duty of loyalty requires them to ‘put the interests of the 
company before their interests, the interests of majority holders or shareholders or any third 
party and their relatives.’1423 The new TCC also introduced the principle of equal treatment as 
a main shareholder right.1424 Additionally, the new TCC lists the non-assignable duties of the 
board, which is intended to prevent controlling shareholders from crossing over the duties of 
                                                     
1416 Yamak and Ertuna, A Primer on Corporate Governance (n 83) 99. 
1417 OECD, 'A Pilot Study' (n 159) 100. 
1418 OECD, 'OECD Principles of Corporate Governance' (2004) 59. 
1419 OECD, 'Methodology' (n 1244) 108. 
1420 Ibid. 
1421 OECD, 'A Pilot Study' (n 159) 99. 
1422 TCC Article 369. 
1423 Oumer, 'Duty of Care and Loyalty While Running Joint Stock Companies' (n 1100) 165. 
1424 TCC Article 357. 
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the board and exercising certain board functions themselves.1425 The aforementioned changes 
in legislation can be interpreted as the government attempting to restrain the controlling owners’ 
influence over the boards in Turkey. 
 
On the other hand, the CMB also introduced specific rules to limit controlling owners’ control 
over the boards. For instance, regarding the OECD Principle on boards being ‘able to exercise 
objective independent judgement on corporate affairs’, the OECD states ‘there should be a 
sufficient number of non-executive directors’.1426 The Pilot Study has found that the existing 
CMB regulations did provide for a part of the board to be composed of non-executive, 
independent directors. However, there has been limited compliance amongst listed companies 
because these rules were non-binding.1427 The report has attributed the lack of implementation 
to difficulties in finding ‘experienced, knowledgeable and independent candidates’ as well as 
the family owners’ unwillingness to give up their control over the boards.1428 Thus, to rectify 
this situation, the CMB Principles made almost all its principles on BoDs mandatory. In fact, 
most mandatory principles are contained under this heading.1429 For instance, the CMB 
Principle stating that ‘a majority of the members of the board of directors shall consist of 
members who do not have an executive duty’ is mandatory.1430 Moreover, it is now required 
that at least one thirds of the listed company boards to be composed of independent directors.1431 
The CMB Principles further provide stringent and ‘qualitative’ independence criteria which are 
binding on listed companies.1432  
 
The issue of independence has been accorded so much importance in the new corporate 
governance framework that the CMB is now required to confirm the independence of the board 
candidates prior to subjecting them to the general assembly for approval.1433 The principles have 
been further strengthened by the provisions of the CML and the corresponding enforcement 
authority has been provided to the CMB. Accordingly, if listed companies fail to implement the 
mandatory CMB Principles within the timeframe provided, the CMB is authorised to  
 
                                                     
1425 Eminoğlu, Corporate Governance in the Turkish Commercial Code (n 154) 177-178. 
1426 OECD, 'OECD Principles of Corporate Governance' (2004) Article VI.E.1. 
1427 OECD, 'A Pilot Study' (n 159) 110. 
1428 Ibid. 
1429 Communique on Corporate Governance Article 5. 
1430 CMB Principle 4.3.2. The CMB defines non-executive board member under this article as ‘the person 
who does not have any administrative duty other than being a board member or any executive unit 
subsidiaries to himself/herself and is not involved in the daily work routine or ordinary activities of the 
corporation.’ 
1431 CMB Principle 4.3.4. According to Principle 4.3.3, the independent directors are ‘among the non-
executive board members who have the ability to fulfil their duties impartially.’ 
1432 CMB Principle 4.3.6.; OECD, 'Supervision and Enforcement in Corporate Governance' (2013) 80. 
1433 CML Principle 4.3.7.  
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appoint ex officio independent members of board of directors in required number that 
is necessary for the board of directors to convene and to take resolution […] the new 
board of directors shall fulfil the required amendments at the articles of association to 
provide the compliance to the mandatory principles of corporate governance.1434  
 
In sum, the CMB now has the authority to directly appoint independent directors if listed 
companies fail to implement the binding corporate governance principles regarding the 
constitution of the board.1435 With these new rules, ‘Turkey became one of the few countries 
where (outside the banking sector) public authorities are involved in the appointment process 
of independent directors.’1436  
 
Turkey’s new corporate governance legislation has significantly addressed the issues raised in 
the Pilot Study regarding the other principles assessed under the heading: The Responsibilities 
of the Board. For example, even though the old CMB Principles required listed companies to 
establish a corporate governance committee within the boards, this principle was not very 
effective due to its voluntary nature. In a survey, the CMB found that only 18% of the listed 
companies it had examined had established a corporate governance committee in 2004.1437 
Therefore, the new CMB Principles listed the establishment of a corporate governance 
committee as a mandatory principle.1438  
 
Another relevant issue pertains to directors’ pay. The Pilot Study has advised that companies 
should link board remuneration to performance and disclose these practices in the annual report. 
It has also noted that very limited information is disclosed on directors’ performance and 
remuneration in Turkey.1439 The new CMB Principles address this by requiring listed companies 
to disclose their remuneration policies of the board members and executives on the company 
                                                     
1434 CML Article 17; Communique on Corporate Governance Article 7/3. 
1435 One well-known instance, where the CMB has used its authority concerns the leading mobile operator 
company Turkcell. The holding company of the family-owners (Cukurova Group) held the majority of 
the shareholdings in Turkcell and wanted to hold onto control against the second largest shareholder 
(Telia Sonera). The two shareholder had a disagreement over a possible sale of shares from Cukurova 
Group to TeliaSonera, since the family owners did not want to lose their dominance over the board. Thus, 
the shareholders could not reach an agreement over the election of independent directors, which stalled 
the general assembly meetings for the next coupleof years, until the CMB stepped in 2013 to elect the 
independent board members to Turkcell ex officio. This decision of the CMB was announced in CMB, 
'Turkcell İletişim Hizmetleri A.Ş.'ye ilişkin duyuru (Press Statement on Turkcell Communication 
Services)' (15.08.2013) <http://www.spk.gov.tr/Duyuru/Goster/20130815/2>. Also, for a detailed 
timeline of event see Yamak and Ertuna, A Primer on Corporate Governance (n 83) 36-38. 
1436 OECD, 'Supervision and Enforcement in Corporate Governance' (2013) 79. 
1437 OECD, 'A Pilot Study' (n 159) 103. 
1438 CMB Principles 4.5.1. and 4.5.10. 
1439 OECD, 'A Pilot Study' (n 159) 103. 
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website.1440 The CMB has also required listed companies to establish a remuneration committee, 
which would submit its recommendations on the remuneration policies of directors and 
executives ‘considering the achievement level to the criteria used in remuneration’.1441 
However, these principles are at odds with the business practices in Turkey. The Pilot Study 
has noted that a 2005 survey demonstrated that ‘only 4% of listed companies compensated 
board members on the basis of company performance.’1442  
 
Moreover, directors in Turkey do not commonly expect to receive any compensation for having 
a seat on the board; they are usually only paid a small attendance fee.1443 In fact, nearly half of 
the listed companies noted that they do not make any payments to their board members.1444 If 
the board members are compensated, these payments are generally fixed at the legal minimum 
wage, which is not related to performance.1445 Disclosure of executive remuneration is not a 
common practice amongst Turkish companies.1446 Even when remuneration is linked to 
performance, that is usually measured by subjective criteria.1447 These practices result from 
established business customs and mentality; since boards are mainly composed of the relatives 
of the shareholders, they usually do not expect any sort of compensation as directors.1448 Even 
if the directors claimed to be independent, they were likely to be connected with the controlling 
shareholders because they were elected by those shareholders.1449 The reforms make it 
mandatory for at least one-third of the listed company boards to include independent directors 
who will be determined by strict independence criteria, subject to further approval by the CMB. 
Overall, the CMB’s mandatory rules constitute radical reform that is likely to change the way 
boards operate in Turkey. As the OECD notes, these developments will help ‘raise expectations’ 
regarding the board’s professionalism.1450 
 
In sum, Turkey’s new corporate governance framework introduces reforms to protect the rights 
of minority shareholders in individual and group companies vis-à-vis the controlling owners 
with regard to the BoDs. The reforms explicitly provide that the board has a duty of loyalty 
towards all shareholders, thereby imposing liability on board members who fail to fulfil this 
                                                     
1440 CMB Principle 4.6.2.  
1441 CMB Principle 4.5.13.b. 
1442 OECD, 'A Pilot Study' (n 159) 105. 
1443 Ararat, Orbay and Yurtoglu, 'The Effects of Board Independence in Controlled Firms ' (n 97) 38. 
1444 Yamak and Ertuna, A Primer on Corporate Governance (n 83) 104. 
1445 Ibid. 
1446 Ibid 103. 
1447 Ararat and Eroğlu, 'Separation of Execution and Control Functions' (n 1080) 121 
1448 OECD, 'A Pilot Study' (n 159) 104. 
1449 Ararat, Orbay and Yurtoglu, 'The Effects of Board Independence in Controlled Firms ' (n 97) 37. 
1450 OECD, 'A Pilot Study' (n 159) 112. 
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duty to the minority shareholders.1451 Moreover, the fairness principle is strengthened by law 
through the principle of equal treatment of shareholders provided for in the TCC. These changes 
are further supplemented by the mandatory CMB Principles, which define rigid independence 
criteria and require boards to be mainly composed of non-executive directors. These changes 
place the boards in an equal position in relation to all shareholders while curbing the controlling 
shareholders’ influence over the board members. This is in line with the mainstream corporate 
governance model, which seeks to propagate a system in which all shareholders are equally 
distant from the boards of the companies they invest in. 
 
 Conclusions 
 
The Pilot Study is an essential reference point to assess whether the Turkish legislators have 
taken up the OECD’s instructions to shape Turkey’s corporate governance framework in line 
with the mainstream model. The Secretary General of the OECD at the time asserted the 
following: ‘As long as the authorities and business community remain committed to pursuing 
international best practices, we can be confident that the remaining weaknesses in Turkish 
corporate governance will be addressed soon.’1452 The subsequent legal reforms significantly 
addressed the areas that had been identified by the OECD as requiring ‘improvement’.1453 
Shareholders are placed at the core of the new corporate governance legislation, and stakeholder 
rights are only acknowledged in terms of transparency. Extensive rules and binding principles 
have been introduced to compensate for the presence of controlling owners. For example, rules 
that facilitate professional boards, rules that facilitate further disclosures, or the equitable 
treatment principle. These rules carry significance in countries like Turkey, where the presence 
of controlling owners constitutes a risk for global investors because it ‘diminishes the ability of 
outside actors and institutions to impose checks and balances’.1454 In sum, it can be concluded 
that the new Turkish corporate governance framework has conformed to the mainstream model 
as advanced by the OECD Principles. 
                                                     
1451 Under the previous TCC, the minority shareholders had a derivative claim against board members in 
cases where they fail to fulfil their duties, but shareholders could only file this claim on behalf of the 
company where a damage has been caused to the whole company. Thus, the minority shareholders did 
not have a personal claim if the board members treated them unfairly or did not fulfil their duty of loyalty 
towards them. With the new TCC, the minority shareholders can sue the boards themselves for personal 
damages to be compensated. For a further discussion on this, see Cankorel, 'Shareholder Fiduciary 
Duties’ (n 1051). 
1452 OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría, Corporate Governance in Turkey (October 17, 2006). 
<http://www.oecd.org/turkey/corporategovernanceinturkey.htm> accessed on 12 November 2017. 
1453 OECD, 'Methodology' (n 1244) 8. 
1454 Soederberg, 'The Promotion of “Anglo-American” Corporate Governance in the South' (n 70) 10. 
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3 Implications of the New Corporate Governance Framework 
 
 Analysing the Shift to Mandatory Corporate Governance Principles 
 
Prior to analysing the implications of the new legal framework, it is first necessary to assess the 
switch to hard law regulation of corporate governance and the reasons for that change. That 
assessment is necessary because that shift in regulatory style is likely to facilitate the 
consequences discussed under the subsequent sections of the chapter. The following section 
discusses the possible reasons for the CMB to adopt the hard law approach to its corporate 
governance principles.  
 
In 2011, the CMB Communiques obliged certain listed companies to implement some of its 
formerly voluntary corporate governance principles.1455 Thereafter, consecutive regulations of 
the CMB increased the scope of its mandatory principles to cover more listed companies. As 
elaborated in detail previously, the CMB Principles are very similar to the OECD Principles. 
Both regulators and scholars have acknowledged that the OECD Principles have been the main 
source of influence behind Turkey’s corporate governance principles.1456 Nevertheless, with the 
2011 amendments, the CMB Principles have deviated in form from the ‘non-binding, 
principles-based approach’ which has been advocated as best practice by the OECD;1457 Indeed, 
while admitting ‘that there is no single model of good corporate governance’, the OECD has 
also suggested that the corporate governance rules should be sufficiently flexible to allow 
companies to adapt their corporate governance practices as they see fit to remain 
competitive.1458 In fact, the OECD has warned that going beyond the comply-or-explain 
approach risks the rules becoming too prescriptive.1459 This stance contradicts Turkey’s move 
to use hard law to regulate its corporate governance practices. Thus, the reasons behind the 
move to hard law should be further explored to understand what the binding corporate 
governance principles strive to achieve. 
 
The most discernible explanation for the move to hard law lies in the ownership structure of 
Turkish companies and the particular challenges it poses for the minority investors. Turkish 
                                                     
1455 CMB, Communique on the Determination and the Application of Corporate Governance Principles 
IV-54 (11.10.2011). This communique obliged the companies listed in the ISE-30 Index to implement 
certain CMB Principles, with the exception of banks. 
1456 CMB, Corporate Governance Principles (2003) 7; Akdoğan and Boyacıoğlu, 'Corporate Governance 
In Turkey' (n 1036) 11; Yamak and Ertuna, A Primer on Corporate Governance (n 83) 60. 
1457 Bill Witherell, 'The Revised OECD Principles of Corporate Governance: A Management Roadmap 
For Healthy, Well-Governed Companies' (OECD 2004) 3. 
1458 Preamble. OECD, 'OECD Principles of Corporate Governance' (1999). 
1459 OECD, 'Corporate Governance: A Survey of OECD Countries' (2004) 11. 
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companies are characterised by concentrated ownership structures which have a prevalence of 
controlling owners who are founding family members.1460 The OECD has stated that its 
‘Principles focus on governance problems that result from the separation of ownership and 
control’1461, which is a distinct feature of the Anglo-American corporate system with a dispersed 
ownership. The central corporate governance problem under this system results from the 
supposed agency relationship between the shareholders and management. The shareholders are 
principals who delegate their decision-making power to management, who are their agents.1462 
The relationship is predicated on the agent’s promise that it will act in the principal’s best 
interest by maximising shareholder wealth.1463 The agency or the ‘moral hazard problem’ ‘arises 
when there is a divergence between the interests of the two parties and it is prohibitively 
difficult, or costly, for the shareholders to ensure that managers are indeed running the company 
in their best interests.’1464 Thus, ‘good’ corporate governance mechanisms ensure that there is 
effective monitoring of the agents so that they pursue the principal’s interest.1465 On the other 
hand, in emerging markets such as Turkey, where the separation of ownership and control has 
not fully materialised due to concentrated ownership, the agency problem turns into a ‘principal-
principal’ problem between controlling and minority shareholders.1466 This causes its own set 
of corporate governance issues and corresponding mechanisms. Although the OECD 
Principles’ Preamble does recognise the existence of the principal-principal conflict,1467 the rest 
of the Principles are designed to function within a dispersed ownership system. In such a system, 
the presence of controlling owners is perceived to be an inherent threat that should be restricted 
as much as possible.1468 
 
The OECD Principles are founded on the ‘separation of ownership and control’ thesis;1469 the 
principles use corporate governance rules to try to resolve the problems generated by this 
separation. Hence, the principles are unsuitable to provide solutions to the corporate governance 
                                                     
1460 Ararat, Orbay and Yurtoglu, 'The Effects of Board Independence in Controlled Firms ' (n 97) 11. 
1461 OECD, 'OECD Principles of Corporate Governance' (2004) 12. 
1462 Jensen and Meckling, 'Theory of the Firm' (n 10). 
1463 A Keay, 'Ascertaining The Corporate Objective: An Entity Maximisation and Sustainability Model' 
(2008) 71(5) The Modern Law Review 663, 667. 
1464 Peck and Ruigrok, 'Hiding Behind the Flag?' (n 1409) 421. 
1465 OECD, 'OECD Principles of Corporate Governance' (2004) 11. 
1466 MW Peng and S Sauerwald, 'Corporate Governance and Principal-Principal Conflicts' in Wright, 
Mike and others (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Governance (OUP 2013) 658; MN Young 
and others, 'Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal–Principal 
Perspective' (2008) 45(1) Journal of Management Studies 196, 197. 
1467 OECD, 'OECD Principles of Corporate Governance' (2004) 12. ‘In some jurisdictions, governance 
issues also arise from the power of certain controlling shareholders over minority shareholders.’ 
1468 Ibid; ‘As owners of equity, institutional investors are increasingly demanding a voice in corporate 
governance in some markets. Individual shareholders […] may be highly concerned about obtaining fair 
treatment from controlling shareholders and management.’ 
1469 Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (n 36). 
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issues of Turkey. Indeed, the existence of controlling owners removes the issue of securing 
managerial accountability to shareholders.1470 For instance, the OECD Principle’s assignment 
of the vital role of monitoring company management to independent and non-executive board 
members is rendered ineffective in the context of Turkish companies. Anecdotal evidence has 
demonstrated that independent directors in Turkish companies rarely question the decisions of 
management due to their loyalties to the controlling-owners who elected them.1471 This finding 
indicates that the independent board members are not effective monitors of management in 
Turkey, in contrast to what has been advocated by the OECD. Moreover, studies have found 
that the presence of independent directors negatively affects performance in Turkish 
companies,1472 demonstrating that this practice inflicts extra costs on companies instead of 
improving performance.1473 Nonetheless, the CMB not only based Turkish corporate 
governance principles on the OECD standards, but also made some of these principles 
mandatory. 
 
Prior to the reforms, the difficulty in implementing the CMB Principles arose from their 
voluntary nature; they were binding only to the extent of the comply-or-explain approach. 
Accordingly, listed companies were only required to publish statements on whether they 
implemented the CMB Principles or explain their reasons for not implementing those rules. As 
per a 2004 survey conducted on listed companies within the ISE-100 Index,1474 the CMB has 
found that these reports were not in line with the Corporate Governance Compliance Report 
format required by the CMB and instead consisted of short and standard explanations with no 
details.1475 Ararat has noted in 2011 that the Corporate Governance Compliance Reports of 
listed companies were still unsatisfactory because they only consisted of a few pages and were 
almost the same each year.1476 It is clear that Turkish listed companies were reluctant in 
implementing the voluntary corporate governance principles.  
                                                     
1470 PL Davies, 'The Board of Directors: Composition, Structure and Powers' (OECD 7-8 December 2000) 
3. 
1471 Ararat and Eroglu, 'Separation of Execution and Control Functions for Effective Governance and the 
Potential Effect of Structural Regularities in Turkey on Firm Performance' (n 1080) 114. 
1472 Ararat, Black and Yurtoglu, 'The effect of corporate governance on firm value and profitability' (n 
158); Ararat, Orbay and Yurtoglu, 'The Effects of Board Independence in Controlled Firms ' (n 97) 36. 
1473 Ararat and Eroglu, 'Separation of Execution and Control Functions for Effective Governance and the 
Potential Effect of Structural Regularities in Turkey on Firm Performance' (n 1080) 114. 
1474 ISE-100 Index (now called BIST-100 under the new name) is composed of the listed companies with 
highest market capitalization and trade volume. 
1475 CMB, 'Payları İMKB’de İşlem Gören ve Ulusal 100 Endeksine Dahil Olan Şirketlerin Kurumsal 
Yönetim Uygulamalarına İlişkin Değerlendirme (Evaluation of the Corporate Governance Practices of 
Listed Companies in the ISE-100 Index' (2004) <http://www.spk.gov.tr/Sayfa/Dosya/461> accessed 7 
October 2018. 
1476 Ararat, '“Comply or Explain” Without Consequences' (n 69) 356. 
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Ararat has argued that the shortcomings of the comply-or-explain approach are due to the weak 
legal foundation of the CMB Principles and the Turkish companies’ ownership structure.1477 
Turkey has a civil law background which is characterised by an ‘insider system of ownership 
and control structure where the majority of the company shares are held by family, business 
groups, and the state.’1478 In this setting, non-controlling shareholders are faced with the 
potential abuse or cheating by the controlling shareholders, which deters prospective outside 
investors from becoming minority stakeholders in Turkish companies. Ates et al. have also 
noted that  
 
The existence of such tight family control may not be a problem in countries with 
effective regulations and laws for protecting minority shareholders, but it may pose 
challenges in an emerging market setting like Turkey where protection of minority 
shareholders are not as strong.1479 
 
A strong legal framework is thus a prerequisite for the protection of minority shareholders in 
countries with concentrated ownership structures. La Porta and others have demonstrated the 
link between ownership patterns and the level of investor protection in a country; acccordingly 
‘ownership concentration is a consequence of poor legal protection of minority 
shareholders.’1480 They have also noted that weak legal protections would deter outside 
investors from owning equity in those countries’ stock markets.1481 Thus, in the case of Turkey, 
it can be argued that a soft law approach to corporate governance has not provided prospective 
investors with sufficient confidence to own small stakes in listed companies. 
 
The conclusion that can be drawn from the above findings is that the shift to hard law was not 
intended to address the corporate governance issues faced in Turkish companies. Instead, as 
Yamak and Ertuna have argued, the main motivator appears to be attracting foreign capital.1482 
Indeed, according to the CMB, the new regulations that facilitate mandatory application ‘were 
made in order to adopt the corporate governance principles in our markets as we [the CMB] see 
them as an important milestone in the improvement process of our markets’.1483 Thus, binding 
legal rules were required to attain this objective, especially in terms of protecting minority 
shareholders. This shift also demonstrates the undesirability of concentrated ownership and 
                                                     
1477 Ibid 355-356. 
1478 Yamak and Ertuna, A Primer on Corporate Governance (n 83) 116. 
1479 Gurarda, Ozsoz and Ates, 'Corporate Governance Rating and Ownership Structure' (n 716) 2. 
1480 La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer, 'Corporate Ownership Around the World’ (n 31) 511. 
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controlling owners for attracting foreign investors. Cheffins has suggested that ‘policy-makers 
in countries where corporate governance is organised on an “insider/control-oriented” basis 
should strive to create the correct regulatory environment.’1484 Turkey seems to have followed 
this advice; it introduced a new corporate governance framework with binding primary 
legislation and mandatory principles to restrain the power of controlling owners. Writing prior 
to the corporate governance reforms, Ararat and Ugur have commented that ‘the statutory CG 
standards in Turkey have improved, but highly concentrated ownership structures and the 
inadequacy of the enforcement framework would continue to constitute serious obstacles’.1485 
This finding anticipated two things. First, rectifying the inadequacy in implementation through 
hard laws. Second, the need to overcome the ownership structure of Turkish companies. 
 
On the other hand, binding corporate governance principles are not necessary in countries with 
diffused ownership structures because there are other mechanisms in place to protect outside 
investors, such as the market for corporate control or monitoring by the institutional investors. 
As Cheffins has asserted, ‘strong corporate law is probably not a necessary condition for a 
corporate economy dominated by widely held companies.’1486 Such substitutive governance 
mechanisms provide assurance to outside investors that their rights are adequately protected 
even though they own small stakes. However, this is not the case in the Turkish setting. The 
situation is exacerbated because the ‘government has a central role in the allocation and 
enforcement of property rights where favouritism takes a leading role.’1487 These factors present 
substantial risks for the minority shareholders and deter prospective investors from entering the 
Turkish stock market. Therefore, using hard law to regulate corporate governance in Turkey is 
not only justified but also essential to attract outside, mainly (mainly foreign) investors and to 
facilitate stock market development. Indeed, La Porta and others have concluded that for the 
principal-principal agency problem to be reduced, legal reforms needed to be considerably 
‘radical’.1488 They have added that ‘Corporate governance reform must circumvent the 
opposition by these [controlling shareholder] interests.’1489 The new Turkish corporate 
framework appears to have followed this reasoning by imposing mandatory CMB Principles on 
listed companies and including further minority protections in corporate governance legislation. 
These measures were taken to ‘circumvent’ the power of the controlling families to benefit 
outside shareholders. 
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Another important factor regarding the switch to hard law pertains to the de facto binding 
character of the mainstream corporate governance principles. As discussed earlier, the OECD 
Principles constitute the corporate governance module of the ROSCs as stipulated by the IFIs. 
Although the stated objective of the ROSCs is ‘to develop and disseminate international 
standards to promote the stability of the global financial system’1490, Soederberg argues that 
they effectively function as benchmarks to assess whether ‘emerging markets play by the rules 
dictated by the powerful translational financial capitals.’1491 Therefore, the corporate 
governance standards that make up the mainstream model not only represent a certain class’ 
interest, but also place constraints on national policy making. The implementation of the OECD 
Principles may be promoted as best practices, but they have an implicit binding power. If a 
country deviates from the standards under the ROSCs, it sends negative signals to investors. 
This risks capital flight, investment strikes, and possible downgrades from global credit rating 
agencies.1492 These actions have important ramifications for a country, especially for emerging 
markets like Turkey, whose economies are largely dependent on foreign capital. In fact, the 
OECD projects that the reliance of the Turkish economy on foreign capital will reach 25% of 
GDP by the end of 2018.1493 Thus, as Ireland has asserted, ‘in practice it is near compulsory for 
states who wish to retain their credibility with foreign investors.’1494 Additionally, while the 
IMF has confirmed that the ROSCs are voluntary, it adds that ‘when ROSCs are published, they 
can help potential investors to better evaluate the investment climate’.1495 Overall, the ROSCs 
have an inherent disciplinary nature. 
 
Subsequently, the ROSCs are used to pressure governments to stay in line with the 
conditionality agreements in return for financing from the IMF. This was evident in 2001 when 
Turkey was recuperating from a national financial crisis. The IMF extended further credit 
accompanied with the conditionality of ‘good governance in the public and private sectors’.1496 
In its responding Letter of Intent, the Turkish government noted that it ‘is fully committed to 
pursue these goals and stands behind all the measures and polices detailed in the letter.’1497 
Following the Turkish government’s promise, the CMB published its Corporate Governance 
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Principles in 2003 for the first time. This development was significant because at the beginning 
of the 2000s, Turkey was the only OECD member country that did not have a corporate 
governance code.1498 Nevertheless, due to the voluntary nature of the CMB Principles and the 
apparent mismatch between the principles and the established business practices in Turkey, 
listed companies were not ‘enthusiastic’ about implementing them.1499 From this perspective, 
mandatory corporate governance principles seem to be necessary for the Turkish government 
to keep its ‘promise’ to ensure the implementation of good governance practices in the private 
sector. In sum, the move to a hard law approach to regulate corporate governance illustrates the 
policy constraints placed on the Turkish government by the IFIs. The next section discusses the 
possible consequences from this new legal framework. 
 
 Implications for the Ownership Structure 
 
The prevalent company ownership structure in a country is an important determinant of 
corporate governance ‘because the presence or absence of a controlling shareholder affects 
substantially the way in which, and the ends toward which, a corporation will be governed.’1500 
Indeed, there has been extensive research on the connection between particular ownership 
structures and the corresponding corporate governance mechanisms in different countries.1501 
As noted earlier, countries with widely dispersed companies tend to have better shareholder 
protection mechanisms.1502 The main examples of this are the United States and the United 
Kingdom, where ownership concentration and large shareholders are less prevalent; hence, 
shareholdings are diffused and extensive legal protection for investors exists.1503 In a later study, 
La Porta and others have found evidence that ‘strong investor protection is associated with 
effective corporate governance, as reflected in valuable and broad financial markets, dispersed 
ownership of shares, and efficient allocation of capital across firms.’1504 They have also noted 
that in the absence of adequate investor protection, outside investors ‘face a risk, and sometimes 
near certainty, that the returns on their investments will never materialize because the 
controlling shareholders or managers expropriate them’.1505 Thus, legal systems which do not 
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provide strong minority shareholder protection are said to inhibit active stock markets.1506 
According to this line of research, the lack of strong investor protection and ownership 
concentration are impediments to share dispersion and hence stock market development 
 
The ownership structure is also an important dimension of the debates over whether various 
corporate governance regimes will eventually converge into a superior model. The competing 
systems are usually classified as the market-centric and dispersed ownership model (the outsider 
model) versus the concentrated ownership model with controlling shareholders and less-
developed capital markets (the insider model).1507 The neoclassical economic theory asserts that 
‘one unique and efficient corporate governance model emerges as all other inferior models are 
selected out and fade’1508 due to the link between the efficiency of corporate governance and 
performance. Such transformation is understood ‘in terms of globalization-driven, neoliberal 
convergence.’1509 On this point, Dignam and Alanis have noted that ‘the shareholder supremacy 
scholarship has been influential in framing the rules upon which the process of globalizing 
capital markets has been based.’1510 Moreover, increasing globalisation has led to the 
anticipation that ‘companies in different countries will tend to adopt corporate governance 
practices consistent with free capital markets and geared toward maximizing shareholder 
value.’1511 Charreaux has pointed out that because efficiency depends on the availability of 
shareholder protection against expropriation by controlling shareholders, the corporate 
governance systems of countries with dispersed ownership models are perceived to be more 
efficient.1512 Similarly, although Hansmann and Kraakman have argued that the shareholder-
oriented model of corporate law ‘does not logically privilege any particular ownership 
structure’, they have also argued that controlling shareholders may not always ‘wish to 
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maximize their financial returns’; thus, the presence of such structures leads to inefficient 
results.1513 In sum, convergence towards the outsider model is advocated on the basis of 
economic efficiency arguments which are underpinned by the shareholder value maximisation 
purpose of the company.  
 
On the other hand, there are opposing views that claim that certain factors would prevent 
ownership and corporate governance structures from becoming uniform through convergence. 
Roe’s political determinants argument has illustrated how the socio-democratic traditions of the 
continental European countries would prevent convergence towards an outsider ownership 
model.1514 Also, Bebchuk and Roe have provided ‘path dependence’ arguments to explain that 
‘the corporate structures that an economy has at any point in time are likely to depend on those 
that it had at earlier times.’1515 Despite the ‘powerful forces of globalization and efficiency’, the 
ownership structure and governance patterns have persisted due to these path-dependencies.1516 
Rhodes and Apeldoorn have also noted the possible reluctance of the domestic elites to 
undermine their dominant position in the company, thereby impeding convergence.1517 Finally, 
other scholars have noted the relationship between corporate governance, culture, and national 
identity to be an important factor and questioned the validity of convergence arguments.1518  
 
From a different standpoint, whilst not opposing the convergence claims, La Porta and other’s 
law and finance theory (or the ‘law matters’ theory) has argued that ‘the quality of legal 
protection of shareholders helps determine ownership concentration.’1519 Their main contention 
has been that ‘weak laws actually make a difference’.1520 Accordingly, concentrated ownership 
creates a cost for the company in the form of difficulties in raising external finance because 
minority shareholders fear expropriation by the controlling owners and managers, which 
hampers economic development. This seems to suggest, as Cheffins has noted, ‘that legislation 
should be enacted that will allow investors to feel sufficiently comfortable to purchase tiny 
stakes in widely held companies.’1521 In other words, the law-matters theory claims that laws 
that provide strong investor protection reduce the possibility of the expropriation of the 
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minority, thereby facilitating share dispersal and ultimately economic growth. Cheffins has 
summed this up as follows:  
 
The law matters thesis dovetails neatly with the proposition that a switch towards the 
American approach would be beneficial. Again, a key implication of the thesis is that a 
suitable legal regime constitutes the crucial bedrock which underpins a system of 
ownership and control dominated by widely held companies.1522  
 
In sum, this theory not only connects strong investor protection laws and economic 
development,1523 but also seems to suggest that an appropriate legal framework can facilitate 
convergence between the ownership structures towards the outsider model. Regarding this 
point, empirical research to evaluate the impact of legal reforms on Italian ownership structure 
has concluded that strengthening the legal protection of shareholder rights is indeed associated 
with increased dispersed ownership.1524 In a similar way, this section of the chapter argues that 
the recent reforms on corporate governance laws in Turkey are likely to impact the ownership 
structure of its listed companies. 
 
The Turkish private sector has been shaped by state-based allocations.1525 The state plays an 
important role in the economy: both as an owner and by allocating resources to private 
companies.1526 The result is that having connections within the government is an important 
factor for running a business in Turkey. This factor has also been associated with the resulting 
concentrated ownership structure because the owners must actively manage their company’s 
relationship with the state by being in charge.1527 Thus, listed companies in Turkey are generally 
established as corporate conglomerates in the form of family-controlled groups.1528 A study in 
2001 has demonstrated that almost 80% of the listed companies had families as ultimate 
owners.1529 The situation has not changed much since then; family ownership and control is still 
a prevalent feature of business groups in Turkey, where most of the large conglomerates are 
family-owned.1530  
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The state has often provided support to family-owned business groups through various means 
such as easy access to financing from state banks.1531 A private bank usually constitutes a part 
of the group in the holding structures.1532 The banks owned by group companies and the access 
to cheap credit through state-owned banks have reduced Turkish companies’ need for financing 
through the capital markets. For instance, in 1998, only 3.12% of listed companies had a free-
float ratio1533 of 70% or more, which rose to just 9% in 2006.1534 Also, a more recent OECD 
report in 2013 found that only 12% of the largest Turkish companies were listed.1535 In sum, the 
corporate sector in Turkey has remained mainly bank-based.1536 Subsequently, it has been noted 
that one of the key weaknesses of Turkish companies is being over-leveraged to domestic 
banks.1537 Also, the Turkish economy has been characterised by low domestic saving rates.1538 
The limited domestic savings were kept in local and foreign deposits instead of capital markets 
instruments.1539 This was coupled with the limited availability of foreign direct investments 
(FDI) and highly volatile external portfolio investments.1540 These factors hampered the role 
and development of the capital markets in Turkey. Indeed, even though Turkey is one of the 
fastest growing economies globally with an annual GDP growth rate of 7.4% in 2017,1541 its 
capital markets remain thin in comparison to other countries with similar levels of 
development.1542 This has also been the case for Turkey’s primary stock market, BIST, which 
has remained underdeveloped; its market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP has been 
relatively low in comparison to other OECD countries.1543 
 
In countries where domestic savings are limited such as Turkey, reliance on foreign capital as 
a source of finance for companies becomes vital.1544 Thus, Turkish policy makers have turned 
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their attention to attracting foreign investors for stock market development and economic 
growth. The TUSIAD has also highlighted the necessity of foreign capital inflows for economic 
development.1545 However, one issue with relying on foreign investors for capital is that Turkish 
companies are subject to high costs of financing that are greater than their international 
competitors due to the high-risk premium associated with investing in Turkey.1546 On this point, 
Ararat and Ugur have noted that macroeconomic instabilities have undermined the credibility 
of the Turkish government both in terms of rule-setting and enforcement,1547 which have 
contributed to increasing the risks associated with investing in the Turkish stock market. 
Likewise, the WB has noted that the largest obstacle for progress in Turkish capital market 
development lies in addressing the ‘credibility’ aspect of the state because Turkey is a country 
with a history of macroeconomic instabilities.1548 However, foreign ownership in Turkish listed 
companies has ‘significantly increased’ since the CMB first launched its corporate governance 
principles.1549 As previously discussed, strong investor protection is crucial for attracting 
foreign investors in a stock market dominated by concentrated ownership and controlling 
owners. Thus, foreign investor presence in the Turkish stock market is expected to further 
increase in line with the new corporate governance laws. The chart below illustrates the change 
in the number of foreign investors and their percentage of the total number of investors in the 
BIST over the years. 1550 
 
Figure - 2 
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According to the figures above, there have been increases in foreign ownership of Turkish 
company stock over the years. This rise can be attributed to the strengthening of minority 
shareholder rights. The reforms started in 2011 with the CMB’s Communique IV-54 which 
introduced mandatory corporate governance principles for the first time. This was followed by 
the promulgation of the new TCC in July 2012 and finally the new CML in December 2012. 
Although the effects of the new laws have yet to be documented in the literature,1551 the above 
graph illustrates that the number of foreign investors substantially increased between 2012-
2013, which corresponds to the period directly after the enactment of the legislation on 
corporate governance. 
 
Nevertheless, the number of foreign investors still constitute a very small percentage of the total 
investors. Also, there was a sharp drop in the number of foreign investors in 2015. The United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has noted that international capital 
flows, particularly portfolio investments, turned negative due to the uncertainties in the global 
economy in 2015.1552 Similarly, the decrease in the number of foreign investors in BIST has 
been attributed to the low risk appetite globally in 2015, which caused a significant outflow of 
foreign investment from Turkish companies.1553 Although the number of foreigners constituted 
only a small percentage of all investors, their capital flight resulted in a considerable loss of 2.5 
billion USD value from the BIST at the end of 2015. 1554 This indicates that the number of 
investors may in fact be a misleading figure. The table below demonstrates the foreign 
investors’ share of the total market capitalisation (the total value of a listed company’s 
outstanding shares in the stock market) and their share of the total trade volume over the same 
years as the above graph.1555 The following figures reveal the importance of foreign investors 
for the BIST: 
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  Jun-12 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Sep-18 
% of Market Capitalisation 62% 66% 63% 64% 62% 63% 65% 62% 
% of Trade Volume 19% 16% 20% 20% 22% 25% 25% 32% 
Figure - 3 
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As can be observed from the table, even though the foreign investors are few in number relative 
to the domestic investors, foreign investors provide more than half of BIST’s total market 
capitalisation. The significance of foreign investment as a source of financing for Turkish 
companies is not a new phenomenon; the percentage of foreigner investments in the BIST 
(formerly the ISE-Istanbul Stock Exchange) was 54.7% in 1997; this figure rose to 64% in 1999 
and eventually decreased to 40.9% at the end of 2000 following the Turkish financial crises of 
2000-2001.1556 Thereafter, foreign ownership of the free-float steadily increased, which was 
likely to be due to the developments on corporate governance in Turkey. For example, after the 
CMB published its corporate governance principles for the first time in 2003, the percentage of 
foreigners who held outstanding shares rose from 43% in 2002 to 52.2% by the end of 2003 and 
57% by 2004.1557 By the end of 2012, which is when the corporate governance reforms were 
mostly enacted, the foreign investors comprised two-thirds of the free-float.1558 This is a 
considerable increase from the figures in 2002, which is when corporate governance regulations 
were non-existent in Turkey. 
 
According to the latest data obtained from the stock exchange, as of October 2018, foreign 
investors held 62% share in BIST total market capitalisation, which amounts to 199 billion 
Turkish Liras (or approximately 33 billion USD).1559 This illustrates the interdependency of the 
Turkish stock market and the entire Turkish economy with foreign capital. For example, when 
foreign investors sold their shares and exited the market in 2015, the total value of the BIST fell 
by 30%.1560 Similarly, when Turkey experienced political and economic volatilities during 
2018, there was a net foreign investment outflow worth 2 billion USD in the first 9 months of 
2018.1561 These examples demonstrate that when the investment environment deteriorates in a 
country, foreign investors tend to promptly exit that market; this is also referred to as capital 
flight. As Gill has noted, financial capital is currently so mobile that it can react to any changes 
in a country’s investment climate and government policies (or expected policies) much quicker 
than productive capital.1562 The result of this is that large sums of money that are particularly 
vital for the emerging market’s economy and companies flow to other markets that are more 
conducive to global investor interests.  
                                                     
1556 ISE, '2010 Faaliyet Raporu (2010 Activity Report)' (2011) 10.  
1557 Ibid. 
1558 OECD, 'Supervision and Enforcement in Corporate Governance' (2013) 71. 
1559 Ibid. In the report, this figure was stated in Turkish Lira currency, therefore I made the exchange 
manually for ease of understanding, using the historical FX rate on the 1st October 2018 obtained from 
<www.xe.com>. 
1560 Central Depository Institution of Turkey, 'Borsa Trendleri Raporu Sayı: XV (Exchange Trends Report 
No: XV)’ (January 2016). 
1561 Central Depository Institution of Turkey, 'Borsa Trendleri Raporu Sayı: XXVI (Exchange Trends 
Report No: XXVI)’ (October 2018). 
1562 Gill, Power and Resistance (n 70) 110-111. 
229 
 
Due to the impact of global investors on the overall economy, their mobile character also works 
to discipline government policymaking. For example, global investors can influence the 
enactment of laws that are more suitable for the market and global capital.1563 Indeed, Turkey 
experienced this scenario following the financial crisis of 2000-2001. Foreign capital pulled out 
of the stock market in 2001 following the volatilities experienced in the previous year, causing 
an outflow of over 10% of Turkey’s GDP, triggering recession in the country.1564 On the other 
hand, controlling shareholders, who are usually domestic families, do not have the same 
mobility and must withstand the economic turbulence their country goes through. The same is 
also true for stakeholders, especially labour, who do not have easy exit opportunities in times 
of distress. Thus, both the controlling owners and the stakeholders of listed companies must 
absorb the losses caused by the capital flight of global investors. Another point to note is that 
the share of foreign investors in BIST trade volumes reached 32% by mid-2018, which is the 
highest it has been since 2012.1565 This signals the speculative nature of the foreign investors’ 
equity trades; these investors benefitted from the volatilities in the market during a period of 
political instability to the detriment of Turkish companies. On this point, UNCTAD has noted 
that the high volatility of foreign portfolio investments due to their ‘short-term cyclical nature 
and sensitivity to short-term developments’ makes them an unreliable source of financing for 
developing economies.1566 
 
In 2016, FDI to Turkey fell by 31% due to investors’ concerns following the political instability 
caused by the failed coup attempt.1567 However, as a prominent newspaper had announced, 
foreign purchases of BIST stocks ‘quadrupled’ the same year. Accordingly, by the end of 2016, 
there was a net foreign portfolio investment of 630 million USD into BIST.1568 Immediately 
after in the first half of 2017, BIST experienced the highest net foreign investor inflow semi-
annually in the last five years.1569 This increase contradicts with UNCTAD’s finding that 
external financial flows (which include foreign portfolio investments) to developing countries 
decreased in 2016 from previous years.1570 The Turkish stock market during times of turmoil 
accords with the research, which demonstrates that global investors tend to have a risk appetite 
for investing in countries with economic and political instability due to the prospects of greater 
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financial gain.1571 This appetite is an indicator of the speculative nature of foreign portfolio 
investments. In 2018, Turkey’s bond credit rating, which ‘indicates its credit-worthiness, and 
helps investors assess whether or not the debt will be repaid’,1572 was downgraded to ‘junk’ for 
the first time in over a decade by influential credit rating agencies such as Moody's and Standard 
& Poor's (S&P) due to the unpredictability of Turkey’s policymaking.1573 Nevertheless, the 
trade volume of foreign investors in the BIST reached a record 32% of the total trade volumes 
in 2018.1574 
 
Indeed, foreign portfolio investment has an exploitative nature. As Hilferding notes, an ‘export 
of capital’ which creates value in the country in which it is invested is only possible when 
‘capital used abroad remains at the disposal of domestic capital, and the surplus value produced 
by this capital can be utilized by the domestic capitalists.’1575 On the other hand, foreign 
investment in the stock market is inherently speculative. In fact, ‘speculation is necessary to 
keep this market open for business at all times, and so gives money capital as such the possibility 
of transforming itself into fictitious capital.’1576 For instance, between 2003-2007, foreign 
investors transferred earnings of almost 6 billion USD from investing in the Turkish stock 
market to other countries, thereby aiding other economies.1577 This indicates that foreign 
investors are not interested in investing their profit back into Turkish companies or the 
economy. Thus, their speculation-oriented investment strategy makes the already unstable 
Turkish economy more volatile by subjecting it to the capital flight risk of global investors. The 
more Turkey’s stock markets are dominated by foreign investment, the more its economy will 
be tied to pleasing global investors to prevent such capital flight. This makes Turkish policy 
solely dependent on fulfilling the requirements of the neoliberal capitalist order. The result is 
Turkey being exploited to create surplus for the few whilst externalising the costs onto the 
many. 
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On the other hand, considering the highly volatile and unstable political and economic 
environment Turkey experienced during the last few years, that foreign investment to the BIST 
nonetheless continued to increase can be attributed to the new corporate governance laws. The 
new framework provides minority shareholders with greater protection and rights than the 
controlling shareholders. Thus, higher return opportunities from investing in an emerging 
market have been supplemented with strong shareholder protections, explaining the 
attractiveness of Turkish company stocks. Overall, the figures suggest that there may be a close 
connection between the corporate governance reforms in Turkey and the inflow of foreign 
capital, which accords with the findings of the ‘law matters’ thesis discussed earlier. To 
summarise, in countries with concentrated ownership, weak protection of shareholders leads to 
the risk of abuse of the minority by the controlling shareholders.1578 In contrast, laws that 
provide adequate protection for minority shareholders also provide external investors with the 
assurance that their wealth will not be misappropriated, which stimulates external 
investments.1579 As a consequence, improved minority protection may also facilitate a change 
in that country’s ownership patterns in a ‘desirable way’. 1580 ‘Desirable’ can be defined as the 
Anglo-American system that facilitates capital market development by supporting share 
dispersal, which is enabled by ‘good laws’ that protect minority shareholder interests and thus 
incentivise small investors.1581 A dispersed ownership structure is also viewed as desirable 
because a liquid stock market backed by laws with strong minority protection, transparency, 
and the confidence that insiders will not expropriate investors’ wealth is regarded as a 
prerequisite for economic growth.1582 
 
That the value of foreign shareholdings in Turkish companies increased after the legal reforms 
on corporate governance has an implication for the ownership patterns in Turkey. It has been 
argued that even though policymakers are not able to change the ownership structures of 
companies, they can instead improve the legal protections provided to minority stockholders 
and achieve the same effect.1583 Turkey’s new corporate governance framework provides strong 
legal rights for minority shareholders and extends their sphere of influence within company 
decision-making. Implementation of the related corporate governance rules are secured through 
binding legal provisions and mandatory principles for listed companies instead of being left to 
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the initiative of the private sector. Therefore, the increase of foreign investment to the BIST 
implies that the Turkish system now displays ‘good law tendencies’1584 because outside 
investors feel sufficiently assured that they may safely become minority shareholders. One 
anticipated outcome of these developments would be Turkey’s gradual transformation from a 
concentrated model to a dispersed shareholding model. Indeed, neoliberalism perceives share 
dispersal to be the most efficient system for economic growth.1585 This perspective resembles 
the arguments of convergence proponents such as Hansmann and Kraakman, who insist that 
controlling owners act as ‘a barrier to the evolution of efficient ownership structures, 
governance practices, and corporate law.’1586 Hence, it has been argued that wide share 
dispersal’s supposed economic advantages would lead to it becoming the dominant ownership 
structure in a country over time.1587  
 
My argument here is that the ownership structure of Turkish companies has been targeted not 
because of efficiency outcomes but for the imposition of the Washington Consensus’ market-
based restructuring on emerging economies’ corporate systems so they will be based on 
shareholder value.1588 As will be discussed in the next section, a stock market with a dispersed 
shareholding structure and its related institutions are more suitable to serve the interests of the 
global investor class than a system with controlling family owners. The concentrated ownership 
model does not allow global investors to penetrate domestic listed companies as is required for 
the capital’s liquidity and mobility. On this point, the Institute of International Finance (IIF), 
which defines itself as ‘the leading voice for the financial services industry on global regulatory 
issues’,1589 has warned Turkey that ‘As long as the economy remains dominated by family 
companies whose majority stockholder values maximizing control rather than performance, 
overall levels of corporate governance may be difficult to improve.’1590  
 
A recent study has argued that ‘family control has a significant and negative impact on Turkish 
firms’ CGR [Corporate Governance Rating] scores, suggesting that controlling stakes by a 
family are considered as unfavourable conditions from a corporate governance perspective in 
the case of Turkey’.1591 The Corporate Governance Rating scores are measured by assessing 
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listed companies’ compliance levels with the CMB Principles by independent rating agencies 
licenced by the CMB. The writers of the study have noted that 
 
Although corporate governance ratings may not truly reflect corporate governance 
quality, from a global investor’s perspective, CGR ratings are seen as important proxies 
in assessing whether firms in emerging market countries follow corporate governance 
practices in line with international standards.1592  
 
Finally, the writers have suggested that family control in Turkish companies must be reduced 
to improve corporate governance practices in Turkey.1593 Another study conducted on Brazilian 
listed companies, which have similar characteristics to Turkish companies’ ownership and 
control, found that: ‘Dispersed firm control is associated with higher quality corporate 
governance practices signalling that the absence of powerful controlling shareholders is 
beneficial to corporate governance.’1594 In sum, concentrated family ownership and control is 
seen as an impediment to company performance and good corporate governance, which is 
informed by the company’s objective of maximising shareholder value. 
 
Nevertheless, despite the increase in foreign ownership of Turkish company stocks, family 
owners have retained their share concentration. In fact, previous research has found that 
ownership concentration in listed companies has increased between 1999 to 2009.1595 While the 
largest owners retained and even increased their concentration of shareholdings, the free-float 
(the percentage of dispersed shareholdings) also increased in the same period, which indicates 
that the holdings of block owners other than the largest shareholder decreased.1596 As of the end 
of 2017, the free float ratio of the BIST reached 33%, which is an increase from 26% in June 
2012.1597 These figures indicate that the concentrated owners’ holdings have not diffused 
enough to speak of a widely held stock market, thus illustrating that controlling shareholders 
are still dominant in the Turkish corporate landscape. Indeed, as of November 2017, out of the 
20 companies listed in BIST with the highest market capitalisation, there was only one that had 
a free float ratio above 50%.1598 This can be interpreted as reluctance on the part of family 
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owners with the largest holdings to give up control, while other smaller block holders may be 
selling their stakes with premiums in line with the increased demand. 
 
Buğra has noted that due to the highly unstable business environment in Turkey, companies 
have significant incentives to remain in family control because the state-business relationships 
have an informal character which makes the transfer of control to outsiders inoperable.1599 
Moreover, she has commented that family owners are most likely to resist offering their shares 
to the public to avoid losing their control over the company.1600 The largest owners’ insistence 
on remaining in control may also signify a reaction to the recent corporate governance reforms; 
the owners may be concerned about losing their dominant position in the company. 
Nevertheless, the increase in share dispersal levels developed in parallel to the improvements 
in legal shareholder protection, which gained momentum from 2011 onwards. Comparing the 
free-float ratios from 2010 to the 2017 figures indicates that the 20 companies with the highest 
market capitalisation mostly increased their share dispersal in this 7-year period.1601 In sum, it 
can be concluded that while most companies are increasing their level of free-float, they are 
generally averse to diluting the concentration of shares of the majority owners. On that point, 
the IIF has commented that changes of perceptions in Turkey ‘is a challenging process, as it 
requires a wholesale change in the mindset of controlling shareholders who still cannot cope 
with the idea that company assets do not belong to them but to the company.’1602 Thus, even 
though the pressures to accept share dispersal are intensifying, they may not be enough to 
persuade controlling owners in Turkish companies to let go of their controlling stakes. 
 
Furthermore, Talbot has argued that for the ownership structure to become dispersed in a 
country, the government must also be in favour of such change. She has asserted that 
 
the conditions for this share dispersal must be a pro-shareholder political environment. 
Without this the wealthiest in society cannot be sure their interests will be pursued as a 
matter of course and will be obliged to maintain their majority stake.1603 
 
The Turkish government, legislators, and the regulatory authorities have explicitly shown their 
pro-business and pro-foreign investment stance during the development process of the new 
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Turkish corporate governance framework. Indeed, the AKP government has prided itself for 
taking on ‘major structural reforms [which] have all contributed to the integration of Turkey’s 
economy into the globalized world while also transforming the country into one of the major 
recipients of FDI in its region.’1604 Furthermore, Bozkurt has argued that the AKP government, 
who has been in power since November 2002, has remained committed to a neoliberal 
agenda.1605 The neoliberal policy orientation of the AKP is explicitly stated in its party charter 
through statements that note that it 
 
favors market economy […]; recognizes that the State should remain, in principle 
outside all types of economic activities […]; regards the privatization as an important 
vehicle for the formation of a more rational economic structure; believes that foreign 
capital […] will contribute to the development of the Turkish economy’1606 
 
Although the extent and nature of the current government’s policies is a research topic in its 
own right, it can be concluded that it has a neoliberal and pro-shareholder stance. Given the 
government’s position and that its policies largely correspond to the interests of the Turkish 
business community,1607 the domestic elites may not need to retain their majority holdings 
because their interests will be protected by the government in the case of share dispersal. This 
also helps explain why the domestic elites in control of the Turkish listed companies did not 
object to the corporate governance reforms although they facilitated the transfer of elites’ 
control to outsiders.1608 
 
If the raison d’etre of the Turkish corporate governance reforms is to materialise, a 
transformation to a dispersed ownership would be expected to occur as follows. Stronger legal 
protections for minority shareholders coupled with professional boards and management that 
are independent of the controlling owners will make Turkish company stocks more attractive 
for the outside investors. As per the ‘law matters’ thesis, this development would be because 
stronger protections have given investors the confidence to buy small stakes in a company. In 
turn; ‘such confidence means that investors are willing to pay full value for shares made 
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available for sale, which in turn lowers the cost of capital for firms that choose to sell equity in 
financial markets.’1609 In fact, a similar effect was observed when Turkey experienced increased 
merger and acquisition activity after the 2001 crisis, which led to increased demand for Turkish 
stock. This resulted in controlling shareholders selling their stakes with very high premiums.1610 
Thus, as Cheffins has noted, in such a scenario ‘most controlling shareholders will be content 
to unwind their holdings since the law will largely preclude them from exploiting their 
position.’1611 Indeed, by obliging the formation of independent boards and professional 
management, new corporate governance laws aim to preclude controlling shareholders from 
influencing company decisions. 
 
A second factor which will be discussed in the last part of the chapter is that independent boards 
are more likely to prioritise share price increases, unlike controlling owners who ‘are likely to 
have a preference for retaining and reinvesting earnings over distributing them, even when it is 
inefficient to do so’.1612 These factors will increase the demand for BIST listed stocks, which 
increases share price and result in companies offering more shares to the public. Subsequently, 
if the share prices reach a point whereby it makes more sense for controlling owners to sell 
rather than to hold onto control, this would facilitate the diffusion of large holdings. On this 
point, Roe has noted that ‘mechanically smooth corporate law is important for a nation in 
facilitating diffuse ownership and investor protection.’1613 He has added that when this is absent, 
family owners stay in charge to ensure they protect their own interests through holding majority 
shares. However, if their presence is replaced by management that would pursue shareholder 
interests as a whole by increasing shareholder value, there would no longer be a need for the 
owner families to remain in charge.1614  
 
Indeed, after an increase in professional management, family members’ control of the boards 
of Turkish listed companies has declined.1615 On this point, Young and others have pointed out 
that ‘it may be in the best interest of the firm’s continued development for founders (or the 
founding family) to yield control’.1616 As Hansmann and Kraakman have argued, the controller 
owners can capture greater economic gains by selling their shares at a premium; otherwise, if 
they stay in control, the only way to maximise their returns would be through self-dealing, for 
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instance.1617 However, the authors have added that for the controlling owners to capture these 
economic efficiencies, ‘the legal regime must offer means by which restructured firms can 
commit to good governance practices.’1618 The new corporate governance framework provides 
exactly this purpose. 
 
 Implications for the Stakeholders 
 
I have argued so far that the new Turkish corporate governance framework has adopted the 
mainstream model advanced by the OECD Principles, which resembles the rules and 
mechanisms found in the Anglo-American system of wide share dispersal. I have also discussed 
how laws with strong minority protection are able to facilitate a convergence of corporate 
governance systems and ownership structures in countries with controlling owners. In line with 
these discussions, I illustrated that the foreign ownership of Turkish company stocks has 
increased over time, and that the increase accords with the timing of the reforms in corporate 
governance laws in Turkey. This finding supports the ‘law matters’ theory, which argues that 
share dispersal in companies increases when a country strengthens legal protections for 
shareholders. If investors feel secure about becoming minority shareholders, this should 
positively impact stock prices. In turn, this provides incentives for companies to float a larger 
proportion of their shares and for block holders to diffuse their holdings due to the high 
premiums they would receive. This implies not only a transformation of the dominant 
ownership structure in Turkey to a wide-share dispersal model, but also the transfer of control 
from the owner families to outsiders.  
 
In this last part of the chapter, I discuss the possible implications of a scenario where control of 
the family owners passes to professional management and independent boards under a share 
dispersal model. I contend that if shareholdings are diffused enough so that no group has control 
over the company, the management is more likely to solely pursue shareholder interests because 
they are responsible towards shareholders as a class and are not bound to consider any other 
interests under the mainstream corporate governance laws. On this point, Talbot has argued that 
general shareholder interest corresponds to ‘short-term, profit maximising goals’.1619 This 
management objective inherently excludes taking into account the interests of other 
stakeholders. On the other hand, while the presence of controlling shareholders has been 
criticised for their ability and incentives to expropriate value from minority shareholders,1620 
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controlling shareholders may be better stewards for protecting the interests of stakeholders and 
society. While I refrain from making the bold assumption that the dispersed ownership model 
is detrimental for the stakeholders per se, I argue that in the Turkish context, controlling owners, 
especially family owners, are better placed to steer the company in line with long-term 
objectives and more amenable to considering stakeholder interests. 
 
Theoretically, in a stock market with widely dispersed shares, wealth is not distributed amongst 
more people. By contrast, it becomes concentrated within a smaller segment of the wealthiest 
investors, thus exacerbating inequality. De Vroey has used a Marxist lens to expand on share 
dispersal in joint-stock companies as a stage in the process of socialising the means of 
production.1621 Accordingly, the emergence of joint-stock companies had two interrelated 
consequences: ‘firstly a functional differentiation between ownership and management and 
secondly, a dispersion of share ownership among the public, going alongside with a 
concentration of power into the hands of big stockholders.’1622 On the first point, Marx has 
recognised the different roles performed by the capitalist in the production process to be ‘money 
capitalist’ and ‘industrial capitalist’.1623 He has explained that the ‘profit of enterprise appears 
to him [industrial capitalist] as the exclusive fruit of the functions he performs with the capital 
[…] in contrast to the non-activity and non-participation of the money capitalist in the 
production process.’1624 However, Marx has stated that in both instances the profit accrued to 
the capitalist ‘as a mere reward for capital ownership’.1625 Nevertheless, he has perceived this 
‘functional differentiation’ as ‘a manifestation and a stage of the process of socialization of 
capitalist production.’1626 Indeed, he has noted that when ownership and control are completely 
separated in joint-stock companies, the manager becomes a type of skilled labour, and the 
company’s undertakings become a form of social undertaking, which indicates the abolishment 
of private capital in lieu of social capital.1627 
 
Nevertheless, the separation of ownership and control that led to share dispersal did not socialise 
the capital as anticipated. Instead, as Ireland has argued, ‘their immediate effect had been 
productively dysfunctional “financialisation”.’1628 Moreover, this separation allowed capitalists 
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to control the means of production by owning a smaller proportion of the total shares; as De 
Vroey has noted, ‘Paradoxically, dispersion of stock thus favors the centralization of capital.’1629 
Hence, the dispersion of share ownership is not an obstacle to the concentration of control but 
an allocation of control in a smaller segment of the capitalist class.1630 A dispersed ownership 
structure thereby enables a small but powerful class of global investors to gain control of various 
companies in different jurisdictions by holding only a small stake in each of these companies. 
This not only allows them to diversify their investment and reduce the risks they are exposed to 
from portfolio investments but also facilitates the accumulation of profit in the hands of a small 
group of the wealthiest, thereby worsening inequality. On this point, Ireland has examined the 
financial property ownership patterns in countries known for wide share dispersals such as the 
United States and the United Kingdom, illustrating that although share ownership has spread 
amongst the public, the distribution of wealth remained concentrated in a ‘small, privileged 
elite’.1631 Indeed, recent figures from the US are a case on point. In 2016, nearly 52% of the US 
households owned stocks, which indicates that share ownership is indeed widespread. 1632 
Nevertheless, a study by Wolff has demonstrated that by 2016, the wealthiest 10% in the US 
owned 84% of the total value of stocks, which highlights the inequality and concentration of 
wealth.1633 The US Federal Reserve has admitted that ‘Families at the top of the income 
distribution saw larger gains in income between 2013 and 2016 than other families, consistent 
with widening income inequality.’1634 Thus, Ireland has refuted the shareholder primacy norm’s 
claim to benefit large segments of society who are shareholders.1635 Instead, he has argued on 
point that ‘the emergence of public shareholder class’1636 has helped legitimise the pursuit of 
the shareholder wealth maximisation objective on a broader level by enabling capital and power 
to be concentrated in the hands of financial institutions that exert shareholder primacy 
worldwide.1637 Indeed, the mainstream corporate governance model has played an important 
role in forming consensus worldwide that companies ought to be maximising profits for 
shareholders and that this is the only viable objective. 
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Thus, one of the main objectives of the mainstream corporate governance model is to create a 
system whereby the control of listed companies is transferred to global investors, so the latter 
can ensure the surplus value accrues back to them. As Soederberg has asserted, the imposition 
of the Anglo-American governance model on emerging markets economies aims to protect the 
interests of ‘foreign capital’ ‘by placing greater emphasis on “shareholder value” than other 
variants of corporate governance’.1638 Hence, corporate governance laws that are based on the 
mainstream model act as instruments to advance the interests of capitalists, particularly the 
global investor class. As Ireland has pointed out, ‘the development of global standards of ‘good 
governance’ aimed principally at creating a sounder platform for further financialisation, 
holding out to compliant developing countries the promise of foreign capital and to Western 
investors the promise of new, secure investment outlets.’1639 This has been necessary to ensure 
that foreign investors can influence where the company profits go. Unless the profit-maximising 
rationale is imposed on the company, there is the risk that domestic controlling owners may 
pursue objectives that reduce their wealth such as raising employee salaries and safety standards 
or making social investments. This explains the mainstream model’s insistence on professional 
management and independent boards and rejects any majority influence over these bodies.  
 
Harvey has noted that since control by the majority is regarded as ‘a potential threat to individual 
rights’, neoliberals prefer governance by ‘experts and elites’.1640 Indeed, if owners’ majority 
holdings (and thus their control over the company) are diffused, their empty seats will be filled 
by outsiders to the company. The job security of professional management depends on how 
well they deliver shareholder expectations. If they fail to sufficiently maximise shareholder 
wealth, it will be possible to easily replace them because control will be vested in a dispersed 
group of shareholders whose only commonality lies in the expectation of high dividends and 
increases in their share price. In other words, company management will be operating for purely 
‘market goals’, which refer to profit maximisation in line with shareholder interests.1641 As 
Talbot has argued, under neoliberal corporate governance, maximising profit is promoted as 
‘the acme of managerial achievement’, whereas long-term orientations or social concerns are 
not valued.1642 
 
On the other hand, independent directors who are endowed with the duty to monitor executives 
to make sure shareholder interests are prioritised have another function under the mainstream 
model. Ireland has demonstrated how the ‘outside’, ‘independent’, or ‘non-executive’ directors 
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have been instrumental in disseminating the ‘shareholder value culture’ in boards in the UK.1643 
Thus, the independent directors play an important role in ensuring the shareholder-primacy 
mentality is rooted within the company. The significance of independent directors in the context 
of Turkey should also be viewed in this light. The recent reforms mandate that at least one-third 
of listed company boards must be composed of independent non-executive directors.1644 
Studies, however, have shown that the presence of independent directors has lowered the 
performance of Turkish companies.1645 However, the primary function of independent directors 
in Turkish companies appears to be unrelated to their contribution to performance; instead, their 
main purpose is to curb controlling owners’ influence over the boards. In 2006, when 
independent directors were not mandatory under the CMB Principles, the OECD had 
commented on the desirability of independent boards in Turkish companies:  
 
in many companies, the lead controlling shareholder, or shareholders, informally decide 
on nominees with very little or no input either from other board members or 
constituencies within the company. […] Although minority shareholders are not 
restricted from speaking up at meetings, they have limited power to influence the 
election of board members or cause board members to be removed.1646  
 
This highlights the role assigned to the independent boards and their ability to further minority 
interests, which effectively means pursuing the singular objective of increasing shareholder 
wealth. Similarly, there is the fear that a board that is unresponsive to shareholders may pursue 
goals that are not in interests of the majority nor minority shareholders.1647 Indeed, in the post-
war era, company officials gained a degree of autonomy from the shareholders, which allowed 
them to use discretion to form a compromise between labour and the power of capital.1648 
Although it is highly doubtful that executives would act similarly under the neoliberal climate 
of the current business world, the mainstream governance model ensures that the boards are 
solely responsive to shareholders. In sum, in advocating a board composed of independent 
directors, the contemporary interpretation of independence seems to suggest independence from 
the controlling owners only. As long as the board acts in accordance with the shareholder 
primacy norm and for the common interests of the shareholders as a class, then they will have 
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fulfilled the independence criteria. The same is true of professional management; as long as the 
dominant economic view in companies are informed by the neoliberal ideology and its 
extension of the mainstream corporate governance model, managers will only seek to maximise 
shareholder value.1649 
 
On the other hand, the limited liability and the unrestricted transferability features of the joint-
stock company form not only provide liquidity to the company share, but also grant shareholders 
the ability to diversify their investment.1650 The dispersed ownership structure further enhances 
the mobile character of capital by creating opportunities for surplus creation across multiple 
locations without being tied down to a certain place or a production process. From a Marxist 
lens, dispersed ownership structure is seen as ‘a means to mobilize the ever-increasing amount 
of capital needed for accumulation.’1651 Indeed, the mobile character of the share coupled with 
the liberalisation and dispersal of stock markets have made it much easier for global investors 
to use near-instant transactions to enter and exit the company and the market. The priority 
accorded to shareholder interests in corporate governance is similarly justified on the basis that 
they are exposed to the greatest risk as residual owners. However, this argument is invalid 
because global investors are mainly institutional investors who reduce their risk by 
diversification.1652 Overall, the availability and the ease of exit options from the company, 
facilitated through the specific characteristics of the joint-stock company, have further 
strengthened the power of the investor class compared to the stakeholders.1653 
 
It is true that stakeholders cannot exit the company as easily as shareholders. Amongst the 
various stakeholders, creditors are generally accorded priority and protected by laws because 
they are regarded as ‘crucially affected’ by the limited liability of shareholders.1654 The logic of 
the capitalist relations of production also protects creditors more than the rest of the stakeholders 
because creditors are the providers of capital. Other stakeholders such as the employees, 
suppliers, consumers, the environment, and the society in which the company operates are all 
bound with the company at varying levels but share the trait of having greater vested interests 
in the continuity of the business than the dispersed shareholders. Furthermore, they are all 
affected by how the company chooses to conduct business, and if they are harmed as a result of 
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company operations they usually have limited or no exit options. Controlling owners are similar 
to stakeholders in that they are tied to the company because they own large stakes or made 
contributions beyond the financial to the company. As Hilferding has noted, shareholders can 
recover their capital investment in the company at any time by selling their share or receiving 
dividends as long as they are in the position of ‘money capitalist’.1655 On the other hand, the 
industrial capitalists (the controlling shareholders in this case) cannot withdraw their capital as 
easily. In sum, while the global investors’ downside is limited by the amount of their 
investment, the rest of the company constituencies must shoulder the responsibility and bear the 
negative consequences should the business go bankrupt. 
 
The case for employees as a stakeholder group merits further discussion. Even though 
capitalism regards an employment contract as the outcome of a bargain amongst equal parties, 
in reality, employees usually cannot enforce their terms on the employer. The unequal 
bargaining power of the employee stems from the competitive labour market, which is a result 
of the neoliberal policies that shifted the government policy focus away from unemployment.1656 
The result is an abundant workforce that is ready to work whenever or under whatever 
conditions imposed by the employer. This has been made possible through the weakening of 
organised labour vis-à-vis capital, which ensures cheap labour.1657 As a result, the exit options 
of employees are significantly restricted. They cannot easily leave the company they work for 
because their livelihood usually depends on it. Jobs have become extremely scarce in the 
competitive labour market; as Williamson has put it, ‘few workers can simply leave one job and 
walk into another.’1658 Also, employees generally commit themselves to a certain geographical 
location,1659 which limits their pool of accessible jobs and exit opportunities. Finally, the 
employees will have invested their time and resources into acquiring skills and education 
specific to that company, which may not transferable.1660 Hence, employees are placed in a 
relatively powerless position in the company that is exacerbated by the competitive and flexible 
labour markets. 1661 Indeed, the flexibility of labour is an important component of the reduction 
of the power of labour over capital in the neoliberal capitalist system. Neoliberalism has 
advanced the idea that employees are a ‘mere factor of production’ to create the norm of the 
‘disposable worker’.1662 Similarly, the shareholder primacy proponents rely on a flexible 
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workforce because they are concerned with reducing the cost of labour.1663 This leads to greater 
exploitation of the worker but allows more surplus value to accrue to the shareholders, which 
is desirable for capitalist interests. 
 
At the end of 2017, the unemployment rate of the total labour force in Turkey stood at 
11.26%.1664 This figure is very high compared with the OECD average of 5.78%, considering 
that Turkey is also included in the calculation of this average.1665 Furthermore, the Prime 
Minister of Turkey has also commented that the Turkish economy is finding it hard to employ 
the increasing number of university graduates.1666 Indeed, the unemployment figures for the 
young population aged between 15-24 reached over 21% by the end of 2017.1667 Despite the 
stark picture, Turkey’s labour market is not regarded to be competitive enough. According to 
the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index, Turkey ranks 111th out of 140 
countries on the overall score for the competitiveness of its labour market. Unsurprisingly, the 
United States, which prides itself on its competitive economy, is indicated as the ‘Best 
Performer’ under this category.1668 The lack of competitiveness of the Turkish labour market 
may be attributed to its corporate sector being dominated by family-owned companies and their 
commitments to employees and society. 
 
It is also interesting to note that the unions in Turkey have kept quiet over the recent reforms of 
corporate governance. This could be attributed to the 2010-2012 passing of the new laws on 
unions and social insurance that were criticised heavily by the worker unions.1669 The practical 
rules in these pieces of legislation may have diverted their attention away from the more detailed 
corporate governance provisions in CMB communiques onto the more practical rules contained 
in these laws. At the same time, another plausible explanation is the socio-cultural traits found 
in the Turkish business environment that dictates a steep hierarchy, subordinating the employees 
to their ‘leaders’.1670 As a result, employees feel they have no say in company decisions. This 
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is also related to the predominant traits of paternalism and patriarchy in Turkish society, which 
lead to employees believing that the company owners will have their best interest in mind. 1671 
 
Indeed, it can be argued that family-controlled companies in Turkey, which account for the 
majority of listed companies, are better positioned than dispersed shareholders to consider the 
interests of their employees and other stakeholders. For several reasons, companies run by 
families tend to have greater incentives to pursue societal goals alongside their profit-making 
objective.1672 For instance, Danielsen has noted that ‘locally owned national firms might have 
more of a stake in things like the quality of the local environment, the strength of the local 
economy, the education and training of local labour pool and national economic development 
through capital reinvestment.’1673 Also, family owners are generally located close to where the 
company operations take place. Due to this proximity, they have a close relationship with 
employees, suppliers, consumers, and society generally. Although it can be argued that the 
proximity factor has weakened due to the growth of multinational companies, this is not the 
case in Turkey; there are only 13 multinational companies owned by Turkish families,1674 and 
the majority of family companies are still located in their area of operations.  
 
On the other hand, outside shareholders usually have no physical connection or proximity to a 
company, which distances them from any moral obligation towards its stakeholders. As a result, 
outside investors may only lose a portion of their capital invested in the company, which is 
usually the extent of their concerns.1675 This is particularly relevant when company operations 
pose a moral hazard for the environment that would directly affect the domestic owners that are 
located there and possibly their future generations but would not impact foreign investors. 
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Additionally, family owners tend to regard themselves as the ‘guardians of the firm’s 
reputation’.1676 Turkey is a case on point; its companies are usually represented by the last names 
of their owners, which creates reputational links with the company and family. This name 
recognition imbues the owner family with a stronger sense of responsibility and accountability 
towards the public, which can lead to a more stakeholder-oriented approach in governance.  
 
Sociocultural traits have also been one of the main factors shaping corporate governance 
practices in Turkey.1677 With respect to Turkish companies, the OECD has noted that ‘families 
run their companies not just with profit interests in mind, but also with pride and 
commitment.’1678 Buğra has conducted interviews with the owners of the largest companies in 
Turkey and found that family owners appear to lack confidence about the legitimacy of 
businesses that are undertaken solely for profit.1679 Accordingly, Turkish businessmen are 
somewhat apologetic for their companies’ success and often try to highlight their business’ 
positive impact on the society.1680 Moreover, business relationships in Turkey are generally built 
on trust within the company and in relationships with the stakeholders because family 
companies take pride in their social capital.1681 Therefore, family companies in Turkey tend to 
act as ‘social establishments’ that build schools, universities, and hospitals for the public 
good.1682 The family owned companies in Turkey are more akin to a public entity that serves 
society; however, a widely dispersed company, especially one that is owned by global investors, 
would no longer have the capacity or interest to treat stakeholders responsibly unless it serves 
the shareholders’ interest by maximising profit. 
 
The difference in ownership structures also reflects an important choice in terms of 
management’s orientation. Villiers has argued that the hierarchical structure found in large 
dispersed companies replaces ‘paternalistic corporate heads’ who have a sense of responsibility 
to their society with ‘more economically driven, more coldly rational’ managers.1683 This stance 
reflects the advantages of Turkish controlling owners as discussed above. Engelen has also 
noted that if a company is not widely dispersed and has controlling shareholders, it tends to 
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have long-term and integrated objectives instead of a speculative orientation.1684 Cliff and 
Jennings have found that family owners are more committed and long-term oriented.1685 Ireland 
has also argued that  
 
the rootedness and relative lack of mobility of this more ‘committed’ capital also 
enhances the status and bargaining position of non-shareholding groups, facilitating 
both a more relational and more stakeholder-oriented conception of the corporation – 
with longer term productive and strategic horizons – an a more ‘welfarist’ version of 
capitalism.1686  
 
Indeed, in a recent survey, the executives of listed companies from countries with different 
ownership structures were questioned on their views of their companies’ priorities. The results 
were as follows:  
 
In the UK and the US 70-80% of executives thought their companies’ interests were 
essentially shareholder-oriented. In the case of France and Germany, those figures were 
about 20%, while 80% thought their companies’ interests were aligned with 
stakeholders broadly speaking.1687  
 
When companies are run by professional management, they tend to adopt a short-term approach 
and conduct risky activities to acquire the highest possible returns for shareholders and for 
themselves through performance-related compensation plans. This approach encourages 
management ‘to neglect the long term and reap immediate benefit from short-term focused 
actions that may have long-term adverse consequences.’1688 In the end, short-termism affects 
not only the shareholders and managers who pursue it but also the stakeholders, the economy, 
and society at large. This is clear from the recent global financial crisis.  
 
Family controlled companies are also recommended because they provide better performance, 
especially due to their ability to reduce the agency problem as they have ‘a monitoring 
advantage’.1689 Accordingly, owner families maximise company value by diminishing agency 
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costs because ‘the family’s welfare is so closely linked to firm performance.’1690 Gurarda Ozsoz 
and Ates have asserted: 
 
Family-owners acting as managers for a long time also tend to develop comparative 
advantage through capital increases and searching for new investment opportunities 
compared to other nonfamily managers aiming for short-term profits. Thus, […] long-
term orientation of the family owner reduces agent cost and lead to better performance 
outcomes.1691  
 
The OECD has provided empirical evidence from Swiss family companies to illustrate that they 
performed better than other companies.1692 The ‘superior performance of family firms’ has been 
found to be particularly true in the case of emerging markets.1693 Nevertheless, I do not argue 
that family controlled companies perform better than companies with dispersed ownership; my 
point is that they are better stewards for the interests of their stakeholders and do not solely 
focus on profit. In sum, the presence of ‘soft factors’1694 in the Turkish context and the sake of 
more stakeholder-oriented governance may justify preserving the family control of listed 
companies rather than professional management. 
 
All in all, Turkey’s new corporate governance framework is poised to convert to the wide-share 
dispersal model due to the increasing share of foreign investors in the BIST and the slow but 
steady increase in the free-float ratios of listed companies. These developments occurred 
alongside the increased legal shareholder protections that provide rights to minority 
shareholders that empower them over controlling owners. Furthermore, the imposition of the 
independence requirement on the majority of the board members signifies a change of control 
of listed companies from domestic families to professionals. This effectively means restoring 
global capital’s power to discipline companies and subjecting management to pursuing the 
profit maximisation objective.1695 In this setting, any costs are externalised onto ‘dominated 
social classes and countries’ in search of global capital’s higher rate of return.1696 From a 
Marxist lens, the imposition of the shareholder wealth maximisation agenda becomes possible 
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because the global investor class ‘collectively holds shares of corporate ownership sufficiently 
concentrated to permit it to monopolize the power of assignment and disposition of the means 
of production and to use this power for its specific class interests, i.e. to produce and realize 
surplus-value.’1697 Indeed, dispersed ownership does not mean the dispersal of wealth among 
more people; it means the concentration of power and wealth in the hands of a smaller and more 
prominent group of capitalists, which leads to further inequality. 
4 Conclusions 
 
The first part of the chapter analysed whether the mainstream model of corporate governance 
has been incorporated into Turkish laws through the recent reforms. The OECD Principles have 
been utilised as the reference point for the mainstream model because they represent the 
cornerstone of the neoliberal shareholder primacy model. The OECD Principles closely 
resemble the market-centric outsider model of wide share dispersal. Thus, the imposition of the 
mainstream corporate governance model on emerging markets ‘acts to recreate the existing 
power structures of the neoliberal market-centric system.’1698 This perspective makes clear the 
raison d’etre of the Turkish corporate governance reforms. Turkish companies are defined by 
an insider model where ownership and control are concentrated in owner families through group 
company structures. The adoption of corporate governance rules based on a different system 
that does not correspond to Turkish companies’ particular challenges suggests that the reforms 
intended to create conditions that were favourable for the global investors. Because of this, 
Turkish companies were reluctant to implement the voluntary CMB Principles.1699 Therefore, a 
stringent legal reform process was undertaken with the radical move of imposing mandatory 
corporate governance principles on listed companies to ensure they abided by the exigencies of 
the neoliberal mainstream model. 
 
The OECD’s Pilot Study has been instrumental in assessing whether Turkey has been successful 
in conforming to the mainstream model. This report was published during the drafting stage of 
the relevant legislation and is a roadmap to the IFI’s expectations of Turkey because the OECD 
Principles constitute the corporate governance module of the ROSCs. The OECD has stated that 
its principles can be used by policymakers to develop legal and regulatory corporate governance 
frameworks which ‘reflect their own economic, social, legal and cultural circumstances, and by 
market participants as they develop their own practices.’1700 Talbot has argued that this stance 
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‘represents a dialectical relationship between the ideal (neoliberal shareholder primacy) and the 
compromise (individual countries’ cultural context), which is expressed in corporate 
governance codes.’1701 However, instead of accepting Turkey’s specific circumstances and 
ownership structure, the OECD has attempted to dictate its own corporate governance standards 
by using its Pilot Study to grade Turkey with scores that range from ‘Fully Implemented’ to 
‘Not Implemented’. Soederberg has argued that  
 
the OECD contradicts this sensitivity of national specificities by insisting not only that 
'universal' standards exist, such as fairness, transparency, accountability and 
responsibility, but also that they can be applied across a broad range of legal, political 
and economic environments.1702  
 
For instance, the OECD’s ‘universal’ principle of fairness only refers to the equal treatment of 
minority and majority shareholders, whereas in the Turkish context, the controlling 
shareholders counterbalance the contingencies of neoliberalism and its dogma of shareholder 
value maximisation. These controlling shareholders provide a cushion for the stakeholders and 
society by ensuring that the listed companies not only work towards securing returns for 
investors through increased share prices and dividends but also contribute to society and the 
economy in manners other than the financial.  
 
In sum, Turkish corporate governance laws have undergone extensive reforms aimed at 
strengthening the position of minority shareholders vis-à-vis the controlling owners and 
introducing mandatory principles to establish professional management and independent 
boards. Moreover, the reforms introduce rules specifically designed to facilitate foreign 
shareholder participation such as the requirement for online general assembly meetings and 
electronic voting for listed companies. These rules aim to increase the influence of foreign 
shareholders in company decision-making. Meanwhile, the shareholder primacy norm is 
maintained both in company law provisions and the CMB Principles. Within the CMB 
Principles, mandatory rules are found only under the ‘Shareholders’ and ‘Board of Directors’ 
headings. The mandatory principles under Shareholders and the relevant TCC articles seek to 
increase the involvement of non-controlling shareholders in decision-making by facilitating 
their access to information, right to representation, and right to elect board members. Binding 
rules for the BoDs ensure that independent directors are dominant in listed company boards to 
restrict the influence of family owners over the company.  
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All in all, the new corporate governance framework is thus a clear attempt by the legislators to 
reallocate the power from controlling owners to professional management that pursues the 
interests of dispersed shareholders. Since domestic investors constitute a small part of the 
outside shareholder base in the Turkish stock market, the laws effectively focus on foreign 
investors. Additionally, the reforms on corporate governance remain quiet on the issue of 
stakeholder rights; the CMB Principles on stakeholders are all non-binding. This accords with 
the bottom line of the mainstream model, which essentially lacks any ‘social substance’.1703 
Overall, the chapter concludes that Turkey has indeed gone mainstream in the area of corporate 
governance by adopting the fundamentals of the OECD Principles. 
 
Nevertheless, the prevalent ownership structure and the presence of controlling family owners 
have been perceived to be obstacles for securing the interests of global investors in Turkey. This 
is because ownership concentration prevents the development of stock markets, thus hindering 
the liquidity and mobility aspects of the company share. However, these features of the 
company share are necessary for the capitalists ‘to increase their opportunities to search out 
surplus value by keeping their wealth as fluid as possible.’1704 Investing in economically and 
politically volatile emerging markets provides investors with the opportunity to receive high 
returns on their capital, and a widely diffused stock market reduces their risk because the capital 
remains liquid. Second, when making portfolio investments, capitalists need the assurance that 
companies will only pursue the shareholder wealth maximisation objective. This objective 
requires externalising all costs onto stakeholders so that the return to investors can be 
maximised. Turkey’s new corporate governance framework addresses both of these ‘problems’. 
It has already led to an increase in the number and value of foreign holdings of BIST-listed 
shares, as is evident from the figures pre-and-post reforms. This indicates that the overhaul in 
corporate governance laws has created a more favourable investment environment for foreign 
shareholders. The value of foreign investor holdings in Turkish companies is expected to further 
increase as the implementation of the new rules becomes widespread over time. 
 
These developments suggest that the corporate governance reforms targeted the concentrated 
ownership structure of Turkish companies. Indeed, dispersal of large block holdings accelerated 
once the new legislation on corporate governance was enacted. It is thus reasonable to assume 
that owner families with majority holdings will also start selling their stakes because incentives 
to hold on to control will be mostly removed. This is because of the laws limiting their influence 
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in the company and the possibility of receiving high premiums once Turkish stocks become 
more attractive for outsiders. This theoretical assumption is supported by the arguments 
presented in the ‘law matters’ theory, which is that increased legal protection of minority 
shareholders is conducive to the transformation to diffused ownership. Indeed, the findings of 
La Porta and others ‘suggest that dispersion of ownership goes together with good shareholder 
protection, which enables controlling shareholders to divest at attractive prices.’1705  
 
The ‘law matters’ theory supports the supremacy of the outsider model and the law reforms that 
focus on shareholder interests.1706 Accordingly, the theory claims that ‘under optimal 
conditions, the best arrangement for corporate enterprise is a widely held professionally 
managed firm.’1707 This resonates with neoliberal ideology, which advances the view that 
‘economic efficiencies will necessarily result from the adoption of its ideal type of corporate 
governance of dispersed share ownership, fluid markets and a professional management 
charged with the pursuit of shareholder value.’1708 However, I do not agree with the claims that 
corporate structures and governance models will eventually converge into a ‘superior’ model 
by the virtue of economic forces.1709 Instead, I argue that this model is not an economic necessity 
but instead the result of an ideological project to assert the power of global capital in emerging 
markets, where corporate governance laws are used to serve a particular class interest. However, 
I do not insist that a transformation towards diffused ownership will definitely occur because 
there are a multitude of factors that can impede the convergence of ownership structures.1710 
Whether the Turkish corporate landscape will converge into a dispersed market-centric model 
remains to be seen. 
 
Finally, the implication from the above arguments is that family owners will lose their 
controlling position in the company to professional management. This will align company 
objectives with the interests of dispersed shareholders because management under the 
mainstream model ‘implicitly treats shareholders as a homogeneous group with identical 
interest’,1711 where that interest is the exclusive pursuit of profit. Hence, if companies are to 
distribute all earnings as dividends and follow short-term strategies to increase share price at all 
                                                     
1705 La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer, 'Corporate Ownership Around the World’ (n 31) 496. 
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Bebchuk and Roe, 'A Theory of Path Dependence' (n 1500); MJ Roe, 'Political Preconditions to 
Separating Ownership from Corporate Control' (2000) 53(3) Stanford Law Rev 539; Roe, Political 
Determinants of Corporate Governance (n 1514). 
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costs, they must underinvest in research and development, reduce output quality, lower the 
salaries and working conditions of their employees, and possibly cause harm to the 
environment. These measures risk the long-term sustainability of the company. This also 
deteriorates the company’s relationship with its stakeholders because it becomes harder ‘to 
attract dedicated employees, loyal customers, cooperative suppliers, and support from local 
communities’.1712 Thus, an economy dominated by companies with dispersed shareholders is 
more likely to operate for the sole benefit of the global investor class alone and to the detriment 
of stakeholders and society at large.  
 
Moreover, share dispersal does not foster economic growth and create equality in the society; 
instead, it leads to an ‘increasing tendency for economic power in the corporation to be held by 
an increasingly smaller elite’.1713 As Ireland notes, the shareholder primacy norm thus intends 
to promote ‘the primacy of a small, privileged elite; the primacy of the wealthiest ten 
percent’.1714 Therefore, the adoption of the mainstream corporate governance model in Turkey 
will benefit the wealthiest class of global investors by facilitating the penetration of the 
country’s ownership and control structures to make Turkish companies, its stakeholders, and 
society more suitable for exploitation. From a broader perspective, as Talbot has summed up, 
‘investor capitalism mediated through dispersed shareholding and professional management 
simply clarifies the underlying dynamics of capitalism’.1715 
 
  
                                                     
1712 Ibid 2016. 
1713 Talbot, Critical Company Law (n 128) 39 
1714 Ireland, 'Shareholder Primacy and the Distribution of Wealth' (n 34) 67. 
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CHAPTER VII – Conclusions 
 
1 Summarising and Restating the Arguments 
 
The corporate governance laws of a country are of utmost importance for not just the companies 
but also the economy and everyone in society because the laws determine the allocation of the 
vast wealth produced by company operations. It is this power that the companies possess that 
engenders debates over the purpose of the company. The orthodox view holds that companies 
exist to maximise the wealth of their shareholders and thereby indirectly maximise aggregate 
social wealth. Others have argued that companies ought to have a broader goal of serving 
societal interests. These debates are unpinned by ideology, which shapes preferences for a 
particular model of corporate governance. Today, the neoliberal paradigm informs the corporate 
governance structures of many developed capitalist nations and beyond with its pretence of 
shareholder primacy and wealth maximisation as the sole purposes of the company. This model 
has become mainstream globally through international organisations’ dissemination of its 
supposedly universal values across emerging markets. In this light, the thesis set out to analyse 
the reasons, methods, and implications of Turkey’s adoption of the mainstream model of 
corporate governance along with its recent legal reforms. 
 
The starting point of the reforms in Turkey has been its underdeveloped stock market and 
reliance on foreign capital. To attract foreign investors, Turkey has overhauled its company and 
capital markets legislation and issued various regulations to create a corporate governance 
framework suitable for the interests of the outside investors. Although the reform process has 
been portrayed as a necessary precondition for economic growth, this thesis demonstrated that 
it has instead been driven by IFIs through either the conditions stipulated in return for financial 
assistance or the imposition of corporate governance standards backed by the implicit threats of 
capital flight or investment strikes in cases of non-compliance. The latter has been assumed by 
the OECD Principles, which promotes an Anglo-American model of governance predicated on 
the neoliberal efficiency assumption of widely dispersed and liquid stock markets that subject 
managers to the shareholder primacy norm. As Soederberg has remarked, all mainstream 
theorisations ‘speak on behalf of certain interests’.1716 
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Indeed, the reason that the Anglo-American model became the mainstream variant, despite the 
fact that its corporate system is the exception around the world,1717 cannot be solely attributed 
to these countries’ economic performance.1718 Instead, the explanation lies in an understanding 
of whose interests the mainstream model intends to serve. As the joint-stock company is a 
primary organisation of production in capitalist societies, this requires examination of the 
underlying dynamics and class relations in capitalism. To that end, this thesis employed a 
Marxist critical framework to analyse the raison d’etre of the Turkish corporate governance law 
reforms. This aspect of the research indicates its unique contribution to the legal scholarship on 
corporate governance in Turkey since previous studies on this topic have remained within the 
confines of black-letter research. Thus, the thesis has a transformative purpose because it 
questions the common-sense assumptions prevalent in the legal study of corporate governance 
instead of accepting its norms as a given. Although this thesis is limited to analysing the case 
of Turkey, its findings can be interpreted in the broader context of other emerging market 
nations and the role of law in promoting the neoliberal capitalist logic in these markets for 
advancing certain class interests. 
 
Viewing law through a Marxist lens indicates that it reproduces the capitalist relations of 
production and thus becomes an apparatus to serve the interests of the dominant class in the 
society. Within this theoretical framework, Chapter 2 laid out the backbone of the analysis of 
how the legal ‘reconceptualization of the company share’1719 has allowed the capitalists to 
circumvent the production process and thereby assign liquidity and mobility features to capital, 
transforming it into ‘money capital’ en route to greater profit accumulation. The elaboration of 
this process helps to explain the mainstream corporate governance model’s insistence on 
developed stock markets with widely dispersed shareholdings as a necessity for sustaining the 
circuit of money capital on a global level. On the other hand, certain legal constructs, such as 
the legal right to property, have been instrumental in concealing and commodifying the relations 
of production and the related power struggles. In particular, the private ownership of the means 
of production has enabled the capitalists to assert their dominance over the labour class. This 
view finds expression in corporate governance’s misleading perception that ‘shareholders own 
the company’ or that ‘shareholders own the capital’ in the contractual model, thus justifying the 
primacy of shareholders in the company.1720 Moreover, through contract laws, market 
                                                     
1717 According to the research by La Porta et al. dispersed shareholding structure is found to be the 
exception, rather than the norm around the world. In La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer, 'Corporate 
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in American corporate and economic performance’ in Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth (n 8) 105. 
1719 Ireland, 'The Conceptual Foundations of Modern Company Law' (n 181) 152. 
1720 Dine and Koutsias, The Nature of Corporate Governance (n 5) 63. 
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exchanges are assumed to take place between equal parties. However, these laws are a veil 
which projects formal equality but obscures the unequal power of the market participants. This 
point finds its most stark expression in employment contracts. Companies are able to command 
the terms of employment contract as a result of the asymmetry in bargaining positions and 
maintain that power throughout the employment relationship.1721 Hence, the profit accruing to 
the capitalist is a result of the exploitation of labour and the externalisation of costs onto 
stakeholders, which is made possible by this power disparity. 
 
In a similar vein, the mainstream corporate governance model that advocates for management 
to focus on maximising shareholder wealth is also a representation of the relative power of 
shareholders vis-à-vis the other company stakeholders. On an international level, the global 
investors appear to be a class unified under the common goal of receiving the highest possible 
return on their investments. Unlike controlling domestic owners, stakeholders, society, and even 
certain states, the position of global investors has been facilitated by the mobility of the 
company share, which provides global investors with easy exit options that allow them to dictate 
their demands to other groups. To this end, the neoliberal policies of deregulation, market, and 
capital liberalisation have enabled investor capitalists to gain cohesion on a global scale and 
provide further liquidity for them to wield their power.1722 In this light, the neoliberal agenda 
can be seen as ‘an attempt to capture the momentary historical gains of global and mobile capital 
and fix them institutionally’.1723 In line with this agenda, mainstream corporate governance laws 
have played an important role in ensuring that global investors dictate how the company will be 
managed or how the profits will be allocated, thereby securing their position as the recipient of 
all surplus value. 
 
Indeed, the historical narrative provided in Chapter 3 illustrates how the shareholder primacy 
theory managed to become the orthodoxy in corporate governance due to the relative power that 
capitalists gained over labour in line with the rise of neoliberal ideology. By elaborating on 
these developments, the chapter sought to shed light on the reasons that led Turkey to adhere to 
the mainstream variant in constructing its corporate governance framework. As Berle and 
Means have pointed out, by the post-war era in the United States, large companies were 
characterised by a separation of ownership from control.1724 In the context of the United 
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Kingdom, Ireland has illustrated how this separation has been accompanied by the economic 
and legal transformation of the nature of the company share and the creation of a developed 
stock market through changes in law.1725 Overall, the distancing of the shareholders from the 
company had the effects of undermining the shareholders’ claims to company profits and 
transferring their control to the managerial class. Thus, the period between the post-war to the 
late 1970s has been defined as the managerial corporate governance era in the United States. 
During this time, the dominant view amongst policy-makers, businesses, and society was that 
public companies ought to pursue societal goals and that managers hence had a duty to consider 
a multitude of interests in running companies, including the public interest.1726 This mentality 
reflected the social compromise between the capitalists and labour that had been achieved in 
the post-war climate, aided by the Keynesian economic and fiscal policies that elevated the 
position of labour by reducing unemployment as a primary policy goal. Yet, the deteriorating 
macroeconomic conditions from the late 1960s onwards not only weakened the position of 
labour but also cast doubts on the viability of the Keynesian model and managerial corporate 
governance. This backdrop created an opportunity to assert neoliberal policies with the 
objective of restoring the capitalist class’ claims to revenues and power.1727  
 
Subsequently, understandings of corporate governance were redefined by the reassertion of 
shareholder power and the managers’ subordination to the shareholder interests.1728 This was 
aided in part by the increasing power of institutional investors, with the result that shareholders 
collectively became much more influential in asserting their demands to management. The 
managers’ performance criteria were tied down to share price, pay structures linked their 
interest directly with the shareholders’, and there was an active market for corporate control. 
The result was a shift in perceptions from the managerial era, and the creed of shareholder 
primacy started to take centre stage in corporate governance. The shareholder-centric corporate 
governance model relied on various justifications to assert shareholder entitlement to having 
companies run in their interests. These justifications were broadly based on efficiency grounds 
or on the misleading perception that shareholders were the owners of the company. The law and 
economics scholarship prescribed corporate governance as an answer to the agency problem by 
aligning the interests of managers with those of shareholders so that the former could 
exclusively pursue shareholder wealth maximisation. The proponents of this solution attempted 
to reduce the complex set of corporate governance issues to a simple conflict of interest, thereby 
                                                     
1725 Ireland, 'Capitalism without the Capitalist' (n 294); Ireland, 'The Conceptual Foundations of Modern 
Company Law' (n 181). 
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concealing the power struggles found in corporate governance underlain by the competing 
interests of various company stakeholders. 
 
Indeed, the law and economics scholarship excludes stakeholders other than shareholders from 
the scope of corporate governance due the claim that other stakeholders are sufficiently 
protected through their mutual contracts with the company. Neoclassical economic theory holds 
that a rational actor will only enter a bargain that will be to their benefit.1729 The argument goes 
that because the company is a legal fiction composed of various contracts between the company 
and its constituents,1730 only the shareholders as the residual risk-takers deserve to have their 
interests prioritised over others since their returns are not guaranteed.1731 In contrast, the 
stakeholder theory is an alternative to the shareholder primacy norm and envisaged a corporate 
governance model where broader interests are taken into account in management 
considerations.1732 Nevertheless, by the start of the 21st century, scholars had rigorously asserted 
shareholder primacy with its ‘strong corporate management with duties to serve the interests of 
shareholders alone, as well as strong minority shareholder protections […] has established the 
ideological hegemony’.1733 
 
Despite the claims that the triumph of the shareholder primacy theory has been secured by ‘out-
competing’ other models of corporate governance,1734 this thesis draws a different picture of 
how it was imposed on the rest of the world through IFIs to serve dominant capitalist interests, 
thereby becoming the corporate governance model that is globally mainstream. It demonstrates 
that this was a necessary process in implementing the objectives of the Washington Consensus 
agenda, which prescribed a market-based and shareholder-oriented restructuring of the 
corporate governance system of emerging markets to allow ‘greater penetration of the region 
by foreign capital’.1735 Moreover, the neoliberal policies sought to break through national 
conditions to impose their own objectives on other countries as global norms.1736 In the area of 
corporate governance, the OECD Principles have been instrumental in marketing Anglo-
American derived values into emerging markets in the form of universal standards. 
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Although the OECD Principles lack any binding power, they are implicitly coercive. This is 
firstly because a country’s implementation of good corporate governance affects investors’ 
decisions.1737 Second, the international mobility of capital enables global investors to exit a 
country when the domestic market conditions no longer serve their interests. This shields the 
foreign investors from any losses but also compels countries to provide regimes suitable for the 
preservation of foreign capital flows. As Beck has emphasised, it is the ‘threat of non-invasion 
of investors, or the threat of their withdrawal, that constitutes the means of coercion’.1738 In turn, 
foreign capital-dependent countries are left with little autonomy to shape their national 
corporate governance laws. Viewed in this light, as Soederberg has argued on point, the OECD 
Principles conceal the ideological and biased nature of its governance rules by creating the 
illusion of ‘consensus formation’ amongst its members for the adoption of ‘the Anglo-American 
variant’ of corporate governance in national contexts.1739 
 
The detailed analysis of Turkey’s reform process presented in Chapters 4 and 5 illustrate the 
ways in which Turkish corporate governance laws have conformed to the mainstream model as 
instructed by the OECD. In general, the new legislation places shareholders at its core1740 and 
accordingly introduces mechanisms to subject managerial discretion to shareholder interests. 
Although Turkish company law stipulates that management duties are to be performed in line 
with the company’s interest,1741 because the Anglo-American system is emulated in the overall 
corporate governance framework, the company’s interest echoes the interest of shareholders as 
a class. Shareholders’ interests are assumed to be share price increases and the distribution of 
dividends. Other stakeholders are considered only in terms of the transparency principle, and 
their rights are regarded as adequately protected through the relevant legislation and their 
private contracts with the company. Although the CMB has made certain corporate governance 
principles mandatory for listed companies, principles concerning stakeholders, such as their 
participation in management, are left as voluntary recommendations. This is in line with the 
mainstream model, which effectively side lines any consideration other than profit 
maximisation because they are considered to be costs to the company.1742 Finally, even though 
the legislators have identified the main reason for the reforms in company law and corporate 
governance to be the EU accession process, it is clear that the EU’s approach to the matter is 
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similar to what the OECD perceives to be good governance, despite the different governance 
models adopted throughout the European nations. 
 
Moreover, the OECD disregards national conditions and highlights the importance of minority 
shareholder protection as the benchmark of good corporate governance.1743 In countries like 
Turkey, where the prevailing company structure is concentrated ownership, these rules seek to 
strengthen the position of outside shareholders against domestic controlling owners by reducing 
the latter’s influence over the company in favour of the interests of foreign investors. Turkey’s 
new legal framework has been constructed in this direction. The position of the minority 
shareholders vis-à-vis the controlling owners has been augmented with increased rights and 
protections as well as with provisions that limit the controlling owners’ influence over boards 
of directors and the management. This is materialised through the introduction of principles 
such as the equal treatment of all shareholders into company law and rules that facilitate the 
exercise of minority shareholders’ control rights. The new rules also envisage minority 
shareholders appointing board members and introduce special proxy arrangements allowing 
those shareholders to form a collective voice. Last but not least, the mandatory CMB Principles 
impose strict independent board member criteria on listed companies, which implies an 
anticipated power shift from owners to outsiders. This is because non-executive independent 
directors and professional management are the cornerstones of the Anglo-American corporate 
system, which allows these institutions to focus solely on shareholder wealth maximisation. 
Overall, the new laws curtail the power of controlling family owners in Turkish listed 
companies in favour of outside shareholders. 
 
However, while Turkey has attempted to provide a legal framework suitable for minority 
shareholders, it imposed a set of rules which fail to address the corporate governance issues 
faced by its companies. An example of this would be the supposed ‘power gap’ caused by the 
uninterested shareholders in listed companies, which then required that the new corporate 
governance laws focus on ensuring shareholder democracy.1744 To that end, the new TCC 
imposed an obligation on listed companies to hold general assembly meetings and voting 
through electronic means, which are specifically designed to increase the involvement of 
foreign investors in the companies’ decision-making.1745 The presence of controlling owners 
                                                     
1743 OECD, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2004 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development 2004) 12 
1744 TCC with Justifications (n 104) 95. 
1745 TCC Article 1527. Between the period when the TCC came into effect in 2012 until the end of 2015, 
investors from 48 different countries have participated in the online general assembly meetings of Turkish 
listed companies, in Central Securities Depository of Turkey (MKK), 'E-Genel Kurul: Elektronik Genel 
Kurul Sistemi (E-General Assembly System)' <https://www.mkk.com.tr/tr/content/Yatirimci-
Hizmetleri/e-GENEL-KURUL> accessed 24 November 2017. 
261 
 
and their active involvement in company affairs invalidate the claim that there is a power gap 
in Turkish companies. Indeed, the phenomenon of uninterested shareholders emerged due to 
the separation of ownership from control found in countries with dispersed shareholdings, 
which is not the case in Turkey. This point overtly reflects the misfit between the new corporate 
governance reforms and the circumstances surrounding Turkish companies. The reforms 
addressing the lack of shareholder involvement also serves two interrelated purposes: first, by 
claiming to maintain shareholder democracy, it provides greater opportunities for outside 
investors to influence the company management, thus incentivising minority ownership in 
Turkish companies. Second, it creates the perception that small investors have an input in the 
decision-making process, thereby refuting the claims that they are merely rentier shareholders 
and legitimatising their right to profit.1746 Finally, it reveals that the transposition of Anglo-
American corporate governance rules onto Turkish laws serves the interests of foreign investors 
that result from their desire to control the management of the companies that they invest in 
abroad. This has been made possible through the Turkish policy makers’ restricted autonomy 
in the area of corporate governance due to the conditionalities imposed by IFIs in exchange for 
financial assistance. This interdependency helps explain why Turkey has chosen to implement 
a corporate governance model that contradicts its particular ownership and control structures. 
 
In light of this analysis, the thesis indicated that certain outcomes arise from Turkey’s adoption 
of the mainstream corporate governance model.  It discussed that in addition to increasing the 
foreign ownership of Turkish company stocks, the new corporate governance laws will also 
impact the ownership and control structures of its listed companies. On this point, the law and 
finance theory, which effectively claims the economic superiority of the share dispersal model, 
also claims ‘that the quality of legal protection offered to minority shareholders helps determine 
patterns of ownership and control’.1747 The argument states that the presence of a strong legal 
framework that protects shareholders would incentivise outside investors because they would 
feel secure enough to own small stakes in companies with controlling owners.1748 From this 
perspective, the anticipated outcome of the new corporate governance framework would be the 
increase of foreign investments in the Turkish stock market. This is in line with the explicitly 
stated objective of the legislator in undertaking the reforms.1749 Indeed, an examination of data 
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on the value of foreign holdings of BIST listed stocks over the years both pre-reform and post-
reform reveals that the new corporate governance laws have attracted more foreign investment. 
There has been an increased desirability of Turkish company stocks due to the new legal 
framework and a corresponding rise in their share prices, and companies are expected to float 
larger proportions of their shares while controlling owners will have greater incentives to sell 
their stakes with higher premiums. These trends signify a move towards a widely dispersed 
stock market.  
 
Nevertheless, the thesis asserts that the possible convergence of the ownership structure does 
not imply an economically deterministic outcome. Instead, this outcome is the result of the 
relative power of the global investor class vis-à-vis the domestic owners, stakeholders, and 
states. This power ensures conditions that benefit them in cross-border markets. Accordingly, 
this thesis argues that the underlying motive of the reform process has been to facilitate a 
transformation of the concentrated ownership towards a widely diffused and liquid stock 
market, which is more conducive to serving the interests of the global investor class. This is 
because a system of concentrated ownership with controlling family owners largely prevents 
outsider influence or monitoring of management. This creates the risk for the non-controlling 
owners that the managers may pursue objectives other than shareholder wealth maximisation, 
such as environmental protection or increased employee benefits. In contrast, in a dispersed 
market setting, the managers are bound by market discipline to pursue shareholder interests 
alone, excluding other stakeholders’ interests from the company’s objectives. Moreover, the 
lack of share dispersion and thin markets hinder the liquidity and mobility functions of the 
company share. This is undesirable for the capitalists, or more precisely the global investors, 
since their accumulation of wealth from financial markets depends on the free circulation of 
capital across global investment outlets. It can thus be concluded that the new corporate 
governance laws reflect attempts to break the concentration of ownership of Turkish companies 
to ‘recreate the existing power structures of the neoliberal market-centric system’1750 that is 
found in countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, in which capital is able 
to roam freely across borders in search of the highest surplus. 
 
The thesis also argued that the anticipated transformation of the ownership structure would be 
followed by the transfer of control away from family owners to outsiders who are more likely 
to prioritise shareholder interests to the detriment of other stakeholders and society at large. 
This is because shareholders as a class are assumed to have the common objective of 
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shareholder value maximisation.1751 Shareholders with small stakes in the company are 
presumably motivated by the monetary gains of share ownership and generally not concerned 
with the well-being of the company’s other stakeholders, the livelihood of society, or the 
preservation of environment. Thus, once management is freed from the constraints of 
controlling owners, they are beholden to this common objective alone. The argument becomes 
more significant since if control were passed to independent boards and professional 
management, their actions would be dictated by the prevalent neoliberal ideology, which 
subjects companies to the market’s logic of profit maximisation at all costs. On the other hand, 
the control structure of the Turkish companies prevents the proper functioning of the 
mainstream model and the interests it seeks to serve because the family owners have broad 
discretion over the running of the company and the allocation of its revenues. Hence, the global 
investors’ command over managerial decisions is largely restricted, which leaves companies 
room for manoeuvre to consider a wider range of interests. 
 
Finally, the thesis argued that a widely diffused stock market signifies the concentration of 
power and wealth in the hands of a smaller group of global investors. This is because ‘as the 
degree of share dispersal increases, effective control can be exercised with a decreasing 
proportion of the votes’.1752 Despite Marx’s anticipation that the joint-stock company would 
socialise the private ownership of capital, the dispersion of shares amongst the public instead 
socialised the capital within the capitalist class.1753 In fact, while the form of capitalist 
production changed with the joint-stock company, its content remained capitalistic in nature.1754 
In turn, the mainstream corporate governance model helped to aggregate the profit arising from 
company operations into the hands of a particular capitalist class. This created the dominance 
of ‘a privileged elite’1755 or ‘the minority of the opulent’1756 vis-à-vis the rest of the society, 
leading to further inequality within and between nations.1757  
 
This analysis reveals the raison d’etre of universalising corporate governance rules to be 
securing the interests of the global investors by aligning the priorities of companies globally 
with the former. This is particularly the case in emerging markets, where policy-making is 
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effectively tied to maintaining the conditions suitable for foreign investors due to the state’s 
dependency on the inflow of foreign capital. The case of Turkey illustrates that national 
corporate governance laws in emerging markets do not necessarily reflect the needs of the 
countries’ economies, companies, or societies. Instead, the laws resemble the extent to which 
domestic circumstances can be stretched to accommodate the interests of global investors. 
However, these laws determine the allocation of rights and revenues in the company and thereby 
configure the power relations that underlie society. From a broader perspective, this epitomises 
how the corporate governance laws perpetuate the relative power of a certain capitalist class in 
maintaining the status quo under the capitalist mode of production. 
 
In sum, the overarching aim of this research was to provide a critical analysis of the recent 
reforms of corporate governance laws in Turkey. The thesis tackled this objective by answering 
a number of subsidiary questions. The first question attempted to grasp the current hegemonic 
position of the shareholder primacy theory by illustrating the historical process by which it 
became the mainstream corporate governance model globally. The use of socio-legal 
methodology and a Marxist theoretical framework has enabled an understanding of the raison 
d’etre of standardising and exporting the Anglo-American variant of corporate governance rules 
abroad, which would not have been possible through solely black-letter research. The second 
sub-question examined whether the Turkish corporate governance framework was in 
conformity with the mainstream model. To that end, this thesis provided a descriptive account 
of the new legislation on corporate governance and Turkish corporate governance principles. 
Through this inquiry, it found that Turkey has indeed conformed with the mainstream model as 
propagated by the OECD Principles. The last research question explored the implications of the 
new corporate governance laws on Turkish companies’ ownership and control structures. To 
that end, this thesis has demonstrated that the new laws will have implications beyond attracting 
foreign investors and are likely to change the structure of listed companies into a system of 
dispersed ownership. Next, it discussed the effects of the change of control of listed companies 
from family owners to diffused shareholders. Here, this research concludes that the 
incorporation of the mainstream corporate governance rules into Turkish laws will weaken the 
position of the domestic controlling owners in favour of global investors, leading companies to 
pursue the sole objective of shareholder wealth maximisation and to disregard any other 
interests. Ultimately, the thesis revealed how corporate governance laws can be utilised to serve 
certain class interests, such as those of the global investor class, to secure the interests and power 
of the capitalists vis-à-vis the rest of the society, particularly in emerging market nations. 
. 
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2 Possible Areas for Future Research 
 
The breadth of the topic of corporate governance, especially from a multi-disciplinary 
perspective, necessarily leaves some interrelated issues open to further investigation. For 
instance, the scrutiny of external corporate governance mechanisms such as the market for 
corporate control and takeovers has been left outside the scope of this thesis’ inquiry. This is 
because such mechanisms, which signify the presence of market discipline, are still inactive in 
the Turkish context.1758 Thus, if and when the thesis’ anticipated outcome of a widely diffused 
stock market materialises, the external governance aspects of the Turkish corporate governance 
framework could be analysed. On the other hand, this thesis’ research question was approached 
from an international vantage point; it examined the dynamics of the relationship between an 
emerging market nation like Turkey and IFIs, and the relative power of the global investor class 
compared to that of other actors in the company. Further research can examine the extent to 
which domestic factors influence law making for corporate governance in Turkey.1759 Aside 
from these areas that have been left outside the scope of the thesis due to focus and clarity 
considerations, I sketch two interesting guideposts for future research below. 
 
First, a question that came to the fore while analysing the impacts of Turkey’s new corporate 
governance laws was the extent to which these rules intended to create an ‘ownership society’ 
in Turkey. Investigating this claim is especially significant because the low domestic savings 
rate of Turkey has been criticized as a major impediment to its economic growth.1760 Although 
the reform process and the new laws appear to be aimed at attracting foreign investors to the 
stock market, the strengthened minority shareholder rights may also affect the investment 
decisions of the general public. Yet, relying solely on corporate governance laws would not be 
sufficient to analyse this issue, and other related legislation such as pension reforms must be 
included in the scope of the research.1761 Indeed, after the introduction of the private pension 
system legislation, the number of pension contributors in Turkey has increased from 15,245 in 
2003 to over 6 million by 2016.1762 Thus, research in this area would require examination of 
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various legislation and other vehicles such as tax concessions. Meanwhile, it has been argued 
that the pension reforms in Turkey have been largely shaped by the pressure from the IFIs.1763 
Thus, international political economy analysis should also be incorporated into such a study. 
 
From a critical perspective, the attempts to converge the general public into the shareholders 
class through either pension funds or directing their personal savings into the stock market can 
be construed as attempts to align the interests of the general public with the shareholders to 
‘reinforce a culture of dependency’.1764 As Soederberg has argued, this leads to the share-
owning public having a ‘strong stake in the preservation of a system that exploits them because 
the destruction of that system entails the destruction of their savings.’1765 Ireland has stated that 
this point has ‘considerable ideological and psychological significance, encouraging more and 
more people to think of themselves as middle class, and as having a vested interest, albeit a 
modest one, in the performance of the corporate sector, financial markets and fictitious 
capital.’1766 On the other hand, the emergence of an ownership society also helps to legitimise 
the company’s shareholder wealth maximisation purpose on a greater scale.1767 Overall, this not 
only allows workers to transcend the class dichotomy of the capitalist versus labour,1768 but also 
helps eradicate possible grounds for social conflict by equating the interest of share-owning 
general public with that of the shareholders.1769 Nevertheless, as discussed in the final part of 
the thesis, widening the shareholder base only increases the power of a small group of the 
wealthiest investors globally, while leading to greater economic insecurity and inequality for 
everyone else.1770 Ireland has summarised that ‘These developments have blurred class 
divisions but done little to eradicate them.’1771 In sum, the role of corporate governance laws 
and other related legislation in Turkey that incentivises the public to invest in the stock market 
is a fertile subject for further critical legal research. 
 
Second, while the thesis examined the current state of the corporate governance laws in Turkey, 
it is also worth examining the possible alternative reforms to the mainstream model.  Although, 
as Ireland has pointed out, even modest reforms in this area are expected to be resisted by the 
‘enormous power and influence of the financial oligarchy’, issues such as employee 
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participation have already begun to remerge nonetheless.1772 While it should be acknowledged 
that any alternative legal reform proposals and their applicability to the Turkish context require 
in-depth consideration, a plausible starting point would be to extend the CMB’s mandatory 
corporate governance principles to include issues relating to stakeholders, such as a mandatory 
requirement for stakeholder participation in boards. Since the CMB Principles have limited 
applicability to listed companies, a similar provision could be added to the new TCC that would 
cover public and private companies. This is necessary for substantial changes in the way 
companies are run and more importantly for the redefinition of the power dynamics between 
the shareholders, stakeholders, and society. 
 
Another possibility is to reformulate the directors’ duties as stipulated under the TCC. The 
related provision in the new TCC states that directors or any person exercising managerial 
power have a duty of care and loyalty towards the company.1773 However, the proper addressee 
of these duties remains contentious in Turkish legal scholarship.1774 Although Tekinalp has 
suggested that the directors’ duty towards the company means placing shareholder interests 
before their own or any other interests,1775 the TCC provision on directors’ duties remains 
ambiguous. This means that under neoliberal market pressures, directors would be inclined to 
prioritise shareholder interests. In the UK, for instance, directors owe their duties to the 
company, which is codified in law as the duty to ‘promote the success of the company for the 
benefit of its members as a whole’, and directors must consider a range of other interests in 
doing so.1776 Accordingly, this formulation was ‘carefully crafted so as to enshrine the existing 
doctrine of shareholder primacy whilst also providing some protection to the interests of wider 
stakeholders.’1777 Thus, the ‘enlightened shareholder value’ of UK company law has not 
significantly deviated from the shareholder primacy norm.1778 The UK example illustrates that 
any alternative reform proposals to the directors’ duties must clearly define whom the directors 
owe their duties to and the hierarchy, if any, of their importance.   
 
In fact, this shortcoming has been recognised by the policy-makers in the UK; the government 
has recently launched a consultation process on possible corporate governance reforms. In the 
Green Paper published on November 2016, the government proposed certain areas of reform, 
including, inter alia, ‘a range of options for strengthening the voice of employees, customers 
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and other interested parties at boardroom level and building confidence that section 172 of the 
Companies Act 2006 is properly understood and applied.’1779 During the consultation process, 
the Trades Union Congress (TUC) suggested an amendment to the wording of section 172 that 
makes ‘promoting the long-term success of the company’ as the primary aim of directors and 
states that they ‘should be required to have regard to the interests of shareholders, alongside 
those of employees and the other stakeholder groups already included in section 172’.1780 
Another proposal was to require directors to give ‘equal importance to all stakeholders’ under 
this section.1781 Despite these more progressive recommendations, the government eventually 
proposed the option of stronger reporting requirements to ensure that directors consider 
stakeholder interests as per section 172.1782 While Prime Minister Theresa May initially 
proclaimed in her speech that announced the reform process that they were ‘going to have not 
just consumers represented on company boards, but employees as well’1783, this failed to 
materialise. Instead of mandatory worker representation on boards, the government concluded 
that such requirements should be implemented on a comply-or-explain basis.1784 This reform 
process was followed by the Financial Reporting Council’s (FRC) review of the UK Corporate 
Governance Code, resulting in the final version of the code being published in July 2018.1785 
The code provides for three methods of employee representation in the company, all of which 
are voluntary as per the adopted comply-or-explain approach.1786 
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On the other hand, more substantial reform proposals have been voiced recently in a report 
submitted to the UK Labour Party to assist with its policy making.1787 The report urges the future 
Labour government to adopt a hard law approach in corporate governance to ensure the long-
term success of British companies. The report included recommendations on, inter alia, the 
replacement of the ‘comply and explain’ approach with the ‘comply or else’ approach.1788 The 
report stresses the ‘need to democratise corporations’ to mitigate short-termism ‘based on co-
operation and stakeholder representation at company boards’.1789 Indeed, any reforms in the 
direction away from the shareholder primacy norm would require securing through legislation 
and not be left to voluntary regulation or the initiative of companies. In the managerial era, 
managers without any legal obligations were perceived to be capable of acting in the society’s 
interest.1790 However, under the current neoliberal system in which the dominant logic dictates 
that shareholder wealth maximisation prevails over all other concerns, any reforms to curtail 
shareholders’ position must be executed through hard laws. 
 
Overall, even though the UK government’s recent corporate governance reforms seem to be 
incapable of achieving real change for stakeholder and societal interests, that reform proposals 
with such a sharp contrast with the mainstream model have been put forth in the UK signifies 
the extent of discontent with the status quo. This hints that maximising shareholder wealth does 
not maximise aggregate welfare, as has been argued by the mainstream corporate governance 
model.1791 Moreover, it brings hope that counter reforms such as mandatory stakeholder 
representation on boards or requiring directors to pursue stakeholder interests on par with those 
of shareholders is a plausible prospect in Turkey. As Streeck has pointed out, since the return 
that investors expect through share ownership is not set in stone, ‘investors may become more 
modest if they have no alternatives’.1792 Nevertheless, a caveat must be made. Since Turkey is 
an emerging market economy, it is dependent on foreign capital for economic growth, 
particularly loans from the IFIs. Hence, when making policy choices on economically important 
issues such as corporate governance laws, it is important to consider the need to create suitable 
conditions both for sustaining the inflow of foreign investment and for abiding with the loan 
conditionalities imposed by lender intuitions. Thus, the proposed area of research would also 
require a multidisciplinary approach. 
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